




RECOVERING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Xenophon the Socratic Prince

The Argument of the Anabasis of Cyrus



Eric Buzzetti



XENOPHON THE SOCRATIC PRINCE

RECOVERING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

SERIES EDITORS: THOMAS L. PANGLE AND TIMOTHY BURNS

PUBLISHED BY PALGRAVE MACMILLAN:

Lucretius as Theorist of Political Life

by John Colman

Shakespeare's Political Wisdom

by Timothy Burns

Political Philosophy Cross-Examined: Perennial Challenges to the Philosophic Life

edited by Thomas L. Pangle and J. Harvey Lomax

Eros and Socratic Political Philosophy

by David Levy

Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s

edited by Martin D. Yaffe and Richard S. Ruderman

Xenophon the Socratic Prince: The Argument of the Anabasis of Cyrus


by Eric Buzzetti

XENOPHON THE SOCRATIC
PRINCE

THE ARGUMENT OF THE *ANABASIS*
OF CYRUS

Eric Buzzetti

palgrave
macmillan



ISBN 978-1-349-46216-2 ISBN 978-1-137-32592-1 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9781137325921

XENOPHON THE SOCRATIC PRINCE

Copyright © Eric Buzzetti, 2014.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-33330-8

All rights reserved.

First published in 2014 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978-1-137-33330-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: May 2014

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Christopher Bruell

“...καὶ ἔφη συνοίσειν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον.”

This page intentionally left blank

CONTENTS

| | |
|-------------------------------------|------|
| <i>A Note on the Greek</i> | xi |
| <i>Acknowledgments</i> | xiii |
| <i>Note from the Series Editors</i> | xv |

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction The Political Life and the Socratic Education | 1 |
| 1. Morality and Advantage in Rule: The Noble and the Good | 2 |
| 2. Xenophon's Manner of Writing: The Question of Esotericism | 7 |
| i) A Case Study: Xenophon's Depiction of Cyrus's Stance Toward the Gods | 10 |
| ii) LEGETAI, "Repetitions," and Omissions | 13 |
| iii) "Being at the Center" | 16 |
| 3. Xenophon's Manner of Writing: The Manuscripts of the <i>Anabasis</i> | 19 |
| iv) Renaming Men, Rivers, and Mountains: The Primacy of Manuscript C | 21 |
| v) Emending the Manuscripts | 26 |
| 4. Recent Scholarship on the <i>Anabasis</i> | 29 |

Part I The Kingship of Cyrus

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. "The Godlike King" (Book One of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 39 |
| 1. Rooting for the Noble and Good King | 39 |
| 2. Cyrus and His Friends: Klearchos, Menōn, Proxenos, Xennias, and Pasiōn | 44 |
| 3. The Ascent of Cyrus and the Descent of Xenophon | 50 |
| 4. Persian Riches and Greek Freedom: The Battle for Babylon | 59 |
| 5. Conjoining the Noble and the Good: The Godlike King | 66 |

Part II The Kingship of Klearchos

| | |
|--|-----|
| 2. “The Pious King” (Book Two of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 77 |
| 1. Klearchos and Theopompos: Virtue and Weapons | 78 |
| 2. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Klearchos | 85 |
| 3. Klearchos and Tissaphernēs: Hope and Friendship with the Divine | 95 |
| 4. The Noble without the Good: Proxenos | 104 |
| 5. The Good without the Noble: Menōn | 107 |

Part III The Kingship of Xenophon

“The Socratic King” (Books Three to Seven)

| | |
|--|-----|
| 3. Piety (Book Three of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 111 |
| 1. Xenophon the Socratic? | 113 |
| 2. Xenophon, Zeus the King, and Apollo | 119 |
| 3. Virtue, Piety, and Freedom | 129 |
| 4. Success, Failure, and Divine Providence | 141 |
| 4. Courage (Book Four of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 149 |
| 1. Necessity and the Noble (Courage) | 150 |
| i) Necessity and the Noble: The Longing for Immortality | 153 |
| ii) Necessity and the Noble: An Example from Piety | 159 |
| iii) Necessity and the Noble: Pointing toward the Philosophic Life | 166 |
| 2. The End of Necessity | 171 |
| i) Fighting Nobly against the Chalubes | 171 |
| ii) Fighting Nobly against the Taochoi | 174 |
| iii) Fighting Nobly against the Kolchoi | 177 |
| 5. Justice (Book Five of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 181 |
| 1. Justice, Private Interest, and the Common Good | 182 |
| 2. Hellenic Laws, Mossunoikoi Laws, and Nature | 190 |
| 3. Hellenic Laws, Founding a City, and the Good | 204 |
| 4. Justice and the Good | 217 |
| 6. Gratitude (Book Six of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 221 |
| 1. Gratitude, Dancing, and Philosophy | 222 |
| 2. The Gratitude of the Army and the Gratitude of Xenophon | 229 |
| 3. Ingratitude toward Gods and Men | 234 |
| 4. Atoning for Ingratitude toward the Gods | 239 |
| 5. Gratitude and the Good | 248 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7. The Love of the Soldier (Book Seven of the <i>Anabasis</i>) | 259 |
| 1. PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS and the Good | 260 |
| 2. The Generosity of the Philosopher | 273 |
| 3. Xenophon as PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS | 277 |
| Ending at the Beginning: Xenophon the Socratic | 289 |
| Conclusion The Argument of the <i>Anabasis of Cyrus</i> | 295 |
| <i>Appendix 1 Why Is Xenophon “Themistogenēs of Syracuse”?</i> | 301 |
| <i>Appendix 2 On the Authenticity of the Division of the Anabasis into Seven Books and Fifty-One Chapters</i> | 313 |
| <i>Appendix 3 How Many Is Ten Thousand?</i> | 317 |
| <i>Works Cited</i> | 321 |
| <i>Index</i> | 327 |

This page intentionally left blank

A NOTE ON THE GREEK

The translations of the *Anabasis* are my own. For the longer passages, I often chose to reprint the translation of the work by Wayne Ambler (Cornell University Press, 2008). His rendering of Xenophon is a model of faithfulness and elegance that I soon realized I could not hope to match. My borrowings have been noted.

I have transliterated the proper names in Greek literally. Thus I write “Klearchos,” “Mossunoikoi,” and “Kentritēs,” for instance, instead of the more usual “Clearchus,” “Mossynoecians” (a tribe of the Pontos), and “Centrites” (a river in Armenia). I discuss the philosophic significance of the proper names used in the *Anabasis* in my introduction. I have therefore tried to stay as close to the original Greek as possible to enable readers to explore that significance. With regard to the names of famous characters or famous places, however, such as Cyrus, Alcibiades, Socrates, Byzantium, or the Tigris, I have used the customary, Latinized spellings. To write “Kūros,” “Alkibiadēs,” “Sōkratēs,” “Buzantion,” or “Tigrēs” would have been more literal but needlessly awkward and, in some cases, confusing. Still, readers should keep in mind that a name such as “Cyrus” (KŪROS), for example, evokes a man who holds supreme “power” or “authority” (KŪROS, KURIOS: cf. *Hellenika* 5.3.24; *Memorabilia* 1.4.9; *Education of Cyrus* 8.2.17).

The present study is based on the critical editions of the Greek text by L. Dindorf (2nd ed. 1855), G. Gemoll (2nd ed. 1909), E. C. Marchant (1904), C. Hude (1930; revised by J. Peters: 1972), and P. Masqueray (1930). It has been necessary to go back to the edition of Dindorf because his *apparatus criticus* remains, despite its venerable age, the most complete reporting of the readings of *Parisinus* 1640 (C), the single best manuscript of the *Anabasis*. Among the modern editions, the most useful and complete is Masqueray’s. His apparatus, though less comprehensive than Dindorf’s in its reporting of the readings of manuscript C, offers a more complete reporting for the inferior manuscripts. It is also easier to read. The edition by Hude/Peters is valuable as well, though its

apparatus is less accurate and less precise than Masqueray's. Hude/Peters print the inferior manuscripts more often than other editors do. The most widely used edition of the *Anabasis* today—by E. C. Marchant—is of limited utility because of its inadequate reporting of the manuscript tradition.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book could not have been completed without the help of many friends. Thomas Pangle and Timothy Burns, the editors of the series *Recovering Political Philosophy*, expressed their interest at an early stage and made the publication process as easy and as smooth an experience as I could possibly have hoped. Tom also commented extensively on an early version of the manuscript while Tim assisted me at every stage. Wayne Ambler read the manuscript in its entirety and made many valuable suggestions. His knowledge of Xenophon and his usual good judgment rescued me from many errors.

Several other friends read portions of the book and gave me the benefit of their critique. They include Robert C. Bartlett, Robert K. Faulkner, Kate Kretler and Devin Stauffer. I am also grateful to Heinrich Meier for inviting me to lecture on Xenophon at the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung in Munich (June 2011). The opportunity to write a synopsis of the argument of this book provided the impetus for its final completion.

I have acknowledged my greatest intellectual debt in the dedication. This book could not have been written without the generosity and wisdom of Christopher Bruell. May he find here the expression of my friendship and gratitude. Last but not least, I wish to acknowledge the strength I have derived from the love and the occasional forbearance of my family. My wife, Kate, and our two mischievous boys, Henri and Samuel, made my study of the *Anabasis* an even more joyous and pleasant experience than it would have been otherwise. Their love is invaluable to me.


This page intentionally left blank

NOTE FROM THE SERIES EDITORS

Palgrave's Recovering Political Philosophy series was founded with an eye to postmodernism's challenge to the possibility of a rational foundation for and guidance of our political lives. This invigorating challenge has provoked a searching re-examination of classic texts, not only of political philosophers, but of poets, artists, theologians, scientists, and other thinkers who may not be regarded conventionally as political theorists. The series publishes studies that endeavor to take up this re-examination and thereby help to recover the classical grounding for civic reason, as well as studies that clarify the strengths and the weaknesses of modern philosophic rationalism. The interpretative studies in the series are particularly attentive to historical context and language, and to the ways in which both censorial persecution and didactic concerns have impelled prudent thinkers, in widely diverse cultural conditions, to employ manifold strategies of writing—strategies that allowed them to aim at different audiences with various degrees of openness to unconventional thinking. The series offers close readings of ancient, medieval, early modern, and late modern works that illuminate the human condition by attempting to answer its deepest, enduring questions, and that have (in the modern periods) laid the foundations for contemporary political, social, and economic life.

Together with Plato and Aristophanes, Xenophon is one of only three thinkers whose writings on Socrates, the founder of political philosophy, survive intact. Long admired and enjoyed by political philosophers, Xenophon's writings came into disfavor—significantly—at about the same time that the deepest reasons for esoteric writing began to be lost. Recent scholarship on Xenophon, which has taken advantage of the recovery of those reasons, has begun to restore Xenophon's writings to their former rank. Eric Buzzetti's *Xenophon, the Socratic Prince* is a major contribution to that effort. It is the first book-length treatment of the *Anabasis* that takes seriously Xenophon's Socratic education, and hence the central issues of political philosophy as they come to sight in the

actual political leadership of human beings. His argument is as novel as it is convincing, and significantly extends the recent scholarship on Xenophon, including his Socratic agreements with and divergences from Machiavelli. Buzzetti manifests a deep knowledge of the whole corpus of Xenophon's writings, and he deftly and unobtrusively incorporates it into his analysis of the *Anabasis*. This book will be of great interest to all who teach the *Anabasis*, to students of Xenophon's work, to students of classical political philosophy and the history of political philosophy, to classicists, and to historians.



INTRODUCTION

THE POLITICAL LIFE AND THE SOCRATIC EDUCATION

In an age where the ability of reason to answer the age-old Socratic question of the best way of life is widely doubted, the quiet wisdom of Xenophon has been rediscovered with profit and delight by a new generation of readers. For much of the last two centuries, Xenophon was censured by academic authorities as a treasonous Athenian, a limited Socratic, and a hypocrite in matters of morality and piety. In more recent time, however, this rash censure has been challenged by several valuable studies that have begun to restore the signal reputation he enjoyed in Antiquity and well into nineteenth century as an outstanding general and a genuine philosopher. The present interpretation of the *Anabasis of Cyrus*, often regarded today as Xenophon's masterpiece, aims to contribute to the rehabilitation of one of the great men of Antiquity.

The *Anabasis of Cyrus* tells a memorable story. Our hero, a youthful Athenian and student of Socrates, accepts an invitation to travel to Asia Minor and join a military expedition organized by Cyrus the Younger, the brother of the King of Persia. The purpose of the expedition, it is said, is to quell an insurrection in Cyrus's dominions. Yet the secret and true aim of Cyrus is in fact to overthrow his brother and take his place as King of Persia. The *Anabasis* is the story of how Cyrus assembles a small army of Greek mercenaries—the so-called Ten Thousand—and leads them from the coast of Asia Minor, through the deserts of Arabia and up to the gates of Babylon, where he meets his brother in battle. The Greek mercenaries win a remarkable victory that becomes Pyrrhic when Cyrus is killed in the fight. To make matters much worse, the generals of the Greeks are soon ensnared and murdered by the Persians. At that point the plight of the Ten Thousand, leaderless and alone in the heart of hostile Persia, appears desperate. But Xenophon emerges from obscurity and thrusts himself forward. Elected general, he manages to overcome

countless dangers and to lead the host to the safety of “The Sea! The Sea!” The *Anabasis* tells the greatest survival story to have come down to us from Antiquity.

1. Morality and Advantage in Rule: The Noble and the Good

Yet the *Anabasis of Cyrus* is much more than a memorable story. The aim of the present study is to show that it is also a work of political philosophy, and to begin with, a study of the political relevance of the Socratic education. The *Anabasis* contains an analysis of how an outstanding student of Socrates became, through the Socratic education, better able to rule human beings. In their respective writings, Xenophon and Plato both present Socrates as a teacher of politics. They show him introducing himself to potential pupils as a teacher of what is sometimes called the kingly or royal art, the art of ruling with knowledge.¹ It is therefore reasonable for us to wonder: What contribution, if any, did Socrates’s teaching of this art make to the successes of Xenophon? How was *he* prepared for rule? This question is at the heart of the present study. But I also develop a more paradoxical line of argument. I contend that the *Anabasis* is intended to serve, in the economy of Xenophon’s writings, as an introduction to philosophy. The highest aim of the work is *not* to prepare for politics (or for the exercise of rule) but to educate ambition and cause high-minded and talented youths to consider the alternative embodied by Socrates. In other words, the *Anabasis* is an introduction to philosophy in the form of a critique of the political life. I hope to make this claim less paradoxical than it must now appear.



Let us begin by considering how the political life is approached in the *Anabasis*. Here it is useful to call to mind the most famous book on rule, Niccolò Machiavelli’s *Prince*. In a well-known passage, Machiavelli claims that it is necessary for a prince to learn to be able not to be good if he wants to maintain himself in power (chap. 15). A complete reconciliation of morality and advantage is impossible, Machiavelli contends, since human conditions do not admit of it. A prince must learn to be bad. This is of course a perennial issue: Is it possible for a ruler to be at once good and effective? But what is *Xenophon’s* view of it? Does he agree with

¹ For example, *Memorabilia* 1.6.15, 4.2 (esp. §11); *Alcibiades I* (beginning). The art in question is the BASILIKĒ TECHNĒ.

Machiavelli that morality and advantage cannot be conjoined or reconciled in and through rule?

This study will show that the *Anabasis* examines the political life from the standpoint of this question. The work sketches three models of rule, depicting how the three men who successively rule the Ten Thousand as *de facto* kings—Cyrus, Klearchos, and Xenophon—endeavor to reconcile morality with advantage. Of course, the most important of these models is Xenophon himself. His career is depicted in the last five books of the *Anabasis*. But two alternative models are also presented. Book one depicts the rule of Cyrus, the younger brother of the King of Persia, who meets with an untimely death in the Battle for Babylon (1.8). And book two depicts the rule of Klearchos, a Lacedaemonian who takes over after Cyrus and is ensnared and killed at the end of book two. As I intend to show, the *Anabasis* spells out how, according to Xenophon, these three models of rule meet (or fail to meet) the challenge of reconciling morality with advantage. To put the matter as Xenophon himself would have put it, the *Anabasis* depicts how these rulers endeavor to reconcile “the noble with the good.” But before I proceed any further, let me try to situate these models of rule briefly.

Cyrus embodies the first model. I call him the Godlike King. The name is meant to indicate that Cyrus rejects the traditional gods—several scenes adumbrate his impiety—but also that he seeks to become a sort of deity on Earth. He aspires to become an all-powerful and all-knowing king over a large portion of mankind. In effect, the title of our work—the “Ascent of Cyrus”—refers not only to a march upland (as it undoubtedly does) but also to the rise of a man who, should he conquer the Persian throne, would be in a position to dispense a kind of secular providence. As King of Persia, Cyrus would be in a position to reward and punish the vast human multitudes under his rule in accordance with merit. He would be able (in principle at least) to reconcile the noble with the good in the sense that the goodness of virtue among a large portion of mankind would be put beyond question. In other words, “Cyrus the King” is an alternative to “Zeus the King.” But the question then arises: Does the “Ascent of Cyrus” herald the dawn of universal justice? Can the problem of justice be solved, according to Xenophon, through the establishment of a human kingship at once absolute, high-minded, and of enormous geographic scope? This question is treated in book one of the *Anabasis*. It is analyzed in the first part of this study (chapter one).

The Lacedaemonian Klearchos embodies the second model of rule. I call him the Pious King. In marked contrast to Cyrus, Klearchos bows before Zeus the King and pays homage to this deity. He trusts in the superior prudence and in the just providence of what he regards as the King of

Kings. This means that he consults Zeus regularly through sacrifices and oracles. But does piety hold the key to a successful reconciliation of the noble with the good? Is the Pious King superior to the Godlike King? For, abiding by what he thinks the gods demand of him—abiding by the demands of piety and virtue—Klearchos hopes to secure divine assistance and help. Is this hope well founded? Needless to say, Machiavelli would deride any such notion. Every reader of the *Prince* knows that Machiavelli urges rulers to rely on *their own* weapons. They should imitate King David, he writes, who fought Goliath with *his own* sling and *his own* knife (chap.13). But does *Xenophon* approve of rulers who rely on *heavenly* weapons? After all, Xenophon is still thought of today as a paragon of piety.² Yet, as we will discover, he depicts a grave error of judgment of Klearchos, which had fatal consequences (2.5). Could it be that Xenophon is in fact a critic of the Pious Kingship? This question, treated in book two of the *Anabasis*, is analyzed in the second part of this study (chapter two).

The third model of rule is embodied by Xenophon himself. I call him the Socratic King. The bulk of the *Anabasis* depicts how *he* endeavors to conjoin or reconcile the noble with the good. Specifically, each one of the five books that depict and analyze his rule brings to light how he reconciles the demands of one specific virtue with the imperatives of safety and political advantage. Book three, for example, is the book of piety because it shows us how Xenophon reconciles piety—his own piety as well as the piety of the soldiers—with the political good. Book four is the book of courage; book five is the book of justice; book six is the book of gratitude; and book seven is the book of what Xenophon calls “PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS” (i.e., “the love of the soldier”: cf. 7.6.4, 7.6.39). In each case, Xenophon shows us how (as a ruler) he reconciles the virtue or quality in question with the political good. Hence, the third part of this study analyzes piety (chapter three), courage (chapter four), justice (chapter five), gratitude (chapter six) and the love of the soldier (chapter seven). The place that each quality is assigned in the rule of the Socratic King is each time considered.

The present study uncovers for the first time what I believe is the authentic plan of the *Anabasis*, the plan devised by Xenophon when he composed the work. I show that the *Anabasis* is not only a historical chronicle and a war memoir—I readily concede that it is both these things as well—but above all *an argument* or a *logos*³ developed in and through a chronicle and a memoir. Hence the various episodes of the work, and the manner of treatment of these episodes, reflect the stages and the demands

² See, for example, Waterfield (2006) pp. 42–43, Cawkwell (1979) p. 45, Parker (2004).

³ For the *Anabasis* as “logos,” see 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1, 5.1.1, 7.1.1.

of the argument. Minor episodes are sometimes developed at length while major episodes are sketched more summarily. To take a single example here: toward the end of the expedition, the reader is made to witness a symposium that features a longish scene of dancing among the soldiers (6.1.4–13). The scene is entertaining. But why is it treated at such length? Is dancing somehow important for the *logos* of the *Anabasis*? I show (in chapter six) that this seemingly minor scene conveys nothing less than the principle of Xenophon's self-presentation in the *Anabasis*. The scene adumbrates that Xenophon thinks of himself as a Socratic—a “dancing philosopher”—dressed in martial garb. More generally, this study demonstrates that several minor scenes, including “digressions” that bear little or no apparent connection to the expedition proper, are in fact crucial stages of the philosophic argument of the *Anabasis*.⁴

The authentic plan of the *Anabasis*, reflecting a *logos* in three main stages, can therefore be summarized in a preliminary fashion as follows:

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| I. The Kingship of Cyrus | (Book One) |
| “Reconciling the Noble and the Good in and through the Rule of a Godlike King” | |
| II. The Kingship of Klearchos | (Book Two) |
| “Reconciling the Noble and the Good in and through the Rule of a Pious King” | |
| III. The Kingship of Xenophon | (Books Three to Seven) ⁵ |
| “Reconciling the Noble and the Good in and through the Rule of a Socratic King” | |
| 1. Piety | (Book Three) |
| 2. Courage | (Book Four) |
| 3. Justice | (Book Five) |
| 4. Gratitude | (Book Six) |
| 5. The Love of the Soldier (Philostratiōtēs) | (Book Seven). |

My reading of the *Anabasis* is bound to raise a number of objections.⁶ Allow me to consider only two for now. It could be argued that Xenophon

⁴ For example, the famous “digression” on Skilloūs: 5.3.

⁵ Readers will be in a position to make interesting discoveries if they compare the implicit plan of Part III of the *Anabasis* with the explicit plan of the *Agésilaios* (a work dedicated to a model king as well). Suffice it to note here that in the *Agésilaios*, Xenophon begins all his accounts of the virtues or qualities of the Spartan king with piety (c. 3 [beginning], 10.2, 11.1). This helps confirm that book three of the *Anabasis*—the first book treating the kingship of Xenophon—is the book of piety.

⁶ My claim to have discovered the authentic plan of the *Anabasis* implies, of course, that the division of the work into seven books goes back to Xenophon. I know of no weighty

is not a genuine Socratic and that his political successes should not be viewed in light of his education. Indeed, the few scholars who have stressed the theme of education in their study of the *Anabasis* have linked Xenophon's successes to his *Athenian* education.⁷ After all, the fact that Xenophon chooses to *leave* Socrates (and the philosophic life) to befriend Cyrus (and for a political life) in the single most important scene of the *Anabasis* seems to prove that he views the political life as superior to the philosophic (3.1). Doesn't this choice even prove that he failed to grasp the Socratic argument for the superiority of philosophy? How, then, can I rightly call Xenophon a Socratic? A second objection would stress that Xenophon is never actually elected sole ruler of the army. His elevation to the "monarchy" is seriously considered but it never comes to pass (cf. 6.1.31). How, then, can I rightly call him a king?

I will show that Xenophon's decision to befriend Cyrus (and to leave Socrates) was *not* the result of a rejection of philosophy but stemmed, in part, from the fact that Athens had become a dangerous place for a Socratic in 401 BC. The trial and execution of Socrates a few months after Xenophon's departure from Athens was to illustrate this danger with shocking clarity. Textual evidence will be adduced that Xenophon's decision to leave must be viewed in light of his dimming prospects at home. Nor is it adequate to ascribe Xenophon's successes to his *Athenian* education: there were several other Athenians among the Ten Thousand but only he rose to the challenge of saving the army. Better to take our bearings by the author's explicit indications that *Socrates* was crucially important for him. Indeed, in the most important scene of the *Anabasis* just referred to, Xenophon makes clear that he sought the counsel of Socrates—and of no one else—before joining Cyrus and Proxenos (3.1.4–10). Xenophon quietly presents himself as a Socratic.

As for the second objection, it is admittedly correct that Xenophon is never elected sole ruler of the Ten Thousand. But this objection is not decisive. Xenophon *does* exercise *de facto* kingship in book five.⁸ Besides,

argument against this view, though the opposite is occasionally asserted (e.g., Masqueray [1930] p. 6; Couvreur [1929] p. 104, note 1 and *passim*). Yet even Masqueray, who doubts the authenticity of the division, admits that it is mentioned in Antiquity "par Hérodién, Harpocraton, Diogène, Athénée" (p. 6). The correct view, as I believe, has been stated powerfully by Høeg (1950, pp. 162–64). The division of the *Anabasis* into seven books is found in all the complete MSS. For further discussion, see Appendix 2.

⁷ See, notably, Grote (1900) Vol. 9, p. 87. Also Erbse (2010) p. 491. The outstanding exception is Bruell (1987).

⁸ He exercises the kingship during a long absence of the *primus inter pares*, the Lacedaemonian general Cheirisophos. This seldom-noted fact makes book five the most important of the five books devoted to Xenophon's rule. (Cheirisophos leaves at the beginning of book five and returns—two months later—at the beginning of book six.)

while he is never elected “monarch,” the same can be said of Cyrus and Klearchos (cf. 2.2.5). Indeed, Socrates is reported to have said that it is not election but knowledge of how to rule that makes a man a king.⁹ Xenophon, as we will see, holds the same view.¹⁰

But (it will be asked) what exactly is the Socratic education? It seems that I must answer this question before I can analyze how Xenophon puts his education to work, so to speak, in the *Anabasis*. And, it would appear, I must develop my answer through a study of the Socratic writings. For several reasons, however, not the least of which is that my task would become unmanageable, I will *not* take this path here. Though I will often refer to Xenophon’s four Socratic writings—the *Memorabilia*, the *Oikonomikos*, the *Symposium*, and the *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors*—and though I will analyze some key passages from these works, for the most part I will look directly at the finished product—Xenophon himself—as he is seen in the *Anabasis*. Yet it will not be amiss if I state at the outset what I mean by the Socratic education. Following Xenophon’s indications in the *Memorabilia*, the Socratic education can be said to consist, at its core, in a thorough investigation of what virtue is. This investigation includes a comprehensive reflection on the character of, and the relation between, the noble and the good.¹¹ Indeed, Xenophon shows in the *Oikonomikos* that Socrates was once eager to converse with the noble and good man Ischomachos in order to discover how “the good is attached to the noble” in his person.¹² In other words, what I am calling the question of the noble and the good is but another way of referring to the age-old Socratic question, “What is virtue?” One aim of the present study is to analyze the political benefits, as well as the results, of the Socratic inquiry into virtue.

2. Xenophon’s Manner of Writing: The Question of Esotericism

Before I interpret the *Anabasis*, I must explain how I read Xenophon. Since the issue is important, my explanation must be substantial. No

⁹ *Memorabilia* 3.9.10, 3.1.4.

¹⁰ One sign that kingship is the theme of the *Anabasis* is the fact that the word “king” (BASILEUS) occurs at least 144 times in the work (according to the Perseus Digital Project). This number is substantially larger than the number of occurrences of the word in the *Education of Cyrus* (at least 100), a work longer than the *Anabasis* by perhaps 25 percent. And of course, the *Education of Cyrus* is unquestionably focused on the theme of kingship and its establishment.

¹¹ *Memorabilia* 1.1.16.

¹² *Oikonomikos* 6.15.

interpreter of Xenophon has been more influential and controversial in modern times than the philosopher Leo Strauss. His rediscovery of the art of esoteric writing—and his claim that Xenophon practiced this art—has been accepted in some quarters but has met with spirited resistance in others.¹³ It is a pleasure to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Strauss. The present study is both premised upon and a defense of the claim that he was the first to formulate that Xenophon *is* an esoteric writer capable of the most refined forms of irony. Yet I confess my sympathy for critics who have charged that Strauss's students and followers have occasionally used esotericism to obfuscate or distort, rather than to illuminate, great texts of the past. That a particular chapter is at the “center” of a book, for example—to mention a much-maligned Straussian hermeneutical principle—is not an argument for anything. It is a fact, and not a very interesting fact at that. Nevertheless, facts are liable to occur in patterns, and patterns should be an object of careful examination.

I wish to approach the question of esotericism as fruitfully and unpo-lemically as possible. To do so, I will consider Xenophon's treatment of the question of piety and the gods. For as we will discover, the three models of kingship presented in the *Anabasis* differ profoundly on the issue of the place that piety and the gods should have in rule. (In fact, the question of the noble and the good is ultimately inseparable from the issue of piety, as we will see.) Of course, it would not be particularly surprising if we should discover that Xenophon exercised restraint when he wrote about piety and the gods. We have already alluded to the fate of Socrates, who was executed by the Athenians partly for not believing in the gods in which the city believed. Moreover, Socrates was neither the first philosopher to fall victim to politico-religious persecution in the West, nor was he to be the last. We citizens of liberal democracies are rediscovering today after a hiatus of over two centuries certain forms of pious virulence, which, though obviously different from premodern forms, adopt a stance toward reason, philosophy, and secular rule that is hardly unprecedented. These developments should give us pause and renew our openness toward the *possibility* that Xenophon wrote esoterically. For, as a thinker and an author, Xenophon faced a solidly pious world that resembled in some respects the Islamic world of today. The pious and moral opinions of his average Hellenic reader had not been transformed by anything resembling the Enlightenment, that is, by the modern project to (in the words of Montesquieu) “detach religion from the soul.”¹⁴ It is not reasonable, in other words, to expect complete

¹³ The most recent spirited and extensive critique is Gray (2011a).

¹⁴ *The Spirit of the Laws*, book 25, chap. 12.

openness from Xenophon, at least if he can be shown to have rejected the orthodoxy of his day in matters of piety and morality. For, to write seriously about kingship requires a reflection on who (or what) the highest king is.¹⁵ Besides, the theme of kingship is delicate for other reasons as well: it is liable to offend democratic sensibilities.¹⁶

To many readers, these considerations will perhaps appear plausible but nevertheless unconvincing. For even if we set aside the issue of whether Xenophon challenged the orthodoxy of his day—and aren't his books replete with evidence of his conventional piety and morality?—many will feel puzzlement or disbelief at the notion that an author might convey his thought between the lines of his work. Why would anyone choose to conceal his views from the majority of his readers and only intimate them to a close-reading minority? The purpose of a book is to enlighten and convey knowledge, not to mislead. How can social progress occur if intellectuals lack the courage to challenge openly the orthodoxies of their day? Isn't esotericism the practice of a misguided or cynical elitist who thinks that the *hoi polloi* are too unintelligent to understand the truth and to benefit from it? And doesn't this practice suggest that the ideas being concealed are disreputable? Finally, the alleged "proofs" of esotericism—small textual hints—are regarded as proofs only by those who ignore the damage suffered by ancient MSS. These proofs are in fact blemishes or scribal blunders.

Proponents of esotericism must confront these powerful objections. I intend to do so. But open-minded critics must face the possibility, for their part, that their hostility to the idea of esotericism reflects the influence of an argument spelled out famously by John Stuart Mill: speech ought to be free in a civilized society because truth will win out over error if both are allowed to clash publicly in the marketplace of ideas, and because the victory of truth will be socially beneficial and conducive to intellectual progress as well.¹⁷ Whether we, citizens of liberal states, like it or not, Mill's liberal-progressive view is not Xenophon's view. As I hope to show in this study, Xenophon accepts a version of the Platonic-Socratic view stated so memorably in Plato's *Republic*: every political community is akin to a dim-lit cave. Only few human beings are ever both able and willing to

¹⁵ For a humorous treatment of this issue, see Aristophanes's *Clouds*, lines 380–82 and *passim*.

¹⁶ The true king is a practitioner of the "kingly art." But this art points toward the rule of the wise. See *Memorabilia* 1.2.58, quoting *Iliad* 2.188–91, 198–202. In the *Memorabilia* passage, Xenophon "omits" to quote *Iliad* 2.204–6, where Odysseus endorses kingly rule at the expense of democracy since "no good thing is a multitude of lords." See also Plato's *Republic* 488b6–8.

¹⁷ J.S. Mill, *On Liberty* (1998).

free themselves from the shackles enslaving their minds and ascend toward the light of the natural sun. The pursuit of truth and the authority of the “shadows” on the walls of the cave are in a state of permanent tension. It is from this tension, in part, that the practice of esotericism arises.

To be sure, we modern readers do not have to accept this Platonic-Socratic-Xenophonic view. We may even reject it wholeheartedly, just as thinkers of the Enlightenment such as Kant or (later) Mill rejected it. Yet it is imperative when we read an author who shows signs of accepting this view that we let our interpretation be guided by that fact throughout. Historical objectivity is not possible on another basis, and a failure to read accordingly is bound to distort the author’s thought. I readily grant, however, that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of those who claim, as I do, that Xenophon is an esoteric writer.

To begin to discharge this burden, I shall therefore consider a series of literary techniques employed by Xenophon in the *Anabasis* to convey his thought between the lines. In the remainder of this section, I examine how he depicts Cyrus’s stance toward the gods. This brief case study is followed by a more general analysis of his manner of writing (section two).¹⁸ I then consider the manuscript tradition of the *Anabasis*. My goal is there again to explore literary devices employed by Xenophon to convey his views quietly (section three). Finally, I consider the recent scholarship on the *Anabasis* to show the importance of approaching the work as a study in Socratic rule and an introduction to philosophy (section four).

i) A Case Study: Xenophon’s Depiction of Cyrus’s Stance Toward the Gods

Early in their march toward Babylon, Cyrus and the Ten Thousand reach the city of Peltas where they stay for three days. Xenophon describes the scene as follows:

In those days, Xennias the Arcadian performed the sacrifices of the Lukaia and he held an athletic contest. The prizes were golden scrapers. Even Cyrus beheld the athletic contest (1.2.10).

This passage seems innocuous enough: the Ten Thousand celebrate a festival honoring Zeus Lukaion under the presidency of Xennias, a prominent Greek general. They also hold an athletic contest. Cyrus looks on. Less

¹⁸ I have benefited from several discussions of Xenophon’s manner of writing. These include Bartlett (1996b), Bruell (1987), Dillery (1995), Flower (2012), Gautier (1911), Higgins (1977), Hirsch (1985), Nadon (2001), Proietti (1987), and the several works of Strauss on Xenophon.

innocuous is a detail omitted by Xenophon. Let us reproduce the same paragraph minus all the unessential information:

[...] Xenias the Arcadian performed the sacrifices of the Lukaia and he held an athletic contest (AGŌNA) [...] Cyrus beheld the athletic contest (AGŌNA).

This edited version makes conspicuous what Xenophon merely adumbrates: Cyrus beheld the athletic contest and *only* the athletic contest. He displayed publicly his indifference to the Lukaia. By the simple device of mentioning and then omitting the Lukaia, Xenophon is able to hint at this indifference. Does this mean that Cyrus is indifferent not only to a festival but to the divine more generally?

This conclusion is surely premature. Xenophon could be guilty of writing sloppy prose. Besides, it could be objected that Cyrus's indifference to the Lukaia is insignificant: he is a Persian, after all, and the festival in question was honoring a *Greek* god (Zeus Lukaion). To meet these difficulties, let us therefore consider a later passage of book one, which will help us confirm our budding suspicions about Cyrus.

In the passage in question, Xenophon recounts a private exchange between Cyrus and his leading Greek general, the Lacedaemonian Klearchos. The exchange takes place as Cyrus nears Babylon and the battle for the throne of Persia seems imminent:

"Do you suppose, Cyrus, [Klearchos said] that your brother will engage battle with you?" "Yes, *by Zeus*," said Cyrus, if at any rate he is the son of Darius and of Parysatis, and my brother, I will not take these things [i.e. the throne of Persia] without a fight" (1.7.9, my emphasis).

Once again, we have a seemingly innocuous passage. It is, however, an arresting passage insofar as it contains one of the few private exchanges of Cyrus deemed important enough to be reported. But why does Xenophon stress this private exchange? Does he wish to emphasize Cyrus's pride in his lineage or in his family virtue? Or perhaps his doubts about his brother's legitimacy?¹⁹ It is striking that Cyrus, though a Persian, swears the Greek oath "by Zeus": his indifference to Zeus Lukaion in the passage considered a moment ago cannot be explained by his Persian origin.²⁰ But what is the solution to our larger difficulty? The solution is conveyed, I believe, in the

¹⁹ Braun (2004) sees in this scene "some chivalrous joust" (p. 125).

²⁰ At *Oikonomikos* 4.24, Cyrus is made to swear the historically more accurate oath "By Mithra!" The Persian Artabazos uses the emphatic form of the same oath at *Education of Cyrus* 7.5.53. Unless I am mistaken, Cyrus the Elder always swears by Greek gods.

following way. Xenophon writes a few paragraphs later (after reporting on the exchange between Cyrus and Klearchos) that Cyrus called to his side a Greek soothsayer named Silanos and gave him a large sum of money (1.7.18). He did this, we are told, because eleven days earlier the soothsayer had predicted to Cyrus that King Artaxerxes would not fight him within the next ten days. Silanos made this prediction after he questioned the gods by means of divination. And Cyrus replied to the divination as follows: "Then [my brother] will not fight thereafter, if he will not fight within these ten days. But I promise you ten talents if you should speak the truth" (1.7.18). On the eleventh day—as the battle had not yet occurred—Cyrus paid out the promised sum to Silanos, who had predicted accurately.

Cyrus's private exchange with the general Klearchos must be read in light of his remarks to the soothsayer Silanos. Or rather, the meaning of the private exchange with Klearchos becomes clear once we restore the chronological order of these two conversations, which Xenophon has purposely reversed. *First* in the order of time are Cyrus's remarks to the soothsayer that his brother *must* fight within ten days if he is to fight at all. Afterward it will be too late. *Then* come Cyrus's private assurances to Klearchos that his brother *will* certainly fight "if he is the son of Darius and of Parysatis, and my brother." It is therefore clear that Cyrus thinks that his brother—who *must* fight within the next ten days if he is to fight at all—*will* certainly fight *within the next ten days*. But this means that he is certain that the soothsayer is wrong. He puts no faith whatsoever in Silanos's divination.²¹ No wonder, then, that Cyrus swears "By Zeus!" in his exchange with Klearchos—the only such oath he swears in the *Anabasis*.²² Far from indicating Cyrus's piety, this oath calls attention to his *rejection* of the god's signs. Yet this rejection does not keep Cyrus from rewarding the soothsayer for having spoken "the truth." In other words, if the two conversations are read together in their proper chronological order, it becomes clear that Cyrus rejects *in toto* the guidance of soothsayers. Xenophon conceals the import of these conversations with the simple expedient of reversing their chronological order. Had he done what I just did—to recount Cyrus's remarks to the soothsayer first—the implication of Cyrus's later private assurances to Klearchos would have been obvious. Not so when the conversations are inverted.

We are now in a position to understand why the obituary of Cyrus is silent about his piety (1.9).²³ This silence is confirmed by several

²¹ This conclusion is confirmed by 1.7.14.

²² Cyrus swears one more oath—"By the gods"—at 1.4.8. For an explanation of this oath, see chapter one, note 21.

²³ Strauss (1983) p. 107. There is, however, one reference to the fact that Cyrus may have prayed (1.9.11). See chapter 1, note 89.

additional pointers.²⁴ The impiety of Cyrus is, so to speak, the negative side of his *anabasis*, of his ascent. Moreover, the impiety of Cyrus distinguishes him from a ruler such as Klearchos, who *is* visibly shaken by Silanos's bold prediction that the King will not fight within ten days. Yet Cyrus's impiety (and the role that it plays in his rule) will not be appreciated unless the reader is aware that Xenophon is wont to intimate—*merely* to intimate—the darker or unconventional side of rulers, such as Cyrus, whom he depicts sympathetically. It has been claimed that Xenophon is prone to hero-worship because he separates rulers into “goodies” and “baddies,” and because his “goodies” are unambiguously good.²⁵ But we see here that Xenophon is not blind to a trait of a goodie that would have been unattractive or frankly objectionable to his contemporaries, if not also to himself.

ii) *LEGETAI*, “Repetitions,” and Omissions

Let me now broaden the discussion to take up several literary techniques employed by Xenophon to convey his thought esoterically. The first such technique is the use of the phrase “it is said” (*LEGETAI*).²⁶ Xenophon often writes that an event “is said” to have happened or that a person “is said” to be such and such.²⁷ But of course, what “is said” may or may not hold true. Sometimes, Xenophon uses the phrase to indicate his ignorance, or to report on a tradition or a rumor about which he does not know the truth. Thus he writes that the army of the King “was said” to be 1.2 million strong and that Cyrus “was said” to have slept with a Cilician queen (1.7.11, 1.2.12). Being cognizant of the difference between knowledge and hearsay, he conveys this difference through the precision of his prose.²⁸ Sometimes, Xenophon uses the phrase “it is said” to intimate his doubts about what is said, or his knowledge that things are not what they are said to be. For example, he writes that “it is said” that the Greek general Menōn, the man who would betray his fellow Greeks to

²⁴ For example, there is not a single reference to the so-called Magi (an Iranian priestly caste) or to any other priests in the army of Cyrus. By contrast, the host of Cyrus the Elder was teeming with them: *Education of Cyrus* 4.5.51, 4.6.11, 5.3.4, 7.3.1, 7.5.35, 7.5.57, 8.1.23, 8.3.11; also 8.3.24.

²⁵ For example, Wylie (1992) p. 117.

²⁶ Strauss (1983) pp. 107–8.

²⁷ For example, *Anabasis* 1.2.8, 1.8.20, 2.6.8, 2.6.29, 3.4.11, 4.1.3, 6.2.1, 6.2.2. Sometimes, Xenophon uses the alternative formula “they said” (*EPHASAN*): e.g., 4.3.12, 5.2.31.

²⁸ Cawkwell (1979) claims that “Xenophon, as it were, experienced by hearsay”—that is, that he failed to distinguish between hearsay evidence and direct experience (p. 24). The claim is misleading and without merit. A small but characteristic example of Xenophon's precision occurs at 1.4.4.

the Persians, did not reap the fruits of his treason. He was tortured for a whole year by the Persian King—the very man whom he had helped—before being put to death (2.6.29). Yet “it is said” that Menōn suffered this fate. Are we to understand that Menōn may have met with a happier or less gloomy end? Could this explain why Xenophon “omits” to state the age of Menōn at the time of his death whereas he conveys this piece of information in the case of every other murdered general (cf. 2.6.29 with §15, §20, and §30)? Lest there be any doubt in this case, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch both confirm that Menōn was *not* put to death by the Persian King along with the generals he had betrayed.²⁹

There is thus unobtrusive but unmistakable evidence that Xenophon uses the phrase “it is said” to achieve something of a beautification of the political world. He makes politics appear to be more supportive of morality and piety than he thinks it really is. By using this phrase, he is able to intimate the unadorned truth—in this case, he questions a vision of poetic justice—while presenting a more hopeful picture to his incautious readers.³⁰ If Xenophon is cognizant of the darker side of his “goodies,” he is not blind to the successes of his “baddies” either.

To be sure, it is not easy to understand why Xenophon wrote in this manner. After all, is it not risky to conceal the ugliness of the political

²⁹ Diodorus Siculus (2000) 14.27.2; Plutarch, *Life of Artaxerxes* c. 22. Plutarch’s account is explicitly based on that of Ktēsias, a Greek physician at the court of Persia, whose *Persika* now exists only in short summaries by later authors, especially by Photius, a ninth-century scholar and patriarch of Constantinople. Xenophon refers to Ktēsias twice at 1.8.26–27. He therefore knew that Menōn was not put to death. (One of Photius’s summaries—of books 21–23—states explicitly that Menōn was spared.)—It should be said, however, that Plutarch questions the credibility of Ktēsias, though not on the issue of Menōn’s survival (in §1). Braun (2004) also impugns Ktēsias’s veracity (p. 123). For Xenophon’s reliance on Ktēsias in the context of the *Education of Cyrus*, see Hirsch (1985) pp. 83–84.

³⁰ The use of *LEGETAI* as a literary technique is not taken into account by Sandridge (2012), for example, in his study of the *Education of Cyrus*. This causes him to overlook an important point: Xenophon never actually says in his own name (at *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1) that Cyrus the Elder is “most loving of humanity (PHILANTHRŌPOTATOS), most loving of learning (PHILOMATHESTATOS), and most loving of being honored (PHILOTIMOTATOS).” What Xenophon does say is this: Cyrus “still even to this day is said in word (*LEGETAI*) and celebrated in song by the barbarians” to have possessed a soul endowed with the three qualities in question. In fact, one of the first things Xenophon indicates about Cyrus the Elder is that he was not “most loving of learning” justice in particular (1.3.15–18). Great political ambition is linked by Xenophon to a lack of love of *knowledge* of justice or virtue, that is, to a deficiency in point of intellectual and moral fastidiousness. Observe also that “love of learning” is not mentioned at *Education* 1.4.1—in the wake of the lack of love of knowledge of justice that Xenophon brings out at 1.3.15–18—whereas “love of humanity” and “love of being honored” both are. When the “love of learning” of Cyrus is again mentioned, at 1.4.3, Xenophon makes clear that this love does *not* extend to the subject of justice: Cyrus must be *compelled* to learn justice by his teacher.

world? Would it not be better to depict this ugliness openly, perhaps in the manner of a Machiavelli (who can be said to have exaggerated its ugliness) in order to put one's readers on notice? For, by writing the way he does, Xenophon sets a trap, or so it seems, for high-minded but insufficiently cautious readers.

Interpreters of Xenophon must face this difficult question. In this study, I shall argue that Xenophon's depiction of the political world reflects his view of the proper way to educate the best and most promising among his readers without abdicating his civic responsibilities. Far from reflecting a naïve or moralistic impulse, Xenophon's attractive manner of writing is rooted in his humanity as well as his wish to put properly equipped youths on the path to philosophy. This manner of writing also reflects his taste. Xenophon says in one of his most memorable speeches of the *Anabasis* that "it is noble and just and pious, and more pleasant, to remember the good things more than the bad" (5.8.26). As the author of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon abides by this beautiful maxim of historical recollection.

Let us turn to a second literary technique. Xenophon frequently resorts to apparent "repetitions" that are in fact modifications of earlier statements. He is especially fond of this technique in connection with the speeches he delivers to the Ten Thousand. As narrator, Xenophon will give an account of an event (or his private thoughts about that event) and then show that he offered a somewhat different account of the event to the soldiers. For example, Xenophon occasionally credits the gods for certain events in his speeches while quietly ascribing these same events, in his narrative, to blind "chance" or "luck" (ΤΥΧΗ). To say the least, the pious thoughts he expresses publicly are not always to be taken at face value.³¹ Of course, this does not prove that Xenophon is *not* a pious man. It merely proves that he sometimes credits the gods for what he believes must be ascribed to chance. Nor does it prove that he is a scoundrel: he *does* tell us the truth, after all—in his narrative. Rather, the technique of "repetition" is used to indicate where and how Xenophon adapted himself to the opinions of his men—oftentimes, to lift their spirits—thereby helping his reader explore whether truthfulness is consistent with prudent rule. In other words, the technique of "repetition" is used to analyze an aspect of the question of the noble and the good.

Xenophon employs patterns of "repetition" within the narratives themselves. In his first speech to the assembled army, for example, he

³¹ Cf. 6.3.6 with 6.3.18; 6.1.20 with 6.1.26; see also 5.2.24–25. For the distinction between "ΤΥΧΗ" and "ΓΝΩΜΗ" ("[divine] purpose"), see *Memorabilia* 1.4.4ff, esp. §6 *in fine*.

puts forth proposals that are subject to three distinct votes. Recording the first two votes, Xenophon writes that “all raised their hands”: the two proposals were carried unanimously (3.2.9, 3.2.33). Recording the result of the third vote, however—the vote pertained to the adoption of a debatable military tactic—Xenophon writes that “it was adopted” (EDOΞE TAŪTA). The shift of language intimates that there was opposition (3.2.38). The incautious reader easily receives the impression that Xenophon’s successes on the first day of his rule were seamless and fore-ordained. But his precision enables us to see where he had to overcome opposition.³²

If Xenophon sometimes “repeats” himself, he is also known to omit information that he has led us to expect. We have already seen how omissions are used to paint more attractive pictures of Cyrus and (of the fate) of Menōn. But the technique is employed more broadly. Upon reaching the Black Sea, Xenophon pronounces a speech in which he makes five proposals to the soldiers. All five proposals pertain to how they should henceforth conduct their affairs (5.1.5–14). After each one, Xenophon writes that the proposal “was adopted”: each proposal was carried, albeit over some opposition. The fifth proposal, however (which is the third one in the order of presentation) is *not* followed by these words, or, indeed, by any words at all. Xenophon had proposed to the soldiers to continue to guard the camp. Though they had now reached the Black Sea (he said) they were still being threatened by enemies. The authorial silence of Xenophon mirrors the deafening silence of the soldiers, who allowed themselves to hope, despite the facts of the ground, that they were now safe and could put their guard down.

iii) “*Being at the Center*”

Let me now consider a technique that will seem odd to many readers: whatever is “at the center” of Xenophon’s writings is of special importance.³³ By the phrase “at the center,” I mean to say that the interpreter must always take pains to count the number of items in a list or in an enumeration, of arguments in a given passage, of chapters in a book, etc. and pay particular attention to whatever lies “at the center.” (Pay special attention to the second item in a list of three, for example, or to the third argument in a passage that contains five.) Since this technique is not only odd but also controversial, I will approach it from a less foreign point of view.

³² Sometimes, Xenophon uses the technique to revisit history: cf. 7.6.14 with 7.3.14.

³³ I am indebted to Leo Strauss for the rediscovery of this technique.

It is a well-known rule of forensic rhetoric that a good lawyer will begin his pleading with a strong opening statement and end it with a strong closing. He should try to “hide” his weaker arguments somewhere in the middle of the pleading. The rationale for the rule is this: better to state one’s strongest points as the attention of the jury is at a peak—at the beginning and at the end of the pleading—and pass off the weaker points as the jury’s attention inevitably ebbs. Indeed this rule, which is sometimes taught in law schools today, is mentioned by Socrates himself in the *Memorabilia* in a passage where the MSS. unfortunately diverge.³⁴ Yet it is unnecessary to prove the authenticity of the passage in question. Suffice it to use the suggestion it contains as a heuristic hypothesis: Is there any evidence that Xenophon puts his weaker arguments “at the center” when he harangues the troops (or other audiences) in the *Anabasis*?

It is hard to escape the conclusion that Xenophon does do this. In his very first speech, for instance, there is a small but characteristic example of it. Xenophon is trying to encourage the captains of the recently murdered Proxenos by telling them that they can wage war on the Persians with greater confidence than their enemies can. One of the more minor reasons he offers to have confidence is this: “We have bodies that are more capable of bearing cold, heat and labors [than the Persians]” (3.1.23). Granted that the sturdy Greeks were more capable of bearing “cold” and “labors” than the Persians, but the intense “heat” of Mesopotamia as well? This stretches credulity. Here is a second, more substantial example. During the march along the Black Sea, Xenophon is called upon to deliver a speech in reply to an ambassador who had come to the Ten Thousand to demand that they cease harming a certain city of the Pontos. The ambassador threatened to go to war (5.5.13ff.). Xenophon replies in kind. He warns the ambassador that the Ten Thousand have hitherto treated as enemies all those who have failed to open markets for them (as the city in question was doing). They have done this out of necessity, not hubris, because they had to have provisions. To give

³⁴ The passage is *Memorabilia* 3.1.7–11. There, Socrates compares a well-crafted speech to both a well-built house and a well-ordered army. To acquire a useful house, he says, you should use the strongest materials for the foundations and for the roof (i.e., rock and clay), while the weaker materials, which rot and wear away (i.e., wood and brick), are best used for the middle parts. Likewise, a general should put his best troops at the front and at the back of his army and leave his weaker troops in the middle so that they are led by the ones and pushed by the others. Socrates goes on to suggest, in the passage in which the MSS. diverge, that this principle applies not only to well-built houses and well-ordered armies but to well-crafted speeches as well: the weaker material should always be put “in the middle” (3.1.11. The reading “LEGEIN,” which I believe is authentic, is found in five different MSS. See the apparatus of Hude [1985].)

teeth to this not-so-veiled threat, Xenophon names three “very frightening” tribes that the Ten Thousand successively treated as enemies and defeated during their retreat: “the Kardouchoi, the Taochoi, and the Chaldeans” (5.5.17). Yet the narrative of book four describes the centrally placed Taochoi as extremely feeble and almost unarmed (4.7.1–14 esp. §5).³⁵ Xenophon’s speech is once again weak at the center. Here is a third example. In a speech delivered later in the book, Xenophon tries to persuade the army to campaign with, and become the paid mercenaries of, a Thracian chieftain named Seuthēs instead of obeying the Lacedaemonian governor of Byzantium. The governor wanted the Ten Thousand to repair to a region of the Pontos known as the Chersonese. But Xenophon thought that the proposal of Seuthēs was much better in the circumstances (7.2.15). To persuade the soldiers of this, Xenophon recalls a series of three crimes perpetrated by the Lacedaemonian governor against them (7.3.3). Yet the second and central crime—the Greeks had been cheated out of their wages—had been perpetrated by another man. The governor had had nothing to do with it!³⁶ Xenophon thus slanders the governor of Byzantium—admittedly, a thuggish man—at the center of his speech. He does so to help overcome the soldiers’ resistance. A fourth example occurs earlier in the *Anabasis*, where Xenophon tries to persuade the captains of Proxenos to fight an all-out war against the Persians and abandon any thought of negotiating with the faithless King. They must expect the worst, Xenophon warns, if they ever come into the King’s power. He gives three reasons to expect this. The second and central reason is this: since the Greeks campaigned against the King to make him a slave and to kill him, if they could, they would be shown no quarter (3.1.17–18).³⁷ But Xenophon states explicitly (in his narrative) that the Greeks campaigned with Cyrus *without knowing* of his imperial ambitions. When they discovered these ambitions, they followed him out of *shame* (Xenophon stresses) not in order to enslave or kill the King (3.1.10). The speech of Xenophon thus exaggerates, at the center, the culpability of the Ten Thousand. It does so to nip in the bud the dangerous temptation to try to appease the King (3.1.10). Lastly, as a fifth example, recall that the speech in which Xenophon proposes to the soldiers to maintain a guard around the camp even though the army has reached the Black Sea—a proposal silently rejected by the soldiers—is

³⁵ The Kardouchoi and the Chaldeans are described as warlike: 4.3.2, 4.3.4.

³⁶ The crime had been perpetrated, not by the Lacedaemonian governor Aristarchos but by the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibios. Xenophon also considers three options in that speech. To follow the chieftain Seuthēs (and disobey Aristarchos) is the second and central option.

³⁷ Xenophon also states his reasons by means of a succession of three rhetorical questions.

the third of five proposals put up for a vote that day. Xenophon's powers of persuasion actually fail him at the center (5.1.5–14).

I will uncover dozens of examples of the use of "the center" in this study. Taken together, they will prove that Xenophon uses this technique in his speeches. But I wish to make two additional points here. First, if readers remain unconvinced that Xenophon employs the technique in question, I ask them to keep an open mind. I grant that the examples adduced hitherto do not yet prove my case. But I hope that they will suffice to foster an openness toward the *possibility* that I may be right. Second, I contend that this technique is used by Xenophon not only in his speeches but also in his narratives: after all, the narratives are speeches, too—aimed at the reader. And just as he does in his speeches, Xenophon uses "the center" to call attention to the weaknesses of his arguments or to indicate where his hopeful depiction of the political world may fall short. A single example must suffice here. The "baddie" Menōn is the only Greek general seized by the King and *not* executed by him. He is also the third of the five generals eulogized (or censured) by Xenophon (2.6). I believe that Menōn occupies this central position because he embodies a challenge to ordinary piety and morality. Though he deserves the title of "arch-baddie" of the *Anabasis*, Menōn "succeeds" where others, such as the noble Proxenos, fail. The central placement of Menōn thus calls attention to his survival. This survival in turn forces us to wonder whether Xenophon, the Socratic King, is able to combine the nobility of Proxenos with the "effectiveness" of Menōn. Can he cut a path between the Charybdis of noble failure and the Scylla of criminal success? The rhetorical technique of "the center" thus points toward *the* question of the *Anabasis*.

3. Xenophon's Manner of Writing: The Manuscripts of the *Anabasis*

Some literary devices used by Xenophon are best discussed in connection with the manuscript tradition of the *Anabasis*.³⁸ The text has come down to us in about fifteen manuscripts divided into two families: the Paris family, whose main representatives are MSS. B, A, E, and above all C; and the Italian family, whose main representatives are today thought to be MSS. F and M. Though the Italian family is slightly older,³⁹ philologists

³⁸ On the manuscript tradition, see the useful discussion of Masqueray (1930), pp. 29–40, to which I am indebted.

³⁹ MSS. FM are from the twelfth century (or the early thirteenth century in the case of M). MS. C was copied in 1320. But according to Masqueray (1930), C is from an archetype

(till the early twentieth century) regarded the Paris family as superior and the MSS. belonging to it were known as the *meliores*. MS. C, the best and most important of the group, was the basis for several major textual editions. In 1903, however, this near-scholarly consensus was shattered by the discovery of a papyrus at *Oxyrhynchus* believed to date back to the second or third-century AD and containing a portion of the *Anabasis* (P. Oxy III, 463).⁴⁰ In those passages where the two families of MSS. diverge, the papyrus agrees with the Italian family with somewhat greater frequency than with the Paris family.⁴¹ Since this papyrus is believed to antedate all extant MSS. by about a millennium, philologists started to accord greater weight to the Italian family because of the manifest antiquity of some of its variants.⁴² Later editors have treated the two families more evenly. Hude/Peters (1972) even give something of a preference to the Italian family (FM) in several places.

My study of the variants of the *Anabasis* has convinced me that the older view held by Dindorf, Gemoll, and other philologists is the correct view. The best manuscript of the *Anabasis* is *Parisinus* 1640 (C).⁴³ Speaking generally, it must be acknowledged that MS. C is often “bumpier” than MSS. FM. This is so, however, because MSS. FM systematically expunge from the *Anabasis* textual pointers or “bumps” that are both grammatically possible and suggestive of important possibilities of interpretation. All too often, modern philologists, fortified by the evidence of the papyri, have followed FM and relegated these “bumps” to their *apparata*. But they should not have accorded so much weight to the papyri. Even *Oxyrhynchus* 463, by far the longest extant papyrus of the work, contains less than 1 percent of the *Anabasis*. It is simply impossible on such a slim basis to determine the merits of the manuscript which the fragment was once a part of. Besides, we should not confuse antiquity with merit. Chance played a crucial role in the preservation of any given papyrus.

To restore the position that MS. C is the best manuscript of the *Anabasis* and that we should depart from its readings with much caution, I now

of the ninth century (p. 30). There is some disagreement about the age of MS. F. Bizos (1972) thinks that it dates back to the second half of the tenth century (Vol. 1, p. lv).

⁴⁰ For the text of all the *papyri* of the *Anabasis*, see Paap (1970). *Oxyrhynchus* 463 contains *Anabasis* VI. 6.9–10, 15–24.

⁴¹ According to Paap (1970), the papyrus agrees five times with the Italian family but only three times with the Paris family (p. 11).

⁴² Also, consider the inscription at 5.3 *in fine*. The epigraphic evidence is discussed by Masqueray (p. 36, note 2).

⁴³ It is a view also held by Hug (1886) and even Masqueray (1930). Where MS. C has been corrected, the view of Gemoll should be followed: the corrected version (known as C1 by Masqueray and as C2 by Hude/Peters) is almost always superior.

examine an important literary technique employed by Xenophon that is preserved almost exclusively in MS. C (and in the MSS. of the Paris family). It is a technique I shall call “renaming.” Given that modern editors of the *Anabasis*, including such champions of C as Dindorf and Gemoll, have followed the inferior MSS. over C in this regard, we can say that the technique in question has been overlooked for at least two hundred years, perhaps much longer.

***iv) Renaming Men, Rivers, and Mountains:
The Primacy of Manuscript C***

Xenophon frequently gives new names to men, rivers, and mountains in the *Anabasis*—he renames them—to produce a variety of literary effects, including humor and the enhancement of the beauty of his work. In some cases, he employs renaming to convey pointers to his philosophic argument. I saw a first glimmer of the technique of renaming as I was reading a speech in which Xenophon rebukes the Ten Thousand for their lawless and shameful behavior (5.7.13–33). Xenophon recounts how a group of soldiers had hunted down a market supervisor named ZĒLARCHOS, who was apparently liberal with his whip (ZĒLOS-ARCHEIN: “zealous-ruler”). The soldiers had complained that ZĒLARCHOS was treating them most terribly (5.7.23). Fearing for his life—the soldiers now wanted to lapidate him—ZĒLARCHOS had fled the army. Xenophon deplores this flight: if ZĒLARCHOS was guilty, he has now escaped with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been wronged. But as he refers to the now-departed ZĒLARCHOS, Xenophon calls him by the name “TĒLARCHOS”: that is, “Far-Away Ruler” (TĒLE-ARCHEIN: 5.7.29). This funny reading occurs in all (but one) of the MSS. of the Paris family (CBA), and not in FM or in any of the inferior MSS. (These MSS. show the “correct” reading ZĒLARCHOS.) But is it so difficult to believe that Xenophon kept his sense of humor even as he chastised the soldiers? No modern editor of the *Anabasis* has printed the reading.⁴⁴

But (it will be objected) the reading “TĒLARCHOS” is probably the work of a droll scribe. Moreover, since a single letter separates “TĒLARCHOS” from “ZĒLARCHOS,” textual corruption provides an alternative explanation. Is there any evidence that the practice of renaming extends beyond this one small example? The evidence is overwhelming, and, taken cumulatively, it amounts to a proof that Xenophon uses the literary technique in question. In the first book of the *Anabasis*,

⁴⁴ On the use of TĒLE, consider the renaming of the TĒLEBOA (“far-sounding-river”: TĒLE-BOAŌ) at 4.4.3.

for instance, Xenophon refers to a Persian named ARTAPATĒS, who was the most faithful of Cyrus's scepter bearers (1.8.28). ARTAPATĒS also acted as Cyrus's henchman. Hence, ARTAPATĒS was once assigned the task of doing away with a high-ranking Persian who had betrayed Cyrus. ARTAPATĒS did such an effective job that "no one ever saw [the traitor] again, alive or dead, nor could anyone say with knowledge how he died. [...] No tomb of his was ever found" (1.6.11). As he writes this, Xenophon dubs the henchman in question "ARTAPOU": that is, "He-Who-Butchers-[Someone]-Somewhere" (ARTAMOS-POU: MSS. CBA).⁴⁵ In this case, the "renaming" entails a couple of letters, which, if MS. corruption is to be the explanation, would have had to drop from three different MSS.⁴⁶

Xenophon's practice of renaming people extends to the non-Persians. In his first major speech to the army, he tells the troops that even if it should prove impossible to return to Hellas, they could still settle somewhere in the Persian empire. A few barbaric tribes were dwelling profitably in those parts, including a tribe that the Ten Thousand had defeated on their way to Babylon and whose territory they had plundered. The tribesmen in question were known as the "LUKAONAS"—the High and Mighty "Wolf-People" (1.2.19, LUKOS). In his speech, however, Xenophon renames them: they become the "LUKARNAS"—the less-than-mighty "Wolf-Sheep-People" (3.2.23: LUKOS-ARNOS, MSS. FA and C [corrector's hand]).⁴⁷ Later in the retreat, the Greeks march through the uplands of Armenia during the winter and suffer bitterly from cold and hunger. They reach some local villages. A gallant Athenian captain named POLUKRATĒS captures one of these villages, thereby providing food and drink for the starving soldiers. "POLUKRATĒS" means "Much-Strength" (POLUS-KRATOS). Xenophon renames him POLUBŌTĒS—"Feeder-Of-Many" (POLUS-BOSKŌ, MSS. CBE: 4.5.23–24).⁴⁸ Not long after that, the Greeks conscript an Armenian village chief to serve as their guide. To ensure the man's faithfulness,

⁴⁵ ARTAMOS ("butcher") is a rare word, but Xenophonic: *Education of Cyrus* 2.2.4. It is listed among Xenophon's dorisms by Gautier (1911, p. 36).

⁴⁶ It is true that MSS. B and A are thought to be copies of C. Yet they often disagree in the spelling of names.

⁴⁷ Gautier (1911) points out that Xenophon apparently coined the verb "LUKOŪSTHAI" ("to-be-eaten-by-a-wolf"), a *hapax legomena* found at *Education of Cyrus* 8.3.41 (p. 153–54). According to Strabo (2000), the plain of Lukaonia was teeming with sheep (12.6.1). On the opposition between "wolf" and "sheep," see *Memorabilia* 2.7.13–14. The LUKAONAS are also mentioned at *Education of Cyrus* 6.2.10, but without any renaming.

⁴⁸ "BŌTIANEIRA" (= BOSKŌ-ANĒR) at *Iliad* 1.155 is a parallel case of the lengthening of the omicron in POLUBŌTĒS.

they hold his pubescent son captive and entrust his guard to a captain named EPISTHENĒS (4.6.1–3). EPISTHENĒS was a fine soldier and a decent man. But he was a pederast. Xenophon calls him in this context KLEISTHENĒS—“The-Mighty-Door-Shutter”: he kept a close watch over the boy (KLEIŌ-STENOS, MS. BE, *though not C*).⁴⁹ Later on, as Xenophon complains to the Greek soldiers of their wild and shameful behavior, he tells the story of a captain named KLEARĒTOS, whose lawless actions had caused much grief (5.7.13ff.). KLEARĒTOS means “The-Fame-Of-Virtue” (KLEOS-ĀRETĒ); Xenophon calls him twice KLEARĀTOS—“The-Infamy-Of-The Accursed” (5.7.14, 16: KLEOS-ARĀTOS, MSS. CBAE).

Xenophon also renames landmarks such as rivers and mountains, and here comes into view the most important function of renaming. Interpreters of the *Anabasis* have long struggled to decipher Xenophon’s geography. Already in the nineteenth century, the traveler W. F. Ainsworth complained that the task of determining the path of the retreat of the Ten Thousand was a “most perplexing subject” because several landmarks mentioned by Xenophon bore names found in no other earlier source, such as Herodotus.⁵⁰ The cause of Xenophon’s singularity in naming, however, has never been stated: Xenophon simply *coins* new names to provide guidance, not to his geography, but to his *logos*, his philosophic argument. He enlists toponymy in the service of philosophy.⁵¹ One interesting example of this practice occurs in book two. As the Greeks retreat in Mesopotamia under a precarious truce with the Persians, they reach a large river, which the inferior MSS. call the “ZABATON,” that is, “The-Easily-Fordable-River” (ZA-BATOS, MSS. FM, 2.5.1). And indeed, when the Greeks cross this river, they do so with ease (3.3.6). But since the Lacedaemonian general Klearchos and his fellow Greeks are ensnared by the Persians on the banks of the river,

⁴⁹ Xenophon uses the verb KLEIŌ three times to refer to the locking of a gate in the *Anabasis*: 5.5.19, 6.2.8, 7.1.36. He may also have been thinking of the notorious Athenian pederast by the same name: see, for example, Aristophanes’s *Clouds* 355. The adjective AKLEISTOS (“unlocked”) occurs at *Education of Cyrus* 7.5.25.

⁵⁰ (1875) p. 266. Larcher (1778) already complains of this difficulty.

⁵¹ M.-F. Baslez (1995) observes: “Mais on trouve aussi dans *l’Anabase* des créations grecques à valeur descriptive pour les fleuves jusque-là inconnus du Moyen-Euphrate et d’Arménie: ainsi Téléobas [*sic*], le « Rugissant » (*Anab.*, IV.4.3 [...] ou Physkos (*Anab.*, II.4.25) l’« Enflé » [...]” (p. 80). But Baslez misunderstands the significance of this observation. She goes on to ascribe the practice of renaming to Xenophon’s intellectual laziness, that is, to his lack of interest in “enquêtes de type toponymiques” (p. 83). Along the same lines is Kuhrt (1995): “Xenophon’s handling of geographical names in ‘the east’ is altogether odd [...] and belongs to a discourse not helpful for understanding topographical realities [...]” (p. 243). But what is not helpful topographically is helpful philosophically.

Xenophon chooses to rename it. According to the better MSS., he calls it “ZAPATAN”—“The-River-of-the-Big-Fraud” (ZA-APATAŌ, MSS. CB: 2.5.1)⁵²—a name befitting the egregious Persian deception. Interestingly, the same river receives yet another name a little later in the book, *after* Xenophon has described the deception of the Persians and the grave error of judgment of Klearchos, which led to his death and that of many others (2.5). Xenophon calls the river by the name “ZATĒN”—“The-River-of-the-Big-(God-Induced)-Madness” (ZA-ATĒ, MSS. FMBC [corrector’s hand]: 3.3.6).⁵³ No modern editor of the *Anabasis* has dared to print this reading though it is found in all the MSS.⁵⁴ Yet the name, which must go back to Xenophon, provides a pointer to the cause of Klearchos’s misguided attempt to become the “friend” of the Persian Tissaphernēs. As I will show in chapter two, the name suggests that Klearchos’s error of judgment had a pious-moral cause.⁵⁵ He was made “mad” by the gods.

Having reached this point, we see that we must always wonder why Xenophon names people or landmarks the way he does, especially when the names are odd or without precedent.⁵⁶ For example, why does he call a tribe of the Pontos the “Drilai,” a name otherwise unknown (5.2)? Why does he call an affluent of the Tigris the “Kentritēs” (4.3)?⁵⁷ Why does he call two different rivers by the same name (“Phasis”), though he obviously knew at the time of writing the *Anabasis* that they were different rivers (4.6.4; 5.6.36, 5.7.1, §5, §9)?

⁵² The prefix ZA has two distinct meanings. It can mean (in Aeolic Greek) DIA-; thus, ZABATOS = DIABATOS. But it can also mean “very,” as in ZATHEOS (“very divine”) or ZAKOTOS (“very angry”). Hence, “ZAPATAN” means “very deceiving.” The verb APATAŌ (“to deceive”) is used frequently by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*—no fewer than nine times in the first part of a single speech (5.7.5–12)—but always in the compound EX-APATAŌ (“to deceive thoroughly”).

⁵³ On ATĒ, the divinity that “blindeth all,” see *Iliad* 19.85–138. Zeus is said to have expelled ATĒ from Olympus. She is compared to Eros by Agathon in Plato’s *Symposium*, not only because they both induce madness, but above all because they both dwell among *men* (195d2–5).

⁵⁴ The first (uncorrected) hand of C gives EZOTĒN.

⁵⁵ It did not have a politico-military cause, as Grote (1900) Vol. 9, p. 74 argues.

⁵⁶ The Xenophonic Socrates suggests explicitly that proper names are pregnant with meaning, at least in Homer. Consider Socrates’s admittedly fanciful etymology of “Ganumēdēs” at *Symposium* 8.30—Even names that are *not* coined by Xenophon can acquire a special significance under his pen. In chapter five, for example, I discuss the case of a tribe called the “Mossunoikoi” (“the-wooden-house-dwellers”: MOSSUN-OÏKOS, 5.4). Though the name “Mossunoikoi” occurs in Herodotus (3.94, 7.78), Xenophon infuses it with a significance that bears on the *logos* of the *Anabasis*: “the Mossunoikoi” are literary stand-ins for “the Socratics.”

⁵⁷ The name is found in later writers such as Diodorus Siculus (2000): 14.27.7.

I will explain these and other instances of renaming in the body of my study. For now, I must limit myself to three observations. First, of the eight instances of renaming described in this subsection, all but one are preserved in MS. C. (The exception is EPISTHENĒS.) Only two such instances are preserved in MS. F (LUKARNAS and ZATĒN) and MS. M preserves a single one (ZATĒN). This pattern constitutes strong *prima facie* evidence of the quality and reliability of MS. C. It shows that the smoothness and seamlessness of FM is rather a sign of the inferiority of these MSS. than of their quality and reliability.

Second, modern editors of the *Anabasis* have printed the readings of MSS. FM over those of MS. C in all but one of these instances.⁵⁸ Indeed, not infrequently, the readings of MS. C are not even listed in the *critica apparata*.⁵⁹ To be sure, some of these instances of renaming could stem from scribal interference or MS. corruption. This possibility cannot be disproved and should not be discarded too quickly. Yet the sheer number of probable instances shows that the technique of renaming goes back to Xenophon. In my opinion, an enduring prejudice against the intellectual and literary abilities of our author is what explains how so many excellent philologists and classicists overlooked during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries what are often manifest instances of Xenophonic artfulness or playfulness.⁶⁰

In the third place, the most famous scene of the *Anabasis*—the sighting of the Black Sea from atop Mount Thēchēs—benefits from being read through the lenses of renaming. The name “Mount Thēchēs,” accepted by all modern editors, is found only in the inferior MSS. and

⁵⁸ The universal exception is “ZAPATAN,” which is printed by Dindorf (1855), Marchant (1904), Gemoll (1909), Masqueray (1930), Hude/Peters (1972), and others. The choice is never explained.

⁵⁹ Marchant (1904), for example, does not list “LUKARNAS” or “KLEISTHENĒS.” Gemoll (1909) omits “LUKARNAS,” “KLEISTHENĒS,” and “KLEARATOS.”

⁶⁰ The existence of the technique of renaming is supported by the findings of Léopold Gautier (1911), the best student of the language of Xenophon, who, though he takes no cognizance of the technique *per se*, shows through many examples that Xenophon was strongly inclined to compose and derive new words: “Mais [Xénophon] appartient à cette classe d'écrivains qui en usent très librement avec la langue, qui ne connaissent point les affres du style, parce qu'ils estiment que la langue est au service de l'écrivain, et non l'écrivain sous la domination de la langue. Telle était son attitude. Les libertés qu'il prend en témoignent hautement; il use des mots les plus spéciaux ou même de vocables étrangers; surtout il ne se gêne pas pour composer et dériver des mots à sa convenance” (p. 143, emphasis added. See also pp. 153–54). The technique of renaming is not limited to the *Anabasis*. The reader may consider, for example, the case of Aglaitadas, the dour and pious Persian, enemy of laughter (*Education of Cyrus*, 2.2.11 ff). According to one reliable but unfortunately incomplete MS. (F), Aglaitadas is once renamed “Agalitadas.” “Agalitadas” is there taking offense at Cyrus's irreverent laughter: 2.2.11.

has no discernable meaning.⁶¹ According to the better MSS., however, the mountain in question is called “Mount Êchēs:” that is, “Mount-Of-The-Roar.” ÊCHÊ (the genitive of which is ÊCHÊS) is a poetic word employed by Homer to refer to the roar of the sea in particular.⁶² The name “Mount Êchēs” is thus a beautiful way to memorialize the roar of Ten Thousand tearful men as they gaze upon the horizon—“The Sea! The Sea!” (4.7.21–27).⁶³

v) *Emending the Manuscripts*

Given the quality of MS. C⁶⁴ (and the Paris MSS. generally), editors of the *Anabasis* must be careful when they propose to emend them. In this subsection, I discuss a pair of instances where emendations have gained wide currency. My purpose is not philological, however. I seek to shed further light on literary techniques employed by Xenophon to convey his thought between the lines.



In the third book of the *Anabasis*, the Ten Thousand are in full retreat in Mesopotamia and are marching northward on the eastern banks of the Tigris. Xenophon describes how they skirmish with the Persians and their leader, the satrap Tissaphernēs:

When [Tissaphernēs] came near, he stationed some of his units behind the Greeks, and he led others alongside them, opposite their flanks, but he did not dare to charge nor did he wish to hazard all, but he ordered his men to discharge their slings and to let fly their arrows. But when the Rhodians [i.e., the slingers of the Greeks], who had been put in battle order, discharged their slings and the *Scythian archers* [i.e., the archers of

⁶¹ As early as Larcher (1778), the mountain is called Thēchēs.

⁶² *Iliad* 2.209.

⁶³ I disregard the varying accents and breathings found in the better MSS., which are the guesswork of later scribes. These literary aids were not in use before the third or second century BC (*pace* Thompson [1912] pp. 61–62 and Reynolds and Wilson [1991] p. 4).

⁶⁴ Of course, I am not suggesting that MS. C is “perfect.” Among other blemishes, it contains several apparent short lacunae (e.g., 3.4.33, 5.2.11, 6.6.20, 6.6.28, 7.1.35, 7.3.38, 7.7.24, 7.7.39) many of which seem to have been caused by a *saut du même au même*. One lacuna is more extensive and significant (4.1.2–4). It is filled by the inferior MSS. as well as by MS. A of the Paris family. The lacunae are less frequent in the first four books of MS. C since it was corrected with a (lost) MS. that must have been excellent. Indeed, the primacy of MS. C is less pronounced in the last three books of the *Anabasis* because it was either not corrected, or corrected with inferior MSS. (see Masqueray pp. 30–31).

the Greeks] let fly their arrows and no one missed his man—even if one were very eager, it would not have been easy to miss—Tissaphernēs very quickly retreated out of range and the other units retreated as well. For the rest of the day, [the Greeks] marched, and the [Persians] followed. (3.4.14–15, my emphasis)

Scholars have been baffled by the reference to “Scythian archers” in this passage (SKUTHAI TOXOTAI). There is no other mention of “Scythians” in the *Anabasis* (but cf. 4.7.18, 4.8.1). The only archers we ever see fighting on the Greek side are Cretans (1.2.9, 3.3.7, 3.3.15, 3.4.17; also 4.2.28). To resolve this difficulty it has been suggested that since the Scythians were famous for their ability to shoot their bows while riding, “Scythian archers” must have been a synonym for “mounted archers.” But the argument is weak. The Greeks could barely piece together a cavalry of fifty horses in the beginning of the retreat. They had neither the riders nor the horses needed to organize a body of mounted archers (3.3.19–20). Besides, Xenophon does not refer to mounted archers in the *Anabasis* (cf. 3.3.6 ff.). He *does* refer to such archers in the *Education of Cyrus* and in the *Memorabilia*. In both places he uses the customary word—HIPPOTOXOTĒS (5.3.24, 3.3.1). C. G. Krüger (1849) thus deleted “Scythian” as an interpolation and has been followed by modern editors.⁶⁵ But is there no way to make sense of the MSS. reading?

According to LSJ (s.v. “SKUTHĒS”), the Scythians were renowned in Antiquity for something beside their skills as archers. They were notorious for mutilating the bodies of slain enemies, so much so that the primary meaning of “SKUTHIDZEIN” (“to behave like a Scythian”) was “scalping.”⁶⁶ Tellingly, Xenophon alludes to these so-called “Scythians” in the wake of mentioning that the Greeks had mutilated some Persian cadavers two days earlier in an attempt to scare off pursuers (3.4.5). This deed, though perhaps understandable in the circumstances, was an impious act from the point of view of Hellenic law.⁶⁷ Xenophon does not state, however, who among “the Greeks” had committed the crime (3.4.5). But by speaking of the “Scythian archers,” he intimates the truth: the culprits were the Cretans, the only archers ever mentioned by him.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ He has been followed by Gemoll, Hug, Marchant, and Masqueray. Dindorf and Hude/Peters print the MSS. reading.

⁶⁶ Herodotus describes vividly how the Scythians treated the bodies of slain enemies: 4.64–65.

⁶⁷ The transgression occurs right before the diptych “Larissa-Mespila” (3.4.7–12). One purpose of that diptych is to indicate whether the transgression of the Hellenic law by the “Scythians” was likely to be punished by the divine. See chapter three, pp. 144–47.

⁶⁸ The Cretans are mentioned in the immediate vicinity of the “Scythians”: cf. 3.4.17 with 3.4.15.

By renaming the Cretans, he manages to soften his censure. Why does he not blame the Cretans openly? Because he remembered their gallantry. In the perilous mountains of Kardouchia, they would soon distinguish themselves and prove most useful to the army (4.2.28). Xenophon softens his censure to pay tribute to their dedication and skill.⁶⁹ This is a fine instance of his remembering the good things more than the bad. But since he wishes to convey the truth, he intimates the sin of the Cretans, quietly but with perfect clarity.

The most significant case of a widely accepted but dubious emendation pertains to the summaries affixed to each of the books of the *Anabasis* after the first.⁷⁰ In these passages, Xenophon gives a summary of the previous book (or books) as a preface to the next stage of his *logos*. Before the nineteenth century, scholars did not seriously doubt the authenticity of these summaries. Diogenes Laertius already refers to them in the second or third century.⁷¹ Philologists such as Bisschop and Cobet were the first to impugn their authenticity in the nineteenth century. Later editors, including Hug (1886), Marchant (1904), Masqueray (1930), and Hude/Peters (1972), began to bracket them. Gemoll (1909) put them in his footnotes. He was imitated by Brownson (1922), editor of the Loeb *Anabasis*, whose editorial decision was reaffirmed when his translation was revised in 1998. At present, only one English translation—by Ambler (2008)—preserves the summaries. The others omit the summaries without noting the omission. For the Greekless readers, they never existed.

Remarkably, no arguments are ever adduced to justify this editorial license.⁷² It is apparently believed or assumed that the summaries are unnecessary since they repeat what the reader already knows. They must be mnemonic devices added by a later hand. Yet the summaries do not repeat what the reader already knows. An important counterexample is the summary affixed to book four. There, Xenophon explains why the Greeks decided to march north and into the dangerous mountains of Kardouchia when they met geographic obstacles that stopped their advance along the eastern bank of the Tigris (4.1.1–4). To be sure, the account *appears* to be repetitive since Xenophon gives an account of the same decision at the end of book three (3.5.14–18). Yet if we compare

⁶⁹ Cf., however, 5.2.28–32.

⁷⁰ 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1–4, 5.1.1, 7.1.1.

⁷¹ (1995). The reference is at 2.57.

⁷² Consider, for example, Brownson/Dillery (1998): “All these summaries must have been the work of a late editor” (p. 146, note 1). It should be noted, however, that a part of the summary affixed to the fourth book is missing in all the better MSS. except A. Book six does not have any summary (see, however, 6.3.1 in MSS. FM). I explain this anomaly at the beginning of chapter six.

these two accounts in the un-emended texts of the MSS., crucial differences become evident. Most importantly, in the initial account (book three), the generals hear *privately* from local captives that the northern road will be extremely difficult: the Kardouchoi who live in the mountains are warlike and once destroyed a Persian army of 120,000 men.⁷³ Despite this, the generals think it necessary to go north: there is no viable alternative in the circumstances. When he “repeats” himself, Xenophon writes that *the soldiers* think that they ought to go north (4.1.2).⁷⁴ (“Necessity” is not mentioned in the “repeated” account.) The “repeated” account thus contains the explanation of why the troops agree with the generals. Not surprisingly, it is silent about the difficulties disclosed privately to the generals at the end of book three, especially the warlike character of the Kardouchoi. Instead, the soldiers hear from some captives an optimistic report about how the sources of the Tigris can be easily crossed or circumvented once the army gets beyond Kardouchia and reaches Armenia (4.1.3).⁷⁵ A conclusion seems inescapable: the generals allowed the captives to speak about an overly hopeful report about the northern road to avoid further discouraging the soldiers.⁷⁶ Far from being redundant, the summary of book four illustrates how the technique of “repetition” is used to analyze when truthfulness is consistent with prudent rule. Once again, “repetitions” are employed by Xenophon to explore the question of the noble and the good.⁷⁷

4. Recent Scholarship on the *Anabasis*

The writings of Xenophon have been the object of a resurgence of scholarly interest in the last twenty-five years. Initially ignored by this

⁷³ According to the best MSS., the generals also hear that even if they should march through Kardouchia and reach the “large and happy” land of Armenia, they will find it “very difficult” (APOROS: MSS. CAEB1, 3.5.17) to get beyond Armenia. The inferior MSS. FM read “very easy” (EUPOROS) instead of “very difficult” for that passage. The reading of the best MSS. accords with the later sufferings of the Greeks in Armenia: 4.4–4.5. On the Persians’ enduring problems with the Kardouchoi, see *Hellenika* 2.1.13.

⁷⁴ The emendation of Leonclavius, from STRATIŌTAIS (“soldiers”) to STRATĒGOÏS (“generals”) at 4.1.2, accepted by all modern editors, is without any MS. support.

⁷⁵ In the event, the crossing of the river “Kentritēs,” which lies on the border between Kardouchia and Armenia, will prove to require the audacity of Xenophon: see chapter four, section 1 subsection ii), as well as 4.4.3.

⁷⁶ Note how Xenophon vouches for the veracity of a single one of the statements that “were said” by the captives to the soldiers: 4.1.3 *in fine*.

⁷⁷ For a powerful linguistic argument in support of the authenticity of the summaries, see Høeg (1950) pp. 162–64. In particular, Høeg states: “En effet, prétendre que les résumés sont dus à Xénophon, c’est prétendre que la division en livres est xénophontéenne, ou

movement, the *Anabasis* has been studied in several monographs more recently. With one partial exception, however, these recent books do not treat the *Anabasis* as a work of political philosophy, let alone as a study in Socratic rule and an introduction to philosophy.

Robin Waterfield's *Xenophon's Retreat: Greece, Persia and the End of the Golden Age* (2006)⁷⁸ aims "to present a rounded version of the story of the expedition [of the Ten Thousand]" and to explore various aspects of it not developed by Xenophon, such as "the gruesome nature of ancient battle" (xii, xi). Waterfield also seeks to show that the expedition of the Ten Thousand (and Xenophon's account of it) is a turning point in Greek history: it marks a "retreat from a golden age of optimism" of fifth century BC to the "realistic disenchantment" characteristic of the fourth (192). Waterfield's book is written gracefully and offers several curious observations about the geography of the land through which the army of the Ten Thousand made its famous march. (Waterfield retraced a portion of this route "in the comfort of a modern Land Rover" [144].) Yet his account of the *Anabasis*, aimed at a general audience, is introductory. It largely consists of paraphrases of the work in which Xenophon disappears for surprisingly long stretches. When he is mentioned, Xenophon emerges as a capable but somewhat conventional leader who "never questioned the religion of his youth" and remained prisoner to such dubious prejudices as pro-Spartan sympathies (42). Xenophon's interest in Socrates—and the education he received from Socrates—are not significantly treated. Never would we guess from this book that Xenophon wrote four Socratic works. Moreover, while Waterfield expresses admiration for Xenophon's literary gifts—"At his best, Xenophon is an outstanding writer and a great storyteller" (186)—he gives little evidence of being aware of his peculiar manner of writing, which conveys so much between the lines. Xenophon's rhetoric is simply not investigated in this monograph.

In contrast to Waterfield, John W. I. Lee writes *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis* (2007)⁷⁹ for the academic historian rather than the lay public. The monograph paints a picture of the military experience of the Ten Thousand and, more generally, of the Greek mercenary soldier in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Following an approach developed by John Keegan, a military historian of note, Lee

mieux—pour éviter d'être dupe des mots—c'est prétendre que Xénophon, au moment où il donna son texte aux copistes, en marqua nettement les coupes, probablement en leur enjoignant simplement et sévèrement de respecter la répartition en 7 rouleaux." As for the summaries themselves, "Rien ne nous autorise à en douter de l'authenticité [sic]" (p. 164). Erbse (2010) also contends that the Xenophonic origin of the summaries is clear (p. 480).

⁷⁸ Harvard University Press, 248 pages.

⁷⁹ Cambridge University Press, 323 pages.

seeks to “examine battle through the soldier’s rather than the general’s eyes”; readers are invited “to imagine the physical and spatial dimensions of ordinary soldiers’ worlds” (5, 276). Lee’s careful study thus explores in an extremely thorough fashion the daily routine of the Greek soldier—from how he marched, provisioned, and made fire, to issues of sanitation, hygiene, and sexual relations. Lee believes that scholarly readings of the *Anabasis* have tended to “view events solely through political eyes” (10). To counteract this tendency, he focuses on the purely military, not to say the mundane. His monograph is filled with accounts of curious practices or customs that will be of interest to the historically minded. Yet in his quest to transcend politics and the political arena—as well as the perspective of rulers—Lee’s account evacuates all issues of leadership. The army he depicts is an army without a head, so to speak. Xenophon is absent from this monograph. It is as if he had no share in saving the Ten Thousand. Thus the book sheds no light on Xenophon’s conception of rule. It is a study in social organization, not a study in leadership. We cannot be surprised that the name of Socrates does not occur in it (cf. 97, 273).

Vivienne J. Gray’s *Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections* (2011)⁸⁰ is a more ambitious book than either Waterfield’s or Lee’s. Her intent is to develop a comprehensive account of Xenophon’s “theory of leadership” through a study of his entire corpus, including the *Anabasis* (2, 7 and *passim*). Gray also examines various methods employed by Xenophon to portray leaders so as to gain insights into his “general literary techniques” (1). In the process, she develops a sustained critique of what she variously calls “darker,” “subversive,” or “ironical” readings of Xenophon—readings such as those developed by Christopher Nadon,⁸¹ Christopher Tuplin,⁸² W. E. Higgins,⁸³ or James Tatum⁸⁴—which have discovered “concealed criticism behind [the] apparently positive images of leadership in the majority of [Xenophon’s] works” (1). Reacting against this scholarly tendency, which she traces back to Leo Strauss, Gray sets out to develop what she calls “innocent” or “positive” readings of Xenophon; in such readings, “[Xenophon] means to praise and

⁸⁰ Oxford University Press, 405 pages.

⁸¹ *Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia* (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press) 2001, 198 pages.

⁸² *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon. Hellenika 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner) 1993), 264 pages.

⁸³ *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (New York: SUNY Press) 1977, 183 pages.

⁸⁴ *Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1989, 328 pages.

blame what he seems to praise and blame" (2, 25 note 29, 117–18). In other words, Gray argues for "the transparency of his messages" (118). She is adamant that Xenophon does *not* convey his thoughts between the lines because this kind of rhetoric is subversive and would turn him into "a man of monumentally modern cynicism," bent on "systematically destroy[ing] seeming virtue and uncover[ing] hidden vice" (63). Though Gray concedes that Xenophon employs irony—or what she calls Socratic irony—this turns out to mean only that Xenophon is a playful and sarcastic author who uses his wit "to highlight oppression and injustice" (371). But, Gray insists, Xenophon does not conceal his wisdom: his "messages are always clearly flagged, never just for the coterie, but for all readers to perceive" (371).

The approach of Gray has much to recommend itself, at least in principle. She rightly highlights the importance of the theme of leadership for Xenophon, and alone among recent interpreters she illustrates key concepts of his "theory of leadership" from the Socratic works. She also brings together, for comparative analysis and in a useful fashion, various passages from his different writings, insisting that "no passage from any one of [Xenophon's] works can be read without cross-reference" (372). Gray is also right to make the question of how to read Xenophon central to her analysis. This said, however, the execution of her design leaves much to be desired. To begin with, her book contains surprisingly little discussion of the *Anabasis*, though Xenophon's account of how he himself ruled human beings is surely crucial for anyone seeking to clarify his "theory of leadership." (Gray's relative silence about the *Anabasis* reflects the fact that her aim is to combat "darker readings," and she is satisfied that the "*Anabasis* has not yielded much to such readings" [61].) Second, Gray's account is often rather moralistic. Her discussion of the rule of Cyrus the Elder, to take one example, is more enthusiastic than penetrating, and it suffers much in comparison to such enlightening treatments as Christopher Nadon's or Christopher Bruell's.⁸⁵ Indeed, Gray does not succeed in explaining away all the evidence that supports the so-called "darker readings." Her refusal to acknowledge the existence of genuine Socratic irony in Xenophon is equally unconvincing. Finally, Gray does not offer anything like an adequate discussion of several important issues facing rulers—such as the tension between the common good and the demands of moral virtue, or the tension between the good of the ruler and the good of the ruled—which lie at the heart of such works as the *Anabasis* and the *Education of Cyrus*. All too often, she rests satisfied with moralistic clichés and commonplaces (e.g., "the happiness of the ruler is

⁸⁵ Nadon (2001) and Bruell (1987).

impossible unless it rests on the happiness of those he rules”: 34–35). In short, Gray has the right general aim but misses the mark.

The most recent monograph on the *Anabasis*, Michael A. Flower’s *Xenophon’s Anabasis or The Expedition of Cyrus* (2012) is the best recent treatment of the work.⁸⁶ Flower approaches the *Anabasis* from the standpoint of classical history and literary criticism. His primary interest lies in “the representation of the story [of the Ten Thousand] rather than [in] a positivist reconstruction of the facts that lie behind it” (8). Specifically, he seeks to illuminate “the narratological and rhetorical strategies that shape the text” (4). To achieve this goal, Flower concentrates on a number of literary and rhetorical strategies employed by Xenophon—including what he calls “focalization” (85), “narrative economy” (89), “narrative gaps and inconsistencies” (95), “speeches” (99), “characterization” (103), and several others—that enable Xenophon to tell the story of the Ten Thousand in a manner at once vivid, instructive and “deceptively simple” (41).

Flower’s monograph is gracefully and cogently argued. He discusses with nuance and insight several passages of the *Anabasis*, including (to name but a few) the obituary of Cyrus (188–92), the entry of Xenophon in the narrative (120–30) and several episodes of the march along the Black Sea and of the campaign in Thrace (114–15 [and 165], 143, 149, 163–64). Flower’s reading is informed by an awareness that the interpreter of Xenophon must be able to “read against the grain or between the lines” (169). (Regrettably, the name of Leo Strauss is not mentioned in this monograph, not even in the several bibliographies, though Flower’s goal is “to provide as multifaceted an exploration of the *Anabasis* as I am able” [6].) An especially valuable part of the monograph is the sober critique it contains of several theories pertaining to the intention or purpose of the *Anabasis*. Two such theories should be mentioned here. First, Flower shows that purpose of the *Anabasis* is *not* primarily apologetic, as scholars have been claiming for more than a century. That is, the work is *not* designed primarily “to excuse Xenophon for participating in and enriching himself through events that, as an Athenian aristocrat, he should have had no part in” (31). Granted, the *Anabasis* contains “a degree of personal apology” (117), but Flower argues convincingly that the “time lag” between the expedition and the likely moment of composition is problematic for the “apology school”: “If the *Anabasis* was written as long after the events described as almost all historians now believe, then [Xenophon’s] banishment from Athens may already have been revoked [...] he had earned fame as the writer of several other books (probably

⁸⁶ Oxford University Press, 242 pages.

his Socratic dialogues) and he was almost too old to play a role in political and military affairs. So, unless he was excessively worried about his posthumous reputation and waited some thirty years to address that concern, the overriding purpose of the work is unlikely to be apologetic" (33 and, generally, 30–34). To this cogent line of argument we can only object that Flower is prone to forget his own better reasons and to relapse into viewing the *Anabasis* as a mere defense speech (e.g., "From start to finish, book 7 [of the *Anabasis*] constitutes a defense of Xenophon against charges of being self-serving" [152]; "Book 7 is perhaps the least read but, in many ways, the most important book in the *Anabasis*" [150].)

The second interpretive theory refuted by Flower is the notion that the *Anabasis* is a "panhellenist manifesto" whose underlying message is "if [a] band of mercenaries could so easily defeat the forces of the king and then escape from the interior of Asia, a united Hellenic force under the leadership of a professional general, such as Xenophon himself, could not fail to conquer the Persian Empire" (172). Flower demonstrates through an extensive textual analysis (chap. 7) that Xenophon is not a panhellenist: "The *Anabasis* is a panhellenist tract only on the most simple and unreflective of readings, one that looks for confirmation of stereotypes while ignoring nuance and context" (187). In particular, he shows that Xenophon doubts the feasibility, and, above all, the desirability of any panhellenic enterprise, a doubt developed in the *Education of Cyrus*. For according to the author of the *Anabasis*, "Any would-be Greek conquerors of the Persian Empire would also find Eastern luxury to be corrosive of their traditional lifestyle, ethos and values" (182).

Despite its many qualities, however—and here we could add Flower's deft use of Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, and Ktēsius to vindicate the essential veracity of the *Anabasis* (chap. 3)—this monograph is deficient in two major respects. First, Flower pays only lip service to Socrates. This omission is surprising given that Xenophon himself, according to Flower, "emphasiz[es] his connection to Socrates [...]," presenting Socrates as "the wisest of men," whose advice even "transcends mere human wisdom" (120, 123). Yet Flower's analysis of Xenophon's leadership is silent about the education he received at the hands of the philosopher. (The four Socratic writings are barely alluded to.) Second, Flower treats only superficially "the religious dimensions of the *Anabasis*" (203). To his credit, Flower stresses the importance of the issue. He also distances himself from some of the more misleading claims that have been put forth about Xenophon and piety in recent decades, not least by G. L. Cawkwell. Yet Flower's treatment of Xenophon's stance toward piety and the gods remains conventional (chap. 8). He offers little by way of analysis of the "narratological and rhetorical strategies" employed by Xenophon in the

“construction of his own religious mentality” (4, 204). And the little he does offer merely reaffirms that the author of the *Anabasis* is a man of “deep reverence for the gods” (119). Flower chides contemporary readers who “may take the intrusion of religion [in the *Anabasis*] to be a cynical device for manipulating naive or superstitious readers”; such a conception, he warns, “would itself be a naive and unsophisticated way of viewing Greek religious practices and beliefs” (159). Instead, Flower contends that Xenophon emerges as an effective leader in the *Anabasis* precisely because “he sees himself as being led by the gods” (210). We shall have ample opportunity to assess this contention in this study.

Besides the monographs of Waterfield, Lee, Gray, and Flower, a fifth book should be mentioned: *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (2004), a collection of essays edited by Robin Lane Fox.⁸⁷ Most contributors to the collection are historians of Antiquity and classicists. Their essays take up such themes as the social organization of the Persian Empire, Xenophon as mercenary, the Ten Thousand as a fighting force, and the army as a deliberating polis. The manner of writing of Xenophon is also examined by several contributors. Yet a substantial majority of them are unsympathetic. As a writer, Xenophon is accused of omitting “large and unpleasant facts”; of being “evasive, apologetic and a master of leaving unwelcome things out”; he is a lawyer pleading his case (5, 45). The opening essay of the collection (by G. L. Cawkwell) lays the foundations for these charges. Cawkwell claims that Xenophon’s primary motive for writing the *Anabasis* was to reply to serious accusations that had been leveled against him by a fellow general, Sophainetos the Stumphanian, who had authored a (lost) indictment: “Xenophon had a tale to tell in which he himself had to play the leading part [in the expedition]. Someone had told the tale differently and moved Xenophon to set the record straight. The book [i.e. the *Anabasis*] was in that sense apologia, personal apologia” (67). Though the best essay of the collection (by P. J. Stylianou) rightly questions Cawkwell’s hypothesis—a hypothesis put forward in 1972 in an influential essay—the view that the *Anabasis* is primarily “a work of apologetics” is accepted by most of the contributors to this collection (289).⁸⁸ As a result, Xenophon is depicted inaccurately and somewhat darkly—mendacious, intellectually limited, vainglorious. One

⁸⁷ Yale University Press, 351 pages.

⁸⁸ The original essay of Cawkwell is his “Introduction” to *The Persian Expedition* (1972). The essay tries to account for Xenophon’s apparent decision to publish the *Anabasis* only many years after his return from Asia. Cawkwell hypothesizes that the account of Sophainetos painted Xenophon unfavorably, prompting him to publish a rejoinder (p. 19). (The account of Sophainetos, if it was indeed written, has been lost, except for four small fragments apparently preserved by the sixth-century scholar Stephanus of Byzantium.)—For my part,

essay raises the question of “how far, [as a ruler, Xenophon] conforms to Socrates’s (probable) teaching,” but the question is not further treated (193 cf. 10). The theme of rule is of little interest to the contributors, whose purpose is historical, not philosophic—“to return [the *Anabasis*] to the center of cultural histories of the Greeks” (6).

The foregoing survey of the recent literature on the *Anabasis* will have shown, I hope, the need for an interpretation that treats the book as a work of political philosophy and a study in Socratic rule. The *Anabasis* reveals its significance, I believe, only when it is approached as such a work. But the recent literature has overlooked the centrality of philosophy—both as a preparatory training for the exercise of rule and as a way of life in its own right—in the thought of Xenophon. For, when the *Anabasis* is read as it was intended to be read, it points toward Socrates and toward philosophy, the noble and good activity *par excellence*.

Of course, to be able to practice reading as an *art* in this way, one thing is necessary above all, something that has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays [...], something for which one must almost be a cow and in any case *not* a “modern man”: *rumination*.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*

I would not dismiss too quickly P. J. Stylianou’s doubts that Sophainetos even wrote the account in question: “How is it” (Stylianou writes) “that [Sophainetos’s] work, of the first importance if it existed, is not known to anyone through all the long centuries of antiquity, with the single exception of the Byzantine drudge Stephanus? With this single, very late exception [i.e. almost a thousand years after Xenophon’s *Anabasis*], only Xenophon was known in antiquity to have participated in the march of the Ten Thousand and to have written an account of it” (p. 70). But even if we concede that Sophainetos did write a book, as I am inclined to do, Xenophon indicates with perfect clarity in the *Anabasis* how he assesses the man: Sophainetos is useless at a critical moment (2.5.37), he is fined by the soldiers for neglecting his duties (5.8.1), he is of bad judgment and somewhat cowardly (6.5.13), he is only fit to rule noncombatants, women, and children, or to be put in charge of the baggage train (4.4.19–22, esp. §22; 5.3.1). To suggest that a masterpiece like Xenophon’s *Anabasis* was written *primarily* to answer such a man, whose book, if it ever existed, must have reflected the deficiencies of its author, is untenable.—In addition to Cawkwell’s essays, the reader may consider Dürrbach’s old but still influential “L’Apologie de Xénophon dans l’*Anabase*” (1893). Dürrbach is an even more extreme example of the tendency to attack Xenophon on the basis of bald assertions, unsupported hypotheses, or worse.

PART I

THE KINGSHIP OF CYRUS

CHAPTER 1

“THE GODLIKE KING” (BOOK ONE OF THE *ANABASIS*)

The *Anabasis of Cyrus* bears an enigmatic title.¹ Even the casual reader can see that the “ascent” of Cyrus fills only the first of the seven books of the work. Cyrus is killed in the Battle for Babylon and plays no role afterward (1.8.21–29). Yet the entire work is named after him. Why? Xenophon apparently wishes to draw our attention to Cyrus. But let us be more precise. The *Anabasis* could have been more simply titled “The Expedition of Cyrus,” a phrase used twice in book one.² It is therefore to Cyrus’s *ascent* that our attention is being drawn. We must seek in the present chapter to understand the character of this ascent. But it will be a much longer time before we can understand why Xenophon chose to name his *entire* work after “the ascent of Cyrus.”

1. Rooting for the Noble and Good King

Book one of the *Anabasis* paints a favorable portrait of Cyrus. In fact, the portrait is so favorable that first-time readers invariably root for his success. “To Darius and Parysatis were born two sons,” the story begins, “the elder was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus” (1.1.1). When Darius fell ill and suspected that his death was near, he wished for both his sons to be by his side. Artaxerxes was already at court but Cyrus had to be recalled from Western Asia Minor where he ruled a satrapy and commanded a large body of troops. Cyrus obeyed the paternal summon and journeyed upland with Tissaphernēs, a neighboring satrap, whom he took along as a friend. Darius eventually died and Artaxerxes ascended the throne.

¹ The title “Anabasis of Cyrus” is found in all the MSS.

² TON KUROU STOLON: 1.2.5, 1.3.16.

No sooner had this occurred, however, than Cyrus was slandered by Tissaphernēs, who accused him of plotting against the new King. Cyrus was thrown in jail and barely escaped with his life when his mother interceded on his behalf. Sent back to his satrapy in dishonor and having been in danger, he resolved never to be in the power of his brother again but to become King in his place if he could. His mother Parysatis assisted him because she loved him more than King Artaxerxes.

Our sympathy for Cyrus, aroused by the sight of a wrong suffered, is strengthened by the array of virtues or qualities that Xenophon ascribes to him. The first two chapters sketch how Cyrus begins his second journey up-country after assembling in secret a force of Greek mercenaries. Cyrus is shown to be highly capable of acquiring accomplished and loyal friends. When Artaxerxes sends envoys to him, for example, he sends them back after making them better friends to himself than to the King. He also trains his subjects in the art of war and cultivates their goodwill (1.1.5). When Cyrus goes to war with Tissaphernēs, all the Greek cities of Ionia (with one exception) side with Cyrus because they trust him more. For, he had made it evident that he placed the greatest importance on never being false to his treaties, agreements, and promises. In keeping with this, Cyrus is visibly distressed, early in his campaign against the King, when he is unable to pay the wage he promised his Greek mercenaries (1.2.11). He also reacts with signal magnanimity when two important Greek generals abandon the campaign. He declares publicly that he shall not hunt down the two men, though he has the power to do so and knows where they are: "But let them go, in the knowledge that they are acting worse to us than we to them" (1.4.8).

Cyrus's magnanimity and justice (among other qualities) make him an immediately attractive ruler. Of course, the portrait painted by Xenophon is not attractive in every respect. Most notably, Cyrus is shown to be willing and able to deceive. It is perhaps not surprising or entirely without justification that he deceives Artaxerxes. The King had jailed and almost killed him (1.1.8). Less easily justified are Cyrus's repeated deceptions of his Greek troops and officers, some of whom, like the Boeotian Proxenos, were his guest-friends (e.g., 1.2.1, 1.3.20–21; 1.1.11). Indeed no Greek soldier or officer (except for Klearchos) is ever apprised of the goal of the expedition until after it is too late to turn around (3.1.10).³ If Cyrus places the greatest importance on being true to his word, he is hardly above deceiving even his friends. Yet despite this mendacity, Xenophon portrays him favorably. He even gives Cyrus a fulsome eulogy after his death: "Cyrus was agreed by all those who seemed to have had

³ On Cyrus's deceptions see also note 18 and Appendix 3.

experience of him to be a most kingly man and one most worthy to rule among all the Persians who have been born since Cyrus the Elder" (1.9.1). The qualities ascribed to Cyrus include loyalty (1.9.10), manliness (1.9.11), justice in rewarding the good and punishing the bad (1.9.13–16), and care and generosity toward friends (1.9.24–28). Xenophon even asserts on the basis of what he hears about Cyrus that "no one among Greeks or barbarians was loved by more people" (1.9.28). Cyrus would appear to have been Xenophon's model King.

Critics have charged, however, that this portrait of Cyrus is inaccurate and misleading. Xenophon turns a blind eye to the darker side of his hero, it is asserted, and fails to state the facts as he must have known them. For example, there is evidence that Cyrus was *not* slandered by Tissaphernēs or wronged by Artaxerxes at all. In fact, the opposite is the case. In his *Life of Artaxerxes*, Plutarch sketches the details of a plot hatched by Cyrus to murder his brother during his accession ceremony, a plot exposed *in extremis* by Tissaphernēs. The account of Plutarch would appear to be reliable since it is based on that of Ktēsias, a Greek physician at the Persian court who had personally witnessed the failed coup and described it in his (lost) *Persika*. Since Xenophon refers to the *Persika* twice in the *Anabasis*, he must have been familiar with this eyewitness account (1.8.26, §27). Nevertheless, he depicts Cyrus as a blameless victim, glazing over the evidence of his culpability. So, at least, the critics have charged.⁴

This accusation is weighty and must be answered. Let us consider the *Hellenika* for a moment. We find indicated in *that* work that Cyrus had trained his sights on the Persian throne even before the death of his father King Darius. Cyrus had put to death two of his cousins as they approached him without putting their hands into their sleeves, a gesture of submission that the Persians would do (Xenophon stresses) "*only for the King*."⁵ That Cyrus murdered his two cousins even as King Darius was still alive left no doubt about his ultimate ambition. Moreover, it was for *these* hubristic acts that Darius recalled Cyrus, using his illness as a pretext.⁶ To say the least, the *Hellenika* does not disprove that Cyrus

⁴ Hirsch (1985), for example, discusses the apparent blindness of Xenophon to the sins of Cyrus (p. 24). For the reliability of the accounts of Plutarch and Ktēsias, see Flower (2012) pp. 60–80.

⁵ *Hellenika* 2.1.8–9. The primary purpose of the gesture was apparently to ward off assassination attempts. See also *Education of Cyrus* 8.3.10.

⁶ After the parents of the murdered youths impress upon King Darius that it would be terrible to overlook Cyrus's hubris, the King recalls him, "saying that he is sick" (HOS ARRŌSTŌN: *Hellenika* 2.1.9). Consider also the rather unusual use of HUPOPTEUŌ ("to suspect") in the second sentence of the *Anabasis* (1.1.1) and compare the next use of the word (1.3.1).

had been plotting against his brother and that Tissaphernēs was telling the truth.⁷

But this line of argument is open to an obvious objection: If Cyrus had been plotting against his brother the King, why not say so in the *Anabasis*? Isn't the presentation of Cyrus in the *Anabasis*—where he comes to sight as the victim of a wrong—inconsistent with the presentation of him in the *Hellenika*? And given this inconsistency, shouldn't we dismiss *Hellenika* 2.1.8–9 as an interpolation, as many scholars have done?⁸ In my view, we must answer these questions in the negative, and not merely because *Hellenika* 2.1.8–9 is found in all the MSS. For, if we go back to the *Anabasis* and consider the text carefully, we see that Cyrus's innocence is more apparent than real. In the first place, Xenophon never actually says that Cyrus has been wronged by his brother or by Tissaphernēs. He writes only that after being freed from jail, Cyrus was sent back to his satrapy “having been dishonored and in danger” (1.1.4). He avoids saying that Cyrus had been “wronged” (ADIKESTHAI). A parallel passage of the *Hellenika* proves that, for Xenophon, “being dishonored” and “being wronged” are distinct considerations: one can be “dishonored” without being “wronged” at all (4.1.27). Even more tellingly, Cyrus never complains of any wrong done to him. In a speech to his Greek mercenaries before the Battle for Babylon, he has a golden opportunity to voice just such a complaint. The reader expects that he will justify himself by alluding to the justice of his cause. But he is silent about justice.⁹ He speaks only of his desire to be free (1.7.2–4). The meaning of this silence becomes clear if we contrast it with Cyrus's vocal complaints, at the trial of the Persian traitor Orontēs, where Cyrus enumerates all the sins that

⁷ Diodorus Siculus (2000) writes that Cyrus “had been planning for a long while to lead an army against his brother Artaxerxes” (14.19.2).

⁸ The grounds for impugning *Hellenika* 2.1.8–9—which go beyond the alleged inconsistency between the presentation of Cyrus in the *Hellenika* and the presentation of Cyrus in the *Anabasis*—are well summarized in *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika* (2009) (p. 42, note 2.1.8a). But we should not reject the passage as an interpolation even if we take into account the additional grounds. For one, the impugned passage is entirely consistent with the rest of the *Hellenika*. During the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, Cyrus supports Sparta with his own money. He thereby lays the foundations for a successful request for help from the Spartans after the war (*Hellenika* 3.1.1). In keeping with the almost complete silence about Cyrus's plot in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon does not explain why a fleet of thirty-five ships, commanded by a Lacedaemonian, and an army of seven hundred hoplites, also commanded by a Lacedaemonian, would have reached Cyrus. He says merely that the contingent was sent “from the Peloponnesus” (*Anabasis* 1.4.2–3). See Proietti (1987) pp. 22–23.

⁹ Compare the speech of Cyrus the Elder to the Peers before they set out from Persia: *he* stresses the justice of their cause (*Education of Cyrus* 1.5.13).

the accused man committed against him: Cyrus was not one to suffer injustice in silence (1.6). Yet (it will be objected), doesn't Xenophon say that Cyrus was "slandered" (DIABALLŌ) by Tissaphernēs (1.1.3)? Yes he does. But the Greek verb DIABALLŌ must sometimes be translated as "to accuse" without any implication of falsehood.¹⁰ Once this picture is completed by several additional pointers—for example, why does Cyrus visit his father's deathbed with a retinue of three hundred *Greek* hoplites? (1.1.2)—a conclusion becomes inescapable: Cyrus had been plotting a coup. He was not wronged at all.¹¹

The genuine difficulty, then, is not to reconcile the *Anabasis* with the *Hellenika* since these works paint a consistent portrait of Cyrus. It is rather to explain why Xenophon chooses to "improve upon" Cyrus in the *Anabasis*: that is, why he makes him even more sympathetic and attractive by *almost* depicting him as the victim of a wrong, while intimating that he was not. This question will lead me, I believe, into the heart of Xenophon's intention in the *Anabasis*. But instead of trying to answer it now, let me first examine the character of Cyrus's rule. I must focus on the central issue of book one, which is also the central issue of the first stage of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*: Can the noble and the good be conjoined or reconciled in and through the rule of a Godlike King? I shall return to the question of Xenophon's manner of writing at the end of the chapter.

¹⁰ Consider the use of DIABALLŌ at 5.6.29. Xenophon was "accused" but not "slandered" by Silanos—unless we put words in Silanos's mouth that Silanos did not pronounce (cf. the LOGOS of 5.6.29 with the LOGOS of 5.6.17).

¹¹ Consider the central placement of amputated "hands" at 1.9.13: the killing of Cyrus's two cousins may have been an extreme sanction, but the crime for which they were punished—failing to put their hands into their sleeves—had been punished in others before. Cyrus demanded to be treated as the King. Observe also that Cyrus is said to be accompanied by Xennias of Parrasia (PARRASION, the accusative of PARRASIOS) on his first journey upland (1.1.3). According to the *apparata* of Dindorf and Hude/Peters, however, the best MSS. (CBA) all "misspell" PARRASION and have PARASION instead (only one R). I believe that this reading is authentic and goes back to Xenophon. It should be read "PARA-SION" (i.e., PARA+ the accusative of SIOS): Xennias marches up-country "by the side of a god." (For the description of Cyrus as a god, see section three of this chapter.)—There is another occurrence of "PARASION" (only one R) at *Memorabilia* 3.10.1 (MSS. BMOX, Hude's apparatus). In that text, we must imagine that the painter bearing the name "PARASION" is standing next to a portrait of a being of unimpeachable beauty, perhaps of Zeus himself (§2, §4). Or is the painter standing next to a portrait of the beautiful courtesan "Theodotē" ("The-Gift-Of-God") who appears in the following chapter and whose beauty was said to surpass speech (*Memorabilia* 3.11)? According to Xenophon, Theodotē showed to painters "as much of herself as was beautiful to show" (3.11.1). It is not clear that the phrase is restrictive. ("Theodotē" = "The-Giving-Goddess"?)

2. Cyrus and His Friends: Klearchos, Menōn, Proxenos, Xennias, and Pasīon

“And you [...] Hermogenēs, what do you glory in above all?” And he said, “In the virtue and power of my friends, and that, being of this sort, they take care of me.”

Thereupon all looked at him, and many asked at once if he would make clear to them who these were. And he said that he would not begrudge doing so.

Symposium 3.14

Xenophon’s description of the march toward Babylon is terse, not to say laconic. He gives us few details about the landscapes, the rivers, and the peoples encountered by the army except for the occasional mention of the width of a river or of a city “inhabited, happy and large” (e.g., 1.2.6).¹² He has been accused of traveling with his eyes closed.¹³ Is the terseness of speech meant to convey a sense of the rapidity of the march? Cyrus is certainly eager to catch his brother as ill-prepared as possible (1.1.6, 1.5.9; e.g., 1.4.1). But let us keep the question open. I shall offer a more important reason for the terseness of speech in section three of this chapter. Meanwhile, we witness the difficulties that Cyrus is able to overcome in the early goings of his campaign—the difficulty of finding money to pay his mercenaries, for example (1.2.11 ff.). At the city of Tarsus, he appears to run out of expedients. The soldiers refuse to march any further. They suspect that he is leading them against the King. Cyrus had been claiming that his campaign was directed against the Pisidians. But his deeds were long at odds with this claim.¹⁴ The soldiers eventually conclude that he must have bigger fish to fry: “We have not been paid for this” (1.3.1).

The Lacedaemonian exile Klearchos, the commander of a contingent of two thousand troops, comes to the assistance of Cyrus. At first, he attempts to compel his own soldiers to march on. But he fails miserably.

¹² Strauss (1983) analyzes the significance of the formula “inhabited, happy and large” (pp. 106–7).

¹³ Masqueray Vol. 1 p. 162 (note to page 62). Others have noted this terseness: Brulé (1995) pp. 5–6, Tuplin (2004) p. 166, Waterfield (2006) p. 103, Lane Fox (2004b) pp. 27–28. The terseness of Xenophon contrasts with the loquacity of Herodotus (1.193–99).

¹⁴ At 1.2.27, Cyrus presents the ruler of Cilicia with gifts “which are believed to be honors from a King.” The soldiers refuse to march on in the immediate aftermath of this episode (1.3.1). The march of Cyrus also circumvents the territory of the Pisidians, the ostensible target of his expedition. Finally, consider Cyrus’s evident pleasure when, during a mock charge, he sees the fear that his Greek mercenaries inspire in “the barbarians,” a phrase that refers (in part) to his own Persian troops (1.2.18 cf. 1.2.16).

He therefore gathers his soldiers and stands before them for a long time, crying silently. The soldiers are surprised and keep a hushed silence. Finally, Klearchos speaks up: "Do not be surprised, men and soldiers, that I bear the present circumstances with difficulty" (1.3.3). For, Klearchos explains, he has been exceedingly well treated by Cyrus even though he is an exile from his fatherland.¹⁵ Since the soldiers are now refusing to march on, he is under a necessity either to be false to his benefactor or to betray fellow-Greeks. "I do not know whether I will be doing what is just," he says, "but I choose you, and, with you, I will suffer what may" (1.3.5). Klearchos, who repeats this last formula twice, also gives two reasons for his choice.¹⁶ First, he does not want anyone to say that after leading Greeks against the barbarians, he betrayed the Greeks and chose "the friendship of the barbarians" (1.3.5). Second, he claims to be motivated by self-interest: "I believe that you are my fatherland and my friends and my allies; with you, I suppose that I would be honored wherever I go; but without you I could neither benefit a friend nor ward off an enemy" (1.3.6).

Klearchos's speech is a resounding success. The soldiers praise him for saying that he will not march against the King. Over two thousand men (from the contingents of the generals Xennias and Pasiōn) pack their weapons and wares and go pitch their tents near his encampment. The reader has grounds to distrust Klearchos, however. For one, Klearchos's reason based on self-interest is weak: his mercenaries have followed him because he has paid their wage. But he himself has been bankrolled by Cyrus. If he abandons Cyrus, he will be abandoned by his own troops, who will look for a wage elsewhere. It is not in Klearchos's interest to forgo "the friendship of the barbarians." As for the second reason—he will not betray fellow-Greeks—it is somewhat suspect as well. Klearchos is an *exile* from Sparta. His dedication to his native city, at least, is hardly above suspicion. Besides, his lofty philo-Hellenic speech is addressed to a group of soldiers almost half of whom are (non-Hellenic) Thracians. Surely an odd crowd to address such a speech to (1.2.9)!

We are thus not surprised that Klearchos works behind the scene to persuade the soldiers to follow Cyrus. First, he refuses to go meet Cyrus. Being at a loss and distressed, Cyrus keeps sending for him. Yet Klearchos sends word to Cyrus in secret to take heart: all will be well.¹⁷ Second,

¹⁵ Klearchos claims that Cyrus was his guest-friend (1.3.3). Xenophon does not say this (cf. 1.1.9 with 1.1.10 [Aristippos] and 1.1.11 [Proxenos; Sophainetos and Socrates]).

¹⁶ Klearchos repeats the phrase "SUN HUMĪN...HOTI AN DEĒ PEISOMAI" at the beginning of each of the two reasons.

¹⁷ Klearchos bids Cyrus to keep sending for him but warns that he will not heed his calls (1.3.8).

Klearchos calls an assembly of his soldiers. At issue is what to do next: "It is clear," he begins, "that Cyrus's situation toward us is the same as our situation toward him: we are no longer his soldiers, since we are not following him, and he is no longer our paymaster" (1.3.9). Klearchos goes on to say that, as he knows, Cyrus believes that he has been wronged by the Greeks. He also reminds his audience of the large infantry, cavalry, and navy of Cyrus, all of which the soldiers both know of and can see. Klearchos then opens the debate, but not without bidding some soldiers to stand up and show that (without the consent of Cyrus) it will be difficult either to stay put in Tarsus or to go home. The speeches have their effect. The soldiers begin to realize that they may have to follow Cyrus after all. Eventually, it is decided to ask Cyrus what he intends to do (1.3.18). Envoys report that Cyrus says that he wishes to march against Abrocomas, his enemy, who is near the Euphrates, *twelve* days distant (1.3.20, my emphasis). "If Abrocomas is there," Cyrus is reported as saying, "I desire to inflict the just penalty on him; but if he flees, we will deliberate there about these things" (1.3.20). The soldiers decide to follow Cyrus, encouraged by a promise of a substantial pay increase. But they continue to suspect that he is leading them against the King (1.3.21).

Xenophon makes it perfectly clear that Cyrus is steeped in deception. As soon as the army reaches the Euphrates, at the city of Thapsakos, Cyrus simply tells the Greeks that they will march against the Great King in Babylon. He never "deliberates about these things" with them, though Abrocomas has fled (1.4.11).¹⁸ Cyrus also rewards Klearchos handsomely for his part in the affair. Klearchos is permitted to keep the troops of Xennias and Pasiōn (over two thousand men). Henceforth, he becomes the Greek most honored and trusted by Cyrus. Klearchos is stationed on the right in the position of honor at the Battle for Babylon. He has become Cyrus's closest friend (1.8.4).¹⁹

Yet Klearchos's handsome reward notwithstanding, it would be incorrect to conclude that, as a rule, Cyrus reduces the noble to the useful or the expedient. In fact, the episode of the deserting generals Xennias and Pasiōn carries the emphatic message that it is precisely the *virtue* of his friends—not their political usefulness to himself—that Cyrus looks to above all when he determines how to treat them.

The generals Xennias and Pasiōn desert because (as it seems to most) their honor has been wounded that Klearchos was permitted to keep their

¹⁸ Other lies could be mentioned. For example, Cyrus expects to encounter Abrocomas much before the Euphrates (cf. 1.3.21 with 1.4.5).

¹⁹ Hitherto, Xennias (cf. 1.2.10) and Menōn (1.2.15 and 1.2.20) had occupied the first places.

troops (1.4.7). Reacting to their desertion, Cyrus calls the Greek generals together.²⁰

Xennias and Pasiōn have abandoned us (Cyrus says), but let them know well that they have not run away in secret (APODIDRASKŌ)—I know where they have gone—nor have they escaped my reach (APOPHEUGŌ)—I have triremes with which to overtake their boat.²¹ But by the gods, I will not pursue them! No one will say that I profit from those who are by my side, but that when they wish to go away, I seize them, do them harm, and deprive them of their property. But let them go, in the knowledge that they are acting worse to us than we to them. And even though I have their children and wives under guard in Tralleis, I will not deprive them of these either, but they will receive them, on account of their former virtue (ARETĒ) toward me. (1.4.8)

Hitherto, rumors had been swirling around Cyrus that he was in hot pursuit of the two deserters. Some prayed for them to be caught—they held them to be cowards—but others pitied their plight should they be captured. An uneasy mixture of shame and fear was thus keeping the Greeks united and obedient to Cyrus (1.4.7 cf. 3.1.10). But the magnanimous speech of Cyrus causes the Greeks to become much more forward in their enterprise: “If anyone was rather dispirited about the ascent, they campaigned more pleasantly and eagerly upon hearing of Cyrus’s virtue” (1.4.9). The prospect of being ruled by a man who is, so to speak, all-knowing (“I know where they have gone”) and all-powerful (“I have triremes with which to overtake them”), and who takes virtue into consideration and even singles out virtue as the proper standard for punishment and reward, is exceedingly invigorating. The ascent of Cyrus opens up bright prospects for the virtuous. It heralds a new order where the subjects of the (future) King might receive in accordance with their merits, and where transgressions might be punished mildly or entirely forgiven in recognition of past virtue. Admittedly, Cyrus might not act as he says. And by stressing his concern for virtue and by speaking magnanimously, he serves his political interests. Nevertheless, the episode of Xennias and Pasiōn opens up an important vista of interpretation: the “Ascent of Cyrus” refers to the rise of a ruler who becomes an

²⁰ This is the first speech of Cyrus reported by Xenophon (1.4.8–9). Cyrus never harangues the ordinary soldier. A being of his rank must maintain awe-inducing aloofness.

²¹ The capacity of Cyrus is limited neither by deficient knowledge nor by deficient power: cf. 2.5.7 and *Symposium* 4.47–48. Note the emphatic oath “by the gods” that immediately follows: Cyrus partakes of the knowledge and power characteristic of the gods (1.4.8).

emphatically knowledgeable and powerful King, and who appears to be both willing and able to ensure a just correspondence between merit and reward (or punishment) for his subjects.



Cyrus reaches the Euphrates *nineteen* days after leaving Tarsus. He sends for his Greek generals and tells them that the objective is Babylon. He also bids them persuade the soldiers to follow along. Xenophon describes how one general, Menōn of Thessaly, persuades his own army to do so (1.4.14–16). Upon hearing the news, the troops are incensed. They accuse their generals of duplicity. They also demand a further pay hike. But as they debate whether or not to follow Cyrus, Menōn takes aside his own soldiers and urges them to take the lead in crossing the Euphrates: “Men, should you be persuaded by me, you will be honored by Cyrus above his other soldiers without incurring any danger or suffering any toil” (1.4.14). Indeed, Menōn reasons, if the army votes to follow Cyrus, the troops of his contingent will seem to have caused this and Cyrus will reward them handsomely; if, on the other hand, the army votes against Cyrus, the expedition will fold and the troops in question will have gained Cyrus’s trust nonetheless. Theirs is the proverbial “win-win” situation. The soldiers are persuaded by this reasoning and they cross the Euphrates. Menōn also proves to be an accurate forecaster, for, after the crossing, his soldiers are promised great rewards: “It will be my care,” Cyrus is reported as saying, “that you praise me, or no longer believe (NOMIDZEIN)²² (in) me Cyrus.” This promise, conveyed by the Persian Gloūs, instills great hopes in the soldiers. They pray for²³ Cyrus to succeed. The passions of shame and fear are being gradually superseded by hope as the cement of the army (1.4.16). Menōn himself is said to receive magnificent gifts from Cyrus, for, in the wake of his contingent, all the Greeks cross the Euphrates.

The gifts received by Menōn should remind us of the gift received earlier by Klearchos: in both cases, Cyrus recompenses friends whose behavior is useful but not in keeping with the demands of the noble. Or is the behavior of Menōn more defensible—or less ignoble—than that of Klearchos? After all, it was too late for the Greeks to turn around and

²² Cf., for example, *Memorabilia* 1.1.1, 1.1.19.

²³ ΕΥΧΟΝΤΟ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΥΤΥΧΗΣΑΙ: 1.4.17; cf., for example, 6.1.26, where ΕΥΧΟΜΑΙ is used with the accusative of the being to whom the prayers are addressed. In the same vein, consider the description of the river at 1.4.17–18. According to Herodotus, the Persians regarded rivers as quasi-divine beings: 1.138.2, 1.189.2.

go home. Menōn made the best of the situation (it could be argued) so that he and his men got the credit for doing what they could no longer help doing. Besides, Menōn benefited his men, in marked contrast to Klearchos, who benefited only himself. Yet this defense of Menōn overlooks that no less than Klearchos, he places "the friendship of the barbarian" above the interests of (most of) the Greeks. If the action of Klearchos was ignoble, it had the merit of not fostering dissension in the army. Menōn's unilateral crossing of the Euphrates was bound to fracture Hellenic unity. In the sequel, a riot nearly causes the implosion of the army of the Ten Thousand (1.5.11–17). Menōn's action at the Euphrates sets the stage for this perilous showdown. He has undermined the common safety at a time of mortal danger.

As Cyrus enters Arabia, the story focuses on a pair of episodes whose function in the *logos* of the *Anabasis* is to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the rule of a Godlike King. The army advances rapidly through a desert that is as level as the sea, very fragrant, populated by many kinds of wild animals, and devoid of trees. After marching for about three weeks, Cyrus finds himself in a narrow and muddy place difficult for the chariots to get across. He orders two of his officers, Gloūs²⁴ and Pigretes, to take some barbarian troops and move the chariots out of the mud (1.5.7ff). When it seems to him that his order is carried out lackadaisically, he directs, as if in anger, the best Persians of his circle to take over the job and dislodge the chariots. "There," Xenophon observes, "one could contemplate a part of good order" (1.5.8). Straightaway, the Persian nobles throw off their purple coats and run down a very steep hill "as someone might do to win a victory" (1.5.8). Though wearing expensive Persian tunics and embroidered pants, and even (in some cases) necklaces and bracelets, they leap into the mud, lift the wagons into the air and dislodge them more quickly than anyone might have thought possible. Under the watchful eye of Cyrus, the Persians display remarkable zeal and manly vigor. They behave as if they had entered a race, and indeed they have: the prize for victory is the friendship of the (future) King.²⁵

The second episode takes place near the city of Charmande²⁶ where the riot mentioned a moment ago takes place (1.5.10–17). A scarcity of provisions and some unusually long marches exacerbate the tensions. But it is Klearchos who ignites the powder keg. A soldier of Menōn is fighting

²⁴ According to the *apparata* of Masqueray and Dindorf, the second hand of MS. C renames GLOŪS into LOŪN ("he-who-takes-a-bath-[of-mud]"). LOŪN (or LOUSASTHAI) is common in Xenophon: for example, *Education of Cyrus* 1.3.11, 4.5.4; *Memorabilia* 3.13.3 (4X).

²⁵ Cf. 1.9.15 and *Education of Cyrus* 8.1.39, as well as *Oikonomikos* 12.20 and 21.10–12.

²⁶ In the best MSS. "CHARMANDĒ" is called "CHARMANTHĒ" (1.5.10: "The-Blooming-of-Battle," CHARMĒ-ANTHĒ).

with one of his own soldiers. Klearchos judges that Menōn's soldier is in the wrong, and he beats him (1.5.11). The soldier complains of this to his comrades, who are exceedingly wroth with Klearchos. Later in the day, as Klearchos is riding through Menōn's camp with a few of his men, one of Menōn's soldiers who had been splitting wood hurls his ax at him (he misses). Several other soldiers start pelting rocks and raise an outcry. Klearchos flees to his army and calls it to arms. He moves against Menōn's troops at the head of his Thracian infantry and more than forty horsemen (most of them also Thracians). They, in turn, are astonished and run to arms along with Menōn. Just at this point, Proxenos the Boeotian arrives on the scene. He was coming late into camp with a company of hoplites. He immediately leads these troops and stations them between the two armies. He asks Klearchos to stop what he is doing. An angry Klearchos orders him to step aside. Meanwhile Cyrus reaches the camp and learns of the riot. He immediately arms himself, rides up between the two sides with a few faithfuls and says:

Klearchos, Proxenos and you others who are present, you do not know what you are doing! For if you fight each other now, believe that I am done for, and so are you, not much later than I. For if our affairs go badly, all these barbarians you see will be more hostile to you than those who are with the King. (1.5.16)

At these words, Klearchos comes to his sense and the crisis is instantly over. And indeed, Cyrus is right: the fate of the Greeks is bound up with his own. If his affairs go badly, his own barbarian troops will turn on the Greeks.²⁷ Yet it is striking that Cyrus rebukes *Proxenos*, not just Klearchos and the others, for this showdown. Why? Didn't Proxenos avert a catastrophe? Yes he did. But Cyrus does not know this. He blames the very man whose presence of mind and courage saved his expedition: it is Cyrus who "does not know what he is doing." If Cyrus wishes to reward individual merit, he will have to know the facts. He needs more eyes and ears, for he is obviously not all-knowing. He needs good informants.

3. The Ascent of Cyrus and the Descent of Xenophon

"The good household managers [...] say that one should buy when it is possible to purchase for a small sum what is worth a lot. Because of the present troubles it is possible to acquire good friends very cheaply."

And Diodōros said, "You speak nobly indeed, Socrates, and bid Hermogenēs come to me."

²⁷ That is exactly what will happen after the death of Cyrus.

“No, by Zeus,” he said, “not I”; “Nor do I believe that it would be nobler for you to invite him than if you were to go to him yourself; nor that it is a greater good for him that these things be done than for yourself.”

Thus Diodōros went to Hermogenēs. And without spending a lot he acquired a friend who made it his task to examine what he could say or do that would profit and delight Diodōros.

Memorabilia 2.10.4–6

The next chapter makes it clear that Cyrus's practice of rewarding handsomely good services he has received earns him a *de facto* network of informants (1.6). In this respect (among others) he walks in the footsteps of Cyrus the Elder.²⁸ The chapter depicts the trial of Orontēs, a relative of the King reputed to be among the best of the Persians in matters of war. Orontēs had waged war against Cyrus before, but the two men had made their peace. Orontēs was now campaigning alongside him. He, however, decides to become a turncoat. He first persuades Cyrus to entrust him with a thousand horsemen. He promises to use the squadron to stop the King's cavalry from scorching the earth ahead of Cyrus's advancing host. When Orontēs believes that his forces are ready, he sends a secret dispatch to the King, stating his intention to defect and asking to be received as a friend. This letter he entrusts to a man he believes is faithful to himself. But the man puts the letter in Cyrus's hands. Cyrus immediately arrests Orontēs and summons to his tent the seven best Persians of his circle (1.6.4). He also gives orders that Greek hoplites be positioned around his tent. (About three thousand hoplites are so positioned.) Klearchos is the only Greek allowed inside. He later reports to his fellow Hellenes how the trial of Orontēs took place. “For it was not a forbidden secret,” Xenophon observes, rather pointedly (1.6.5).

Cyrus opens the trial by stating that he wants to deliberate with the men present about what is just in the eyes of both gods and human beings, and to visit this just punishment upon Orontēs (1.6.6). He conducts the proceedings like a skilled inquisitor, getting Orontēs to confess his sins.²⁹ We learn that Orontēs wronged Cyrus on three separate occasions. The first two times, he was eventually forgiven by Cyrus and the two men

²⁸ *Education of Cyrus* 8.2.10–12.

²⁹ The trial focuses on the question of justice. Cyrus does not raise the question of whether it would be advantageous for him to punish Orontēs. This trial should be contrasted with the trial of the Armenian in the *Education of Cyrus*, where Cyrus the Elder (under the tutelage of the Socratic Tigranēs) gradually moves away from consideration of justice to considerations of advantage (3.1). The stress of Cyrus the Younger serves to highlight his preoccupation with justice even as it shows that he is not a man to suffer injustice in silence. That Cyrus the Younger is *not* indifferent to considerations of advantage, however, will soon become clear. (See below, note 31 and accompanying text.)

made their peace. But Orontēs is forced to admit that Cyrus's forgiveness was poorly requited as he kept committing acts of wrongdoing. The most revealing of these acts is undoubtedly the second and central one. Orontēs had defected to the Mysians and harmed Cyrus's territory even though he had not been wronged by Cyrus. When Orontēs realized the limits of his power, "you went to the altar of Artemis (says Cyrus), and you said that you repented, and, after persuading me, you again gave me pledges of trust and received them from me" (1.6.7). Yet despite his belated repentance, Orontēs has once again been exposed, for the third time, as a plotter against Cyrus. The verdict of the trial is therefore something of a foregone conclusion: "You agree that you have been unjust toward me?" "It is necessary," Orontēs concedes (1.6.8). Since Orontēs can no longer be trusted, the trial ends on a predictable sentence of death. It is carried out by the scepter bearer Artapates. Orontēs is never again seen, dead or alive (1.6.11).

The trial of Orontēs is revealing. First, it proves that Cyrus is quite capable of discovering what his followers say or do in the privacy of their tents. That his first-hand knowledge is limited need not keep him from becoming something of an all-knowing King, at least if he can rely on good informants. Second, the episode shows us that loyalty to Cyrus is in short supply in some quarters of his camp. That he surrounds himself with three thousands Greek hoplites before the trial shows that he believes—correctly³⁰—that some Persians are more faithful to Orontēs than to himself. Cyrus uses the military might of his Greeks to check his barbarians, and he uses his barbarians (at Charmande) to check his Greeks (1.5.16). Indeed Orontēs is not the sole high-ranking Persian whose loyalty is in doubt. His trial is intended to shore up the loyalty of "the seven best Persians of his circle." And it is quite successful in this.³¹

The most important aspect of the trial, however, is pointed to by Cyrus's prefatory announcement that he will deliberate with the men present about "what is just in the eyes of [or toward] both gods and human beings" (HO TI DIKAION ESTI KAI PROS THEŌN KAI

³⁰ Xenophon remarks that some men "who used to prostrate themselves" before Orontēs, "when they saw him being led away, prostrated themselves even then, though they knew that he was being led to his death" (1.6.10).

³¹ Consider the passage describing the death of Cyrus (1.8.27–29). Xenophon writes that "the eight best [Persians] of his circle" died fighting alongside Cyrus. Of those eight, only one is named—the scepter bearer Artapates. The other unnamed seven are apparently the same unnamed seven who witness the trial of Orontēs. Xenophon adumbrates this point by being awkwardly precise about the number "seven" (1.6.14) and then about the number "eight" (1.8.27). The death of these men is thus hardly evidence that Cyrus was greatly loved (cf. 1.9.28–30, esp. §30). In other words, Cyrus is not forgetting about political advantage in the trial of Orontēs, though he focuses on the question of justice.

PROS ANTHRŌPŌN: 1.6.6). The announcement contains a carefully crafted ambiguity. Is Cyrus saying that the trial will be *witnessed by* both gods and human beings (PROS = “in the eyes of”)? Or is he saying that the trial will determine what wrongs were *done to* or *suffered by* both gods and human beings (PROS = “toward” or “with respect to”)? Both interpretations are grammatically possible, and both are intended, I believe.³² Yet both interpretations are open to difficulties. If Cyrus expects the proceedings to be *witnessed by* the gods, then it is strange that he would choose to try Orontēs in the secrecy of his tent. The gods, it was believed, did not know the secret proceedings of human beings.³³ But if Cyrus means that the trial will determine what wrongs were *done to* or *suffered by* the gods, then an equally serious problem arises: the trial of Orontēs investigates exclusively the wrongs done to *Cyrus* (1.6.6). No stress whatsoever is put on the wrong done to the gods, though the goddess Artemis, in particular, had been wronged by Orontēs. (The traitor broke the pledges he had given before her very altar.) Yet the wrong done to Artemis goes unmentioned in Cyrus’s noticeably one-sided verdict: “You agree that you have been unjust to *me*?” (1.6.8, my emphasis).

To be sure, Cyrus’s verdict reflects his indifference toward the gods. But if this is a sufficient explanation of his silence about the gods, why even allude to them—and so ostentatiously—at the beginning of the trial? Why call attention to the missing element of his verdict? All these difficulties can be solved at a single stroke, I believe, if we assume that Cyrus has only one deity in mind when he speaks of “the gods”—Himself. That is, the trial of Orontēs adumbrates the ultimate significance of the phrase “The Ascent of Cyrus”: the Persian is becoming a “god.”³⁴ This interpretation explains why the trial is described with words that carry overtones of impiety—most notably “APORRĒTOS” (“forbidden secret”)³⁵—but also why the episode reads like a scene of “revelation:” a

³² For PROS = “in the eyes of,” see, for example, 2.1.17; for PROS = “toward” or “with respect to,” see, for example, 2.3.18. The first meaning is more usual than the second, however. The latter is generally conveyed by PROS + the accusative, not PROS + the genitive, as we have here.

³³ *Memorabilia* 1.1.19.

³⁴ According to Hirsch (1985), historians disagree about whether Achaemenid monarchs were held to be divine beings (pp. 188–89; see also Tuplin [2004] p. 161.) The *Anabasis* suggests that Cyrus, at least, wished to be so regarded. But however that may be, Xenophon is less interested in the historical than in the philosophic question: how should we assess the model of the Godlike King with a view to the question of the noble and the good.

³⁵ The adjective “APORRĒTOS,” which I translate as “forbidden secret,” means literally “unspoken.” It is used to refer to pious “mysteries”: for example, Aristophanes, *AssemblyWomen* 442; Plato, *Laws* 854e4; *Theaetetus* 152c10; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1111a19–22. Xenophon himself uses the word ARRĒTOS (i.e., APORRĒTOS without

“forbidden secret,” amounting to a pious “mystery,” has been revealed: Cyrus is a nascent “deity.” The trial of Orontēs is indeed *witnessed by* the gods—not just by human beings—provided we understand “the gods” properly, and it investigates the wrongs *done to* the gods—as well as to human beings—because it investigates the wrongs done to the god-man Cyrus. Needless to say, the trial of Orontēs is not a genuine scene of revelation. The impiety of Cyrus was no “mystery” to anyone who knew him. But this is consistent with Xenophon’s manner of writing. “The trial,” says our author, “was not a forbidden secret”—a funny understatement that hints at the ultimate significance of the scene (1.6.5).³⁶

I am now in a position to restate a core contention of this chapter: “The Ascent of Cyrus” refers to Cyrus’s rise to the status of an emphatically knowledgeable and powerful ruler, both willing and able to reward and punish justly. But the King in question must be conceived of as an actual “deity”—“all-knowing” and “all-powerful.” In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, book one explores the rise of a King who displaces “Zeus the King.”³⁷ It explores the strengths and limitations of a human kingship that promises a kind of secular providence by dint of its absoluteness, high-minded character, and enormous geographic scope. *This* is the cause of Cyrus’s undeniable appeal: his ascent heralds the dawn of universal justice, a dispensation that Zeus the King brings about only unreliably or mysteriously.³⁸



To go from Cyrus to Xenophon is to leave the side of a god to contemplate a nonbeing. For Xenophon is invisible during the march discussed

the prefix APO-) in this sense at *Hellenika* 6.3.6. Xenophon also uses the word MUSOS in the present scene, in the phrase “you defected to the Mysians” (APOSTAS EIS MUSOUS: 1.6.7). This could be significant. Observe that the spelling of “Mysian” (MUSOS) is identical to the spelling of “[impious] defilement” (MUSOS) (except for the accents, which would have been absent in the original papyrus). Could it be that the phrase “you defected to the Mysians” is meant to carry the suggestion that Orontēs “turned to [impious] defilement”? The word MUSOS (“defilement”) is spelled MUSĒ in the accusative plural, however, not MUSOUS (like “Mysian”). On the other hand, the verb MUSATTOMAI (“to feel defiled”) is employed at *Education of Cyrus* 1.3.5.

³⁶ The word APORRĒTOS is used twice in the *Anabasis*. The other occurrence refers to a “forbidden secret” that is in fact on everyone’s lips, just as we have here (7.6.43–44).

³⁷ That human kingship can entail the displacement of the King of Kings has a biblical analogue: *Deuteronomy* 17.14ff.; 1 *Samuel* 8.1–9. Consider also Plato, *Symposium* 190b8.

³⁸ The punishment of Orontēs reflects Cyrus’s nascent status as a god: the unrepentant sinner, who was forgiven twice, is made to vanish from the face of the earth (1.6.11). In this connection, note that the instrument of Cyrus’s justice is his scepter bearer. The scepter is of course a symbol of kingship. The word “scepter” (SKĒPTRON) is closely connected

hitherto (1.1–1.6). We would like to know what he is thinking as he learns of Cyrus's true objective.³⁹ But he does not tell us, at least not explicitly. He himself makes a single appearance in book one. But this appearance (analyzed in section four of this chapter) provides no answer to our question (1.8.14–17). Nevertheless, we are not without means to answer it. Recall that in section two, I noted that Xenophon gives us few details about the landscapes, the rivers, and the people the army encounters during the march. This observation admits of one important exception however: Xenophon's terseness of speech is suspended, early in the march, when Cyrus reaches the Phrygian city of Kelainai (1.2.7–9).⁴⁰ There, Xenophon becomes almost prolix as he describes two palaces—one belonging to Cyrus and the other to the King—a hunting paradise (also belonging to Cyrus) and two local rivers, the Marsyas and the Maiandros. Xenophon also recounts a couple of stories or myths⁴¹ associated with these landmarks, which involve the pair Marsyas–Apollo and the Persian King Xerxes. But (we wonder) why does Xenophon describe Kelainai at such length? That he suspends his terseness of speech suggests that these landmarks are somehow important. Why?

The myth of Marsyas and Apollo immediately attracts our attention. Xenophon goes out of his way to explain how the river Marsyas got its name. He explains that Marsyas once challenged the god Apollo in a contest over wisdom (1.2.8). Marsyas was defeated and then skinned alive by the god, who hung his flayed skin in a cave. Since the sources of the Marsyas are located in this cave, the river is said to be the Marsyas.

This is a fine toponymic explanation. But what is the point of it? Given Xenophon's habitual indifference to local names elsewhere—he renames several geographic landmarks, as we have seen—the explanation is curious.⁴² The difficulty might be thought to be solved by the hypothesis that the pious Xenophon cannot resist the pleasure of retelling a myth linked to traditional piety as he beholds, perhaps for the first time, some landmarks associated with it. But if this hypothesis is correct, why then does he *modify* the famous myth? According to other extant accounts of the

etymologically to the word “thunder-bolt” (SKĒPTOS). Zeus punishes human injustice with his thunderbolt (3.1.11). Cyrus does the next best thing.

³⁹ Xenophon was apparently not as quick as Tissaphernēs in figuring out Cyrus's true objective: 1.2.4–5.

⁴⁰ Xenophon also gives a rather extensive description of the deserts of Arabia (1.5.1–3). But the peculiarity of the scenery is perhaps a sufficient explanation of his doing so.

⁴¹ Both stories are introduced by the phrase “it is said” (LEGETAI).

⁴² The toponymic explanation is all the more curious given that the local name of the Marsyas was apparently Katarrēktēs. This is the name reported by Herodotus, at any rate (7.26). See Ainsworth (1875) p. 271.

myth, Marsyas challenged Apollo in a contest “over musical skill” (PERI MOUSIKĒS), not “over wisdom” (PERI SOPHIAS).⁴³ More precisely, Apollo was declared the winner by all but one of the judges of the contest when he proved to be a better lyre-player than was Marsyas a flute-player. But Xenophon speaks of a contest over *wisdom*. And he highlights this usage by never again employing the word SOPHIA in the *Anabasis*.⁴⁴

To find our way in the maze of these difficulties, we must recall that Marsyas was a mythical creature, a Silene.⁴⁵ In his *Symposium*, Xenophon stresses repeatedly the resemblance of Socrates to a Silene (4.19, 5.7). Plato goes even further and compares Socrates to Marsyas himself.⁴⁶ Moreover, Socrates’s lifelong activity is presented in the *Apology of Socrates* as a test of the wisdom of Apollo, whose oracle Socrates tried to refute. And, as is well known, Socrates paid the ultimate price for this challenge, as Marsyas did.⁴⁷ “Marsyas” evokes Socrates.⁴⁸ Xenophon is retelling the myth of Marsyas-Apollo to indicate that he is somehow preoccupied with Socrates as he reaches Kelainai. He fears that Socrates’s challenge of Apollo—his Delphic Mission—has resulted in a god-inspired “skinning” back home (see the cover of this book).

That Socrates is looming large on Xenophon’s mind at this point in time is confirmed in the immediate sequel. One of the judges of the mythical contest over wisdom dared to defy Apollo and sided with

⁴³ Apollodorus (1994) 1.4.2; Diodorus Siculus (2000) speaks of a contest “over the [musical] art” (PERI TĒS TECHNĒS: 3.59.2). Plato alludes to the myth in several discussions of MOUSIKĒ (*Republic* 399e1–4; *Laws* 677d4; *Euthydemus* 285c7–d1; *Symposium* 215b3ff.).

⁴⁴ The adjective “wise” (SOPHOS) does occur, however, at *Anabasis* 1.10.2. For an interpretation of this important occurrence, see chapter six, note 21.—The word SOPHIA is admittedly broad enough to mean “skill” and could be translated as “musical skill.” Yet when Xenophon speaks of “music” or “musical skill,” he uses MOUSIKĒ (and its cognates): for example, *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.38 (2X), 3.3.55 (2X); *Oikonomikos* 2.15 (2X), 12.18; Xenophon employs the word SOPHIA with parsimony in the non-Socratic works. The only human being to whom he ascribes SOPHIA unambiguously and in his own name is Socrates: *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors* §34 (cf. *Memorabilia* 4.2.33, *Education of Cyrus* 3.1.41). As for the “wisdom” of Agesilaos, it pertains less to speeches than to deeds, if indeed his deeds display wisdom (*Agesilaos* 6.4, 11.9). By speaking of “a contest over wisdom,” Xenophon gives the myth of Marsyas and Apollo a layer of resonance lacking in the original.

⁴⁵ “Silenuses were creatures, half-horse (or goat) and half-man, usually old, and given to mischief. They were apparently portrayed also as old drunkards, though not without intellectual talents [...]” Bartlett (1996c) p. 149, note 51.

⁴⁶ *Symposium* 215a4ff. Alcibiades alludes to the story of the flaying of Marsyas as he describes the speeches of Socrates (221e2–4).

⁴⁷ *Apology of Socrates* 20c3ff. Socrates also distrusts Apollo in Xenophon’s *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors* (§15–16). In addition, see the story of Croesus in the *Education of Cyrus*. Croesus tested the veracity of the Delphic god and paid the price (7.2.15ff.).

⁴⁸ For Socrates-Marsyas as flute-player: *Oikonomikos* 18.9.

Marsyas, declaring *him* the winner over the god. The judge in question was Midas, the legendary king of Phrygia. Midas was subsequently punished by Apollo for his questionable judgment, though not as severely as Marsyas.⁴⁹ Interestingly, Midas makes a cameo of his own in the *Anabasis*, barely one Greek page after the myth of Marsyas. Xenophon mentions Midas in connection with yet another myth involving yet another Silene (1.2.13). This time, he alludes to a story according to which Midas captured Silene⁵⁰ by mixing wine with the waters of a local spring. Here again, however, it is the fuller version of the myth that explains its significance. Midas had ensnared Silene in order to learn his wisdom. Once captured, Silene told Midas the following tale: a large army once tried to invade a foreign land reputed to be very happy. When the invaders discovered the mediocre state of happiness of the local inhabitants, they turned around and went home.⁵¹

It does not take Sherlock Holmes to note the similarities between this melancholy tale and the predicament of Cyrus's army: Xenophon finds himself in Phrygia and he, too, is wondering whether it would not be the better part of wisdom to turn around and go home. More precisely, he yearns for the advice of Socrates–Silene as to what he should do (cf. 3.1.4–7). He is unsure whether he should continue to follow Cyrus, though he is mindful that the expedition against the King might turn out well. (Note the reference to the defeat of Xerxes at the hands of Greeks at 1.2.9.) If “Marsyas” evokes Socrates, “Midas” is Xenophon.

We are now in a position to understand what the myth of Marsyas–Apollo (1.2.8) along with the reference to Midas (1.2.13) are meant to convey. In the first place, these passages indicate that Xenophon is worried about the fate of Socrates during his march up-country. He yearns for Socrates's advice but he also fears for the latter's security back in Athens. Second, when Xenophon leaves Athens, he is aware of the dangers facing Socrates (and, by extension, all the Socratics) as a result of their characteristic activities. Xenophon's acceptance of Proxenos's invitation must be viewed in the light of the fate of “Midas,” who was punished for judging Marsyas to be wiser than Apollo. In other words, looming political persecution motivated Xenophon's decision to leave Athens.⁵² Third, the fact that Xenophon compares himself to Midas—a figure

⁴⁹ The ears of Midas grew so much that they came to resemble those of an ass.

⁵⁰ A Silene was also known as a Satyre (SATUROS). Xenophon uses the latter word here (1.2.13).

⁵¹ The myth is recounted in Theopompus's *Thaumasias* (FGrHist 115 F 15). Dillery (1995) offers a useful synopsis (pp. 45–48).

⁵² This conclusion is confirmed in striking fashion in book two of the *Hellenika*. See chapter three, pp. 113–17, for a fuller discussion.

whose interest in gold, according to another famous myth, got him into trouble—adumbrates a second important motivation aside from security.⁵³ Finally, by stressing his closeness to “Marsyas” on the subject of “wisdom,” Xenophon quietly presents himself as a Socratic. Indeed, he campaigns in the early parts of the *Anabasis* with the state of mind of a disciple of Socrates. When he alludes to a certain Lacedaemonian admiral in the immediate sequel, for example, he calls the admiral “Pythagoras” (1.4.2). Yet we know from Xenophon’s own *Hellenika* that the man was actually named Samios.⁵⁴ How do we explain this obvious instance of renaming? Xenophon is thereby adumbrating, I believe, his state of mind: when he hears “Samios,” he is liable to think of Pythagoras, the most famous Samian philosopher.⁵⁵ Xenophon is hinting that he is still somehow pre-occupied with philosophy even after he decides to follow Cyrus.⁵⁶

To sum up: Xenophon describes the landmarks of Kelainai at uncharacteristic length because doing this enables him to illuminate his relation with Socrates.⁵⁷ In particular, he is thereby able to indicate why he left Socrates to befriend Cyrus. We now know that he is impelled by two motivations. On the other hand, we have *not* uncovered evidence that he is motivated by political considerations, such as honor, power, superiority, or glory. If anything, Xenophon marches up-country as something of an apolitical Socratic, which is not to say that he did not fight in the Battle for Babylon.⁵⁸

⁵³ For example, Aristotle, *Politics* 1257b14–17.

⁵⁴ *Hellenika* 3.1.1. This admiral is called “Samos” instead of “Samios” by Diodorus Siculus (2000): 14.19.4

⁵⁵ Strauss (1983) saw this clearly: “It would not be surprising if the author of the *Memorabilia*, when hearing the name ‘Samios’ thought at once of the most famous Samian philosopher, Pythagoras” (p. 106). See also Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* 15.60ff.

⁵⁶ In the only passage in which Xenophon indicates what he did in the camp when he had free time, he shows himself walking (EN PERIPATŌ) with Proxenos (2.4.15). On “PERIPATEIN” as characteristic of Socrates: *Oikonomikos* 11.15, *Memorabilia* 1.1.10. Of course, Xenophon’s activities change dramatically at the beginning of book three.

⁵⁷ The name Kelainai is derived from an adjective meaning “dark” (KELAINOS). It refers to the darkness of blood (e.g., *Iliad* 1.303; *Odyssey* 11.98). Kelainai thus refers to the bloody skinning of Marsyas. Observe also how the river that Xenophon calls “MARSYAS” empties itself into, or becomes, the “MAIANDROS.” Does the “MAIANDROS” evoke to Xenophon’s mind “the-midwife-of-a-real-man” (MAĪA-ANDROS: 1.2.8)? Does the MARSYAS become the MAIANDROS in the way that Socrates became the “midwife” of Xenophon? (Socrates as midwife: Plato, *Theaetetus* 149a1ff.) Finally, the flayed skin of MARSYAS is hung “in a cave” (1.2.8); but according to Herodotus, it is hung “in the city” (7.26). Xenophon’s Marsyas is more of an indoor dweller.

⁵⁸ According to Francis Bacon (1952), “Xenophon the philosopher [...] went from Socrates’ school into Asia, in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very young, and never had seen the wars before; neither

4. Persian Riches and Greek Freedom: The Battle for Babylon

Cyrus and his army approach Babylon. On the night before what Cyrus expects will be the decisive battle with the King, he makes a review of his troops, Greeks and barbarians. At the break of day deserters begin to stream into his camp and make reports about the King's army. Cyrus gathers his Greek generals and captains. His exhortation to them hints at his future intentions:

Men of Greece, it is not because I lack barbarian human beings that I brought you along as allies, but because I believe that you are better and stronger than many barbarians. May you be worthy of the freedom that you possess and for which I deem you happy! For, know it well, I would choose freedom over all the things that I have and many other things beside. (1.7.3)

Cyrus's march on Babylon is driven (as he claims) by an ardent desire for freedom. He too is a slave of the King (1.9.29, 2.5.38). Indeed, Cyrus not only deems his Greeks happy because of their freedom, he deplores the despotic regime of Persia. He goes on to describe the adversaries that the Greeks will meet in battle and he claims to be ashamed that the Greeks will discover that his land is populated by mere "human beings."⁵⁹ The Persians and their subjects have become unmanly and servile as they have prostrated themselves before their Godlike Kings. Is the intent of Cyrus to restore Persian freedom and thereby make his countrymen, if not also their subjects, "better and stronger," and thus "happy"? Will Cyrus make the Persians more like the Greeks? He does not seriously claim to intend this. In fact, he ends his speech on a remarkable about-face: if the Greeks show themselves to be courageous and daring,⁶⁰ he says, "I will make anyone who wishes to go home be an object of envy back home; but I suppose that I will make many choose the things that are by my side instead of what is at home" (1.7.4). According to Cyrus,

had any command in the army, but only followed the war as a voluntary, *for the love and conversation of Proxenus his friend*" (1.7.30, my emphasis). Although I do not accept the specific motivation (or cluster of motivations) ascribed here to Xenophon—if you can converse with Socrates in Athens, why travel halfway around the world to converse with Proxenos?—Bacon captures something of the spirit in which Xenophon follows Cyrus at first.

⁵⁹ Cyrus refers to the Persians three times as "human beings" (ANTHROPOI), never as "men" (ANDRES); he refers to the Greeks four times as "men," never as "human beings."

⁶⁰ According to Cyrus, victory in the coming battle depends entirely on the Greeks' courage and daring. The speech contains no reference to the divine. Contrast the speech of Cyrus the Elder before the battle with Croesus: *Education of Cyrus* 6.4.12–20 esp. §12 and §19.

many Greeks will choose to enjoy great riches in Persia instead of the freedom they could have in Hellas: if freedom is a great good, splendid riches are more broadly alluring, even if they must be had under despotic authority.

That Cyrus has no intention to restore Persian freedom is confirmed by what follows. In Cyrus's audience is a certain Gaulitēs, an exile from Samos. Gaulitēs enjoys Cyrus's trust, but he challenges him publicly:

Some people say, Cyrus, that you now promise many things because of your situation, since danger is approaching; however, they say that, if the thing turns out well, you will not remember [your promises]; and some say that, even if you were to remember and wished to, you would not be able to give all that you have promised. (1.7.5)

Cyrus replies:

Well, men, the empire of my father extends to the south to a point where human beings are not able to live because of the heat, and to the north to a point where they cannot live because of the cold; and all the things that lie between these points are controlled by my brother's friends, who rule over them as satraps. If we win the victory, we will need to put you, our friends, in control of these things. So, I have no fear that I may not have enough to give to each of my friends, if the thing goes well, but rather that I may not have enough friends to whom to give. And to every one of you Greeks I will also give a golden crown. (1.7.6–7)

Cyrus replies to Gaulitēs by dangling the prospect of plum appointments to the satrapies of the Persian empire. ("Gaulitēs" is probably a fictional name. Etymology appears to suggest "a-bucket-full-of-[impious]-audacity" [GAULOS-ITĒS]. Why does Gaulitēs get this name? He is challenging the veracity and power of a "god."⁶¹) It is noteworthy, however, that Cyrus does not boast of the empire's far reach in the east or west (1.7.6 cf. *Education of Cyrus* 8.6.21, 1.1.5 *in fine*, and 8.8.1, where the four cardinal borders are always mentioned). The reason for Cyrus's silence about the eastern and western borders of the Persian empire can be guessed without too much difficulty. He wishes to preserve a certain ambiguity about the location of the western border, in particular, which had been the object of perennial clashes between Persians and Greeks. Gaulitēs's native Samos, for example, had once been under the authority of Persia and

⁶¹ "Gaulitēs" should not be identified with his namesake in Thucydides (8.85). The Thucydidean character hails from Caria, not Samos. Besides, "Gaulitēs" is here probably a fictional name, as I have said.

would be so again.⁶² As Cyrus promises a golden crown to his Greeks, the overtones of the promise are unmistakable: they may be appointed satraps of the existing empire *and* of future extensions of the empire. Perhaps Gaulitēs can hope to be “crowned” satrap of Samos. Far from making the Persians more like the Greeks, Cyrus intends to make the Greeks more Persian-like.



At this time Klearchos asks Cyrus whether he thinks that his brother will fight for his throne (1.7.9). As we saw in the introduction, Cyrus has no doubt that his brother will, and he says so emphatically. Cyrus accords no importance whatsoever to the prediction of the soothsayer Silanos that the King will not fight within the next ten days. He relies on his own judgment. But this judgment proves unsound. For once the critical period of ten days has elapsed, Cyrus drops his guard. He concludes that his brother has abandoned the fight. He becomes careless. Proceeding at ease in a chariot, he stations only a small body of ordered troops in front of him. The bulk of his army is advancing in disorder.

Suddenly, the no-longer-expected battle is upon Cyrus: on the third day after crossing a massive and hastily abandoned defensive ditch, around midday, a scout gallops into the van of the army, his horse in a full sweat. The scout bellows that the King is sighted approaching in battle array. For a moment, there is great confusion in Cyrus's army. It seems to the Greeks, and indeed to all, that the King will immediately attack them in their disorder. Cyrus jumps from his chariot, puts on his breastplate, mounts his horse, and grabs a pair of spears. He goes into battle without a helmet—just like other Persians sport a bare head in the dangers of war, “it is said” (1.8.6). Every horseman is wearing a helmet. Even the horses are wearing them (1.8.6–7).

Nothing happens for some time. In the afternoon a speck of dust appears on the horizon. In time, a dark patch becomes visible all along the plain and a massive and gleaming body of men is afterward visible, advancing in order and in silence. The Battle for Babylon is imminent. Riding along the line, Cyrus issues his final orders. He shouts to Klearchos who is stationed next to the Euphrates (on the right) that he should lead his men straight against the center of the enemy. That is where the King is stationed. “If we are victorious there,” Cyrus says,

⁶² *Education of Cyrus* 1.1.4; *Hellenika* 3.1.3, 3.2.12ff.; also 5.1.31ff and *passim*. For a discussion of Samos and its relation to the Persian empire, Grote (1899) remains helpful: Vol. 10, pp. 295–96. See also Thucydides 8.43.3–4; Herodotus 3.139–49.

“everything will have been accomplished for us” (1.8.12). Klearchos sees that the enemy’s center is a compact mass and he hears that the King is beyond the Greeks’ left. Indeed, the King’s line is so wide that the center of his army is beyond *Cyrus’s* left.⁶³ Klearchos replies evasively: “All will be well; I will take care of it” (1.8.13).⁶⁴ But he makes no attempt to carry out the order of Cyrus during the battle. To do so would have required a leftward charge across the front of an advancing enemy. Such a charge would have exposed his right flank and created a risk of encirclement. After singing the paean, the Greeks will make a straight charge, keeping their right flank protected by the Euphrates. Klearchos has been criticized by posterity for his excessive caution, though he has had his defenders as well.⁶⁵

However it may be of Klearchos’s military judgment, our focus must be Xenophon, who now makes his entry *eo nomine* in the *Anabasis* (1.8.14–17). The battle is set to begin and Cyrus is riding along the line and surveying the two opposing armies. Xenophon sees him from the Greek side. He rides up to him and asks: “Do you have any order?” Cyrus halts his horse and says—and he orders Xenophon to say to everyone—that the *hiera* (the campground sacrifices) and the *sphagia* (the battle-line sacrifices) are all propitious (1.8.15).⁶⁶ As Cyrus says this, however, he hears a din rising from the Greek ranks and asks what it is. Klearchos, apparently still within earshot,⁶⁷ answers that the password is going through the ranks for the second time.⁶⁸ Cyrus wonders who has announced the password. What is it? he asks. “Zeus Savior” and “Victory” comes the reply. “But I accept,” Cyrus declares, “and let this be so” (1.8.17).

The vignette is curious. It seems that Xenophon goes out of his way to make sure that he comes to sight in the *Anabasis* as a sort of flatterer, a sycophant even. But why does he cast himself this way? Does he wish to indicate his political ambition—his desire to serve Cyrus “after the fashion of a lieutenant”?⁶⁹ But why, then, does he stress later on that he

⁶³ Cyrus is stationed with his barbarian army to the left of his Greek troops, who are next to the Euphrates (1.8.4–6, §23).

⁶⁴ The phrase or promise “I will take care of it” occurs twice in book one (1.4.16 and here). In each case, the promise is honored in the breach. The only other occurrence of the phrase in the *Anabasis*—a pointed one!—is at 5.3.13. Does the pattern hold?

⁶⁵ Plutarch’s *Life of Artaxerxes* contains the classic statement of the criticism, often echoed in modern times. According to Wylie (1992): “The real blame rests with Cyrus, who let himself be surprised” (p. 133). I agree with this assessment.

⁶⁶ See Flower (2012) for the difference between *hiera* and *sphagia* (p. 205).

⁶⁷ I follow the reading of the better MSS. and read “Klearchos” at 1.8.16. The inferior MSS. read “Xenophon.” Some editors delete the word altogether.

⁶⁸ For the password going around twice, see *Education of Cyrus* 3.3.58.

⁶⁹ Howland (2000) p. 884.

followed Cyrus “neither as a general, nor a captain, nor a soldier” (3.1.4)? Indeed, given his close friendship with Proxenos, who was a general and in whose contingent Xenophon could probably have secured an appointment, he seems to have *chosen* to follow Cyrus in a private capacity (3.1.4). Nor is it at all likely that Xenophon rides up to Cyrus “to observe [him] more closely so as to better understand him.”⁷⁰ The Battle for Babylon is minutes away—hardly a suitable time for psychological musings. A more satisfactory explanation is indicated in the next chapter (1.9). Xenophon writes that Cyrus never let anyone’s eagerness to obey his orders go without its reward (1.9.18). Xenophon arranges to come to sight in the *Anabasis* as a seeker of reward, or, more generally, a lover of gain—a self-presentation supportive of my claim that he is “Midas.”

But (it will be objected) if Xenophon is “Midas,” how can I claim that he is a Socratic? After all, Socrates was poor and satisfied to be poor. He had little interest in money.⁷¹ The objection is sound and calls attention to a genuine difference between Socrates and Xenophon. Yet it overlooks a more fundamental point. Socrates is heard to say in the *Oikonomikos* that it is particularly becoming of a philosopher to learn how he might get (if he wanted to) the largest amount of barley and wheat (16.9).⁷² Xenophon and Socrates share a sympathy—and more than a sympathy—for the love of gain.

If Xenophon’s entry into the *Anabasis* is curious, the demeanor of Cyrus in the vignette in question is enigmatic. Even if we set aside the question of whether propitious *hiera* and *sphagia* had been obtained, as Cyrus claimed that they had been,⁷³ his reaction to the password begs for an explanation. Why does Xenophon stress that Cyrus “accepts” (DECHOMAI) the password “Zeus Savior” and “Victory”? Cyrus had manifestly not announced

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Oikonomikos* c. 2 *passim*, 11.9; *Memorabilia* 1.6.11–15, 1.2.5. Note that while Xenophon stresses that Socrates “did not make his companions lovers of money,” he falls short of claiming that Socrates rid them of this desire (as he does in the case of other desires): *Memorabilia* 1.2.5 and context.

⁷² This important passage is the only one in which the Xenophonic Socrates is heard to use the word “philosopher” (PHILOSOPHOS: cf. *Symposium* 8.39). Consider also *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.31–34: the teaching of the unnamed teacher of justice should be compared with the teaching of Socrates (*Memorabilia* 4.2.12–23). Consider also Plato’s *Hipparchos* as a whole.

⁷³ Given the sudden appearance of the King and his army, Cyrus almost certainly did not have any time to perform sacrifices. The *Anabasis* does not state that he performed any (cf., e.g., 2.1.9). Is the contrast between 1.8.15 and 1.2.10 a reflection of the growing influence of Xenophon as advisor? In the *Education of Cyrus*, Cyrus the Elder performs sacrifices right before the battle against Croesus and obtains favorable omens (6.4.1, §12). See also *Agesilaos* 1.31.

any such password to his troops. He had neglected an important aspect of the duty of the general.⁷⁴ But why does Xenophon stress his “acceptance” of this *particular* password?

Recall that the literal meaning of the word “password” (SUNTHĒMA) is “agreement.” The password is an agreed-upon signal intended to help soldiers differentiate friend from foe in the confusion of battle (e.g., 7.3.39, *Hellenika* 2.1.1–2). But as one passage of the *Education of Cyrus* makes clear, ancient armies expected that the password would elicit the “agreement”—that is, the assistance—of the divinity being invoked.⁷⁵ As the frightened Greeks face a massive army, said to be almost one hundred times larger than their own, and as they are still in a state of some disorder just prior to the charge, they turn to heaven as suppliants.⁷⁶ The din rising from their ranks is not just the sound of a military signal being passed along. It is above all the noise of the Greeks beseeching “Zeus Savior” for a “Victory.” When Cyrus replies that he “accepts” the password, he is accepting less the password itself—it is too late to change it anyway—than the underlying supplication. He “accepts” to grant the Greeks a safe victory.⁷⁷ Xenophon is playfully suggesting that Cyrus has *literally* replaced Zeus as the deity whose powerful will can fulfill human prayers.⁷⁸ This “acceptance” thus sums up what it would mean for Cyrus to ascend in the fullest sense while indicating the imminent completion of that part of his ascent, which, as a mere man, he is in a position to complete.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ He was no Cyrus the Elder: *Education of Cyrus* 3.3.58. Cf. note 75, below.

⁷⁵ Before his encounter with Croesus, Cyrus the Elder beseeches ancestral Zeus to be a “Leader and Ally” of his army. He then announces the password to his troops: “Zeus Savior and Leader” (*Education of Cyrus* 7.1.1; 7.1.10).

⁷⁶ Wylie (1992) points out that after the approach of the King is announced, “there must have been prolonged confusion [in the Greek ranks]; several hours later (1.8.14) in the face of the enemy, the Greeks were still ‘forming their line from those coming up’” (p. 124). As for the size of the opposing armies, deserters from the King report that the latter’s army is 1.2 million strong, compared to Cyrus’s 110,000, of which 10,400 are Greek hoplites. The King’s personal cavalry is said to outnumber Cyrus’s by 10 to 1 (6000 horsemen for the King and 600 for Cyrus). In addition, Cyrus has 1000 Paphlagonian horsemen: 1.7.10–13, 1.8.5–6. Xenophon does not vouch for the veracity of these astonishing figures, however. He says that the King’s army “was said” to be of such a size (1.7.11). Wylie (1992) argues convincingly that the King’s army could not have been nearly so large (p. 123). See also Appendix 3.

⁷⁷ Cyrus the Elder praises the gods following his first great victory, since his army has obtained “victory and safety” (*Education of Cyrus* 4.1.2).

⁷⁸ Zeus was known as “the suppliant’s god” (e.g., *Odyssey* 13.213). This SUNTHĒMA or “agreement” to grant a safe victory is of course not honored by Cyrus. This fact should be kept in mind when we read his obituary: he did *not* honor the most important “agreement” he ever made (at 1.9.7, SUNTITHĒMI is in the central position).

⁷⁹ The verb DECHOMAI (“to accept”) is used to refer to the acceptance of a supplication at *Education of Cyrus* 4.6.8. By stressing Cyrus’s failure to announce a password,

Xenophon's account of the Battle for Babylon is memorable.⁸⁰ The Greeks sing the paean and charge the King's army even as they are separated from it by five or six hundred feet. They apparently do not await the order to attack (1.8.17–18). The phalanx immediately falls out of line, and, after shouting to the god Enualios, the men begin a premature run. Despite their disorder and the King's numerical superiority, the Greeks turn the troops opposed to them. The Persians flee even as they are still out of bow range. They are pursued at full speed. Some of the King's war chariots are driven into his own line, others into the Greek line. Even these do no damage, however, because the drivers jump off prematurely. Xenophon reports that not a single Greek soldier was said to have suffered anything in this attack, "except that someone on the left was said to have received an arrow" (1.8.21). A fantastic claim! Only a single Greek casualty ("it is said"!) when thousands of men were clashing in ponderous battle? But the claim neatly sums up what we are to think of the troops of the King. Their behavior justifies Cyrus's lament that his land is populated by mere "human beings."⁸¹

The Greeks eventually end their pursuit, reorder their phalanx, and make two further charges. Each time they rout the King's troops and even his cavalry (1.10.10–11; §13). Cyrus is pleased by the initial victory of his Greeks. The members of his circle begin to prostrate themselves before him as the new King (1.8.21). But Cyrus's victory is not yet secure. Holding his cavalry back, he watches for his brother's next move. When he sees him wheeling his line in an attempt to encircle the Greeks and

Xenophon is calling attention not only to his neglect of duty as general, but also to his indifference to divine assistance.

⁸⁰ The account contains a high concentration of phrases like "they say," "it is said," "some say." Xenophon could not be everywhere at once to witness the action: 1.8.18, §20 (2X), §24, §26 (2X), §27, §28, §29, 1.10.7, §12, §18.

⁸¹ In his otherwise balanced and informative monograph, Hirsch (1985) does not sufficiently stress Xenophon's criticism of Persia, which shines through in such passages as the description of the Battle for Babylon. The significance of this description is confirmed by *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.22–26.—One could perhaps defend the infantry of the King on the grounds that it was not as well armed as the Greek hoplites. It was thus at a disadvantage in fights at close quarters. But this fact does not excuse them. The point is made a bit later. The King somehow finds his way into the Greek camp during the battle. He starts to plunder property and carry away people (1.10.1–3). Some Greek baggage-carriers who are in the camp happen to have some weapons, however, and they mount a resistance. Killing many Persians—and even though they themselves suffer some casualties—they refuse to flee or to let themselves be taken. They save everything within their square, including one of Cyrus's mistresses. Baggage-carriers, who must have been armed with rather summary weapons, more than hold their own against picked troops of the King: armament is not everything. The habit of *not* prostrating oneself before a human being has significant political consequences (1.10.3; cf. 1.6.10, 1.8.21, 3.2.8–9, 3.2.13). See also *Anabasis* 6.1.13.

cut them down from behind, he rides up to counter the maneuver. With his cavalry of six hundred, he defeats Artaxerxes's six thousand. But as his cavalry begins the pursuit his men are scattered. Only a few faithful are left to protect him. Just then Cyrus gets a glimpse of his brother behind a compact mass of defenders: "I see the *man*," he shouts: the completion of Cyrus's ascent entails the unceremonious descent of Artaxerxes (1.8.26, my emphasis).⁸² Cyrus leaps forward and strikes Artaxerxes in the chest. No sooner has he landed his blow than he is himself wounded mortally in the head. Almost all of his Persian faithful die in the fight over his body. The ascent of Cyrus has come to a premature end.

5. Conjoining the Noble and the Good: The Godlike King

Cyrus the Younger represents an attractive solution to the problem of the noble and the good. In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, the function of book one is to sketch the strengths and weaknesses of a model of kingship in which a high-minded and capable ruler ascends to a position so lofty that he becomes all-powerful and all-knowing, and from which he can reward and punish on the basis of merit. Indeed, the obituary of Cyrus depicts a man who (had he been successful) would have become a sort of deity on earth, possessed of a godlike ability to conjoin or reconcile virtue and happiness for all those under his rule (1.9).⁸³ The kingship of Cyrus would have ushered in a new Golden Age.⁸⁴ Or would it?

The obituary is undoubtedly attractive. Cyrus was educated at the gates of the King, we are told, where he was held to be the best among the children of the Persian nobility in everything. Persian children observe who is honored by the King, and they hear of them, as well as (of) those who are dishonored, so that right away even as boys "they learn both how to rule and to be ruled" (1.9.4).

Cyrus seemed to be most bashful of his age-mates, more obedient to his elders than even his inferiors in rank, most loving of horses and best at using them. They also judged him to be most loving of learning the deeds of war—bowing and spear-throwing—and most diligent in practicing these deeds. When he was old enough, he was the greatest lover of the hunt and of the dangers associated with it. Once, when a she-bear charged him,

⁸² Xenophon, as narrator, never stops calling Artaxerxes "the King" (1.8.26, §27). Cyrus's triumphant shout is premature.

⁸³ Consider the repeated use of the phrase "HEIS GE ANĒR" in Cyrus's obituary. It should be translated "for one, at least, who is a man" (1.9.12, §22).

⁸⁴ The enduring attractiveness of this model of rule is evident in Molière's *Tartuffe* (first performed in 1667) where Louis XIV is given the role of *rex ex machina* (see act 5, scene 7, last speech of the officer).

Cyrus did not flee but flung himself at the animal. He was unhorsed and suffered some wounds. But in the end he killed the animal. He also made the first man who came to his rescue blessed in the eyes of many (1.9.6).

When Cyrus's father appointed him satrap over parts of the empire as well as general of a large body of troops, he showed what kind of ruler he had become. He was not false to any of the treatises, agreements, and promises he would make (1.9.7–8), and he displayed (among other qualities) loyalty (1.9.10), manliness (1.9.11), justice (1.9.13–16), and care and generosity toward friends (1.9.24–28). Since Cyrus also punished most unsparingly the criminals—he did not allow them to make him a laughing stock⁸⁵—“it was possible for any Greek or barbarian to travel wherever he might wish in Cyrus's rule without fear, carrying with him whatever suited him” (1.9.13).

Those who were good in war were honored by Cyrus to an exceptional degree. The men he saw who were willing to run risks on campaigns he appointed rulers of the territories he subdued, and he honored them with other gifts, such that the good appeared to be happiest, and the bad were deemed worthy to be their slaves (1.9.15). Moreover, if someone appeared to Cyrus to make a willing display of justice, he placed the greatest importance on making such persons richer than those who were greedy for unjust gains (1.9.16). And if Cyrus saw someone managing skillfully and justly the land over which he ruled, he never took anything away from him but always gave more. Justice and virtue were thus rewarded, and injustice and vice punished by Cyrus, who was (as we saw before) agreed by all those who seemed to have had experience of him to be a most kingly man and one most worthy to rule among all the Persians who have been born since Cyrus the Elder (1.9.1).

⁸⁵ “To make someone (or a being) a laughing stock” translates KATAGELAŌ. This verb, along with the cognates KATAGELŌS and KATAGELASTOS, conveys overtones of impiety. The laughter in question threatens to turn the “deity” into a joke (cf. e.g., *Memorabilia* 1.4.2; Plato, *Republic* 330e1). In Plato's *Symposium*, the adjective KATAGELASTOS is used to intimate the character of Aristophanes's encomium to the god or daemon Eros (189b7); it is also used to adumbrate Socrates's (or Diotima's) assessment of the same (198c6; read the passage with 202b10–c2, keeping in mind that KATAGELASTOS can mean “to be laughing” rather than “to be laughed at.”)—To understand the repeated use of KATAGELAŌ and KATAGELŌS at *Oikonomikos* 13.4–5, recall that when Socrates tells Ischomachos that the capacity to make human beings skilled at ruling—to make them “kingly” (BASILIKOS)—is not deserving of laughter (KATAGELŌS) but rather of great praise, he is adumbrating what the capacity in question, understood in the Socratic sense, entails (13.5). The kingly man is in relation to his subjects what the trainer of colts or puppies is in relation to his charges—a being of a different species (*Oikonomikos* 13.6–8; cf. *Education of Cyrus*, opening chapter, especially 1.1.2–3). In the *Anabasis*, KATAGELAŌ is ascribed to the “baddie” Menōn: 2.6.23. See also 2.4.4.

Some clouds are visible at the margins of this attractive portrait, however. In the first place, Xenophon does not actually say in his own name that Cyrus was most kingly and most worthy to rule. He merely ascribes this opinion to all those who “seemed to have had experience of him.” Is this equivocation significant? Speaking in his own name, Xenophon says that “on the basis of what I hear [about Cyrus], I at least judge that no one among Greeks or barbarians was loved by more people” (1.9.28). But what could Xenophon have criticized in Cyrus?

In the first place, the premature death of Cyrus is undoubtedly caused by a lack of self-control. He hurls himself at the compact mass of defenders protecting King Artaxerxes when he is himself vulnerable and when his victory is almost achieved (1.8.26). This reckless charge is strikingly reminiscent of his charge on the she-bear in the hunting incident of his youth. Unlike his elder namesake, Cyrus never learned to control his vehemence when he saw the “game.” This time he paid with his life.⁸⁶

Cyrus also has too much manliness. Had he taken the precaution of wearing a helmet in battle, he might have avoided the head wound that killed him. There is no doubt that Xenophon censured this unnecessary risk-taking, especially since the fortunes of Cyrus’s army were dependent on his safety (cf. 1.7.8–9).⁸⁷ Indeed, if we study Xenophon’s obituary, we notice several omissions. We are not surprised that neither self-control (ENKRATEIA)⁸⁸ nor piety (EUSEBEIA)⁸⁹ are listed among Cyrus’s qualities. But what about the omission of prudence (PHRONĒSIS), wisdom (SOPHIA), and moderation (SŌPHROSUNĒ)? Cyrus was deficient in all these.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ As a youth, Cyrus the Elder was also involved in a pair of incidents that revealed a recklessness bordering on “mad daring” (*Education of Cyrus* 1.4.7–9; 1.4.16–24). But by the time of the battle against Croesus, he is a model of cautious self-control.

⁸⁷ As we saw, Xenophon stresses that even Cyrus’s horses were fitted with helmets (1.8.7). Cyrus the Elder wore a solid bronze helmet in battle (*Education of Cyrus* 7.1.2). The Socratic view of protective gears is indicated at *Memorabilia* 3.10.9: Socrates swears ‘By Hera!’ and praises the invention of the breastplate as something noble. As for Xenophon, he describes how horsemen should be equipped for war, giving prominence to the helmet (*On Horsemanship* 12).

⁸⁸ Cyrus campaigned with *two* different mistresses (1.10.2–3). He was also said to have slept with the queen of Cilicia (1.2.12). Unlike Cyrus the Elder, he could be diverted from his political tasks by eros (cf. *Education of Cyrus* 5.1.2–18, 8.5.28; also 8.4.22). See Bruell (1987) pp. 112–14.

⁸⁹ There is one reference to the fact that Cyrus may have prayed (1.9.11). But the prayer is weakly attested—only “some” report it. The prayer should be compared with such a text as the *Psalms*. Cyrus did not ask the gods to help him enforce justice. He took the work of enforcement entirely upon himself.

⁹⁰ The reader should compare the generalship of Cyrus the Younger, at the Battle for Babylon, with the generalship of Cyrus the Elder at the battle against Croesus. (The latter

Yet the clouds visible at the margins of the portrait of Cyrus do not necessarily indicate that a Godlike King is incapable, in principle, of conjoining the noble with the good. It is easy to imagine an improved version of Cyrus endowed with the latter's qualities but not weighed down by his defects. This is precisely what the fictional Cyrus of the *Education of Cyrus* is.⁹¹ Moreover, that Cyrus does *not* always follow the path of the noble in the *Anabasis* does not by itself constitute a refutation of the model of the Godlike King. It could be argued that the ignoble means employed by Cyrus—his deceptions, his acts of intimidation, and so forth—were necessary because he was the *younger* son of Darius. But what if he had been born in the purple, preferably as an only child?⁹² Wouldn't Cyrus then have ascended the throne smoothly and without any need to use the means in question? Does the solution to the problem of the noble and the good lie in a good birth at the right time—that is, in an act of chance?

It should be clear by now that to assess the model of the Godlike King requires an analysis of the work that is the companion to the *Anabasis*, the *Education of Cyrus*, and of the improved Cyrus depicted therein. Students of Xenophon will derive much help from the existing scholarship, some of which is outstanding.⁹³ The *Anabasis of Cyrus* sketches only the bare outlines of Xenophon's view of the Godlike King. Let me therefore offer the beginning of a reflection on the subject, focused on the question of the noble and the good.

is an "idealized" version of the Battle for Babylon.) In view of this comparison, the generalship of Cyrus the Younger is (to say the least) deficient. Useful discussions of the differences are Wylie (1992), p. 133, n. 27 and Anderson (1970) chap. 9. With regard to wisdom, it is true that one of the two mistresses of Cyrus is said to be wise (1.10.2). Yet this reference makes the *absence* of any mention of Cyrus's wisdom all the more notable. Finally, Xenophon never ascribes moderation to Cyrus. While he does suggest that he, along with the children of the best of the Persians, was expected to learn moderation at the gates of the King (1.9.3), he attributes only "bashfulness" (AIDĒMŌN) to him—a pale imitation of moderation (1.9.5). For the distinction between bashfulness and moderation, see *Education of Cyrus* 8.1.31.

⁹¹ On the differences between the two Cyruses, see above all Bruell (1987) pp. 112–14. Flower (2012) correctly states that "the reader [of the *Anabasis*] is meant to notice that Cyrus is an imperfect replica of his famous namesake [Cyrus the Elder]" (p. 189). See also Hirsch (1985) p. 75. That Xenophon playfully treats Cyrus the Younger and Cyrus the Elder as one and the same person at *Oikonomikos* 4.13 is meant to indicate, I believe, that "Cyrus" ultimately stands for a single political possibility in his thought: the Godlike King. Hirsch (1985) is therefore on the right path when he asks: "Is it possible that the two [Cyruses] have become virtually one for Xenophon?" (p. 175) Many passages of the obituary of Cyrus the Younger are strikingly reminiscent of what Xenophon says of Cyrus the Elder: cf., for example, *Anabasis* 1.9.24 with *Education of Cyrus* 8.2.13. See Hirsch 74–75.

⁹² Needless to say, Cyrus the Elder is an only child: *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1.

⁹³ See especially the studies by Bruell (1987) and Nadon (2001).

Consider for a moment the challenge that would have confronted Cyrus had he sought, as the new king of Persia, to reward and punish his subjects on the basis of merit. To meet this challenge he would have needed knowledge. Cyrus could not have allowed evidence bearing on the issue of merit to escape his notice. He would have needed many informants and overseers since he could not know first-hand what he had to know about individual merit.⁹⁴ Yet what sort of knowledge can be obtained from such sources? Are informants and overseers typically animated by a concern to highlight truthfully the virtues and the vices of the targets of their reports? What if they can themselves profit by false reports and slanders—as, indeed, the limits of Cyrus's first-hand knowledge, together with his enormous wealth and power, would insure that they often could?⁹⁵ Even the high-minded Cyrus would have faced this grave difficulty had he sought to reward and punish justly. And we need only peruse the historians of the late Roman Empire—to say nothing of more recent experience—to see what would happen under less than high-minded rulers.⁹⁶

It goes without saying that no human ruler can become a god in actual fact. However lofty or exalted a king's station, he remains a man with political needs and political ambitions. Even a Godlike King must maintain himself in power. The examples of Klearchos and Menōn, who were rewarded by Cyrus for their serviceable (though ignoble) actions, and of the virtuous Proxenos, whose courageous (though equally serviceable) action at Charmande was blamed by Cyrus, suggests that even a high-minded ruler will at times reward the serviceable ahead of the virtuous. The fulsome obituary of Cyrus suggests a similar line of thought. In the first half of the obituary,⁹⁷ Xenophon describes the rule of Cyrus and he uses the word "justice" (and various cognates of the word) nine times.⁹⁸ He speaks only once of Cyrus's care for his "friends" (1.9.10). As the obituary unfolds, however, this proportion is reversed. In the second half of it, Cyrus's concern for justice is mentioned only once (1.9.19) compared to thirteen references to his care for his friends. Even the high-minded Cyrus tended to equate justice with a care for friends.

⁹⁴ He would have had to rely on a network akin to that of the "Eyes and Ears of the King" created by Cyrus the Elder: *Education of Cyrus* 8.2.10–12.

⁹⁵ Consider also the importance of mutual accusations between satraps and military commanders for the "good governance" of Persia: *Oikonomikos* 4.5–11, esp. §10.

⁹⁶ Consider, for example, Gibbon (1909) Vol. 2 chap. 16, pp. 199–200. Consider also the moving testimony of Nadezhda Mandelstam (1999) about Joseph Stalin, esp. chap. 32.

⁹⁷ I mark the halfway point of the obituary at 1.9.17.

⁹⁸ I include in this count the references to Cyrus's treatment of the unjust and the wrongdoers.

Under his rule—even under his rule—merit was liable to devolve into a mixture of serviceability and loyalty.⁹⁹ The rule of the Godlike King undermines the noble.¹⁰⁰ And even when it does not undermine it directly, it tends to reduce the noble to a means serving the self-interest of the “friend.”

To the extent that the Godlike Kings of Persia became all-knowing through their extensive networks of informants and overseers, they employed this knowledge to secure themselves against plots.¹⁰¹ They showed little concern to reward true merit. On the other hand, their enormous power *did* turn them into godlike rulers. Whereas the Greeks prostrated themselves before their gods—and only before their gods—the Persians prostrated themselves before their Kings.¹⁰² Even a man like Orontēs, the man who betrayed Cyrus and who was himself a relative of the King, was adored by his inferiors (1.6.10). Rank in Persia typically entailed despotic authority on one side and self-abasement on the other. The Persian regime was inured to the habits of servility.¹⁰³ The Battle for Babylon illustrated vividly the cost, from a purely military point of

⁹⁹ Consider 1.9.29–30.

¹⁰⁰ Consider *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.4–5. In his obituary, Xenophon states that Cyrus the Younger was said to have the best assistants for every task because he was never ungrateful to people who served him zealously (cf. 1.9.18). We are not told, however, whether the tasks entrusted by Cyrus were always noble or honorable ones (cf. 1.8.15). We are told that Artapates, the scepter bearer who died in battle at the side of Cyrus, had been honored by him on an equal footing with “the best of the Persians” (1.8.29). Cyrus prized his goodwill and loyalty. Yet Artapates was entrusted by Cyrus with such tasks as the physical elimination of Orontēs (1.6.11). It is true that Cyrus *was* able to induce a willingness to run risks or to bear burdens in the people he ruled (1.9.15). Xenophon gives us a signal example of this willingness (1.5.7–8). Yet he stresses that this willingness existed (only) “when someone supposed that Cyrus would perceive it” (1.9.15). In keeping with this, even in the scene in question, Xenophon ascribes not virtue but only “orderliness” (EUTAXIA) to the members of Cyrus’s circle (1.5.8). The importance of this distinction is made clear by *Education of Cyrus* 8.1.31–33, especially §33. Note Xenophon’s stress on how people *appear* to Cyrus: 1.9.15–16, §19.

¹⁰¹ As indeed Cyrus was seen to do (1.6). When Xenophon discusses the “Eyes and Ears of the King” in the *Education of Cyrus*, he does not breathe a word about reports concerning virtue and vice (8.2.10–12). The informants would report only “what would benefit the King” and were much feared: “People are everywhere afraid to say what is not advantageous to the King, just as if he were listening, and afraid to do what is not advantageous, just as if he were present” (§12, translation by Ambler [Cornell, 2001]).

¹⁰² 3.2.13, 3.2.9; 1.8.21.

¹⁰³ Other practices exacerbated these habits. Xenophon stresses, for example, that Cyrus frequently sent food from his own table to gratify his friends (1.9.24–26). This Xenophon relates to prove Cyrus’s outstanding care for his friends. Yet the *Education of Cyrus* makes clear that this practice had a political aim as well: to encourage a general subservience toward the friends of the King (8.2.4).

view, of this state of affairs. The rule of a Godlike King destroyed not only freedom but also the manly vigor without which freedom cannot long endure. And the fact that the will of the King replaced the law of the land, displacing all customs or unwritten codes, added a powerful incentive to servility.¹⁰⁴

The model of the Godlike King holds out an attractive central promise: that a high-minded and capable ruler, all-knowing and all-powerful, might bring justice to a large swath of the earth.¹⁰⁵ But Xenophon teaches that this promise cannot be fulfilled. The justice of the Godlike King is but a pale imitation of divine justice. Though Cyrus was more high-minded and capable than almost all the previous Kings of Persia, his ascent would not have solved the problem of the noble and the good. No human ascent of this sort can.¹⁰⁶ This is the main lesson of the first stage of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.



My analysis of book one of the *Anabasis* is open to an objection: If Xenophon is a critic of the Godlike King, as I have argued that he is, why does he write so sympathetically of Cyrus? Why does he not state his critique openly and straightforwardly?

The simplest way to answer this question is to consider the alternative: What if Xenophon had *not* written sympathetically of Cyrus? What if he had stated at the outset of the *Anabasis* that Cyrus had not suffered any wrong but had nevertheless plotted to overthrow his brother, the legitimate King of Persia? Undoubtedly, many readers would have dismissed

¹⁰⁴ Xenophon makes clear, for example, that property rights in Persia were at the mercy of the King. The case of Cyrus is revealing. He was not envious of the visibly rich but “attempted to use the money of those who were concealing it” (1.9.19). Concealed money is concealed power to acquire friends; visible money is a tie on obedience. The practice of the Persian Kings was even more unsentimental: *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.6.—The word “law” (NOMOS) occurs only once in book one of the *Anabasis*—in a reference to a Greek law (1.2.15 cf. §27). That the “will” (NOMIDZEIN) of the King was the “law” (NOMOS) of Persia is suggested by *Education of Cyrus* 8.1.7–15.

¹⁰⁵ This model of rule holds some appeal even for Greeks who would otherwise abhor prostrating themselves before a man, such as the pious gentleman Ischomachos: cf. *Oikonomikos* 12.20, 13.11.

¹⁰⁶ The character of “Cyrus” is an important point of contact between classical political philosophy and the Bible. In both traditions, Cyrus is presented favorably. For the Bible, consider the Book of *Isaiah* and 2 *Chronicles*. But the underlying conceptions of Cyrus are diametrically opposed. In the Bible, Cyrus is praised as the ready instrument of the Lord’s just vengeance. In Xenophon, Cyrus is “the Lord.” Ultimately, the Bible and Xenophon assess Cyrus very differently, and this difference stems from the underlying difference of conception.

Cyrus as a “baddie” unworthy of the kingship. Young and high-minded readers, in particular, would have recoiled at such a description. It would have been impossible for them to be enthusiastic about Cyrus, though Cyrus *was* noble and good in many regards, and though he *did* (and does) embody an attractive model of rule.

By writing sympathetically of Cyrus and by casting a veil of decency over his sins and blemishes, Xenophon enables his readers to experience a moment of enthusiasm: they root for the success of Cyrus. When he stumbles and is brought down, these readers are bound to be disappointed. The most high-minded and serious among them will go back to the *Anabasis* to try to understand what went wrong: Wasn't Cyrus exceedingly noble and good? Wasn't he wronged? Didn't he *deserve* to succeed? And on a second (and third) reading, sharpened by the intensity of such noble concerns, the best or most promising readers begin to notice the many hints provided by Xenophon that Cyrus was *not* the victim of a wrong at all. They begin to unearth the true picture of Cyrus, for, as I have tried to show, if Xenophon writes sympathetically of Cyrus, he does not suppress the facts. In time, these readers begin to piece together Xenophon's intimations. They start to see more clearly both the genuine attractiveness of Cyrus (and of the model of rule he embodies) as well as the deficiencies of both the man and the model. And once they turn to the *Education of Cyrus* to confirm their conclusions about the model—as they must—they discover that the *Education of Cyrus* fleshes out what is only hinted at in the *Anabasis*. Indeed, the *Education of Cyrus* employs the very same rhetorical technique: a sympathetic portrait of the founder of the Persian empire is capped by a strikingly disappointing epilogue that casts into doubt all his accomplishments (8.8).

Had Xenophon presented Cyrus “realistically” at the outset of the *Anabasis*, he would have caused his best or most promising readers to recoil in a movement of indignant revulsion. He would have demoralized them. But they would have continued to harbor deep-seated sympathy for “Cyrus,” hopeful that a solution to the problem of the noble and the good lies in the radical ascent of a high-minded and capable ruler. From a pedagogical point of view, they would have remained untouched by the lessons of “The Ascent of Cyrus.” I conclude that the rhetoric of Xenophon is intended to enlist the moral seriousness of his best or most promising readers in the cause of their own education. *That* is its overarching purpose.

PART II

THE KINGSHIP OF KLEARCHOS

CHAPTER 2

“THE PIOUS KING” (BOOK TWO OF THE *ANABASIS*)

The justice of a Godlike King is but a pale imitation of divine justice. This is the main lesson of the first stage of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. But what are its implications? Does Xenophon regard the inadequacies of “Cyrus” as so many reasons to prefer a rule guided and helped by the gods? Should a Godlike King be replaced by a human ruler who looks up to heaven? After all, Zeus the King would appear to be superior to any human ruler insofar as he is free of political needs and political ambitions. He is in a position, at least in principle, to reward and assist noble action without any regard for its serviceability, that is, without undermining the noble or reducing it to the status of a self-serving means. Or is this to forget that Zeus *was* moved by ambition, having unthroned his own father to gain the kingship of Olympus?

The reader of the *Anabasis* who is attentive to the theme of piety and the gods is liable to conclude that Cyrus’s failure is a cautionary tale: his impiety and his hubristic attempt to displace Zeus the King are punished by the offended deity. Cyrus is caught off guard after ignoring the omen of a soothsayer. He aggravates his sin by failing to seek to obtain favorable *hiera* and *sphagia*. And he omits to propitiate Zeus the King with an entreating password. Is it any surprise that his ascent fails and that he is himself killed in the battle? The untimely death of Cyrus stands in marked contrast to the success of Klearchos, who displays steadfast piety throughout book one. If Klearchos is admittedly guilty of deceiving his fellow Greeks at Tarsus, he gives every sign of believing in the soothsayer’s omen, and there is little doubt that *he* selects the password before the Battle for Babylon.¹ Klearchos entreats “Zeus Savior” to grant him and

¹ 1.7.9. I read “Klearchos” at 1.8.16 with the best MSS., as I have said.

the Ten Thousand a “Victory.” His trusting prayer earns him the hoped-for reward (1.8.16). Admittedly, the death of Cyrus transforms a splendid victory into a Pyrrhic achievement. Klearchos’s success is a disheartening failure in the end. Yet isn’t this outcome consistent with—not to say that it is required by—our hypothesis? After all, Zeus the King is the protector of kings, and the Greeks were seeking to unseat the legitimate king of Persia (cf. 3.1.17 and, especially, 3.1.11–12).² We must consider the possibility, in other words, that Xenophon refuses to praise Cyrus (in his own name) as “a most kingly man” and “one most worthy to rule” above all because he views him as impious and hubristic.

Let us return to the text of the *Anabasis*. At the beginning of book two, Cyrus is replaced by Klearchos at the head of the Greek army. The Ten Thousand are now ruled by a man who looks up to Zeus the King for guidance and help.³ Let us consider the claim of the Pious King to conjoin adequately the noble with the good.

1. Klearchos and Theopompos: Virtue and Weapons

When David offered to Saul to go and fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger, Saul, to give him spirit, armed him with his own arms, which when David had tried on, he refused, saying that with them he could not give a good account of himself. He would rather face the enemy with his sling and his knife.

Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*

As the sun sets on the Battle for Babylon, the Ten Thousand appear to have won a complete victory. The enemy is reported to be in full flight (1.10.15). Early the next morning, however, they learn of the death of Cyrus. The news is broken to them by the envoys sent by Ariaĩos, a Persian who had commanded Cyrus’s cavalry on the left. Ariaĩos had fled

² *Odyssey* 16.400–405 shows with special clarity that Zeus is believed to be the protector of kings and to punish those who slay men of royal stock. In Homer’s poems, “kings” (BASILEIS) receive the epithet “DIOTREPHĒS”—“nurtured by Zeus”: for example, *Iliad* 2.196, 4.338; *Odyssey* 3.480, 4.44. On the role of Zeus in determining the kingly line, see *Odyssey* 15.512–38 (esp. 533), 16.117–20; see also 24.477–88.

³ This transition from the Godlike King to the Pious King is prepared by 1.10. In the last phase of the Battle for Babylon, Klearchos dispatches two scouts to spy the movements of the King’s cavalry. Xenophon refers to these men as “Lukios of Syracuse and another man” (1.10.14). The formula is bizarre: Why identify only one of the two scouts? The name “Lukios” means “The-Bright-One.” It is a surname of Apollo, the sun-god. Klearchos relies on “Lukios” for his “scouting reports.” (In support of this interpretation, note that “the setting of the sun” occurs right after Lukios delivers his report—an otherwise odd remark: 1.10.15 cf. 1.10.18.) The identity of “Lukios” is probably indicated at 3.3.20.

precipitously during the battle (1.10.1). The news hits the Greeks hard: “Would [to God] that Cyrus were alive,” Klearchos laments, adumbrating (his view of) the cause of Cyrus’s untimely demise (ALL’ ŌPHELE MEN KŪROS DZĒN). “But,” he continues,

since he is dead, report to Ariaĩos that we are victorious over the King and that, as you see, no one is fighting with us any longer. Had you not come, we would have marched against the King. We announce to Ariaĩos, then, that if he comes here we will place him on the royal throne, for it belongs to those who are victorious in battle to rule. (2.1.4)

In his new situation as *de facto* ruler of the Ten Thousand, Klearchos comes to sight as a model of firmness and resolve. Unfazed by Cyrus’s death, he adopts (on behalf of the Ten Thousand) a bold new plan: he will place Ariaĩos on the Persian throne. Yet there lurks beneath this boldness a streak of caution verging on timidity. Klearchos appears reluctant to seize the opportunity afforded by Cyrus’s demise. After all, it is *the Greeks* who deserve to rule Persia, if indeed “it belongs to those who are victorious in battle to rule.” Yet Klearchos offers the kingship to Ariaĩos, a man who fled precipitously during the battle (1.10.1, 3.2.17).

The envoys depart to report the message of Klearchos to Ariaĩos. Menōn and Cheirisophos, two Greek generals, accompany them (2.1.5). Meanwhile the Ten Thousand prepare what morning meal they can manage. (The army’s provisions had been carried off by the King during the battle.) Around mid-morning, heralds sent by Artaxerxes and the satrap Tissaphernēs arrive. Most are non-Hellenes except for a man named Phalĩnos, a Greek who was honored by Tissaphernēs for his professed knowledge of military things.

The heralds deliver an ultimatum to the Greeks: “The King orders you, since he has won the victory and killed Cyrus, to surrender your weapons and go to his gates to find for yourselves what good you may” (2.1.8). The Greeks are hit hard by this brazen demand for unconditional surrender. Nevertheless, Klearchos manages to reply that “it does not belong to those who are victorious to surrender their weapons” (2.1.9).⁴ No sooner has he said this, however, than he leaves the scene to go examine the sacrificial victims. “For, he chanced to be sacrificing” (2.1.9). Klearchos asks the other Greek generals to give the noblest and best reply they can—“I’ll be right back” (2.1.9). In effect, Klearchos refuses to give the heralds any answer before he has examined the sacrifices. Deliberating with his fellow-generals is less urgent than securing

⁴ Klearchos no longer speaks of toppling the King: what belongs to those who are victorious in battle is now, it seems, merely not to surrender their weapons.

the guidance of heaven. His awkward departure from the scene suggests that the death of Cyrus has made a deep impression on him. Far from leaving him unfazed, it has strengthened his conviction that the guidance of Zeus is to be sought above all else. Reliance on *one's own* judgment—à la Cyrus—is to be carefully eschewed.⁵

The eldest of the generals, the Arcadian Kleanōr, is the first man to give a reply. He declares with moving simplicity that the Greeks would sooner die than give up their weapons. His is an attitude of defiance tinged with despair (2.1.10). Next to speak is Proxenos, a Theban who is less dispirited than Kleanōr. Proxenos wonders aloud whether the King is asking for the Greeks' weapons on the grounds that he is stronger than them, or else because he is their friend, asking for the weapons as gifts. "If it is because he is stronger, why need he ask? Why not advance and *take* the weapons? But if he wishes to obtain the weapons by persuasion, let him say what the soldiers will obtain in return if they gratify him in these things" (2.1.10). Proxenos is thus ready to wage war against the King but he would prefer a negotiated settlement. He is apparently ready to surrender his weapons if such a settlement is reached. The third and final reply is by a young Athenian named Theopompos,⁶ who says: "As you see, Phalīnos, we now have nothing good except our weapons and our virtue. We believe that, with our weapons, we

⁵ Klearchos provides a rather extreme illustration of a Spartan war practice: the King offers sacrifices at dawn before deciding what to do: *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 13.2ff, esp. §5.

⁶ "Theopompos" is the reading of the best MSS. CBAE. MSS. FM read "Xenophon." I accept the reading of the best MSS. but (for the reasons stated in the text) I believe that "Theopompos" is "Xenophon." Some editors follow FM (Brownson/Dillery, Hude) but the majority follows CBAE (Dindorf, Gemoll, Marchant, Masqueray). Among those who accept "Theopompos," opinion is fairly evenly split as to whether this otherwise unknown character should be identified with Xenophon.—The name "Theopompos" also occurs at *Hellenika* 2.1.30. In that text, the Spartan Lysander sends word to the Spartans that he has captured the entire Athenian fleet at Aigos Potamoi. (Lysander was able to exploit the inexperience of recently appointed Athenian generals.) This stunning success ensures Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War. Lysander's emissary on that occasion is "Theopompos, a Milesian pirate" (2.1.30). That Lysander sends a man named "Theopompos" adumbrates his sense of self-worth (cf. *Hellenika* 3.4.7–8); that he sends a pirate foreshadows the character of his impending rule over many former cities of the Athenian empire (cf. *Hellenika* 2.3.7, 3.5.13, 3.4.2). The name "Theopompos" in the *Hellenika* is pregnant for another reason as well. The Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War occurs right after the judicial murder of the Athenian generals who had won the battle of the Arginousai. These generals were then replaced by the inexperienced commanders mentioned above (2.1.16 cf. 2.1.25–26). The victors of the Arginousai were tried and executed in flagrant contravention of the Athenian law (*Hellenika* 1.7). Was this illegal act—which was an impious act as well (cf. *Hellenika* 1.7.19, 1.7.25; *Memorabilia* 1.1.17–18)—punished by heaven? The name "Theopompos" adumbrates Xenophon's answer to this question.

would be able to make use of our virtue; but were we to surrender our weapons, we would be deprived even of our lives. So, don't believe that we will surrender to you the only good things we have, but, with them, we shall fight over *your* good things as well" (2.1.12). Phalīnos bursts out laughing: "You look like a philosopher, young man,⁷ and you speak not unpleasantly.⁸ But know that you are a fool (ANOËTOS) if you suppose that your virtue can prevail over the power of the King" (2.1.12–13). Phalīnos is amused, and perhaps grudgingly impressed, by Theopompos's readiness to fight the King over his "good things." The young philosopher shares in the defiance of Kleanōr but is not weighed down by his despair. He adopts Klearchos's stance that "ruling belongs to those who are victorious in battle" but, unlike Klearchos, he is ready to act on it: the Greeks do not need a Persian champion, such as Ariaños, to become rulers of Persia.

Theopompos's bold defiance is not, however, the sole or even the primary cause of Phalīnos's laughter, which is rooted in a misunderstanding. To exaggerate for the sake of clarity, let us say that Phalīnos ascribes to Theopompos the view that virtue can prevail over the power of the King all by itself; weapons are, so to speak, irrelevant. Of course, this is precisely what Theopompos denies: virtue alone cannot save the Greeks. Phalīnos laughs, then, at what he takes to be the naïveté of Theopompos, who, as a young philosopher, appears to be blissfully unaware of the importance of weapons, or of an overwhelming preponderance of weapons, in political life.⁹

If Phalīnos is amused by the naïve Theopompos, he takes seriously the hard-boiled Klearchos, a soldier the opposite of a naïve youth. At length Klearchos returns from the sacrifices and he asks whether the envoys have received their reply. Meanwhile some Greek generals had been growing soft, floating offers of friendship and services to the King. Phalīnos interrupts and says: "These men say different things, Klearchos, but you tell

⁷ "Young man" translates NEANISKOS, a word fraught with overtones of hot-headedness or wantonness.

⁸ I follow MSS. FM and read OUK ACHARISTA ("not unpleasantly") instead of OUK ACHRĒSTA ("not unprofitably") found in MSS. CBAE (2.1.13). The phrase "not unpleasantly" occurs at *Odyssey* 8.236. King Alcinous uses it to characterize a speech of Odysseus who had boasted of his martial skills. Alcinous responds by describing the customs of his fellow Phaeacians: "We are not flawless boxers or wrestlers, but in the foot race we run swiftly, and we are the best seaman; and always to us the banquet is dear, and the lyre, and the dance, and change of clothes, and warm baths, and the couch" (8.246–49, translation by A. T. Murray). Apparently, "Theopompos" is to Odysseus what the Persians are to the Phaeacians.

⁹ Cf. Callicles's description of the inexperienced babblings of philosophers: Plato, *Gorgias* 485a3–e2.

us what *you* say” (2.1.15, my emphasis). The answer of Klearchos deserves to be quoted in full:

I am pleased to see you, Phalīnos, and I suppose that so are all these others as well. For you are a Greek and so are we, as many as you see. Since we are in these troubles, we are deliberating with you as to what we ought to do about what you are speaking of. So, before the gods, give us what advice seems to you noblest and best, which will bring you honor in the future when it is recounted that Phalīnos, as he was once sent by the King to order the Greeks to surrender their weapons, gave them the following advice. For you know that it is necessary for your advice to be spoken of in Greece. (2.1.16–17)

By leading Phalīnos down this path, Klearchos was trying to bait the herald into advising the Greeks not to surrender their weapons. Had the King’s own herald offered this advice, the Greeks would have become “more filled with good hopes” (EUELPIDES MĀLLON EĪEN: 2.1.18). But Phalīnos turns the tables on Klearchos: “If you had a single hope (ELPIS) in ten thousand to save yourselves by waging war against the King, I would advise you not to surrender your weapons; but if indeed there is no hope (ELPIS) of safety while the King is unwilling, I advise you to save yourselves however you can” (2.1.19).

Why did Klearchos think it fit to seek advice from the herald of his enemy? Did he really think that Phalīnos would advise him *not* to surrender his weapons? This was (to say the least) improbable. Klearchos even enhanced Phalīnos’s credibility by stressing their shared Greekness, thereby coating his advice with a specious hue of goodwill. Far from filling the Greeks with good hopes, Klearchos deepens their despondency and increases the likelihood that they will grow soft and agree, perhaps, to surrender unconditionally. What caused Klearchos to resort to such an ill-advised stratagem?

Klearchos stresses that Phalīnos’s advice will be spoken of in Greece; his stratagem rests on what he presumes is Phalīnos’s concern for honor or glory among fellow Hellenes. Future generations will remember his noble deed. Klearchos does not pause to ask himself whether Phalīnos values the prospect of gaining such honor or glory nearly as much as he values the honor he is currently enjoying at the court of Tissaphernēs (2.1.7). *That* honor would be forfeited, needless to say, should he advise the Greeks not to surrender their weapons. Besides, it is not at all “necessary” for the advice of Phalīnos to be spoken of in Greece: if the Greek army is destroyed in Mesopotamia, so too (in all likelihood) will be the memory of Phalīnos’s advice. What *is* necessary, however, is for the advice in question to be spoken of at the court of Tissaphernēs and of the

King by the coterie of non-Hellenic heralds witnessing their parley. Had Phalīnos advised the Greeks not to surrender their weapons, he would have issued his own arrest warrant.¹⁰ Klearchos's appeal to him had no chance of succeeding.

Yet why doesn't Klearchos see this fairly obvious point? Even *he* seems to be somehow aware that Phalīnos would pay a dear price if he were to advise the Greeks not to surrender their weapons. He stresses that he wishes to hear Phalīnos's "noblest and best" advice (...SUMBOULEUSON HĒMĪN HO TI SOI DOKEĪ KALLISTON KAI ARISTON), not simply his "best" advice, as he says elsewhere in another context (2.1.17, my emphasis).¹¹ Klearchos is somehow aware, that is, that the advice he is seeking would entail a *sacrifice* from Phalīnos—a greater sacrifice, indeed, than he appears to believe or realize—and it is this sacrifice that would ennoble Phalīnos's advice.

Yet to repeat: If a sacrifice is required of the one who gives noble advice, why does Klearchos think that he will obtain this advice? For, Xenophon stresses that the advice given by Phalīnos "defeated the expectation" of Klearchos.¹² Why does Klearchos *expect* that the herald will give him the noble advice he is seeking?

One cause of Klearchos's expectation would appear to be (what he regards as) the intrinsic appeal of the noble. For, it would be noble for Phalīnos to give advice to the Greeks that, though dangerous or bad for himself, is good *for them*. He might thereby be harmed in one sense, but he would be giving an eloquent proof of his virtue, and isn't virtue a greater possession than honor or even glory, promising a complete and lasting happiness?

In view of this consideration—and given that Phalīnos *might* have gained honor or glory among Hellenes by giving the noble advice sought by Klearchos—the latter's appeal to Phalīnos was perhaps not entirely ill-advised. It may have had a chance of succeeding. Yet even if we grant as much—even if the appeal of Klearchos might have persuaded a soul nobler than Phalīnos's—wasn't the appeal still *unlikely* to succeed? Yet to repeat, Klearchos *expected* to receive the noble advice he was seeking. Why? Even Klearchos concedes somehow that the noble involves

¹⁰ By Phalīnos's own account, the King is cruel: he is ready to use his subjects as cannon fodder (2.1.11). Consider also his use of the first person plural ("*we* will report these things") at 2.1.21.

¹¹ Klearchos requests the "best" (ARISTON) advice of his troops at 1.3.12. Xenophon also speaks of the "best" advice of Proxenos and Menōn at 2.5.41 (TA BELTISTA SUMBOULESTHAI). Klearchos does use the formula "noblest and best reply" at 2.1.9 (HO TI KALLISTON TE KAI ARISTON).

¹² Phalīnos answered PARA TĒN DOXAN of Klearchos: 2.1.19.

a sacrifice, that is, that it is not simply or unambiguously good. There must therefore be a second cause of his expectation or confidence. Such a cause is indeed pointed to by his ostentatious oath: “So, *before the gods*, [Phalīnos], give us what advice seems to you noblest and best [...]” (PROS THEŌN: 2.1.17, my emphasis). Klearchos believes that Phalīnos’s advice will be witnessed by the gods. For he believes, as he will soon state, that human affairs are perceived by gods who are overwhelmingly powerful, far-seeing, and concerned to punish and reward justly (2.5.7). This belief sustains Klearchos’s confidence and helps keep in check whatever doubts he may have harbored about the goodness of the noble. And it would seem that it is this belief, above all, that causes him to disregard the obstacles standing in the way of Phalīnos giving him the “noblest and best” advice he seeks, for he ascribes to the herald an opinion that he himself holds: the sacrifices required by virtue will be recompensed, in one way or another, by just gods. In other words, Klearchos’s baiting of Phalīnos is not merely aimed at hope, it is itself *based* upon hope. Yet it results—paradoxically—in a deepening of despondency.

We are not yet in a position to analyze the character and grounds of Klearchos’s hopefulness. In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, the function of the failed baiting of Phalīnos is to set the stage for a later and much more dramatic failure on the part of Klearchos (2.5). We will return to this question in that context (section three). For now, let us take a look back at Theopompos. Recall that the young philosopher appeared naïve to Phalīnos because he seemed to be blissfully unaware of the political importance of an overwhelming preponderance of weapons. Yet it is precisely Theopompos who stressed the cold fact that virtue is powerless without weapons. By contrast, the hard-boiled Klearchos assumes that the virtue of Phalīnos, well-nigh by itself, will issue forth in a piece of noble or self-sacrificial advice. If reliance on virtue alone is a form of naïveté, then it is *Klearchos* who emerges as the more naïve of the two characters.¹³ But let us not forget that Klearchos relies on the help of just gods. Better to say, then, that whereas Klearchos ultimately bases his baiting of Phalīnos on virtue together with heavenly weapon, Theopompos insists that virtue must be supported by this-worldly weapons.

Theopompos makes a single appearance in the *Anabasis*. He is a significant character, however, because he is a stand-in for Xenophon. (Several textual pointers prove this: Theopompos “looks like a philosopher,”¹⁴ he

¹³ On the naïveté of Klearchos, consider also *Hellenika* 1.3.17.

¹⁴ The word “philosopher” (PHILOSOPHOS) is used only here in the *Anabasis*, though it is admittedly rare throughout Xenophon’s corpus. The identification of Xenophon with Theopompos strengthens the case that the man who campaigns in Asia thinks of himself as a Socratic philosopher.

is a young Athenian, and so forth.¹⁵ Even the fact that he makes a single appearance in the *Anabasis* confirms his fictitiousness: all *bona fide* generals in this scene—Klearchos, Kleanōr, and Proxenos—appear in several others.) Why does Xenophon come to sight under a pseudonym at this juncture? Because he was not actually present when the King's ultimatum was delivered to the Greeks, as he indicates.¹⁶ He was then only a private member of the army. Theopompos is a fictitious character who says what Xenophon *would have said*, had he been in attendance. Xenophon would have rejected any thought of surrendering his weapons or of negotiating with the Persians and would have challenged the King to a fight over his good things. He is the emphatic non-appeaser.

Our analysis raises a sensitive question: Is Xenophon adumbrating that heavenly weapons provide no support for virtue—if they exist at all? The evidence marshaled hitherto does not warrant this conclusion. Xenophon styles himself “Theopompos”—a “God-Sent.” Besides, the scene of the ultimatum illustrates the mysterious workings of divine providence. Klearchos goes off to the sacrifices to seek guidance and help from the gods. His prayer is answered, though not in the manner that he likely expected. It is answered through the presence of an Athenian “God-sent” among the soldiers who will prove equal to the task of leading most of the Ten Thousand back to safety.¹⁷

2. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Klearchos

That Klearchos ultimately bases his baiting of Phalīnos on virtue and heavenly weapons does not mean that he is unaware of the importance of this-worldly weapons: he is, after all, an experienced soldier. Once he rejects somewhat awkwardly the “advice” of Phalīnos, he declares that the Greeks will *not* surrender their weapons under any circumstances. His final answer to Phalīnos is even reminiscent of the fabled reply of King Leonidas of Sparta to King Xerxes of Persia at the gates of Thermopylae: “If we are going to be the friends of the King, we will be worth more as friends if we keep our weapons than if we surrender them to someone else; and if we are going to wage war, we will wage war better if we keep our weapons than if we surrender them to someone else” (2.1.20).¹⁸

¹⁵ Cf. the policy advocated by “Theopompos” (2.1.12) with the policy adopted by Xenophon (3.1.21). Cf. also 2.1.13 with 2.4.19: in each place, the character described is a “young man” (NEANISKOS); in each case, Xenophon is meant.

¹⁶ “*They said that* some others were going soft and were saying etc.” (2.1.14, my emphasis). Xenophon's account of the ultimatum of the King is based on the report of others.

¹⁷ Yet consider 3.1.4–8: Xenophon took it upon himself to answer the call of Proxenos. He was not the emissary of Apollo.

¹⁸ Cf. Diodorus Siculus (2000) 14.25.2–4.

Klearchos thus adopts, for the time being, a strategy that can be described as a mean between that of Proxenos and that of Theopompos: he is open to a negotiation with the Persians but will not accept a unilateral disarmament even if a settlement is reached.

After the departure of Phalinos and the other heralds, one of the envoys of Ariaños returns alongside Cheirosophos. (Menōn remains with Ariaños.) The two men report that Ariaños rejects the plan that he be placed on the throne. Many Persians are superior to himself, he is reported as saying, and would not accept his ruling as King. Instead, Ariaños proposes to the Greeks to join his impending retreat. If they wish to do this, however, they must join him during the night. He will break camp at dawn. Klearchos receives the message at sunset. He calls a meeting of the generals and captains:

Men, as I was sacrificing to march against the King, the victims were not favorable, and this is reasonable since, as I am just now learning, the Tigris lies between us and the King; it is a navigable river which we would not be able to cross without boats, and boats we do not have. Nor is it possible to remain here, of course, since we cannot have our provisions. But the victims were very propitious for us to march to the friends of Cyrus. This, then, is what must be done: go away and prepare whatever dinner you can; when the horn gives the signal to rest, pack up; when it signals a second time, load the beasts of burden; on the third signal, follow the leading part, keeping the beast of burden by the river and the weapons on the outside. (2.2.3–4)

Without any opposition or, indeed, any deliberation,¹⁹ the generals and captains go do what Klearchos bids them. “And afterwards he ruled and they obeyed, not because they had elected him because they saw that he alone was prudent where the ruler had to be whereas the others were inexperienced” (2.2.5).

Is the reference to Klearchos’s prudence (PHRONEŌ) in this passage an endorsement, on the part of Xenophon, of the strategy of immediate retreat? It is perhaps too early to tell. What we can say with confidence is that Klearchos aligns his military judgment with the sacrificial victims: he weighs three alternatives and chooses the one for which the victims are propitious. He is manifestly eager for heavenly guidance. He regards the gods as the lords of the works of war, a view widespread among the Spartans in particular.²⁰ Yet upon closer examination, we note that

¹⁹ Xenophon illustrates this playfully: Klearchos deliberates and then agrees—apparently all of it done by himself (2.3.8–9). Klearchos is the undisputed King of the Greeks.

²⁰ The Xenophonic Socrates voices the same view on occasion: *Oikonomikos* 5.19.

Klearchos questions the victims in a very partial way. He is not only a Pious King but an excessively cautious one as well. First, Klearchos does not sacrifice for the second and central alternative: to remain in Mesopotamia (either permanently or for the time being). This alternative he dismisses summarily on the grounds that the Greeks cannot have their provisions there. Yet this is belied by Xenophon's description of the riches of Mesopotamia (2.3.14–16, 2.4.13–14 and §21–22).²¹ Second, Klearchos's argument—aimed at buttressing the god's view that the Greeks should *not* march forward—is suspicious. He claims that he is “just now learning” that the Tigris lies between them and Artaxerxes. How has he “learned” this?²² The information is clearly inaccurate: the two opposing armies are still near each other on the same (western) bank of the Tigris. The river is about five days away point east.²³ (The only information that Klearchos has “just learned” is Ariaños's refusal to be put on the throne.) Yet even—and precisely—if Klearchos has received some (inaccurate) reports that the King is beyond the Tigris—and thus, that a forward march is both impossible and not advised by the gods—doesn't this mean that the Greek army is now enjoying the protection of the awesome Tigris, “a navigable river which cannot be crossed without boats”? Isn't the army (on this assumption) occupying a geographic fortress in the heart of Mesopotamia? Why, then, does Klearchos fail to question the gods about the advisability of remaining there, if not permanently, at least for the time being? Barring an all-out offensive, such a strategy would have been preferable to a hasty retreat. This was Xenophon's view

²¹ When it is decided to retreat, Babylon is said to be 360 stadia away (about 40 miles or 65 kilometers). This corresponds to a march of two or three days (2.2.6). Many editors—including Hude/Peters, Marchant, Masqueray, and Gemoll—bracket the passage on the grounds that it is awkwardly placed and contains textual difficulties. But the placement is appropriate: the geographic ascent is now over and Xenophon gives a tally of the marches and the distances covered (93 marches and 16,500 stadia). These tallies also remind us of how close the Greeks came to Babylon: they shed light on Klearchos's decision to turn around and retreat immediately. As for the textual difficulties, the most important one is that Xenophon counts the marches of the army from *Ephesus*, though Cyrus's expedition began at *Sardis* (1.2.2, 3.1.8). But as Hoeg (1950) has pointed out, the ascent of *Xenophon* began at Ephesus (6.1.23; p. 161). In other words, the passage contains an important pointer to the fact that the *Anabasis* is somehow *Xenophon's* ascent, not Cyrus's.

²² Has Klearchos not even “learned” what he claims to have learned? Or does he know the lay of the land—through reports or otherwise—and lie about what he knows? However this may be, Klearchos's statement is obviously inaccurate: he says that the Tigris is a navigable river “which cannot be crossed without boats,” but the Persians had built a bridge over it (2.4.17–24).

²³ The Greeks and Ariaños will run into the King's army after retreating for less than a day: 2.2.13–15. For the distance to the Tigris: 2.4.12 (three days) and 2.4.13 (two days).

at any rate.²⁴ Yet once Ariaĩos rejects the offer to be placed on the throne, Klearchos can think of nothing except getting back to Hellas as quickly as possible.

With Klearchos in the lead and the rest of the army following, the Greeks meet up with Ariaĩos in the middle of the night. They swear a solemn oath not to betray one another and to be allies. The barbarians swear, in addition, to guide the Greeks without fraud.²⁵ After the pledges are made, Klearchos asks Ariaĩos whether he intends to go back on the road on which he came. The latter says no: that road went through a long stretch of desert. (On that “desert,” see Appendix 2, note 5). The retreating armies, now without provisions, would starve if they went that way again. They must take a longer road that will insure the availability of the provisions. But, Ariaĩos stresses, the first stages of the march must be made as long as possible. Once they are separated from the King by two or three days, he will not be able to catch up with them.

In a rare judgment at once explicit and severe, Xenophon states his opinion that the strategy of immediate and quick retreat was slavish—“capable of accomplishing nothing except secret escape or fleeing fast.” “But chance,” he adds wryly, “proved a nobler general” (2.2.13). On the first day of the retreat, the Greeks chance to run into the van of the King’s army. Mistaking this happenstance for a sign that the Ten Thousand are resolved to fight, the King immediately sues for peace—after ordering

²⁴ See esp. 2.4.15–24 and 3.2.24. Given that the Greeks could have challenged the King, note Xenophon’s pregnant remark, which he makes in his description of the regimen of the soldiers (it includes palm-shoots) that “the palm-shoot from which the brain was removed would wither up completely” (2.3.16). The “brain” in question could be a metaphor for the “King,” “brain” of the Persian empire. But it could equally refer to the dead Cyrus—a more ominous reading for the Ten Thousand. The word “brain” (ENGKEPHALOS) along with other cognates of “head” (KEPHALĒ) occur four times in the span of four lines at 2.3.15–16.

²⁵ The alliance is sealed in animal blood. The two sides slaughter a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, and dip a sword and a lance in the blood (2.2.8–9). Many editors omit the mention of the “wolf” (LUKOS) in this passage. That the Greeks had a wolf ready-to-hand for sacrifice is admittedly strange. Yet they had celebrated the festival of the Lukaia, held in honor of Zeus Lukaion (1.2.10). The Lukaia was an archaic festival said to have been instituted by Lycaion, who was said to have sacrificed a boy to Zeus. The latter was angered by this barbaric human sacrifice, which apparently did not prevent the festival from being established (cf. Plato, *Minos* 315b6–c5, *Republic* 565d4–e2). Were the Greeks trying to appease Zeus when they sacrificed this wolf? Did they understand their victory-turned-into-defeat as having been caused (also) by the displeasure of Zeus at the celebration of the Lukaia? In Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, Jove is so appalled by the bestiality of Lycaion that he destroys mankind with a great flood (1.163–312).

them to surrender their weapons but twenty-four hours earlier. Klearchos exploits the situation to obtain much-needed provisions for the army (2.3.1ff.). Indeed, despite his reservations about the strategy of immediate and quick retreat, Xenophon describes Klearchos's rule in the early part of the retreat as effective and shrewd.

On the day when the Greeks run into the King, for example, Klearchos is careful to avoid the appearance of fleeing before him. Yet he is also careful *not* to lead his troops against the enemy because (as he knows) they are worn out and hungry (2.2.16). The ensuing night, as a groundless panic engulfs the Greek camp, Klearchos bids a herald to order silence and proclaim that the rulers are offering a large reward for whoever will denounce the man who let loose an ass among the weapons. The timely fiction reassures the soldiers: they perceive that their fears are groundless and their rulers safe (2.2.19–21). At dawn the heralds of the King arrive at the Greek camp, cap in hand, to request a truce. By chance, Klearchos happens to be reviewing his troops. He tells the sentinels to order them to wait. He then positions his army carefully, making sure that the compact phalanx cuts a beautiful figure; he also hides the men who have no weapons. When he finally agrees to receive the heralds, he addresses them haughtily flanked by his best-armed and best-looking troops: "What do you want?" The heralds answer meekly that they have come for a truce and are qualified to carry reports from the Greeks, back and forth. "Report [to the King] that that we must first fight another battle, then," Klearchos shoots back, "for we have no breakfast, and no one dares to talk to the Greeks about a truce without providing a breakfast" (2.3.5).

Klearchos's haughtiness and apparent readiness to fight produce immediate results: the King agrees to purchase a truce with provisions. His agents lead the Greeks to local villages where they find what they need. Klearchos keeps his guard up during the march. He maintains his army in battle order and commands the rearguard personally. When the troops encounter canals and ditches brimful of water that cannot be crossed without bridges, Klearchos suspects an act of treachery. He leads his troops across, using fallen palm trees as bridges. Some trees, however, must be cut down. Xenophon observes that "here one could learn how Klearchos commanded" (2.3.11). Assigning the task of felling the trees to his younger troops, he supervises their work with a spear in his left hand and a staff in his right. If anyone seems to him to be shirking, he takes the culprit aside and strikes him. He then gets into the mud and takes over the job himself. So zealous is Klearchos that all the soldiers, even the older ones, are ashamed to display less alacrity than he does. Klearchos

is capable of instilling zeal in his men—not by fueling their hopes for rewards, but by getting his own hands dirty.²⁶

The Greeks remain three days in the local villages where they get provisions. The satrap Tissaphernēs arrives with a Persian delegation. He addresses the generals: “Men of Greece, I live as a neighbor to Greece, and when I saw that you had fallen into many evils, and insoluble ones, I considered it a great find if I were somehow able to ask the King to allow me to save you and return you to Greece” (2.3.18).²⁷ Indeed, Tissaphernēs explains, if he were to do this, he would earn the gratitude not only of the Ten Thousand but of the whole of Hellas as well. He has thus been pressing his just claim with the King, reminding him that he was the first to provide intelligence of Cyrus’s march and that he came to court with military help (cf. 1.2.4). He also did not flee before the Greeks during the Battle for Babylon but drove through and joined with the King in the Greek camp (cf. 1.10.5–8). Tissaphernēs claims that the King has promised him to think about his request. “But he bids me ask you for what purpose you campaigned against him; and I advise you to return a measured answer so as to make it easier for me to obtain some good from him for you, if I may” (2.3.20).

After a moment of deliberation, the Greek generals return a reply through Klearchos. The essence of it is as follows: the Ten Thousand wish to return home as quickly as possible. If anyone attempts to harm them, they will defend themselves with the gods’ help. But if someone does them a good turn, they will return good for good, to the extent of their power (2.3.21–23).

The clever speech of Tissaphernēs has thus caused the generals to return “a measured answer.” Yet by admitting that they have no hostile intentions against the King and lay no claim to the rule of Persia, they appear to forget that their best weapon in the circumstances (aside from their spears and their virtue) is to *appear* hostile—as, indeed, the noble generalship of chance has just showed. For the prospect of being saved by Tissaphernēs is, to say the least, remote. Even if we should grant, for argument’s sake, that the satrap has an interest in saving the Greeks, what interest can the *King* possibly have in allowing this to happen? Isn’t it evident that by sparing them, he would encourage further attacks upon his dominions? This risk was both foreseeable and foreseen at the time (2.3.25, 2.4.3–4) and it materialized when many Greeks were spurred by the Ten Thousand’s victory (and subsequent successful retreat from Persia) to challenge Artaxerxes. King Agesilaos of Sparta might have caused serious harm to Persia had

²⁶ Compare 2.3.10–13 with 1.5.7–8.

²⁷ Translation by Ambler (2008).

circumstances been more favorable to him.²⁸ Indeed, when Alexander the Great conquers Persia, about two generation after the *Anabasis*, he is heard to encourage his troops, before the Battle of Issus, with reminders of the Ten Thousand's successes.²⁹ It is highly unlikely, in other words, that Artaxerxes is considering the request of his satrap if he is at all attuned to his long-term political interests.

But couldn't Artaxerxes grant his satrap's request out of gratitude? He could. But rulers are not known to show gratitude at the expense of their safety. Besides, Tissaphernēs has *already* been rewarded: the King has increased his satrapy by adding to it the former dominions of Cyrus (2.5.11). Indeed, the generals should have suspected that Tissaphernēs had not even requested the favor of saving them. If the safe return of the army was going to threaten the King, it was going to threaten Tissaphernēs as well.

The satrap takes his leave of the generals to report to the King. On the third day, he returns and announces that, despite much opposition at court, he has been granted the favor of saving the Greeks. The terms of the proposed peace are advantageous. The local country will be friendly to the Greeks and they will be guided back to Hellas, without fraud, by Tissaphernēs; markets will also be opened for their convenience. In return, the Greeks must march without harming the King's country and they must take their provisions from the land only when no market is opened. A sworn peace is concluded on these terms. Tissaphernēs goes back to the King to prepare his journey home; he promises to return once he has done what he must. A delay of over twenty days ensues. Relatives of Ariaios and of his soldiers begin to arrive at the Persian rebel camp. They bring encouragements and some also bring promises of forgiveness from the King. The Persian allies of the Greeks begin to pay less attention to them. In the Greek camp, many express their displeasure and concern to Klearchos and the other generals:

What are we waiting for? Do we not know that the King would value our destruction above anything else to instill fear of campaigning against the Great King in the rest of the Greeks? Even now, he is leading us to stay because his army is scattered; when he has reassembled it, there is no way

²⁸ Agesilaos might have detached many nations from the authority of the King had the cities of mainland Greece been less prone to accept bribes in the form of Persian gold: *Hellenika* 3.4.1–6, 3.5.1, 4.1.1–2, 4.1.41, 4.2.1–4, 7.1.34; *Agesilaos* 1.6–8 and §25–36, 7.4–5. The reader should also consider the following evidence: the speech attributed to Jason of Thessaly, *Hellenika* 6.1.12; Polybius (2000) 3.6.1–14; Francis Bacon (1952) 1.7.30; Edward Gibbon (1909) Vol. 2, p. 551.

²⁹ Arrian (1976) 2.7.8–9.

that he will not attack us. Perhaps he is digging some ditch somewhere or building a wall to make the road impassable. For he would never willingly wish for us to go back to Hellas and announce that we, being so few, defeated the King at his gates and then returned home after making him a laughing stock. (2.4.3–4)³⁰

Klearchos responds that he, too, is pondering all these things. However (he adds) by departing now, the Greeks would appear to declare war on the Persians and to act contrary to the sworn peace. Besides, they would deprive themselves of its benefits: markets, guides, alliance with Ariaños, and knowledge of the local geography (especially the rivers). And while the Persians possess a numerous and excellent cavalry, the Greeks have no cavalry at all. They could not pursue and kill many enemies even if they should be victorious in battle. And in case of defeat, no one could be saved. “Given that the King has so many [advantages as] allies,” Klearchos concludes, “if he really desires eagerly to destroy us, I do not know why he needed to swear an oath, and to give us his right hand, and thus perjure himself before gods and make his word distrusted by Greeks and barbarians” (2.4.7).

Amid such growing anxieties, Tissaphernēs returns and the retreat gets underway. Ariaños now marches and encamps with³¹ him. The Ten Thousand keep their distance and march with their own guides. Whenever the two sides encamp near each other, they set up guards as enemies do. This provokes suspicions. They forage for wood or grass from the same spots and come to blows. This provokes enmities. After three days, the two armies encounter the Wall of Media, a massive brick structure said to be located near Babylon. Two days later they reach the Tigris.

That evening, the Ten Thousand encamp near a large city called Sittace and in the vicinity of an expansive and beautiful park. Tissaphernēs immediately crosses the Tigris. He is no longer visible. After dinner, Proxenos and Xenophon happen to be taking a walk in front of where the weapons are stacked. They are enjoying a conversation.³² A man approaches and asks to see Proxenos or Klearchos. (The man arouses

³⁰ That Xenophon was among those who voiced this warning is suggested by 3.1.18.

³¹ “To encamp with” (SUSTRATOPEDUOMAI) is the reading of MSS. FM. The best MSS. CBAE have “to campaign with” (SUSTRATEUOMAI), a reading suggesting that the sworn peace was never more than a paper agreement. The reading of the best MSS. may very well be correct.

³² This is the only indication of what Xenophon does during the early phase of the retreat and until he is elected general (2.4.15).

suspicion by not seeking Menōn, though he claims to have been sent by Ariaĩos, who is Menōn's guest-friend.) When Proxenos states his identity, the man says that he has been sent by Ariaĩos and Artaozos, who were once faithful to Cyrus and are now of goodwill toward the Greeks. He warns that Tissaphernēs has stationed a large army in the nearby park and is planning a night attack. He urges that a guard be sent to the bridge. For Tissaphernēs is planning to tear it down, he says, in order to hem the Greeks in between the Tigris and the canal.

Proxenos and Xenophon take the man to see Klearchos. They report what he says. Klearchos is "exceedingly disturbed and fearful" (2.4.18). However, a certain young man who is present at the meeting gives thought to the matter and says that that it is not consistent for the Persians to speak both of attacking and of tearing down the bridge:

It is clear that those who attack will either win the victory or be defeated. If they win the victory, why should they need to tear down the bridge? Even if there were many bridges, there would be nowhere for us to flee and save ourselves. But if *we* win the victory, and the bridge has been torn down, there will be nowhere for *them* to flee. Nor will anyone be able to help them—the bridge being torn down—though there may be many troops on the other side. (2.4.19–20)

Hearing this, Klearchos asks the messenger how much land lies between the Tigris and the canal. There is much land, the man answers, and villages and many large cities:

At this point, it was understood that the barbarians had sent the man underhandedly out of worry that the Greeks would tear down the bridge and remain on the island, using the Tigris as a bulwark on the one side and the canal on the other. They could have their provisions from the land in the middle, which was extensive and good, and on which were present those who could work it; furthermore, it could become a refuge if someone wished to harm the King. (2.4.22)

Scholars have surmised that the young man (NEANISKOS) in this episode is none other than Xenophon himself. This surmise is correct, I believe. The young man reasons like a consummate dialectician—he calls attention to an "inconsistency of speech" (OUK AKOLOUTHA EIÊ)—and he reminds us of Theopompos, who looked like a philosopher and was dubbed a NEANISKOS by Phalinos (2.4.19, 2.1.13). Admittedly, Xenophon is not identified by name. But this self-effacement is easily explained: the moment for *his* ascent has not yet come. Had he named

himself, Xenophon would have destroyed the effect he achieves at the beginning of book three, where he comes out of nowhere, or so it seems, to save a forlorn situation. Not wishing to spoil that effect here, he is content to let Klearchos's rule show itself for what it is. He merely intimates his own decisive contribution. Yet while he thereby spares Klearchos an uncomplimentary comparison, he makes it perfectly clear that the Spartan is neither calm nor prudent.³³ For the King has tipped his hand: he fears that the Greeks will remain on the island. Nevertheless, Klearchos never pauses to consider whether his strategy of immediate and quick retreat should not be revised in light of the King's implicit admission of weakness. Klearchos does nothing that night except send a guard to the bridge. And he goes to bed. At dawn the Greeks cross the Tigris, keeping their guard up, but without further ado.

How would Klearchos have defended his failure to adjust his strategy? Would he have stressed that the Ten Thousand would have been guilty of double perjury—breaking *both* their sworn alliance with Ariaĩos *and* their sworn peace with Tissaphernēs and the King—had they remained on the island? But had the Persians not already broken *their* oaths? Tissaphernēs was not guiding the Greeks without fraud. And Ariaĩos was in cahoots with him.³⁴ The definitive commentary on this episode comes in the form of a laconic but pointed description of the bridge that spanned the Tigris—“*thirty-seven* boats yoked together” (2.4.24, my emphasis). By crossing the Tigris, Klearchos squandered a unique opportunity to establish his army in a geographic stronghold from which it could not have been easily dislodged. The Greeks might have been able to challenge the King, or launched a less hasty retreat later on. Instead, they will find themselves on the eastern bank of that formidable river,³⁵ further away from home than ever and guided by men whose faithlessness has become apparent.³⁶

³³ This episode is tinged with irony: the word NEANISKOS carries overtones of hot-headedness and wantonness, as I noted before. But it is here applied to a youth who is a model of cool prudence. These overtones must be kept in mind when we interpret a delicate passage involving two NEANISKOI (4.3.10–12).

³⁴ Even Klearchos seems to acknowledge that Ariaĩos has broken the sworn alliance. He says to Tissaphernēs: “Now I see that you have the power and land of Cyrus, while preserving your own land, *and that the power of the King, which Cyrus made use of to wage war, is your ally*” (2.5.11, reading POLEMEÏN [“to wage war”] with the best MSS.). The “power of the King” seems to refer to the Persian army of Ariaĩos.

³⁵ The Greeks will eventually be forced to take the northern road because they cannot find a safe way to cross the Tigris (3.5.7–18; 4.1.1–4). Over the centuries several armies, including the legions of Marcus Anthony and of Julian the Apostate, have experienced the same difficulty.

³⁶ In addition to the episode discussed in the text, consider 2.4.16 and 2.4.24.

3. Klearchos and Tissaphernēs: Hope and Friendship with the Divine

The Lord is my rock, my fortress and my deliverer;
my God is my rock, in whom I take refuge.
He is my shield and the horn of my salvation,
my stronghold.

Psalm 18.2

All his laws are before me;
I have not turned away from his decrees.

Psalm 18.22

Two weeks elapse between the crossing of the Tigris and the arrival at the Zapatan—the River-of-the-Big-Fraud.³⁷ Once the two armies reach the Zapatan, they remain on its banks for three days. Mutual suspicions are rife but no plot is visible. To allay this distrust lest a shooting war be rekindled, Klearchos requests a meeting with Tissaphernēs. Their get-together consists of an exchange of conciliatory speeches followed by a dinner and hospitality for the night for Klearchos. So amicable is their interview that Klearchos agrees to return to Tissaphernēs's tent the following day with the entire Greek leadership. His aim in doing this is to clear the air once and for all. During the second interview, Klearchos will be arrested, imprisoned, and (eventually) beheaded along with the generals who had accompanied him. The episode of the ensnaring of Klearchos is undoubtedly the epiphany of book two of the *Anabasis*. It is filled with dramatic intensity and pathos. It also raises an important question: Why did Klearchos allow himself to be so ensnared? He was a resourceful ruler (despite his excessive caution), an occasional practitioner of the art of deception, and a seasoned general who had witnessed the deceptiveness of Tissaphernēs a few years earlier.³⁸ Yet he let himself be tricked like a Boy Scout! How can we explain this naïveté, which amounts in context to a form of extreme recklessness? Book two culminates in a treatment

³⁷ During these two weeks, Klearchos shows his military skill and experience but he also reveals his deep distrust of the Persians. After marching for four days, the Greeks encounter the bastard brother of Cyrus and of Artaxerxes. He is proceeding from Susa with a large army to relieve the King. The brother in question halts and beholds the Ten Thousand as they march past him. Klearchos, who wishes to make his own army appear as numerous as possible, leads the troops two abreast and makes frequent pauses. Whenever the leading part of the host stops, the pause reverberates through the whole column. The Ten Thousand appear altogether numerous even to themselves. The King's brother is astonished by the size of their army (2.4.25–26).

³⁸ Thucydides 8.80.1

of this question.³⁹ The answer, I believe, is adumbrated in the speech of Klearchos to Tissaphernēs in their first meeting. A close study of that speech—a crucial moment in the *logos* of the *Anabasis*—is therefore called for. It will help us clarify why the Pious King ultimately fails to reconcile the noble with the good.



Klearchos's overarching goal in his speech to Tissaphernēs is to show the satrap that he should not fear the Greeks because the Greeks have several solid reasons to abide by the sworn peace. "I know, Tissaphernēs," Klearchos begins, "that there have been oaths between us, and that handshakes have been exchanged as pledges that we will not be unjust to each other" (2.5.3). "But," he continues, "I see that you are guarding yourself against us as if we were your enemies, and we, seeing this, are guarding ourselves in turn" (2.5.3). However, Klearchos insists that he is unable to perceive that the Persians are attempting to do harm to the Greeks, "and I know clearly that we, at least, have no such thing in mind" (2.5.4). Klearchos has therefore come to Tissaphernēs to remove his distrust if he can. For he knows that human beings before now—some out of slander, others out of mere suspicions—fearing each other and wishing to strike before they suffered, have done irreparable harm to those who neither intended nor even wished any such thing. Since Klearchos believes that face-to-face meetings can most remove misunderstandings, he has come and wishes to teach Tissaphernēs that he is not correct to distrust the Greeks. Klearchos gives him three reasons not to distrust them.

The "first and greatest" reason is that the two sides are prevented from being enemies by their sworn oaths (2.5.7). Klearchos insists he would never deem a man happy who is conscious in himself of having broken his oaths:

For I do not know what sort of speed there is, in war with the gods, by which one could get away by fleeing, or what sort of darkness there is into which one could run off to hide, or how one could withdraw into a secure stronghold. For all things are subject to the gods in every way, and in all places the gods are equally masters over all. (2.5.7)⁴⁰

In this profession of faith, Klearchos makes it clear that he would never risk turning far-seeing and overwhelming powerful gods into his

³⁹ Hirsch (1985) rightly observes that "it is Xenophon's portrayal of Klearchos as utterly naïve, foolish and trusting that calls for an explanation" (p. 28).

⁴⁰ Translation by Ambler (2008).

enemies—gods who are also the enforcers of human oaths. In effect, Klearchos is suggesting that his piety is Tissaphernēs's greatest reason not to distrust. Turning next to what he calls "human affairs," Klearchos states his second reason:

I believe that you are at present the greatest good for us. For with you, every road is easy, every river crossable, and we are not at a loss for provisions. But without you, every road is through the dark, for we do not know the way at all, every river is hard to cross, and every crowd is frightening—and yet solitude⁴¹ is most frightening of all, for it is full of extreme want. (2.5.9)⁴²

Klearchos now addresses Tissaphernēs with remarkable humility and deference, not unlike a suppliant beseeching the deity. He is still trying to ease the distrust of the satrap. Yet the language he resorts to, at once submissive and exalted ("you are the greatest good for us"), is striking coming from a proud and matter-of-fact soldier.

Klearchos's third and final reason (2.5.10–12) invokes hope rather than fear: Klearchos would deprive himself of many hopes, he says, and great ones, if he should attempt to do harm to Tissaphernēs. For the satrap has now secured the power and country of Cyrus as an accession to his own. He has become eminently capable of benefiting anyone he wishes. "In these circumstances, who would be so mad as not to wish to be your friend" (2.5.12)?

The above three reasons justify Klearchos's wish to be Tissaphernēs's friend. They also constitute a strong case that the satrap has no serious grounds to distrust the Greeks. Yet they do little to justify Klearchos's own hope that Tissaphernēs will wish to be *his* friend. That crucial issue is taken up in the second and shorter part of Klearchos's speech (2.5.12–15). There, Klearchos observes that several of the King's subjects are causing him trouble—the Mysians, the Pisidians, and the Egyptians—and that these insurgents could be powerfully chastised with the assistance of the

⁴¹ The word "solitude" can also be translated as "desert" (ERĒMIA). That what is being referred to here is indeed the "solitude" of the Greeks rather than the "desert" is indirectly confirmed by 3.1.2–3, where the "desert" is *not* listed among the *aporai* facing the Greeks, but "being left alone" is (MONOI DE KATALELEIMMENOI: 3.1.2). See also the use of ERĒMIA at *Hellenika* 6.5.23, §25 and Appendix 2, note 5.

⁴² Translation by Ambler (2008). I have changed it slightly. Klearchos's second reason ends with a rhetorical question: If the Greeks were so mad as to kill their benefactor, wouldn't they find themselves *at war* against the King, the greatest *overseer*? (POLEMEŌ, EPHOROS [MSS. CBAE]; in the inferior MSS. FM the passage reads "... find themselves *contending* with the King, the greatest *supporter*": AGŌNIDZOMAI, EPHEDEROS: 2.5.10). The King in question is not necessarily Artaxerxes.

Ten Thousand. Moreover, the army could strengthen Tissaphernēs in his relations with “those who dwell around you.”⁴³ For the Ten Thousand would assist him not only on account of their wage but also out of the gratitude they would justly feel toward him, having been saved by the satrap. In short, Klearchos is hopeful that Tissaphernēs will realize the usefulness of the Greeks.

Even a cursory analysis of the second part Klearchos’s speech suffices to see that his reasons for hoping that Tissaphernēs will wish to be his friend are weak. For while Klearchos dangles the carrot of Greek military assistance, he conveniently overlooks that by allowing the Ten Thousand to return home safely, Tissaphernēs (and the King) will be sending a signal of weakness and fuel both domestic upheaval and foreign challenges. We have seen this problem already. By hiring the Ten Thousand as mercenaries, the King would purchase a fire-hose at the cost of lighting a hundred fires. Besides, Klearchos’s offer of military assistance concludes a speech in which he has stressed in rather exorbitant terms the *weakness* of the Greeks. This is no way to persuade Tissaphernēs of their usefulness.⁴⁴

Why, then, is Klearchos so hopeful that Tissaphernēs will wish to be his friend? Is he resting his hopes on some unstated grounds, perhaps on the oaths that the satrap swore? But Klearchos does not allude to these oaths when he speaks of his hopes (cf. 2.4.7). Does he sense that the satrap’s piety is not above suspicion?⁴⁵ Or are these oaths problematic, as grounds for hope, even from the standpoint of a pious man like Klearchos?

To appreciate the difficulty, let us go back to what I have called Klearchos’s profession of faith (2.5.7). Klearchos opens his speech to Tissaphernēs with a very emphatic phrase—“I know” (EGO OIDA)—and he uses the same phrase five more times over the course of his speech.⁴⁶ He says “I believe” (NOMIDZO) almost as frequently (four times).⁴⁷ The distinction between what Klearchos “knows” and what he (merely)

⁴³ This formula appears to refer to the Greeks of Asia. Is Klearchos offering to become the instrument of their enslavement (2.5.14)?

⁴⁴ The reply of Tissaphernēs, by contrast, stresses Persian *strength*: 2.5.16–21.

⁴⁵ In his first address to the Greeks, Tissaphernēs is silent about the gods (2.3.18–20). Klearchos mentions them twice (§22 §23). Tissaphernēs does mention the gods prominently in his reply to Klearchos (2.5.20–21), but he seems to do so in reaction to Klearchos’s own profession of faith (2.5.7).

⁴⁶ In these five additional instances, Klearchos uses OIDA (“I know”) without the pronoun EGO (“I”). The phrase or formula is therefore somewhat less emphatic.

⁴⁷ OIDA: 2.5.3, §4, §5, §7, §13 (2X); NOMIDZO 2.5.6, §8, §11, §13. Klearchos also uses GIGNOSKO (“I judge”) twice: 2.5.8, §13.

“believes” is the keystone of his speech and must be applied to his profession of faith. Recall that in that profession, Klearchos described the gods as farseeing. Yet once we read his words closely, it becomes evident that Klearchos never says that the gods “know all things.” Klearchos’s failure to ascribe omniscience to the gods sets him apart from several Xenophonic characters—Socrates among them—who do precisely that.⁴⁸ Rather, Klearchos intimates that he *does not know* whether the gods are omniscient: “*I do not know* (OUK OIDA) [...] what sort of darkness there is into which one could run off to hide [from the gods] [...]” (2.5.7, my emphasis). To be sure, Klearchos wants to convey the *impression* that he is convinced of the gods’ omniscience. Yet his failure to claim *knowledge* of this—given his paramount aim to ease Tissaphernēs’s distrust—ought to be read as an admission against interest. Klearchos’s view is akin to that of the noble and good man Ischomachos, who does not know whether every departure from the noble is noticed by the gods.⁴⁹ Klearchos fears that what occurs in the dark may not be perceived by the gods—he simply “does not know.” Yet if the gods remain ignorant of what occurs in the dark, doesn’t Klearchos have to admit that Tissaphernēs might be able to escape divine punishment—that is, that Tissaphernēs might remain “happy” (EUDAIMŌN)—even if he were to break his oaths and pledges (cf. 2.5.7)? Why, then, does Klearchos agree to enter the darkness of Tissaphernēs’s tent, thereby giving the satrap an opportunity to sin with impunity?

I seem to have reasoned my way into a dead end. Klearchos’s recklessness has become even more baffling and mysterious than before. Is there no rational explanation of it? Is the action of Klearchos unfathomable except as a deed of folly, perhaps as the effect of temporary madness? (The verb “to be mad” [MAINOMAI] is used twice by Klearchos: 2.5.10, §12). One scholar has argued that Klearchos allowed himself to be ensnared by Tissaphernēs because he and the Greeks lend credence to the Persians’ reputation for trustworthiness, an explanation suggested by the epilogue of the *Education of Cyrus* (8.8.2–3).⁵⁰ Yet if this reputation for trustworthiness was ever enjoyed by the Persians, we search in vain for any mention of it in the *Anabasis*. There is no evidence that it influenced Klearchos in particular. Far from it: he and the Greeks are shown to *distrust*

⁴⁸ *Memorabilia* 1.1.19. The view attributed to Socrates is also voiced by Socrates’s acquaintance Hermogenēs (*Symposium* 4.47–48) and by the Socratic Cambyse (*Education of Cyrus* 1.6.46). See *Memorabilia* 1.4.18–19 and *Education of Cyrus* 8.7.22; also *Hellenika* 6.5.41.

⁴⁹ *Oikonomikos* 7.31.

⁵⁰ Hirsch (1985) pp. 28–29. Hirsch’s reliance on the epilogue of the *Education of Cyrus* is surprising given that he regards it as spurious—“either [...] not by Xenophon at all or [...] a late and tendentious addition” (p. 96).

Tissaphernēs and the Persians all along.⁵¹ The epilogue of the *Education of Cyrus* cannot resolve our difficulty.⁵² It has also been argued, as an alternative explanation, that the recklessness of Klearchos was caused by his rivalry with Menōn. Both men were vying for the control of the Greek army. But Klearchos suspected that Menōn was secretly trying to detach the soldiers from his authority to lead them to Tissaphernēs in order to ingratiate himself with the satrap. Klearchos, who was “jealous in the extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding still higher himself for the favour of Tissaphernēs.”⁵³ But this explanation, though useful to an extent—Menōn’s fractious behavior probably did blunt the prudence of Klearchos—seems insufficient to explain the amazing recklessness of the latter.⁵⁴ For Klearchos enters the tent of Tissaphernēs *unarmed* with almost the entire Greek leadership (3.1.29).

Are we left with folly or madness, then, as possible explanations of the recklessness of Klearchos? He has only feeble reasons to hope that Tissaphernēs will wish to be his friend. Yet he does not tire of stating how hopeful he is. Why is Klearchos so hopeful? Why does he stake all on what appears to be naked hope?

Xenophon’s answer to these questions, I believe, is as follows: Klearchos is filled with hope because he believes that he *deserves* the saving friendship of Tissaphernēs (AXIOŌ).⁵⁵ He deserves this friendship because he and the Ten Thousand have acted with unimpeachable justice and piety. This is what Klearchos knows with the greatest certainty.⁵⁶ It is Klearchos’s

⁵¹ 2.4.3–7, 2.4.10, 2.4.22–24, 2.5.27–30.

⁵² Grote (1900) correctly describes the epilogue of the *Education of Cyrus* as “a curious perversion of history to serve the purposes of his [Xenophon’s] romance” (p. 73). Xenophon exaggerates the old Persians’ reputation for piety and trustworthiness in order to highlight the corruption brought about by Cyrus the Elder.

⁵³ Grote (1900) Vol. 9, p. 74.

⁵⁴ There is some textual support for Grote’s explanation (2.5.29). But even Grote (1900) concedes its limitations: “Such misjudgment on the part of an officer of age and experience is difficult to explain” (Vol. 9, p. 73).

⁵⁵ Klearchos does not state directly that he deserves the saving friendship of Tissaphernēs, but he speaks of the punishment deserved by those who (unlike himself) spread slander and undermine the sworn oaths and pledges (AXIOŌ): 2.5.24.

⁵⁶ The speech of Klearchos mentions several things he “knows” (OIDA), but the one thing he says he knows with the greatest certainty—“I know clearly” (SAPHŌS OIDA)—is that the Greeks are “not even thinking” of breaking their oaths to the gods or their pledges to the Persians (2.5.4). This knowledge fills Klearchos with hope that he will obtain the reward he believes he and the Greeks so richly deserve. In this connection, observe that Klearchos begins and ends his speech with emphatic assertions that he is *not* plotting against Tissaphernēs (2.5.4; 2.5.15). Observe also that the contingent of two hundred soldiers who accompany Klearchos to the Persian camp do so “to go to the market” (2.3.37). At first it seems strange that this was thought to be an appropriate moment to go and get

blameless virtue—what he *knows* to be his blameless virtue—that makes him deserving of the friendship of Tissaphernēs. For, Klearchos has made several sacrifices, as he believes, to be true to his sworn oaths and pledges. He has not tried to capture or kill Tissaphernes with a preemptive strike, for example, though such a strike could have enhanced his safety (2.5.5). Klearchos's virtue, entailing sacrifice, makes him deserving of a reward. Accordingly, when Tissaphernēs insinuates that Klearchos is plotting against him—when he accuses Klearchos, in effect, of being unjust and impious—the very basis of Klearchos's hopefulness is being undermined.⁵⁷ To rebut this stinging charge, Klearchos resolves to give Tissaphernēs a manifest, irrefutable, and indeed, an exorbitant proof of his virtue: he agrees to enter *unarmed* the tent of the satrap (along with his colleagues), protected only by the shining cloak of his piety and justice. He thereby endeavors to prove beyond any doubt that he is dedicated to his oaths and pledges. In other words, an odd reversal occurs in the mind of Klearchos at this point. Instead of being hopeful, for some tangible or concrete reason, that he will be safe, his very hopefulness becomes the basis of his confidence. And since hope is, so to speak, all he has to go on, he endeavors to *strengthen* this hope by confirming his view of himself as noble.⁵⁸ Instead of seeking to achieve safety through the means at his disposal, he makes himself *more* vulnerable by a reckless display of dedication, thereby strengthening his hope that he will be safe through the friendship with “Tissaphernēs” he more than ever deserves. At that point, his recklessness is no longer an argument *against* his course of action. It becomes—paradoxically—an argument *for* it.

The fate of Klearchos shows just how mistaken he was. But there is a lesson embedded in this fate beyond the obvious—“don't stake all on naked hope.” The less obvious lesson is this: Klearchos lacks self-knowledge. We might even say that he is mad, if lacking self-knowledge is nearest to madness, as Socrates taught.⁵⁹ (Recall that when Xenophon

provisions. But this escort was meant as a show of good faith, to prove to the Persians that the Greeks were abiding by their oaths and pledges and were *buying* their provisions, as the peace treaty stipulated (2.3.26 cf. 3.1.20–22).

⁵⁷ Tissaphernēs says to Klearchos that he would “not justly” (ΟΥΚ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ) distrust the King or himself (2.5.16). Compare Klearchos's less pointed formulation: Tissaphernēs distrusts the Greeks “not correctly” (ΟΥΚ ΟΡΘΩΣ) (2.5.6). See also the accusation at 2.5.25.

⁵⁸ To be sure, Klearchos also keeps his oaths and pledges out of *fear* of the gods, not simply to strengthen his hope. Yet fear cannot explain why he enters the tent of Tissaphernēs and risks becoming *unperceived* by the gods.

⁵⁹ *Memorabilia* 3.9.6. Consider the odd formulation at 2.5.27—HO KLEARCHOS... ΔΕΛΟΣ Τ' ἔΝ ΠΑΝΥ ΦΗΛΙΚΩΣ ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΔΙΑΚΕΪΣΤΗΑΙ ΤΩ ΤΙΣΣΑΦΗΡΝΕΙ. Klearchos seems to be confused about his own attitude toward Tissaphernēs. To remove

refers to the Zapatan in a subsequent scene, he renames the river into the “ZATĒN”—“The-River-of-the-Big-Madness”: [3.3.6].) For, Klearchos understands himself to have sacrificed for virtue, and on this basis he believes that he deserves Tissaphernēs’s saving friendship. Yet he also views Tissaphernēs as his “greatest good” (MEGISTON AGATHON: 2.5.8). Yet how can both of these views or statements be true? If Tissaphernēs is the greatest good of Klearchos, and if the friendship of Tissaphernēs is to be achieved by abiding by the demands of piety and justice, isn’t Klearchos simply being prudent when he abides by piety and justice? Isn’t he choosing the necessary means to the desired end of safety? On the other hand, if Klearchos *does* make a genuine sacrifice when he abides by the demands of piety and justice, then the friendship of Tissaphernēs, achieved by means of a sacrifice, cannot be a good, let alone his “greatest good.” In other words, Klearchos somehow believes that his virtue is both good and bad. He believes that it is both beneficial and sacrificial. But how can it be both at once? Klearchos is confused. He has not reflected adequately on the noble and the good. He has not sought *knowledge* of virtue in a Socratic fashion.⁶⁰

The foregoing analysis cannot be extended and developed on the basis of the present text. To go further would require a consideration of the four Socratic writings. But this much is clear. The Socratic inquiry into virtue, which Xenophon, as disciple of Socrates, had carried out, has the potential to produce a reassessment of the grounds of human hopefulness. It can educate the human tendency to hope that virtue by itself will bring about safety or success by making us *deserving* of success. It is a tendency whose perils are illustrated vividly by the fate of Klearchos.⁶¹ Indeed, as we witness his melancholy end, we remember Theopompos’s warning that unarmed virtue is powerless to achieve safety. In retrospect, this warning reads like a prophetic admonition against rash hopefulness.

I have argued that the failure of the Pious King stems from a characteristic confusion about virtue. But my analysis is open to an objection: Have I not offered a purely *moral* explanation of Klearchos’s recklessness? Yet if the failure of his rule is not rooted in his piety, why should it

the textual difficulty, Dindorf (1855) p. 106, note 27, points to parallel uses of DIAKEÏSTHAI at Thucydides 1.75.1 and 8.68.1.

⁶⁰ The first time Klearchos uses OIDA (“I know”) in the *Anabasis*, it is to say: “I do not know if I will be doing what is just” (1.3.5, my emphasis). Consider also how Klearchos speaks of the gods at 2.5.7, and compare how he speaks of Cyrus at 1.3.10. The latter passage contains Klearchos’s second use of OIDA in the *Anabasis*. It suggests that his knowledge of what “the gods” regard as justice is, to say the least, imprecise.

⁶¹ Greek history offers another striking illustration of these perils: the Athenian general Nikias. For a penetrating analysis: Bolotin (1987) pp. 25–26.

illustrate the limitation of the Pious King?⁶²—In one sense, the objection is well founded: the piety of Klearchos was not the proximate cause of his failure.⁶² In a deeper sense, however, the objection misses the point. Klearchos's hopefulness toward Tissaphernēs illuminates his hopefulness toward the gods. That Xenophon quietly draws this parallel explains, I believe, why he puts a speech at once submissive and exalted in the mouth of Klearchos (2.5.9).⁶³ Moreover, while the hopefulness of Klearchos is, in one sense, distinguishable from his piety, in another sense it is not separable from his piety. Klearchos's failure stems from what is a crucial root of his piety though it is not proximately traceable to it.



The Persian treachery is reported to the Greek camp by an Arcadian named Nicarchos, who had managed to escape the slaughter, though cut in the belly and holding his innards with his own hands.⁶⁴ Stunned, the soldiers run to arms, expecting the Persians to attack them on the spot. But the Persians fail to press their advantage. Instead, they dispatch three heralds to the Greek camp (2.5.35). All three men had been among Cyrus's most trusted lieutenants—the trio includes Ariañs—and all three had sworn an oath not to betray the Greeks and to be their faithful allies (2.2.8–9).⁶⁵ Only two Hellenic generals are left⁶⁶ to hear these oath-breakers renew the

⁶² In the delegation to Tissaphernēs, the Arcadian general Kleanōr, who is clearly a pious man, is absent (2.5.31). He apparently refused to go to Tissaphernēs—a refusal that would be consistent with his earlier firm reply to the King (2.1.10). Kleanōr shows that a ruler *can* combine piety with prudence. Kleanōr is replaced in the delegation to Tissaphernēs by another Arcadian named “Hagias” (“The-Blameless-One.” I read “HAGIAS” instead of “AGIAS.” The breathing on the first alpha, like all such markers, was added by a later hand; it is not from Xenophon.) The aptly named Hagias is mentioned only here in the *Anabasis*. This is clearly a case of renaming. For a fuller analysis of Kleanōr and of his limitations, however, see chapter six, pp. 243–44).

⁶³ The speech of Klearchos must be read on two different levels. “Tissaphernēs” is both a satrap and a stand-in for “Zeus.” This thought must be kept in mind throughout, but especially when we consider the section of Klearchos's speech ostensibly treating “human matters” (2.5.8ff.). That section includes the Psalm of Klearchos (2.5.8–9).

⁶⁴ Nicarchos is not mortally wounded, however. He is apparently the same man who defects to the Persian camp the night after next with about twenty human beings (3.3.5). Nicarchos provides an extreme example of the mentality of appeasement, and of its refusal (or inability) to learn from even the bitterest experiences.

⁶⁵ The central herald is ominously called “Artaozos” (ARTAMOS-AOZOS). The same name occurs at 2.4.16, but several MSS. (including the good MS. E) have the more innocuous ARTAEZOS (see Dindorf's apparatus). Most of the best MSS. (CBA) read Artaozos throughout, however. See also *Education of Cyrus* 6.3.31 and the MSS. variants.

⁶⁶ A third general—Cheirisophos the Lacedaemonian—was off in a village gathering provisions. He had not gone to the Persian market (2.5.37).

demand, on behalf of the King, that the Greeks surrender their weapons unconditionally. The two generals in question—Kleanōr the Orchomenian and Sophainetos the Stumphalian—are a picture of impotence. Kleanōr lambasts the perfidious and impious heralds. He is hot with indignation.⁶⁷ Sophainetos is even more impotent: he remains absolutely silent.⁶⁸ A ray of hope appears in the person of Xenophon, who makes his third and final appearance *eo nomine* in the first two books of the *Anabasis*. Xenophon had gone out with the two generals in search of news about Proxenos. The heralds of the King declare that Klearchos has been put to death—he was found guilty, they say, of violating his oaths and of breaking the truce—but Proxenos and Menōn are held in great honor by the Persians for exposing Klearchos's plot. Hearing this, Xenophon replies:

Klearchos, then, if he broke the truce in violation of his oaths, has received his punishment; for it is just that those who violate their oaths be destroyed. But as for Proxenos and Menōn, since they are both your benefactors and our generals, send them here; for it is clear that being friends to us both, they will try to counsel what is best for both you and us. (2.5.41)⁶⁹

Xenophon “refutes” these heralds. The three men converse with each other for a long time before departing without offering any reply. Persian mendacity has been exposed. But Xenophon has done little to relieve the distress of Proxenos and the others. It would be difficult to capture more feelingly the limits of speech in political life.

4. The Noble without the Good: Proxenos

Xenophon ends book two with obituaries for the murdered generals. His portrait of Klearchos, the first man to be remembered, is sympathetic, as indeed befits a funeral tribute. Xenophon emphasizes a pair of Klearchos's qualities: he was as capable as anyone of ensuring that the army was well supplied, and he was able to impress upon the ruled that they had to obey him. But Xenophon omits to praise Klearchos as a skilled ruler.⁷⁰ One major flaw of Klearchos was that he could not secure the obedience of the

⁶⁷ 2.5.39.

⁶⁸ This scene inclines me to believe that Sophainetos did in fact write an account of the *Anabasis* in which he criticized Xenophon. We see here (a part of) Xenophon's understated reply: when it mattered most, the loquacious Sophainetos had nothing to offer. Sophainetos is the central Greek “speaker” in the scene. See pp. 35–36, note 88; p. 248, note 94 and Appendix 3, note 6.

⁶⁹ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁷⁰ The obituary of Klearchos is divided into three parts of unequal length (§1–6; §7; §8–15). Each part examines one quality that was often ascribed to Klearchos: he was said to

ruled except through harshness. In his looks he was sullen, he had a rough voice, and he always punished severely, sometimes in anger, so much so that he even regretted it at times. Klearchos supposed that a disorderly army was of no benefit. He is even said to have said that soldiers should fear their ruler more than the enemy. In the midst of dangers, the soldiers were exceedingly willing to obey him because his harshness then seemed to be strength. But once the dangers were over many would go off and serve under other rulers. Klearchos had no grace and was always harsh and raw. He never had followers out of friendship and goodwill. However, the soldiers who were bound to him by some ties of necessity he rendered exceedingly obedient, as well as useful. Yet he relied too much on fear. It would be excessive to add that he relied too little on hope.⁷¹



Even as an adolescent, Proxenos of Boeotia desired to become a man able to do great things. Because of this desire he paid money to Gorgias of Leontini. Thereafter he believed himself already able to rule, and, if he should befriend those who were prominent, not to be outdone in conferring benefits. Proxenos joined the expedition of Cyrus in order to acquire a great name, great power, and much money. Yet, though he desired these things exceedingly, it was also clear that he was not willing to acquire any of them with injustice. For, he supposed that one must obtain them with what is just and noble, otherwise not. Proxenos was capable of ruling noble and good men. Yet he could not instill respect for or fear of himself in the soldiers. He even respected the soldiers more than they respected him and was visibly more afraid of incurring their hatred than they were of disobeying him. Proxenos supposed that to be a skilled ruler, and to appear to be, it was sufficient to praise the one who acted nobly and to withhold

be (1) a “lover of war” (PHILOPOLEMOS) (2) a “warlike man” (POLEMIKOS), and (3) a “skilled ruler” (ARCHIKOS). To assess Klearchos as lover of war, Xenophon surveys his career (6.6.2–5). He concludes in his own name that “these deeds seem to me to belong to a lover of war” (2.6.6). Xenophon calls him a “lover of war” twice (2.6.7). Regarding the second quality—a “warlike man”—Xenophon seems also to agree with the general view, though his conclusion or assertion on this point is somewhat more tentative (2.6.7). But there is nothing tentative about his *refusal* to praise Klearchos as a “skilled ruler.” He begins the third part of the obituary by saying that Klearchos “was said to be a skilled ruler, as far as this is possible for a character such as he had” (LEGETAI: 2.6.8). After reviewing the facts, he concludes simply that “this is the kind of ruler [Klearchos] was” (2.6.15).

⁷¹ Underlying Klearchos’s hard-boiled rule was a certain softness of soul. This fact is adumbrated by the obituary: Klearchos was such a lover of war, Xenophon writes, that he was willing to spend money on war “like someone would do on a boy or on some other pleasure” (2.6.6).

praise from the wrongdoer: he never employed (corporeal) punishments. The noble and good among his associates had goodwill for him, but the unjust plotted against him as someone who could be easily handled.

Proxenos had learned rhetoric from Gorgias. Yet despite or because of this training, he overestimated what speech alone could accomplish in political life. He attempted to rule his men by mere praise. He assumed that talk (or negotiation) is always a possibility for resolving political conflicts. In his only speech of the *Anabasis*, he intimates that he is ready to surrender his weapons in exchange for a paper agreement with the King (2.1.10–11).⁷² Gorgias failed to cure Proxenos of a certain high-minded naïveté. Though the rhetorician developed the speaking skills of Proxenos—his one speech is a model of urbanity and sophistication—Gorgias did not enlighten Proxenos about the harsher side of politics. Proxenos's naïveté led him into the tent of Tissaphernēs. Xenophon did not accompany him there. It seems certain that he urged his friend to stay put (cf. 2.5.29–30).⁷³

Despite his flaws, and, indeed, partly because of them, Proxenos is one of the most attractive figures of the *Anabasis*. He is also important for the *logos* of the work. The primary addressee of the *Anabasis* is a youth who resembles Proxenos. The work is primarily written for the benefit of those who share with him (among other qualities) a desire for all the subjects of learning through which one can nobly manage a household and a city, and, altogether, make good use of human beings and human matters: it is written for the benefit of the good natures.⁷⁴ Proxenos associated with Gorgias in the hope of acquiring the knowledge in question. But he was sorely disappointed. The contrast between the melancholy fate of Proxenos, the pupil of Gorgias, and the (soon to be considered) success of Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, suggests a path toward the acquisition of the knowledge just mentioned.

⁷² In Plato, Gorgias claims that rhetoric, or rhetorical speech, is all powerful in the city, a claim that he cannot sustain: cf. *Gorgias* 456a7–c7 with 457b5–c3. See also Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 1181a12–17 and context.

⁷³ The two friends had been inseparable hitherto: 2.1.10–13, 2.4.15ff. Moreover, Xenophon could easily have accompanied Proxenos to the tent of Tissaphernēs since about two hundred soldiers followed their leaders to go to the market in the Persian camp (2.5.30).

⁷⁴ According to Xenophon, Socrates judged the good natures from three qualities: they learned quickly what they turned their minds to; they remembered what they learned; and they desired all the subjects of learning through which one can nobly manage a household and a city, and, altogether, make good use of human beings and human matters (*Memorabilia* 4.1.2). We do not have a sufficient basis to determine whether Proxenos was a good nature in all three respects. He certainly possessed the third quality. His close friendship with Xenophon suggests that he possessed the first two as well.

5. The Good without the Noble: Menōn

As a ruler, Proxenos proves to be unable to reconcile the noble with the good because he fails to attain the good. By contrast, Menōn of Thessaly attains the good (or some parts of the good) but his rule is steeped in criminality.

Menōn manifestly desired wealth insatiably. He desired to rule in order to take more and to be honored so as to make a greater profit. He wished to befriend the most powerful so as to be able to commit injustice with impunity. Menōn supposed that the shortest road to what he desired was through false oaths, lies, and deceptions. The simple and the true he held to be the same thing as the foolish. It was clear that he felt no affection for anyone, but wherever he professed friendship he was manifestly plotting to betray. Menōn did not ridicule any enemy, but with his associates he always conversed as someone ridiculing them all. Nor did he plot to gain the possessions of his enemies—he supposed that it is hard to take what is guarded—but he supposed that he alone knew that the possessions of friends are unguarded, and thus easiest to take. He feared perjurers and wrongdoers as well-armed men but tried to make use of the pious and the truthful as if they were unmanly men. Just as someone might glory in reverence for the gods, truthfulness, and justice, Menōn gloried in his ability to deceive, to turn a lie, and to sneer at his friends. If he sought the first place in a man's friendship, he supposed he ought to gain it by slandering those who already held the first place. And he deemed himself worthy of being honored and paid court to because he showed that he was most capable and willing to do injustice.

Yet despite his criminality (as well as some notorious sexual habits), Xenophon admits that Menōn had his share of successes. The soldiers *did* obey him—as a partner in crime (6.2.27). And he was honored and rewarded by Cyrus (1.4.17; but cf. 1.2.15 with 1.8.4). Above all, Menōn managed to survive the snare of Tissaphernēs. This is not to say, of course, that Menōn was a model ruler. His obituary is a scathing indictment. But he did (and does) embody a challenge to ordinary morality and piety. Menōn compels the reader to wonder about the noble: Why should a ruler abide by the strictures of morality and piety when they prove to be harmful and not profitable? Is survival, even survival achieved by ignoble means, so inconsequential a matter? Nor is the criminality of Menōn an expression of his natural viciousness alone: “[Menōn] always looked upon someone who had scruples⁷⁵ as belonging *among the uneducated*” (TŌN APAIDEUTŌN: 2.6.26).⁷⁶ Menōn had *been taught* to be bad. Xenophon

⁷⁵ “Someone who had scruples” translates TON MĒ PANOŪRGON.

⁷⁶ The remark occurs at the center of the eulogy.

does not name his teacher but Plato indicates that he had been the pupil of Gorgias.⁷⁷ (We should therefore not ascribe the high-minded naïveté of Proxenos to Gorgias. The rhetorician may have failed as a teacher but he was not a teacher of naïveté.) Taken together, the obituaries of Menōn and of Proxenos thus point to a question: Can a ruler cut a path between the Charybdis of noble failure and the Scylla of criminal success? And insofar as both obituaries emphasize the theme of education—a theme that is also stressed in the obituary of Cyrus and alluded to in the obituary of Klearchos⁷⁸—they point to a further issue as well: What kind of education can prepare a ruler to carry out the task in question?



The first two stages of the *logos* of the *Anabasis* have yielded disappointing results. The Godlike King and the Pious King have each failed to conjoin or reconcile the noble with the good. Was Machiavelli correct when he proclaimed that this reconciliation is in fact impossible to achieve? Let us not be discouraged: we have yet to consider the Socratic King. Xenophon shares with Menōn the distinction of surviving the snare of Tissaphernēs, and he is attracted to the nobility and goodness of Proxenos. The fate of the hoped-for reconciliation would appear to hang on the splendid product of the Socratic education—Xenophon himself. Let us turn to the third stage of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.

⁷⁷ Consider *Menōn* 71b9–d4, 73c6–d1, 76a8–c6, 79e6 and *passim*. By naming Menōn's teacher(s), Xenophon would have risked calling attention to his passing association with Socrates as well.

⁷⁸ 1.9.2–6; 2.6.12. The bare allusion to education in the obituary of Klearchos makes clear that he was *not* educated to rule. He was a “teacher” of his soldiers who had never been a student in any serious sense.

PART III

THE KINGSHIP OF XENOPHON

“THE SOCRATIC KING” (BOOKS THREE TO SEVEN)

CHAPTER 3

PIETY (BOOK THREE OF THE *ANABASIS*)

The ascent of Xenophon begins famously:

After the generals had been seized, and the captains and soldiers who followed them had been killed, the Greeks were very much at a loss: they reflected that they were at the gates of the King; that many peoples and cities, hostile ones, surrounded them on every side; that no one was going to provide a market for them any longer; that they were no less than ten thousand stadia distant from Greece; that there was no guide to show them the way; that impassable rivers were barriers between them and their way homeward; that they had been betrayed even by the barbarians who had ascended with Cyrus; that they had been left alone without even a single horseman as an ally, so that it was quite clear that even if they were victorious in battle, they could not [catch and] kill anyone, and if they were defeated, not one of them could escape. Reflecting on all this and being dispirited, few of them tasted food that evening, few lit a fire, many did not go to their arms that night, but each rested wherever he chanced to be, unable to sleep because of their distress and longing for their fatherlands, parents, wives, children, whom they no longer believed they would ever see again. So disposed, then, all were trying to rest. (3.1.2–3)¹

Amid these dire circumstances, Xenophon will thrust himself forward and set out on a path that shall take him—hitherto a nonbeing—to the kingship of the Ten Thousand. By way of preface to this rise to the kingship, our author retraces the beginnings of his association with Cyrus: “There

¹ Translation by Ambler (2008).

was a certain Xenophon in the army, an Athenian, who had followed along even though he was neither a general nor a captain nor a soldier" (3.1.4). Xenophon (the narrative continues) had received a letter from Proxenos of Boeotia, his long-time host, in which Proxenos promised to make him a friend of Cyrus should he travel to Asia. Proxenos assured Xenophon that, for his part, he held Cyrus to be better for himself than his fatherland.

Having read this letter, Xenophon consulted with Socrates the Athenian about the trip. Socrates suspected that to befriend Cyrus might be a chargeable offense in the eyes of the city because Cyrus was thought to have assisted the Spartans zealously in the recently concluded Peloponnesian war.² Socrates therefore advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and consult with the god about the trip. Xenophon complied with this advice, but only partially: he inquired of Apollo *only* which one(s) of the gods he should sacrifice and pray to in order to make the trip he intended in the noblest and best way, and to be safe after he had done nobly.³ Going back to Athens, he told Socrates the oracle he had received from the god. Socrates, however, blamed Xenophon because he had not asked *first* whether it would be better for him to go or to stay. Instead, judging for himself that he should go, he had limited his inquiry to how he might journey most nobly. "But since you asked in this way," Socrates said, "you ought to do what the god bid" (3.1.7). Xenophon therefore sacrificed⁴ to the gods indicated and sailed out, catching up with Proxenos and Cyrus at Sardis, in Asia Minor, as the latter was setting his expedition in motion. Xenophon was then introduced to the Persian. Proxenos eagerly encouraged Xenophon to stay in Asia and Cyrus joined in the encouragement. Cyrus said that he would send Xenophon back as soon as the campaign was over. It was also said that the campaign was directed against the Pisidians, a tribe known for its depredations against Cyrus's satrapy. Xenophon therefore campaigned as a man deceived—but not by Proxenos. For neither Proxenos nor anyone else among the Greeks (except for Klearchos) knew that the campaign was directed against the King. Yet as the real objective became at length apparent to all, most of the Greeks followed Cyrus—albeit afraid of the

² On the help, especially the monetary help, that Cyrus gave the Spartans during the war, see *Hellenika* 1.5.1–10, 2.1.11–12, 2.1.13–15, 2.3.7–8, as well as 1.4.1–7 and 3.1.1. Proietti (1987) pp. 1–43.

³ Xenophon's concern to conjoin or reconcile the noble with the good in his own life is thus apparent from the beginning of his *anabasis* (3.1.6). Moreover, his question to Apollo suggests that the successful carrying out of this task may require divine help.

⁴ Even though Xenophon had requested advice about *both* prayer *and* sacrifice, the oracle apparently had said nothing about what god(s) he should pray to (3.1.6).

road and unwillingly—because they felt shame before one another and before Cyrus.⁵ Xenophon was one of them.

1. Xenophon the Socratic?

The passage just paraphrased (3.1.4–10) is nothing less than the cornerstone of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.⁶ As such, it must be considered closely. Yet the passage poses a difficulty, for it could be thought to refute the view I have been defending. In chapters one and two, I suggested that Xenophon was a Socratic when he traveled to Asia. The education he had received from Socrates, prior to his leaving Athens, had laid the basis for his noble successes as a ruler. It perfected his ability to conjoin or reconcile the noble with the good. Yet as we pick up the thread of our story, we encounter a Xenophon who *resists* Socrates: Xenophon questions Apollo only about the proper way to befriend Cyrus despite being advised by Socrates to question the god about the trip itself. If Xenophon is a Socratic, he is evidently an independently minded one. But doesn't his resistance point in fact to a *rejection* of Socrates on his part? Did I rush to judgment when I anointed Xenophon a Socratic? The above scene leaves no doubt that Xenophon is eager to befriend Cyrus, apparently in order to begin a political life.⁷ But doesn't this mean that he rejects Socrates's argument that the political life is inferior to the philosophic life? By stressing that he abandoned Socrates to befriend Cyrus, Xenophon seems to bear witness to the view that he is a better soldier than philosopher.

The difficulty posed by the above scene must be faced squarely. Yet while I concede that Xenophon wishes to convey the *impression* that he is yearning for a political life, several reasons persuade me that his aim in

⁵ Compare this paraphrased account of why the Greeks followed Cyrus with Klearchos's account of the same to Tissaphernēs: the paraphrased account—the only one which Xenophon applies to himself—is silent about “being ashamed before the gods” (cf. 3.1.10 with 2.3.22).

⁶ The philosopher Socrates makes his sole appearance *eo nomine* in the seventeenth chapter of the *Anabasis* (3.1). For the significance of this, see Appendix 2. It is also fitting that Xenophon raises the question of his relation to philosophy (as embodied by Socrates) most directly in the seventeenth chapter of the book. Flower (2012) perceptively observes that “the same phrase is used of consulting both Socrates and the god of prophecy [Apollo]” [the phrase or verb in question is *ANAKOINOŌ*, “to consult”: 3.1.5]; this suggests, Flower adds, “that Socrates's advice transcends mere human wisdom” (p. 123). This is accurate, but Flower could have gone further. We now see another reason why Socrates makes his sole cameo in book three.

⁷ According to Howland (2000), Xenophon “goes with Cyrus because he is drawn to the splendor and honor of the political life” (p. 884).

going to Asia is *not* to take up such a life. (I must ask leave to postpone the discussion of why Xenophon wishes to create the impression in question until chapter six, where I examine the principle of Xenophon's self-presentation in the *Anabasis*.⁸)

In chapter one, I uncovered evidence that Xenophon is impelled by two main motivations when he leaves Athens. The passage just paraphrased contains additional evidence in support of this view. First, Proxenos's letter (as reported by Xenophon) is silent about any military expedition, or any political task, that Xenophon can expect to take on, or be a part of, if he goes to Asia. The letter promises only to make Xenophon a "friend" of Cyrus. We saw in chapter one that to become a friend of Cyrus means to be rewarded, not least with money. In fact, Xenophon indicates that he is unaware of Cyrus's projected expedition when he quits Athens.⁹ And he makes no attempt to secure a position of rule for himself in the army once he reaches Asia. He explicitly says that he follows Cyrus "neither as a general nor a captain nor a soldier" (3.1.4).¹⁰ His first appearance *eo nomine* suggests love of gain (1.8.15). And so does his last (7.8.8–22).

To be sure, Xenophon must have expected, as a man of talent, to be able to render valuable services to Cyrus. And he must have been willing to render these services, perhaps to be an advisor to Cyrus, or to accompany him on some military venture (though not, I believe, on a

⁸ See pp. 222–29 and Appendix 1.

⁹ Several pieces of textual evidence prove this lack awareness, beginning with the letter of Proxenos, which is silent about Cyrus's expedition. For while Cyrus had not told Proxenos (or any other Greek except for Klearchos) of his secret plan to march against the King—Proxenos was therefore in no position to relay this information to Xenophon—the letter is also silent about what Proxenos *did* know: an army was being assembled by Cyrus to expel the Pisidians from his satrapy, as Cyrus claimed, and Proxenos was going to take part in this expedition (cf. 1.1.11 with 3.1.4). When Xenophon arrives in Asia and is presented to Cyrus, both Proxenos and Cyrus are said to be eagerly encouraging (PROTHUMEOMAI) Xenophon to stay and partake in the expedition in question, which is hardly intelligible on the assumption that Xenophon went to Asia precisely to do so: he did not know of the expedition beforehand (3.1.8–10). In keeping with this, Xenophon is said to consult with Socrates about his prospective POREIA to Asia ("travel," "journey": 3.1.4–7—the word is used twice, and so is the verb POREUESTHAI ["to travel"]). After Xenophon reaches Sardis and meets with Cyrus, the word POREIA is replaced by STRATEIA or STOLOS ("campaign," "expedition"), and POREUESTHAI becomes STRATEUESTHAI ("to campaign": 3.1.9–10).

¹⁰ Note Xenophon's *failure* to state (at 3.1.8) that the god he sacrificed to was "Zeus the King." Only much later in the book do we learn that this was in fact the god he had been assigned to make sacrifices to by the Delphic Oracle (6.1.22). In other words, Xenophon *could have* emphasized the political character of his involvement with Cyrus right at the beginning of book three but chose not to.

risky bid to topple the King).¹¹ Xenophon could not have befriended Cyrus—certainly not to the point of being rewarded by him—unless he served Cyrus in some capacity. But to acknowledge as much is *not* to grant that Xenophon left Athens because he concluded that the political life was not inferior but superior to the philosophic. He left the city above all because his life was in jeopardy.

The paraphrased passage 3.1.4–10 intimates that the atmosphere in Athens was tense when Xenophon decided to leave the city. Socrates's warning that Xenophon might be prosecuted if he were to befriend Cyrus reminds us that Socrates himself was about to be charged, sentenced, and executed (in part) for befriending Alcibiades and Kritias, two supporters of Sparta during the Peloponnesian War.¹² It also reminds us that the regime installed by Sparta in the wake of the defeat of Athens—the Thirty Tyrants—was headed by Kritias, an erstwhile “pupil” of Socrates. That is to say, public animosity toward the Socratics must have been intense when Xenophon decided to leave. This is no mere guesswork on my part. The *Hellenika* proves that Xenophon was worried about his safety. In the Athenian civil war, the *demos* wins a total victory over the party of the oligarchs in 403 BC. The last thing recorded in the second book of the *Hellenika* is the victory speech of the democratic war leader Thrasuboulos, a speech addressed to the so-called “men of the city” (i.e., the defeated oligarchs: 2.4.39–42). The speech is suffused with hostility. Thrasuboulos compares the defeated oligarchs to “biting dogs” who need to be “muzzled.”¹³ (One of the first actions of the restored democracy will be to send away three hundred knights on foreign service—the knights had fought

¹¹ Xenophon going to Cyrus is strongly reminiscent of Simonides going to Hiero, to whom he teaches the art of rule (*Hiero* 1.1). Consider in light of this parallel *Anabasis* 1.8.15, as well as p. 63, note 73. Of course, Cyrus was a prospective king (if an illegitimate one), not a prospective tyrant. (The word “tyrant” [TURANNOS] does not occur in the *Anabasis*—but consider 1.2.14, an apparent case of renaming.) The reader should also consider that Simonides exhorts Hiero at the end of their conversation not to hesitate to spend from his private possessions for “the common good” (*Hiero* 11.1). This exhortation hints at Simonides's intention in starting a dialogue with the tyrant. This intention becomes visible through his use at the center of PARASTASIS (“residency at the side of [the tyrant as an advisor]”) at *Hiero* 11.2. PARASTASIS is a relatively rare word found in all the MSS. of the *Hiero* but mistakenly rejected by Marchant, Schenkl, and other editors. (The word occurs, for example, at *Hellenika* 6.5.43, and most revealingly at *Education of Cyrus* 3.3.21 and 8.4.5). See Strauss (2000) pp. 38, 63, 75, and 121 (note 50). Generally speaking, a scene in the *Education of Cyrus* between “Tigranēs” and Cyrus provides revealing indications about the kind of advice that Xenophon would have given Cyrus the Younger (3.1.7ff.; see p. 51, note 29).

¹² *Memorabilia* 1.2.12–48.

¹³ *Hellenika* 2.4.41; cf. the use of KLOIOS (“muzzle”) at *Hellenika* 3.3.11 in reference to the punishment of some men accused of plotting against the Spartan regime.

on the oligarchic side during the civil war—in the hope that they will be killed abroad.¹⁴) These facts are important here because the Socratics were associated with the “men of the city.”¹⁵ In fact, readers of the *Hellenika* must entertain the thought that the speech of Thrasuboulos, ostensibly addressed to the defeated oligarchs, is in fact addressed—or addressed above all—to the Socratics. This suggestion will probably sound fanciful. But several textual pointers show that it is correct.¹⁶ The leader of the triumphant *demos* calls the Socratics “biting dogs” who need to be “muzzled.” The next thing we hear of in the *Hellenika* is “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” (i.e., Xenophon) campaigning in Asia with Cyrus (3.1.2).¹⁷ The reader must put two and two together, but the math is clear.

When Xenophon leaves Athens, he is impelled by the two main motivations uncovered in chapter one. He leaves Athens as a Socratic and because he is a Socratic.¹⁸ Indeed, the evidence of the first two books of the *Anabasis* makes clear that he thinks of himself as a Socratic philosopher. To recall only a few points of our analysis here: when Xenophon overhears the name of the Lacedaemonian admiral Samios, he renames him “Pythagoras,” thereby showing that philosophy is on his mind (1.4.2); he judges “Socrates-Marsyas” to be wiser than Apollo (1.2.8, 1.2.13); he assumes the persona of “Theopompos,” a youth who “looks like a philosopher” (2.1.12–13); he is a NEANIKOS who argues like a skilled dialectician and detects a Persian “inconsistency of speech” (2.4.19–20).

That Xenophon left Socrates for a period of time, as he admittedly did, does not prove that he turned away from philosophy (3.1.4–10). Recall that the events of the *Anabasis* last less than two years, and it is unclear whether Xenophon’s political involvement extends much beyond them.¹⁹ When he returns to Hellas, he settles near Olympia, where he pursues

¹⁴ *Hellenika* 3.1.4.

¹⁵ The Socratics did *not* flee to the Piraeus with the democratic forces during the civil war: *Memorabilia* 2.7.1–2. Consider also the case of Charmides, a pupil of Socrates who was associated with the regime of the Thirty as well (*Hellenika* 2.4.19 and *Symposium* as a whole).

¹⁶ Consider Thrasuboulos’s emphasis on “priding oneself” (MEGA PHRONEŌ) at *Hellenika* 2.4.40 and compare how the Socratics are shown to “pride themselves” in the *Symposium* (c. 3–4); consider also Thrasuboulos’s reference to the claim of the Socratics that they know how to rule because of the virtue or knowledge that they “pride themselves” on; finally, observe that the speech of Thrasuboulos takes the form of an exhortation to self-knowledge—an odd feature for such a speech, unless we appreciate its “Socratic” overtones (cf. *Memorabilia* 4.2.24 ff.).

¹⁷ For the explanation of why Xenophon calls himself “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” in the *Hellenika*, see Appendix 1.

¹⁸ There are reports that other Socratics also left the city: Derenne (1976) p. 179.

¹⁹ Xenophon says that he returned from Asia with the Spartan king Agesilaos (5.3.6). This return took place in 394 BC. It is not known with any certainty what Xenophon

a life centered on philosophic reflection and writing. Over a period of what must have been several years or decades, he authors an oeuvre that ranks him among the preeminent authors of Antiquity. Moreover, his reflections embraced not only political topics, as well as his own political experiences, but also scientific topics.²⁰ Indeed, Xenophon presents Socrates throughout his corpus as the pinnacle of human excellence: he proclaims Socrates, and Socrates alone, to be blessed and such as a best and happiest man would be.²¹ If Xenophon chooses to befriend Cyrus, he never ceases to look up to Socrates and to the life Socrates incarnates. To be sure—and to repeat—Xenophon wishes to create the *impression* that he is yearning for a political life. But I will show in chapter six that this self-presentation belongs to a literary strategy aimed (in part) to earn a measure of toleration for philosophy in the cities of Hellas. For now, suffice it to observe that the fate of Socrates and, to a lesser extent, of Xenophon showed that such a strategy was acutely needed.

Let us go back to the scene I have called the cornerstone of the *logos* of the *Anabasis* (3.1.4–10). This scene intimates the degree of esteem in which Xenophon held Socrates. For, Xenophon questions Socrates—and Socrates alone—about his prospective journey to Asia. He evidently valued his teacher's advice above that of anyone else he knew, including the advice of his parents and especially of his father. We must go one step further. Xenophon intimates that Socrates *has taken the place* of his father. For, in a context in which the experience or authority of a father would fittingly come to the fore²²—and after he has caused us to expect a cameo of his father²³—Xenophon keeps silent about the man we know from

does between the end of the *Anabasis* (in 399 BC) and his return to Hellas. Many passages of the *Hellenika* appear to be eye-witness accounts, however, suggesting that he spent at least part of that time campaigning in Asia. See also *Hellenika* 3.1.7, a probable reference to Xenophon.

²⁰ Consider, for example, *Memorabilia* 1.4, 4.3, 4.6.1; *Symposium* 7.1–5. Xenophon's interest in scientific topics is also reflected in his works on the natural world, including the *Oikonomikos* and the *Kunēgetikos*. In each, Xenophon entertains the idea that the highest practitioner of the art in question is the philosopher.

²¹ *Memorabilia* 1.6.14, 4.8.11. See also *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors* §32–34.

²² A young Xenophon is contemplating a major decision after he receives an offer from a host of the family.

²³ After mentioning the distress and longing of the Ten Thousand, who thought they would never again see “their fatherlands, parents, wives and children” (3.1.3), Xenophon recalls (with his mind's eye) a conversation which took place just prior to his departure for Asia and in which he discussed with Socrates possible charges laid by their common “fatherland” (i.e., Athens). That Xenophon omits to recall his “wife” or “children” in that context is easy to explain: he had no children and was most likely still a bachelor (7.6.34, 7.2.38). But why doesn't he recall his “parents”? The answer is that he does (in a manner): Socrates is his father. Even though Xenophon never mentions his birth father or parents

the pages of Diogenes Laertius was named Gryllos.²⁴ Xenophon thereby indicates that a charge he ostensibly refutes in the *Memorabilia* is true, at least in his own case: Socrates took the place of the father in the esteem of the son.²⁵ The charge in question had its origins in Aristophanes's *Clouds*. This fact will prove to be significant.

That Xenophon *never* names his father in his writings is noteworthy. In the *Anabasis*, he describes himself as "an Athenian" without adding his patronymic, though he states the patronymic of other Athenians.²⁶ The omission of the patronymic underscores the importance of the only reference to Xenophon's father (though not by name) in his corpus that is at once explicit and textually certain: *Anabasis* 3.1.11. Let us consider this reference.²⁷

by name, he gives us a hint about their reaction to his prospective trip to Asia: he had to escape their authority like a runaway slave (6.4.8). In view of this hint, Socrates's objections to the trip appear, by comparison, tame. The reader should also compare 3.1.11 with 3.1.3: while Xenophon shared in the universal "distress" (LUPE) of the Ten Thousand, he did not share in the universal "longing" (POTHOS) for "fatherland" or "parents."—For the pupils of Socrates as "sons," see also *Memorabilia* 4.2.17. Socrates would cure his "sons" of their sickness of soul with an education that he presented as a means—a mere means—to the exercise of the kingly art. Regarding the relation of Xenophon to "fatherhood," consider in addition *Education of Cyrus* 3.1. In that chapter "Tigranēs" rescues his birth father, the king of Armenia, from an impending death sentence in a trial presided by Cyrus. Tigranēs comes to the rescue of his father though the latter had put to death a "sophist" and fellow "hunter" of Tigranēs whom he greatly admired. The father had killed the "sophist" out of envy (3.1.38–39). The distance between Tigranēs and his father, on the one hand, and his closeness to the "sophist," on the other, are reflected in the fact that it is the younger son of the Armenian king (and not the elder Tigranēs) who is wearing the tiara (3.1.13). The "hunter" Tigranēs comes to sight as a stranger (3.1.7). And Tigranēs is eager to leave his fatherland—yet again—to follow Cyrus (3.1.42 cf. *Anabasis* 3.1.4–8). (Consider in this connection the parallel case of the Sisyphean Derkulidas—though Derkulidas is admittedly not a philosopher, whereas "Tigranēs" is [*Hellenika* 4.3.2 cf. 3.1.8].)

²⁴ (1995) 2.48.

²⁵ *Memorabilia* 1.2.49–55; see also *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors* §19–21. Xenophon is equally silent about Plato's father, and for the same reason: Socrates was his father too (*Memorabilia* 3.6.1). To appreciate the significance of the disregard of the father in the scene between Xenophon and Socrates, consider that Aristotle investigates in the *Ethics* "whether one ought to render everything to a father and obey him in everything" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1164b22ff.). That Aristotle even *raises* this question is suggestive enough. The wide scope of the authority of the father can also be glimpsed from a remarkable omission at *Poetics* 1453b15–22. See also *Education of Cyrus* 3.1.38–40. That the authority of fathers was sometimes resented, even in a traditional city like Sparta, is made pointedly clear by *Hellenika* 4.5.10 *in fine*.

²⁶ 1.8.15, 2.5.37, 3.1.4; 3.3.20, 4.2.13 (2X).

²⁷ There occurs a second reference to Xenophon's father at the end of the *Anabasis* (7.8.5). I am highly confident that the reference is authentic, though it occurs only in the best MSS. For an interpretation of the reference, see chapter seven, pp. 292–93.

2. Xenophon, Zeus the King, and Apollo

The passage 3.1.4–10 is remarkable for its emphasis on Xenophon's *refusal* to seek Apollonian guidance regarding whether or not to befriend Cyrus. For, though a partial or limited questioning of the god need not be viewed as evidence of impiety—the Pious King, for example, questioned the sacrificial victims in just this way—nor does it have to be viewed as evidence of hypocrisy, it is nonetheless remarkable that Xenophon prefaces the account of his rule with a depiction of his partial recalcitrance toward Apollo. What does this recalcitrance mean? Isn't Xenophon a paragon of piety? Why, then, does he place his trust in human prudence—his own prudence, no less—when weighing the *pros* and *cons* of so important a decision as whether or not to befriend Cyrus? Recall that in chapters one and two I analyzed a pair of models of rule that were opposed on the issue of piety: the Godlike King rejected the gods and attempted to become a sort of “deity” himself; the Pious King sought divine guidance and rested his hopes on the just providence of heaven. But what is the position of the Socratic King? What place does he ascribe to piety and the gods in his rule? The function of book three in the *logos* of the *Anabasis* is to answer these questions.



We left Xenophon lying on the ground on the night of the ensnaring of Klearchos and the other generals. He is awake and distressed but manages to catch some sleep. He has a dream in which it seems to him that “there was some thunder and his father’s house was struck by a bolt of lightning that set the whole of it ablaze” (3.1.11). Xenophon immediately awakes, very scared, but he then judges that the dream is partly good, although it is partly fearsome as well. The dream is good because it seems to Xenophon that he has seen a light from Zeus amid hardships and dangers; it is fearsome because the dream seems to him to be from Zeus *the King*, and the fire seemed to be blazing *in a circle*: Xenophon might be powerless to escape the King’s country and be shut in on all sides by some difficulties. “What sort of thing it is to have such a dream,” our author then observes, “one might consider from the events that happened after it” (3.1.13). The now awoken Xenophon reflects that given the impending peril, it is no time to be lying on the ground. He springs to his feet, calls together the captains of Proxenos and delivers to them the first of three speeches by which he restores a degree of order and confidence to the Ten Thousand and in the course of which, from being a nonbeing, he is elected general. These three speeches illuminate the role of piety and

the gods in the rule of a Socratic King. But before I analyze them, I must consider Xenophon's enigmatic dream.

What are we to make of it? The dream—"one of the most famous passages in Greek prose literature"—is also among the most mysterious episodes of the *Anabasis*.²⁸ The dream is apparently *the* cause of Xenophon's ascent. Did he genuinely believe that Zeus the King had sent him a portent? In modern times, few scholars have hesitated to conclude that he did. In Antiquity, however, men of the stature of Cicero and Lucian expressed skepticism on that score.²⁹ Did Xenophon have a dream about what he had been mulling over in his wakeful state?³⁰ But what had he been mulling over?³¹ Or is the episode a literary device meant to illuminate a cause of the collective distress (LUPĒ)—Zeus has punished the Greek army—a distress which, in its effects at least, affected Xenophon as well? But perhaps it is best for now to take Xenophon at his word—the dream did take place and seemed to Xenophon to be from Zeus the King—and to focus on its significance instead. For Xenophon encourages the reader to seek "what sort of thing" the dream is by considering his own reaction to it (3.1.13).

On the face of it, the following interpretation of the dream would appear to be plausible: Zeus the King, the guardian and protector of legitimate kings, was angered by the Ten Thousand's attempted overthrow of the legitimate King of Persia. Zeus has punished their leaders by striking them with a bolt of lightning and is now imprisoning the rest of the army in the heart of hostile Persia.³² This *prima facie* interpretation, however, though helpful to illuminate the collective distress, is open to several

²⁸ Flower (2012) p. 126.

²⁹ Cicero (1923) *On Divination* 1.25; Lucian (1921) *The Dream or Lucian's Career* §17 in *Works*, Vol. 3. Kaldellis (2004) observes that "Lucian had an eye for the subtlety and esoteric qualities of ancient writing" (p. 35). He also notes shrewdly: "Contrary to what is usually assumed, omens in classical historiography have nothing to do with superstition. Like anecdotes, they are vehicles of literary or political analysis" (p. 127). The verb *DOKEŌ* ("to seem") occurs four times in 3.1.11–12.

³⁰ Consider the remarkable account of the origin of dreams in Herodotus *Histories*, 7.16.B.

³¹ Consider 6.1.22, which contains a reference to the same dream. According to the readings of two of the best MSS. (CA), the dream was not the cause but rather the *effect* of Xenophon's budding political involvement. These MSS. read: "And [Xenophon] believed that he had also seen the dream from [Zeus the King], the dream he saw *because* (HOTI, instead of HOTE ["when"]) he began to establish himself as one who would join in taking charge of the army."

³² The word "lightning" (SKĒPTOS) has the same root as the word "scepter" (SKĒPTRON). Of course, the scepter is a symbol of kingship (*Memorabilia* 3.9.10). Xenophon uses SKĒPTOS only here, I believe, in his corpus (3.1.11). Elsewhere, he uses KERAUNOS (*Memorabilia* 4.3.14, *Hellenika* 4.7.7) or ASTRAPĒ (*Education of Cyrus* 1.6.1, *Hellenika* 7.1.31). He also uses PRĒSTĒR at *Hellenika* 1.3.1. In other words, lightning in this scene is an emphatic symbol of Zeus's *kingly* authority.

objections. First, why would Xenophon regard the dream so interpreted as “partly good”? He is encouraged (he says) by the sight of “a light from Zeus.” Yet doesn’t this light symbolize impending destruction? To say the least, Xenophon possesses a well-developed capacity to see the silver lining.³³ Second, why does Xenophon see an image of his *father’s house* being destroyed? If the *prima facie* interpretation is correct, wouldn’t we expect the *Greek army* to be struck down? Third, how precisely does the *prima facie* interpretation account for Xenophon’s reaction to the dream? In other words, why does Xenophon seek to become a ruler of the army? He has stressed that the key to the meaning of the dream lies in *that* reaction. If the dream portends Zeus’s wrath, shouldn’t he try to placate the deity? Pious despondency would not be out of place. Xenophon is evidently not inclined to this sentiment.

The significance of the dream is unlocked by the reference to Xenophon’s *father*. This reference is unique in Xenophon’s corpus, as I have observed, and this fact must be given its due weight. Moreover, the reference occurs in a scene that immediately follows Xenophon’s account of a conversation, not with his father, but with *Socrates*—a conversation, moreover, in which Socrates has usurped the place of the father. The “father” whose “house” is destroyed is none other than Socrates.

But (it will be objected) what does this conclusion mean? Why would the impoverished Socrates come to sight as the owner of a “house” (OIKIA)? And why would the destruction of his “house” by Zeus the King cause Xenophon to seek to become a ruler of the army?

Here we must think of Aristophanes’s *Clouds*, as indeed the context of Socrates’s usurpation of the place of the father bids us do. Recall that the school or think tank of Socrates is repeatedly called a “house” (OIKIA) in the play; this “house” is set on fire in the final scene by a disgruntled father who acts on the advice of the deity.³⁴ (Book five of the *Anabasis* will confirm in humorous and striking fashion this interpretation of the meaning of the “house,” as we shall see.³⁵) Let me therefore propose the

³³ That thunder and lightning *can* be favorable omina, and especially omina of rule, is clear from *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.1. But how can they be interpreted as favorable omina *here*? The contrast between *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.1 and *Anabasis* 3.1.11–12—both the “lightning” and the “house of the father” are referred to in each passage—could not be more striking. (Herodotus suggests that the destruction of a house by divine thunderbolt is a most ominous portent: 4.79. See also *Odyssey* 12.403–425.) Xenophon never recounts this dream to anyone in the army, unlike the more auspicious dream of book four (4.3.8–15). His own “great fear” (PERIPHOBOS) already suggests that it could be interpreted as an altogether bad omen.

³⁴ *Clouds* 1475–end, especially 1483–85 and 1508.

³⁵ See my interpretation of the so-called Mossunoikoi (the “wooden-house-dwellers”) on pp. 197–204. The “Mossunoikoi” are literary stand-ins for “the Socratics.”

following resolution of our difficulty: “Zeus the King” has destroyed “the house” of Socrates in the sense that the dire political circumstances now threatening Xenophon, which were apparently willed by heaven, have destroyed or suspended Socrates’s teaching regarding political rule. (The “house” in question refers less to the physical school than to the teaching conveyed in it.) At the start of book three, politics is threatening to engulf Xenophon. “Zeus the King” has destroyed the position he has hitherto occupied amid the Ten Thousand, a sheltered position eschewing roles of leadership or rule that he was taught to value by a “father” notoriously averse to exercising rule himself.³⁶ Given his dire predicament, however, Xenophon can no longer afford to remain an uninvolved Socratic; he must thrust himself forward and try to save himself (and others) by direct political involvement. In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, the meaning of the dream is therefore as follows: Xenophon is now compelled to set aside his Socratic unwillingness to rule. Such an interpretation explains why (or in what sense) the dream causes Xenophon to seek rule. It also explains why the cameo of Socrates—his sole cameo in the *Anabasis*—is immediately followed by the scene of the dream. Just like a Platonic philosopher-king—and precisely in the manner of a Socratic—Xenophon is unwilling to rule unless he is compelled to do so. But a compulsion now exists: he will likely die unless he takes up the rule of the army (3.1.14).



Several obstacles stand in the way of Xenophon’s prospective rule. The two main ones are that he is young and an Athenian citizen—in the midst of a Peloponnesian army and not long after the end of the Peloponnesian War.³⁷ Besides, he has almost no basis of support in the ranks since he joined Cyrus without any mercenaries of his own (cf. 6.2.9–12). Having few options to reestablish order and rekindle a will to resist in the army, he gathers the captains of Proxenos, to whom he is known. His speech to them—his inaugural speech of the *Anabasis*—has two distinct but closely related aims: first, to restore a measure of hope and persuade the captains

³⁶ To appreciate the quiet humor of the scene of the dream, consider Socrates’s scornful dismissal of the dangers posed by the lightning of Zeus: *Clouds*, 398–402 (and generally 366ff.). It is perhaps in his capacity as “Zeus paternal” that the deity was punishing the alienation of the affection of Xenophon (cf. *Clouds* 1468 and context). By presenting Socrates as his “father,” Xenophon also implicitly questions the fatherhood of Zeus: *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.1, read together with 1.5.14. He replaces one father with another.

³⁷ Consider the two objections that Xenophon makes to himself at 3.1.14. He was probably under thirty years of age at the time.

to be good while inciting the rest of the army to prepare for resistance; second, to get elected general in replacement of Proxenos.

"I am not capable of sleeping, men and captains," Xenophon begins, "and neither are you, I suppose, nor can I lie on the ground any longer since I see what circumstances we are in. For the enemy, clearly, did not reveal their war against us until they held their preparations to be fine, whereas no one on our side is taking any care in response so that we will contend as nobly as possible" (3.1.15–16). Xenophon goes on to stress that the Greeks *must* fight the Persians. It would be both illusory and dangerous to continue to hope, as some soldiers were manifestly doing (e.g., 3.3.5), that safety could be attained through a negotiated settlement, perhaps a surrender on terms:³⁸

And if we submit and fall into the King's hands, what do we think we will suffer? Even in the case of his own brother, one born from both the same mother and the same father, even when he was already dead, he cut off his head and hand and impaled them. And in our case, since we have no protector, and since we campaigned against him, intending to make him a slave instead of a King, and to kill him if we were able, what do we think we would suffer? Would he not go to every length, torturing us to the greatest extremes, so that he might thus produce in all human beings a fear of ever campaigning against him? Then we must do everything so that we do not fall into his hands. (3.1.17–18)³⁹

The opening of Xenophon's speech is well designed to impress upon the captains both the perils of their situation as well as the need to prepare and eschew negotiation. Yet this opening risks deepening their despondency, and not merely because being tortured "to the greatest extremes" by the King could not have been an inspiring prospect. For the bleak situation of the Ten Thousand has been painted in excessively dark colors by Xenophon. To quash the hope of reaching a negotiated settlement with Artaxerxes, he has exaggerated their odiousness and culpability. (The narrator states that the Ten Thousand marched against the King out of shame and reluctantly, and after being thoroughly deceived: they did *not* intend to enslave or kill the King, certainly not at first: 3.1.10).⁴⁰ Xenophon's exaggeration of Hellenic culpability is of course serviceable to quash the

³⁸ As Hirsch (1985) rightly says: "Stranded as they were in the heart of a vast and hostile empire, it is probable that some fearful and despairing Greeks were still urging negotiations with the King and perhaps even a surrender on terms" (p. 31).

³⁹ Translation by Ambler (2008).

⁴⁰ Of course, Klearchos *did* know how things stood and was culpable, but he has now been punished.

hope in question. But it carries a risk. For, Xenophon is thereby suggesting a thought that (as we are about to see) was already oppressing the minds of the Ten Thousand: the army is smarting from a punishment inflicted by Zeus the King. The Ten Thousand have been sanctioned for their attempted overthrow of the legitimate King of Persia. Xenophon stresses that he and his fellow-Greeks have no “protector” in order to spur them to prepare for a fight (KĒDEMŌN: 3.1.17). While it is not entirely clear what “protector” he means, it would be most natural to interpret the remark to mean that divine protection must not be awaited for, or expected, by the guilty Hellenes.⁴¹ So interpreted, the remark could turn the captains into unmartial suppliants bent on appeasing the wrath of Zeus.

In view of this danger, but also and more generally because of the despondency of the captains, Xenophon turns to restoring their hopes in the second part of his speech (3.1.19–23). There, he claims that he never ceased feeling pity for the Greeks as long as the truce held, while he kept viewing the Persians as blessed. For the Greeks were oath-bound to keep their hands off of all the good things of the Persians—land, provisions, servants, livestock, gold, clothes—and to purchase whatever they needed or wanted. Yet few among them had the means with which to buy anything. Thinking of all this, “I was sometimes more fearful of the truce than I am now of the war. Since [the Persians] have dissolved the truce, however, it seems to me that it is the end both of their hubris and of our suspicion. For these good things now lie as prizes in the middle for whichever of us are the better men, and the gods, who are the judges of the contest, will be with us, as is likely” (3.1.21). Xenophon goes on to emphasize that it is the *Persians* who broke their sworn oaths whereas the Greeks remained scrupulously faithful to theirs, though the good things of the Persians were most tempting (3.1.22). The Greeks can therefore enter this contest with much higher spirits.

Xenophon’s inaugural speech of the *Anabasis* reminds us of the language used earlier by Theopompos (2.1.12). Both men argue that the Ten Thousand ought to challenge the King to a fight over his “good

⁴¹ Couvreur (1929, p. 177) sees in the claim that the Greeks have no “protector” a reference to the fact that, unlike Cyrus, they do not enjoy the support of Parysatis, the queen-mother (cf. 1.1.4). But why would he allude to this lack of protection here, and in such an ambiguous fashion? Xenophon does not mention Parysatis in his enumeration of the *aporiai* facing the Greeks (3.1.2–3). Dakyns (1901) interprets KĒDEMŌN to mean “ties of blood”: unlike Cyrus, he suggests, the Ten Thousand are not connected to Artaxerxes by any such ties (p. 70). Yet KĒDEMŌN refers to ties of marriage, not ties of blood (which is conveyed by SUGGENĒS: for example, *Anabasis* 4.5.32, 7.2.31; *Education of Cyrus* 1.4.27, 1.4.28). That KĒDEMŌN is a reference to the gods is supported by *Education of Cyrus* 3.3.22, where the word is used to refer to heroic protection and help.

things.” Of course, the similarity is not surprising since “Theopompos” is “Xenophon.” What *is* surprising is the ostensible difference between the two speeches. Whereas Theopompos had said that the Greeks would fight Artaxerxes with their “weapons” and their “virtue,” Xenophon argues here that the Greeks will fight Artaxerxes with the likely help of the gods because they are the better men. Unlike Theopompos, he appears to base his hopes on virtue and other-worldly weapons. He is essentially silent about this-worldly weapons.⁴² Indeed, his manner of encouraging the captains of Proxenos is reminiscent of the stratagem employed earlier by the Pious King Klearchos, who nursed the hopes of the Greeks with appeals to virtue and other-worldly weapons (2.1.15–20). Is Xenophon a Pious King after all?

That Xenophon ascribes precisely as much importance to this-worldly weapons as Theopompos becomes evident in his ensuing clash with “Apollōnidēs” (3.1.26–32). Xenophon’s initial silence about these weapons is probably due to the fact that the captains of Proxenos might have despaired of salvation had he stressed their importance at the outset. After all, the Greeks were badly outnumbered by the Persians, without allies, and they lacked all cavalry support. On the other hand, they *could* be encouraged by a timely reminder of the likely favor of the gods, for, as Xenophon puts it, the souls of the Greeks are better “with [the help of] the gods.” (To translate the Greek more literally: the souls of the Greeks “are better with the gods [in them.]”⁴³) Xenophon’s inaugural speech in the *Anabasis* shows that he is willing and able to enlist the piety of his addressees in order to help restore their confidence. This does not prove that he is not a pious man himself. But it suggests that he scrutinizes the political consequences of piety to ensure that they are beneficial and not harmful. More generally, Xenophon’s inaugural speech seeks to restore a measure of hope to the captains of Proxenos but only insofar as a state of heightened hopefulness is consistent with an unyielding will to resist and to prepare. For if despair could cause the captains to give up and surrender—this danger is obviously the most pressing danger in the circumstances—a state of heightened hopefulness could cause them to neglect their preparations out of what we might call pious quiescence. For, as we saw in chapter two, confidence in one’s piety and justice is liable to issue in a reckless failure to prepare and take precautions. Xenophon wants the captains to be hopeful without forgetting that the gods help those who help themselves. Thus while the second part of his speech explicitly asserts the likelihood of divine assistance,

⁴² Xenophon alludes to these weapons obliquely at 3.1.23.

⁴³ ECHOMEN DE KAI PSUCHAS SUN TOÏS THEOÏS AMEINONAS: 3.1.23.

the first part quietly denies it ("we have no protector"). That Xenophon contradicts himself on a point of such central importance illustrates the difficulty of the balancing act he must perform between two opposed, if somewhat unequal, dangers.

"By the gods," Xenophon perorates, "let us not wait for others to come and encourage us to the noblest actions, but let us be the ones to incite others to virtue" (3.1.24). Xenophon adds that he is ready to follow the captains. Yet he will not invoke his youth as an excuse (he says) if they assign him to be their leader: "I even believe that I am in my prime to ward off harm from myself" (3.1.25).

Xenophon's inaugural speech in the *Anabasis* is a smashing success: all the captains—or rather, all the rulers or originators (ARCHĒGOI)⁴⁴—bid him lead the way. There is, however, a certain Apollōnidēs who raises an objection in the Boeotian dialect: "To say that safety can be obtained otherwise than by persuading the King, if we are able, is to speak nonsense," Apollōnidēs declares censoriously as he proceeds to enumerate all the difficulties. But Xenophon cuts him off mid-sentence: "Most amazing human being! You do not understand even when you see, nor do you remember even when you hear!" (3.1.27). Yet Apollōnidēs was present (Xenophon continues) when the King ordered the Ten Thousand to surrender their weapons, flush with pride on account of the death of Cyrus. The Ten Thousand did *not* surrender their weapons, however. And no sooner had they armed themselves and gone to encamp next to him than the King dispatched envoys to request a truce, supplying them with provisions to boot. On the other hand, when the generals and the captains of the Ten Thousand trusted in the sworn truce and attended a parley without their weapons—the very thing that they should do again, according

⁴⁴ The best MSS. CBAE read "rulers" or "originators" (ARCHĒGOI) instead of "captains" (LOCHAGOI) at 3.1.26. The latter reading is found in the inferior MSS. and is adopted by some modern editors. But the somewhat odd ARCHĒGOI is probably authentic. The word "ruler" is typically conveyed in Xenophon by ARCHŌN or by a participial noun formed on the root verb ARCHEIN. I know of no other instance where Xenophon employs ARCHĒGOS to mean "ruler" (cf. *Hellenika* 5.2.25; Xenophon uses ARCHĒGETĒS at *Hellenika* 6.3.6, 6.5.47 and, especially, 7.3.12). The primary meaning of ARCHĒGOS is "originator" or "beginner" (*Hellenika* 3.3.4). In the present context, however, the word ARCHĒGOS makes sense: the captains of Proxenos were acting the part of ARCHĒGOI when they originated or began the reestablishment of order in the army (cf. Xenophon's use of ARCHEIN at 3.1.24). The odd use of ARCHĒGOS is thus meant as praise. Yet it is praise tinged with a good deal of irony. For the captains would not have "originated" anything without Xenophon: *he* is the true ARCHĒGOS. A similar instance of irony occurs at 3.1.37, where Xenophon refers publicly to the few surviving leaders of the army as TAXIARCHOI ("originators of order"). In his narration, however, he employs the less-than-flattering HUPOSTRATEGOI ("under-generals"): cf. 3.1.37 with 3.1.32.

to Apollōnidēs—they were beaten, tortured, treated wantonly, and forbidden even to die, “though it is death, I suppose, that these wretches would especially love” (3.1.29). And yet knowing all this, Apollōnidēs says that those who bid the Greeks defend themselves are speaking nonsense, while he bids them go and use persuasion again! Without giving Apollōnidēs any chance to respond, Xenophon calls on the other captains to strip him of his command and use him in the lowly capacity of baggage carrier: “For he shames his fatherland and the whole of Hellas by being such as he is, despite being Greek” (3.1.30). The proposed punishment of Apollōnidēs is seconded, or rather made more severe, by the captain Agasias of Stumphalia. Agasias breaks in and exclaims that Apollōnidēs has no connection whatever with Boeotia or with Hellas at all.⁴⁵ His ears are pierced, like those of a Lydian.⁴⁶ And since this was so, they drove Apollōnidēs away, an apparent agent of the King.

The scene of the rebuke and expulsion of Apollōnidēs is important for the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. First, it shows us that among the Greeks there were some who still believed or hoped that a negotiated settlement with the King was possible or necessary. The scene helps justify the rhetorical tactic of Xenophon to exaggerate the culpability of the Ten Thousand in his first speech. It also helps clarify his strategy insofar as he now stresses the importance of this-worldly weapons if the Greeks are to escape Persia alive. Yet the treatment of Apollōnidēs must be viewed on a trans-political plane as well. The rather pointed name “Apollōnidēs” means “the son of Apollo.” Apollōnidēs is linked to the Delphic deity by his use of the Boeotian dialect, spoken at Delphi or in its vicinity.⁴⁷ Are we then to understand that “Apollo” has left his temple in Delphi to offer an “oracle” to the Ten Thousand—“you must persuade the King”?⁴⁸ Recall that

⁴⁵ In the best MSS. CBAE, the phrase translated as “[he has] no connection whatever with Boeotia or with Hellas at all” reads: “[he has] no connection whatever with the *kingship* (BASILEIA), with Boeotia or with Hellas at all” (3.1.31). Modern editors drop the seemingly redundant “kingship,” but are they right to do so? Agasias is a pious soldier (cf. 6.1.17–33, esp. 30–31). He is ready to expel “Apollōnidēs” but must first be satisfied that he has no connection whatever with “the kingship.”

⁴⁶ “During the times of Grecian autonomy and ascendancy, in the fifth century BC, the conception of a Phrygian or a Lydian was associated in the Greek mind with ideas of contempt and servitude” (Grote [1899], Vol. 3, p. 216). Apollōnidēs is repeatedly described as a “human being” (ANTHROPOS), never as a “man” (ANER).

⁴⁷ Delphi was located near Boeotia. Of course, since Apollōnidēs proves to be a Lydian, the mention of his dialect could also indicate that he is dissembling; or it could be meant to characterize his speech (the Boeotians were proverbially dull-witted). All three intimations are likely intended.

⁴⁸ While Apollōnidēs turns out to be a Lydian, he was a “Lydian” from Ephesus, so to speak (cf. 5.3.4).

Apollo had a reputation for being something of an appeaser. On the eve of Xerxes's fateful invasion of Hellas in the Second Persian War, Apollo was said to have played the part of a Medizer, advising the Athenians to abandon armed resistance and submit to the King. All the hermeneutical skills of Themistocles were needed to avert this Delphic defeatism.⁴⁹ Did Xenophon perform for the Ten Thousand a service comparable to that performed on that occasion by Themistocles?⁵⁰ I believe that he did. But we must go further: if "Apollōnidēs" is a literary stand-in for "Apollo," then the advice of Apollōnidēs to "persuade the King" must refer not only to Artaxerxes—who is simply called by his generic title "the King" throughout—but also and especially to "Zeus the King." In other words, Apollōnidēs⁵¹ gives voice to a possible reaction to Xenophon's speech (or to the first part of his speech), which his reassurances (in the second part) were insufficient entirely to soothe: if the guilty Greeks have aroused the wrath of Zeus the King, then it is above all by "persuading" this deity that they will obtain salvation. Apollōnidēs embodies a temptation, especially strong amid mortal dangers, to rely on entreaties, prayers, sacrifices, and supplications instead of this-worldly weapons to earn divine assistance and atone for one's guilt. The rebuke and expulsion of Apollōnidēs adumbrates Xenophon's rejection of this temptation, a rejection already implied in his response to his own dream. For, Xenophon never takes any steps to placate the putative wrath of Zeus the King.⁵² We might add that his rejection of Apollōnidēs's "oracle" accords with the opening of book three, where Xenophon declines to seek Apollo's guidance regarding whether or not to befriend Cyrus (3.1.4–10). The rejection of the oracle is also consistent, to say the least, with Xenophon's self-presentation as Midas, who sided with Marsyas and against Apollo in their fabled contest over wisdom.

⁴⁹ Herodotus, *Histories* 7.139–45. Xenophon is about to speak explicitly of Xerxes's famous invasion, and to compare the plight of the Ten Thousand to that of their ancestors at the outbreak of the Second Persian War (3.2.13).

⁵⁰ Yet whereas Themistocles had merely "reinterpreted" the (second) oracle of the god, Xenophon dismisses Apollōnidēs's advice outright, and eventually expels him (cf. Herodotus, *Histories* 7.143). It is worth noting, however, that Xenophon had initially proposed to use "Apollōnidēs" as a baggage-carrier. He had some use for him, but in an instrumental capacity only.

⁵¹ "Apollōnidēs" is another probable instance of renaming.

⁵² We reach the same conclusion if we begin from the chapter of the *Iliad* on which the scene of Apollōnidēs is modeled: Poseidon's rebuke of the "Medizing" Apollo (*Iliad* 21.435ff.). In that text, Poseidon criticizes the faint-hearted Apollo for his failure to fight the Trojans. Both deities had suffered at the hands of the Trojan king, who had defrauded them and even threatened to cut off their ears (compare the description of the ears of Apollōnidēs at 3.1.31!) The kinship between Apollōnidēs and Apollo is obvious, but what is the kinship between Xenophon and Poseidon? Are we to recall Poseidon's nonsubmissive relation to Zeus (see, esp., *Iliad* 1.400)?

3. Virtue, Piety, and Freedom

Once Apollōnidēs is expelled, the captains of Proxenos go around the camp to gather the generals, the under-generals, and the captains who had escaped the snare of Tissaphernēs. About one hundred men assemble around midnight in front of the place where the weapons are stacked. First to get up is Hierōnumos, the eldest of Proxenos's captains. He explains why they have all come together. But he quickly turns to Xenophon for help: "Say, Xenophon, what you said to us as well" (3.1.34). The core message of Xenophon's second speech of the *Anabasis* is almost identical to that of his first: "We must do everything, I suppose, so as never to come into the power of the barbarians, but rather that they come into our power, if we are able" (3.1.35 cf. 3.1.18). Yet this, the central speech of Xenophon in book three, is not a "repetition" of what he had said to the captains of Proxenos. Since Xenophon now stands before rulers to whom he is barely known, he must first persuade them that though he is a young man and an Athenian, he is also prudent and trustworthy. Above all, he must convince the Lacedaemonian Cheirisophos, the new *de facto* head of the army, of his worth as a soldier and a human being.

Having stated his core message, Xenophon declares that the gathered rulers have "the greatest opportunity" lying before them (MEGISTON ECHETE KAIRON: 3.1.36). They have (Xenophon appears to mean) the chance to earn honor from, or the admiration and praise of, the rest of army since all eyes are fixed upon them: "If [the soldiers] see you dispirited, all will be bad, but if you are visibly preparing yourselves for the enemy and call on others to do so, know well that they will follow you and attempt to imitate you" (3.1.36). How does Xenophon endeavor to uplift the spirit of the rulers? He does not promise them safety or survival. His speech contains few reassurances in this regard. Instead, he stresses duty: since the rulers have enjoyed a larger share of honors and money than the soldiers during peacetime, it is just, perhaps, that in wartime they should have to be preeminent in goodness, in counsel, and (if necessary) in labors on behalf of the multitude. Xenophon then advises the rulers to benefit the army by electing new generals and captains as soon as possible: "For without rulers, nothing either noble or good could come to be anywhere (to put it briefly), and this is altogether so in military matters" (3.1.38). Yet Xenophon remains coy throughout the speech about the issue of safety, mentioning it only once (3.1.38). He does not refer to the recent victory over the Persians in the Battle for Babylon, nor does he mention that the bodies and souls of the Greeks are arguably stronger than those of their adversaries (cf. 3.1.23). And he never says that the gods will likely help them, as oath-abiding men, as he had said to Proxenos's captains. (His speech is almost completely silent about the gods: the expulsion of

Apollōnidēs is being somehow reflected in it.⁵³) Xenophon does urge the rulers to change the outlook of the soldiers so that, thinking not only of what they will suffer but also of what they will do, they will be much more inspired. But what Xenophon stresses above all—of all subjects—is the inescapable character of death:

As for me, men, I have also pondered this, that all those who desire to stay alive through wars by every means die for the most part both badly and shamefully; but all those who know that death is common to everyone, and necessary for human beings, and who as a result contend over dying nobly, these I see somehow reaching old age more often and, for as long as they live, passing their time more happily. As we perceive this, therefore, it behooves us at the present opportunity (KAIROS) to be good men ourselves and call upon others to be so too. (3.1.43–44)

In light of this peroration, it almost seems as if the “greatest opportunity” that Xenophon had mentioned at the beginning of his speech is the chance to die nobly.⁵⁴ Such a manner of encouraging the rulers is bound to appear surprising and even strange. Isn’t the emphasis on death the opposite of inspiring? Yet upon reflection, Xenophon’s emphasis must be judged to be most fitting. He had learned from Socrates that different kinds of souls can be encouraged and stirred to virtuous deeds in different ways, and to different degrees.⁵⁵ Since Xenophon’s audience here is made up of lovers of honor, he appeals to this love as he exhorts the men to be good. Yet his final peroration extends far beyond the reaches of honor or admiration. By reminding his addressees of their mortality—of the necessarily finite span of their lives—Xenophon appeals to, and seeks to bring to the fore, what we can call their seriousness. He knows that there is a link between the human awareness of death and the love of the noble, and he inflames this love by bringing the awareness in question into active consciousness. I shall endeavor to examine this link more closely in chapter four. For now, let me note that Xenophon uplifts the spirit of the rulers not by promising them safety, nor again by whetting their appetite for the “good things” of the Persians. Rather, he articulates the promise held out by the noble that virtuous deeds will somehow lead to happiness—a complete and self-sufficient good, unsullied by mortality or our awareness of it. Stated differently, Xenophon knows that nobility possesses an invigorating appeal for the better kinds of souls. His speech to the rulers has the additional merit of appealing to a man like

⁵³ The single reference to the gods is at 3.1.42.

⁵⁴ Cf. the use of KAIROS at 3.1.36 and 3.1.44. The word also appears at 3.1.39.

⁵⁵ For example, *Memorabilia* 3.1, esp. §8–11, and generally 3.1–3.7.

Cheirisophos, who, as a Lacedaemonian, had been trained to prefer a noble death to a shameful life.⁵⁶ Indeed, Xenophon makes a highly favorable impression on Cheirisophos, who praises him and endorses all his proposals. Cheirisophos even goes so far as to say that it would be a “common good” to have as many as possible who are just like Xenophon (KOINON AGATHON: 3.1.45).⁵⁷ The disciple of Socrates is willing to rule when something like a common good exists. His second speech has overcome the suspicions of the leading Lacedaemonian: to a not insignificant degree, the success of the retreat of the Ten Thousand will be the result of the reconciliation and active cooperation of one Athenian and one Lacedaemonian.



Xenophon is elected general to replace Proxenos. All the vacant positions of rule are soon filled (3.1.47). The new rulers set up guards around the camp and gather the soldiers. Cheirisophos speaks first:

Men and soldiers, our present circumstances are hard, for we have been deprived of such men who were generals, captains and soldiers, and in addition we have been betrayed by the troops of Ariaios, who used to be our allies. Nevertheless, we must in the present circumstances become good men to the end (TELETHEIN) and not give in, but rather attempt to win a noble victory if we can. And if we cannot, let us die a noble death, at least, and never come into the hands of our enemies alive. For I suppose that we would suffer such things as—May the gods inflict them on our enemies! (3.2.2–3)

Much like Xenophon had done before him, Cheirosophos insists that the Greeks must fight the Persians and never give in; he offers no reassurances regarding safety; and he speaks of a noble death while exhorting the soldiers to be good men. Yet whereas Xenophon had linked virtue to happiness, Cheirisophos appears to be resigned to his fate. His speech is not likely to have much encouraged the soldiers. For he fails to appreciate that he is speaking to a much less select audience—the army at large—than Xenophon had been earlier. Since this audience is less powerfully moved by the noble, it must be addressed more reassuringly. Cheirisophos is resolved and resigned, but he accomplishes little here beyond providing a crucially important public example of resoluteness.

⁵⁶ Compare *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* c. 9 with *Anabasis* 3.1.43.

⁵⁷ The first speech of Xenophon cements his friendship with the captain Agasias; his second speech cements his partnership with the general Cheirisophos.

In view of the influence that Xenophon has manifestly had on him, note that Cheirisophos ends his speech with an emphatic reference to the divine: "May the gods inflict [evil things] on our enemies!" Xenophon had not made any such reference or expressed any such hope.

The second speech is delivered by Kleanōr the Orchomenian, the general who had declined to accompany Klearchos to the tent of Tissaphernēs in the epiphanic scene of book two. If Kleanōr speaks at somewhat greater length than Cheirisophos, he is at one with him over the need for the Greeks to wage an all-out war against the Persians, and he displays the same kind of resoluteness. But whereas Cheirisophos is weighed down by resignation, Kleanōr is hot with indignation. He enumerates all the sins of the King, of Tissaphernēs, and of Ariaios, all of whom broke their oaths and pledges. He stresses in particular the faithlessness of Tissaphernēs, who not only deceived the Greeks egregiously but also destroyed Klearchos—his guest—by sharing his table with him. Tissaphernēs showed no reverence toward Zeus of Hosts. (If the Ten Thousand have angered Zeus the King, the Persians have apparently angered Zeus of Hosts.) Toward the end of his speech, Kleanōr voices a hope similar to the one Cheirisophos has just mentioned: "May the gods avenge themselves on these men" (3.2.6). It is left to Xenophon to articulate concrete grounds in support of the hope that animates both Cheirisophos and Kleanōr.

As the freshly elected hero of the *Anabasis* gets up to deliver his third and by far longest speech of book three, he is arrayed for war as beautifully as he can manage. He tells us that, as he believes, a most beautiful adornment is fitting in the circumstances—whether it be for a victory, if the gods should grant one, or, if he must die, because, as he deems himself worthy of the most beautiful things, it is correct that he should meet his end in these arms. The beauty of Xenophon's armament and dress thus reflects the exceptional gravity of the situation as well as his sense of self-worth. It befits his noble resoluteness and composure. Perhaps nowhere else in the *Anabasis* do we get a more vivid sense of his strength of soul. It is even tempting to see him as an embodiment of Aristotle's magnanimous man. Having been largely inactive hitherto—no task was commensurate with his virtue—Xenophon comes to the fore and claims the honor he deserves. Yet however it may be of such an interpretation, we cannot help noting that Xenophon has adorned himself for a speech, not for a battle. His death is not imminent. Is he trying to reinforce the message of his speech to the soldiers—"we must fight an all-out war"? Or to convey to them a sense of his valor and resoluteness? This much is clear: while Xenophon is about to strike a reassuring tone in his public address, he is hardly certain of the ultimate outcome.

The primary goal of Xenophon's third speech is (once again) to restore confidence to his addressees while exhorting them to be good (3.2.7–39). And he must convince them, if not of his worth as a soldier and a human being, at least of the necessity to obey the new leadership of which he is now a part. He begins by noting that Kleanōr has already spoken of the perjury and faithlessness of the Persians.⁵⁸ (Xenophon observes a polite silence about Cheirisophos's speech.⁵⁹) He adds that if the Greeks wish to try the friendship of the Persians again, they will necessarily experience much despondency. But if they intend to use their weapons to punish the Persians and wage an all-out war against them, they will have “with the [help of the] Gods” “many and noble hopes of safety” (3.2.8).⁶⁰

Imitating the two previous speakers, Xenophon urges his audience to forgo negotiation. His resolve, however, is not marred by resignation or indignation. Instead, Xenophon offers reassurances, using words like “safety” (SŌTĒRIA), “safe” (SŌTĒROS, ASPHALĒS), “safely” (ASPHALŌS), and “to (be) save(d)” (SŌDZEIN) no fewer than fifteen times. He barely alludes to death at all. (Recall that he had mentioned safety once in his second speech.⁶¹) Xenophon reckons that to restore confidence to the average soldier and stir *him* toward obedience and a degree of virtue, he has to appeal to a basic but also powerful and more universal instinct: self-preservation. From here, we can sum up the main *difference* between the three speeches of Xenophon in book three: the contest (AGŌN) between Greeks and Persians is presented by him in his first speech as a contest over the “good things” of the Persians (3.1.21); it becomes a contest over “dying nobly” in the second speech (3.1.43); and it boils down to a contest over “safety” in the third (3.2.15).

As Xenophon utters the words “many and noble hopes of safety,” someone in the audience sneezes. All the soldiers fall to their knees, with one impulse, and prostrate themselves before the god. Xenophon does not skip a beat: “It seems to me, men, that since an omen from Zeus Savior has manifested itself as we were talking about safety, we ought to vow to sacrifice thank-offerings for our safety to this god, wherever we first reach a friendly country, and to the other gods as well,

⁵⁸ Ruderman (1992) observes that Kleanōr had spoken of Persian “perjury,” “impiety” and “faithlessness,” but Xenophon omits the central “impiety”: cf. 3.2.4 with 3.2.8.

⁵⁹ He criticizes this speech implicitly: cf. 3.2.17 with 3.2.2.

⁶⁰ Kleanōr and Cheirisophos had expressed a hope that the gods might be the avengers of the crimes of the Persians. Xenophon encourages the Greeks to become themselves the avengers of these crimes—“with [the help of] the gods” (cf. 3.2.8 with 3.2.6 and 3.2.3).

⁶¹ Xenophon's third speech (which is in two parts) is approximately three and a half times as long as his second speech.

in accordance with our power” (3.2.9). Xenophon immediately puts this proposal to a vote, and all raise their hands to approve it. The vow is accordingly made, and the Greeks sing the paean, their confidence somewhat restored.

Even scholars who think that Xenophon is a paragon of piety have wondered whether he really believed that the sneeze had been sent by Zeus Savior. Xenophon’s inspiring interpretation certainly stands in sharp contrast to his ominous dream where a wrathful Zeus seemed bent on the destruction of the Ten Thousand. (The ominous dream is only communicated to the reader, never to the army.) Is Xenophon’s interpretation guided by political expediency?⁶² It is undeniable that this interpretation yields (or helps sustain) a surge of confidence at a time of great need. In fact, the soldiers’ unanimous movement of self-prostration before what was, after all, merely a sneeze by one man, suggests that something had been weighing on their collective mind. Some nagging suspicion, a sentiment approaching collective anxiety, appears to have been assuaged by the sneeze, producing a spontaneous release of tension. Thanks to the ministering hermeneutics of Xenophon, the anxiety of the soldiers has been soothed and their hopes revived: Zeus (he suggests) has been mollified. Xenophon thus brings it about that the deity has stamped his seal of approval on the policy of all-out war that he, along with Cheirisophos and Kleanōr, regards as necessary for the good of the army. Whether Xenophon regards the sneeze as a heavenly sign, his ability to think on his feet has gone a long way toward reconciling the pious hopes and fears of the soldiers with the imperatives of safety and success. It is thus that having made the most of an unexpected occurrence, Xenophon picks up the thread of his speech and goes on to enumerate the “many other hopes of safety” that the Greeks have.⁶³

Xenophon discusses three such hopes (3.2.10–16). The first one he had mentioned in his address to the captains of Proxenos: the gods will

⁶² According to Spelman (1855), Xenophon “represents himself as having been encouraged by a dream during a momentary doze, which he has so related and interpreted as to leave it doubtful whether his remarkable attention to omens and sacrifices was the result of sound policy or sincere belief” (p. 22). That Xenophon could *see* the soldiers prostrate themselves before the god suggests that he himself was not facing the ground: cf. Aristophanes’s *Knights* 638–40, a reference I owe to Wayne Ambler. *Odyssey* 17.541–45 is another example of a sneeze considered to be a good omen.

⁶³ The formula “many and noble hopes of safety” (3.2.9) is changed by Xenophon as he picks up the thread of his speech. It becomes “many other (ALLAI) hopes of safety” (3.2.10, in the best MSS.). Did he consider that a sneeze was *not* the basis of a noble hope?

likely oppose the Persians and be the allies of the oath-abiding Greeks. And the gods are capable of making the great quickly small, if they wish to, and of easily saving the small from dire perils (3.2.10; cf. 3.1.21–22). But let me focus on the second and central hope. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates is depicted as teaching that a dispirited audience can be encouraged and stirred to virtue by timely reminders of the martial valor and achievements of its ancestors.⁶⁴ Xenophon makes the most of this insight here. He reminds his audience of the victories that the Greeks won over the Medes in the Persian Wars. His goal is to convince the Ten Thousand that “it is fitting for you to be good, and for the good to be saved with [the help of] the gods, even from great danger” (3.2.11). The main events of the two Persian Wars he briefly summarizes in a manner that raises several questions.⁶⁵ But for our purposes, the crucial point to note is how Xenophon shows that it is fitting for the Ten Thousand to be saved “with [the help of] the gods.” First, Xenophon recalls how the Athenians dared to stand up to the Persians in the First Persian War. Before the Battle of Marathon, the Athenians vowed to sacrifice to Artemis as many she-goats as they would kill enemies. Their arms were so successful in the battle that they could not find enough animals afterward. Hence they instituted an annual sacrifice of five hundred she-goats that is still maintained to this day: Artemis granted the Athenians a splendid victory.

When he turns to the Second Persian War, however, Xenophon becomes notably coy regarding the issue of divine assistance. He celebrates the victory of the Ten Thousand’s ancestors, who defeated Xerxes and the ancestors of the present-day Persians on land (Platea) and at sea (Salamis). But he does not say what help, if any, the Greeks received from heaven to achieve these victories. (Of course, Xenophon omits to mention the “help” they received from Apollo—the deity’s dispiriting oracle

⁶⁴ *Memorabilia* 3.5.7ff.

⁶⁵ For example, why does Xenophon give equal weight to the First and the Second Persian War? Why not focus on the second conflict? For the Greek victory in the First Persian War was achieved by the Athenians standing almost alone, a point that Xenophon stresses as he extols their daring. Yet doesn’t he realize (Masqueray objects [Vol. 1, p. 173]) that the bulk of his audience is made up of Dorians, whose latent hostility to Athens would have thereby been aroused? Yet by extolling Athenian daring, Xenophon is quietly bolstering his own credentials as a as-yet-untested Athenian general. What might have given offense in another context is appropriate here, given the intent of his speech. Besides, had Xenophon focused solely on the Second Persian War—a more panhellenic success—he might have called attention to the inglorious record of many of the Ten Thousand’s ancestors. As it is, Xenophon rules a Boeotian contingent, and the Boeotian (Thebans) had been among the most notorious Medizers. Xenophon adroitly glosses over the difficulty by speaking of “our ancestors.”

to the Athenians.⁶⁶) Xenophon's sole allusion to the gods occurs at the end of his remarks:

There are trophies to see as signs of these [military successes], but the greatest witness is the freedom of the cities in which you were born and reared, for you prostrate yourselves before no human master but before the gods. (3.2.13)⁶⁷

That the Greeks defended their freedom successfully in the Second Persian War is shown by the fact that they prostrate themselves before no human master. It is also shown—nay, it is proved—by the fact that they prostrate themselves before the gods.⁶⁸ Xenophon sees a connection between Greek piety and Greek freedom. Without piety, the Greeks would not be free. What is the character of this connection?

The preservation of freedom requires a measure of virtue because citizens who lack virtue are bound to eschew the burdens of free life (cf. 4.3.4). But what are the requirements of virtue itself? We have seen that according to Xenophon, an exhortation to virtue is unlikely to be effective with the army at large. The common soldier is not a lover of the noble. His attraction to the noble is less powerful and (so to speak) less pure. More prosaic considerations must be stressed when he is being exhorted to be good. In keeping with this, the third speech of Xenophon culminates in a depiction of virtue as a means—a *mere* means—to safety (3.2.39). Yet if virtue is indeed a necessary means to the common safety, it can be destructive of individual safety. It is not least with a view to this dilemma that Xenophon invokes divine providence in his third speech: “It is fitting for you to be good, and the good are saved with [the help of] the gods even from terrible dangers” (3.2.11). Xenophon must reassure the soldiers that their exertions and noble deeds will be made good, somehow, even if they should thereby endanger the very life for which they are fighting.

To be sure, the difference between the common soldier and the lover of the noble should not be exaggerated, nor their similarity overlooked. Both Cheirisophos and Kleanōr are lovers of the noble, as we have seen, and both respond to Xenophon's second speech in strikingly similar fashion. They are undoubtedly stirred by his words. Yet they both modify his exhortation as they “repeat” it for the benefit of the soldiers. Each man adds a similar phrase—“May the gods avenge themselves on the

⁶⁶ Recall that Apollo and Artemis were twins. They typically come as a pair: *Kunēgetikos* 1.1, 6.3 and, above all, *Anabasis* 5.3.4.

⁶⁷ Translation Ambler (2008).

⁶⁸ That the Hellenes prostrate themselves before the gods is illustrated by their reaction to the sneeze (3.2.9). The contrasting practice of the Persians is illustrated by 1.8.21.

impious and faithless Persians.” Even and precisely the love of the noble is accompanied by hopeful expectations for a reward that goes beyond the noble itself.

Virtue and piety tend to be conjoined in the same human beings according to Xenophon. This was already clear from his depiction of, and reflection on, Klearchos (book two). Moreover, since the preservation of freedom requires a measure of virtue, the preservation of freedom requires the enduring presence of piety. Stated more generally, the third speech of Xenophon helps us appreciate that what we can call a politics of virtue is necessarily a pious form of politics. This conclusion, supported by the historical example of Sparta, has implications for the rule of the Socratic King. Xenophon knows that the Ten Thousand cannot escape Persia alive unless they display a significant measure of virtue. They have to exert themselves, obey their rulers, and perform some noble deeds. But he also knows that the virtue of the Ten Thousand is ultimately buttressed by hopeful beliefs in providential gods. That he often speaks and acts like a Pious King reflects that reality. The Socratic King nurses and harnesses the hopes of the soldiers while avoiding the pitfalls, born of the same hopefulness, which doomed the rule of the Pious King Klearchos. Moreover, Xenophon’s third speech has implications for how to write about piety and the gods in the context of the Hellenic city of the fourth century BC. As a study of his corpus as a whole would show, Xenophon viewed the politics of virtue as superior to other possible political arrangements, notably Asiatic despotism. The *Education of Cyrus* develops that point. But the point is already suggested by the Battle for Babylon in the *Anabasis*. Accordingly, it can be expected that Xenophon will accommodate himself, as an author, to the enduring presence of piety. He will *not* seek to enlighten the Hellenic body politic in any radical way, though he will sometimes guide the received piety or attempt to correct the manner of its expression. More often than not, however, Xenophon will support (or not openly undermine) the received piety because of his appreciation of the prerequisites and implications of a politics of virtue. Esoteric writing enables him to discharge what he views as his civic responsibilities as an author.



Let us return to the third speech of Xenophon.⁶⁹ Having discussed the Second Persian War, he reminds his audience of their recent victory over

⁶⁹ The third speech of Xenophon is divided into five parts: (1) the introduction and the episode of the sneeze (3.2.8–9); (2) the three “noble hopes of safety” (3.2.10–16); (3) the

the King, which they obtained with the help of the gods. This victory forms the Greeks' third noble hope of safety.⁷⁰ Xenophon then examines five concerns that might cause the soldiers to be dispirited: (1) the Persian troops once loyal to Cyrus have defected and gone over to the King; (2) the enemy has a numerous cavalry and the Greeks have none; (3) Tissaphernēs will no longer act as the guide of the Greeks, nor will the King open a market for them; (4) the Greeks are facing impassable rivers (especially the Tigris); they must somehow ford these rivers to return home;⁷¹ and (5) the rivers might prove impassable, and no guide might yet appear to show them the way.

Xenophon addresses these five concerns at length and skillfully, but he often resorts to the sort of arguments that good lawyers employ in forlorn cases. He insists, for example, that the cavalry of the Persians should not cause the soldiers any despondency because ten thousand horsemen are but ten thousand human beings (ANTHROPOI). No one has ever been killed in battle after being bitten or kicked by a horse. It is the men (ANDRES) who do whatever takes place in battles. Besides, horsemen must fear their enemy but also falling off their horse, whereas the Greeks, with their feet solidly on the ground, are able to strike more forcefully and effectively. According to Xenophon, horses are useful for one thing only: to flee more safely. Needless to say, this disparagement of cavalry is less than persuasive. Xenophon "forgets" that a cavalry is essential to pursue a defeated foe and seal a victory (cf. 3.1.2).⁷² The retreat will soon expose the fallacy of Xenophon's argument. Once the march resumes, the Ten Thousand are forced to skirmish with the Persians. They immediately suffer from their lack of cavalry. After a single day, a squadron of it is organized at Xenophon's own instigation (3.3.16–20).

The fifth and final concern is addressed by Xenophon at greatest length: "But even if the rivers should refuse us passage and no guide appears

five concerns of the soldiers (3.2.17–26); (4) the three recommendations for a safer retreat (3.2.27–28); (5) the concluding exhortation to obey and support the rulers (3.2.32). The third of the five concerns of the soldiers is therefore at the exact center of the speech. The reader who asks why it is so located will be in a position to illuminate the character of Xenophon's rule in the *Anabasis*.

⁷⁰ The second (3.2.11–13) and third (3.2.14–16) hopes of safety are closely linked and can be read as constituting a single hope. Yet even in that case, the victory over Xerxes in the Second Persian War retains its central importance. It becomes the second of the three victories mentioned by Xenophon. All three victories are meant to illustrate that it is fitting for the good to be saved "with [the help of] the gods" (3.2.11–16).

⁷¹ On the difficulty of crossing the Tigris, cf. what Xenophon says at 3.2.22 with 4.3 as a whole.

⁷² Compare also Xenophon's reassurance with the degree of skill displayed by the Persian mounted archers (cf. 3.2.19 with 3.3.10).

for us, even in that case we ought not to be discouraged" (3.2.23). For, Xenophon argues, it would then be possible to settle somewhere in Asia. Indeed, the Mysians are known to inhabit many happy and large cities in the King's land and against his will, and the Greeks would surely not concede that the Mysians are better than themselves. (The cowardice and unwarlike character of the Mysians was proverbial among Greeks.⁷³) Other people who are just as unimpressive as the Mysians lead equally prosperous collective lives there. Xenophon goes on to advise the Ten Thousand not to betray openly their desire to return home. They should act as if they were going to settle somewhere in the King's land. In this way, the King might be persuaded to permit them to evacuate his dominions and even help them do so.⁷⁴ Yet Xenophon immediately adds that if the Greeks were to settle in Asia even for a short while,

I fear that once we learned to live in laziness and to pass our time in abundance, and to consort with the beautiful and tall wives and maidens of the Medes and Persians, we might forget our way home, like the Lotus Eaters. It thus seems to me appropriate and just to try first to reach Hellas and our families, and to show the Greeks that they are willingly poor, when it is possible for them to see those now living in hardship as citizens at home become rich if they convey themselves here. But men, it is clear that all these good things belong to those who conquer. (3.2.25–26)

Xenophon's stated fear that if the Ten Thousand make preparations to remain in Asia, they will "forget their way home, like the Lotus Eaters," appears to bespeak his dedication to Hellas. Like Odysseus, he yearns to return home and to his loved ones. Yet in the same breath with which he states this fear, he suggests that to settle in the King's land would not be the worst of fates. If the Ten Thousands ever forget their homecoming, it will be because they will have discovered that Asia is replete with riches and joys not to be had in Greece. If Xenophon holds that the politics of

⁷³ Proverbs expressive of this Greek contempt are MUSŌN ESCHATOS—"the last of the Mysians"—and MUSŌN LEIA—"the plunder of the Mysians" (i.e., booty that can be snatched with impunity). See also *Hellenika* 4.1.24.

⁷⁴ To support this last suggestion, Xenophon asserts that "I know that the King would give many guides even to the Mysians—that he would send them many hostages as security [...] and even build them roads—if they wished to go away on four-horse chariots" (3.2.24). This assertion is puzzling. The Mysians were despised by the Greeks for their cowardice and unwarlike character, as I just noted. How, then, could they have been such a thorn in the side of the King? Or does Xenophon mean to suggest that the King cannot handle *even* the Mysians? Tuplin (2004) also observes that "what Xenophon says about Mysia is odd," but on somewhat different grounds (p. 179).

virtue—"living as a citizen" (POLITEUEIN)—is superior to the available alternative(s), he would evidently accommodate himself, as an individual, to (one of) the latter. His dedication to Hellas—and to the politics of virtue characteristic of Hellas—is not unambiguous.⁷⁵ Moreover, his alluring description of Asia shows that he is aware of the potential dangers of the retreat for Hellenic republicanism. Once the Greeks learn of the military weakness of the King, they will be tempted to exchange their poverty at home for the life of pleasure and riches in Asia. The success of the retreat might usher in a period of upheaval and eventual decline for Hellenic republicanism—a danger analyzed in the fiction of the *Education of Cyrus* and made actual by Alexander the Great.⁷⁶

In the fourth and penultimate part of the speech, Xenophon explains how the army might march as safely as possible and fight with the best chances of success (3.2.27–28).⁷⁷ He concludes with (what he says is) his most important point: if the Ten Thousand wish to avoid destruction, they must eschew anarchy and disorder. Indeed, the generals and captains must be much more careful than the former rulers, and the soldiers must be much more orderly and obedient than before. "And if someone disobeys, you should vote that whoever among you chances to be present shall join with the ruler in punishing him, if someone is disobedient. In this way the enemies will have been deceived to the greatest degree. For on this very day they will see not one Klearchos but ten thousand, who will not suffer anyone to be bad" (3.2.31).⁷⁸ On a motion put forward by

⁷⁵ Xenophon says that the Ten Thousand ought to try to return to Hellas "first," not "at all costs." He would *not* imitate Odysseus and use force against his own "Lotus Eaters" (cf. *Odyssey* 9.82–104, esp. 98).

⁷⁶ Commenting on Xenophon, Francis Bacon (1952) writes: "[...] this young scholar, or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all the king's high countries, from Babylon to Grecia in safety, in despite of all the king's forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of Persia; as was after proposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by Agesilaos the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar" (*Advancement of Learning*, 1.7.30).

⁷⁷ In this part, Xenophon advises the army to burn its wagons, its tents, and all other unessential equipment (3.2.27–28). The central placement of "tents"—dismissed as "troublesome to carry and of no benefit for fighting or provisioning"—points ahead to the winter of Armenia, where the Ten Thousand suffer grievously, not least for having to bivouac under the winter sky (AULIDZOMAI; see e.g., 4.5.11). The verb AULIDZOMAI occurs with notable frequency in book four. (Some of the tents were apparently not burned, however: 3.5.7.)

⁷⁸ Xenophon calls for the entire army to be made up of "Klearchoses." Earlier, Cheirisophos had expressed the wish that the entire army could be made up of "Xenophons" (3.1.45). Perhaps Xenophon thought that the latter scenario was altogether utopian.

Cheirisophos, Xenophon's proposals are adopted by a universal show of hands (3.2.33).⁷⁹

4. Success, Failure, and Divine Providence

The reader will recall that I argued in the introduction that whatever Xenophon puts "at the center" of his text must be scrutinized. I must therefore examine why book three of the *Anabasis* is the only book of the work to contain an odd number of chapters, and thus to have a central chapter. What makes the third chapter of book three deserving of being so singled out?

The third chapter depicts Xenophon's speeches and deeds on the first day of his rule. The day is marred by failure. At no other point is Xenophon's rule more gravely threatened, at least prior to the army reaching the Black Sea. Having yet to give any tangible proof of his abilities, he stumbles out of the gate. He had planted the seeds of failure the day before when he advised the assembled army to adopt a square formation (3.2.34–38). Expecting that the Persians would harass the march without venturing a pitched battle, he reasoned that the Ten Thousand should arrange their hoplites in a square, entrusting the vanguard to Cheirisophos, the sides to the eldest generals, and the rear to himself and another young general. The baggage train and the light-armed troops would be placed in the middle. Yet experience showed that the square formation was a bad tactic. It kept the archers and the javelin-throwers shut up inside the square. And though the use of the square had been approved by a vote of the army, Xenophon was responsible for having proposed a bad tactic that was approved, moreover, over some silent opposition.⁸⁰

Xenophon compounds his error by attempting to correct it on the fly. On the first day of the retreat, a Persian squadron of about two hundred

⁷⁹ The unusual policy of having the troops assist the rulers in inflicting punishment was dangerous, but it was perhaps necessary in the circumstances. The authority of the recently elected rulers was bound to be weak, not least because some of them, like Xenophon, had no experience. Hence, the proposed arrangement would heighten general orderliness and obedience: the soldiers would help enforce discipline. (The only reported instance of such shared enforcement occurs against a ne'er-do-well, renamed for the occasion "Sōtēridēs" the "Sukaïōnian" [3.4.44–49, see the readings of MSS. C]; Xenophon will later complain that the soldiers did not support him sufficiently: 5.8.21.) But the policy of shared enforcement, if perhaps necessary, was likely to nurse dangerous habits of autonomy in the soldiers.

⁸⁰ Cf. 3.2.9 and 3.2.33 ("all raised their hand": ANETEINAN HAPANTES [TĒN CHEĪRA]) with 3.2.38 ("these measures were adopted": EDOXE TAŪTA).

mounted archers and four hundred slingers and bowmen, all very nimble and active, begin to harass the rear of the Greeks (3.3.6ff.). Xenophon, who is stationed there, sees the rear suffering badly and, bereft of archers or javelin-throwers, unable to respond. He thinks it best to pursue the Persians with the hoplites and the peltasts stationed with him. But the pursuit proves to be worse than ineffective. The Greeks are unable to pursue far from their own formation. But it is not possible for a foot soldier to overtake over a short distance another man fleeing with a significant head start. On the other hand, whatever distance the troops cover in their pursuit, this same distance they must cover, doubling back, while fighting in their retreat. The Persian cavalry even inflicts wounds on the Greeks as they gallop away. Being thus slowed down, the Greeks cover less than three miles during the whole of the first day. They reach local villages in the late afternoon. There is again despondency in the ranks (3.3.11).

How does Xenophon react to failure? A lesser man would have been cowed. The temptation to fade from the scene must have been powerful. Indeed, the decision of Xenophon to pursue is immediately blamed by his colleagues, all of whom are older and more experienced than he is.⁸¹ They complain that Xenophon took risks but did not inflict any harm on the enemy. Thus put on trial, Xenophon gracefully concedes the truth of the accusation of the generals, though he offers a partial defense of himself.⁸² Yet he refuses to fade from the scene. Instead, he displays Odyssean resourcefulness and pluck by proposing and staking the future of his rule, in effect, on a corrective measure: the Greeks must organize a body of slingers (to pelt the enemy from afar) as well as a makeshift squadron of horse (to chase his flying troops). The measure is adopted (“EDOΞE TAŪTA”). It is implemented overnight and produces a signal success, setting the stage for the successful retreat from Mesopotamia (3.4.1–6).

⁸¹ More precisely, the decision is blamed by Cheirisophos and the eldest generals (3.3.11). Timasiōn, who shared the command of the rear with Xenophon, did not blame him. Having partaken of Xenophon’s plight, he was perhaps in a more forgiving mood. Yet Timasiōn is not said to have participated in the pursuit: that error was Xenophon’s alone.

⁸² That the scene of the accusation is a *de facto* trial of Xenophon is suggested by his choice of words: “the deed itself testifies (MARTUREŌ),” Xenophon says, “on behalf [of the accusing generals]” (3.3.12). His ensuing defense is also interesting: “But I was *compelled* (ĒNAGKASTHĒN),” Xenophon says, “to pursue when I saw that you (reading “HUMAS” with the best MSS.) were suffering badly by remaining still, without being able to retaliate” (3.3.12, my emphasis). This defense is not entirely consistent, however, with the narrative: at 3.3.8, Xenophon “thought it best” (EDOKEI) to pursue. That the best MSS. have HUMAS (“you”) at 3.3.12 instead of HĒMAS (“we”) also suggests that Xenophon presented his pursuit as more public-spirited than it may have been.

Let me go back to the issue of the central placement of chapter three. What is thereby being called to our attention? Are we meant to notice the qualities of soul displayed by Xenophon amid severe adversity? Or his tactical errors and failure? Yet we did not need this placement to notice both the errors and the qualities. Besides, Xenophon makes a number of other errors in the *Anabasis*, and he displays the same qualities, yet they are never called to our attention in this manner.

A better explanation requires, I believe, that we keep in mind the theme of book three—piety in the rule of a Socratic King. Recall that only a day before his failure Xenophon had interpreted the sneeze of a soldier as a propitious omen sent by Zeus. The Ten Thousand experience major⁸³ difficulties in the wake of this prognostication. Doesn't this mean that Xenophon interpreted wrongly? This thought must have contributed to the despondency of the army (3.3.11). How does Xenophon react to his failure? One possible reaction would be to conclude that if Zeus is displeased by the policy of all-out war, then sacrifices should perhaps be offered to obtain fresh guidance. Yet Xenophon does not consider sacrificing even for a moment. Nor does he entertain the thought that Zeus is still waxing wroth on account of the Greeks' attack on Artaxerxes, or, more generally, that the problems of the Greeks are heavenly rather than military. He interprets the failure of the day as a proof that the gods are indeed on the Greeks' side!

Thanks to the gods (TOÏS OÛN THEOÏS CHARIS), then, that [the Persians] came not with a large force but with few troops, so that they did not do any great harm, but have made clear what we need. (3.3.14)

What would it take for Xenophon to feel pious despondency? His expression of gratitude to the gods hardly conceals the fact that he relies on *his own* judgment to determine what the Greeks are in need of. Indeed, self-reliance characterizes his rule in book three every step of the way. In particular, he is not seen to sacrifice even once.⁸⁴ The significance of the central placement of chapter three for the *logos* of the *Anabasis* is thereby coming into view: chapter three confirms the suspicion first aroused by

⁸³ In his speech to the generals, Xenophon belittles the harm suffered by the Greek army (3.3.14). His narrative tells a somewhat different story (3.3.7).

⁸⁴ There occurs, however, one sacrifice at the very end of the book (3.5.18). The function of the passage is to call attention to the remarkable *absence* of sacrifices in book three. See p. 147. The reader should compare Xenophon's failure to sacrifice in the wake of his election with the opening of the *Hipparchikos*, as well as with the first action of Cyrus the Elder "immediately upon being chosen" ruler of the expedition to Media: *Education of Cyrus* 1.5.6.

Xenophon's refusal to seek Delphic guidance after being urged to do so (3.1.6–8), a suspicion later reinforced by his unceremonious expulsion of "Apollōnidēs" (3.1.26–32) and by his reaction (or nonreaction) to his own ominous dream (3.1.13–14): when Xenophon makes decisions as a ruler, he relies on human prudence, experience, and judgment. If he seeks the guidance of the gods through sacrifices, oracles, and the like, the reason is to be sought in the exigencies of rule over pious men. The last sentence of the chapter is consistent with this interpretation.⁸⁵ On a proposal by Xenophon, the Greeks constitute a squadron of cavalry the command of which they entrust to a certain "Lukios." The name Lukios ("The-Bright-One") was a nickname for Apollo. Xenophon exploits this literary possibility elsewhere.⁸⁶ If Apollo is to help the army, it will be *qua* skilled military commander, not *qua* purveyor of oracles à la "Apollōnidēs" (3.3.20).⁸⁷



The last two chapters of book three (3.4–3.5) describe how the Greeks successfully escape Mesopotamia and reach the mountains of Kardouchia in the southeastern part of present-day Turkey. These chapters are treasure troves for military historians.⁸⁸ Yet we must confine ourselves here to the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. For if our interpretation of book three hitherto is correct, these chapters can be expected to treat the theme of piety as well. Our expectation is fulfilled in a quiet but striking fashion.

The two chapters in question show the Persians to be remarkably inept at stopping the retreat of the Greeks. If they once cause them serious harm (3.4.24–31), their actions are more typically characterized by incompetence and cowardice. The Persians fail to attack the Greeks when they are vulnerable, for example, because of overconfidence after a successful day (3.4.1–6; see also 3.3.6).⁸⁹ Yet they are soon defeated and scattered by an improvised squadron of Greek cavalry (3.4.4–5). The Persians also invariably take to flight (3.4.13–15, 3.4.27; cf. *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.22–23).

⁸⁵ Chapter three also reminds us that the gods are believed to send the opposite of prudence to human beings: the "ZATĒN"—"The-River-of-the-Big-(God-Induced)-Madness"—is mentioned at 3.3.6.

⁸⁶ See chapter 2, p. 78, note 3.

⁸⁷ Xenophon identifies the man as "Lukios, son of POLUSTRATOS, an Athenian" (3.3.20). POLUSTRATOS means "numerous-army." But the man is entrusted with a squadron of barely fifty horses!

⁸⁸ For example, Xenophon describes how the square formation can be modified to meet the needs of a retreating army (3.4.19–23). He also describes how to build a makeshift bridge over a large and deep river like the Tigris (3.5.7–12).

⁸⁹ Grote (1900, Vol. 9) speaks of "the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings" (p. 89).

Even during the skirmishes at long range, their brutal unimaginativeness is soon outmatched by the Greeks' versatility and adaptability (3.4.13–18, 3.4.34; cf. also 3.4.19–23 with 3.4.34–37).

The military ineptitude of the Persians is well captured by a pair of “digressions” whose sheer length raises the question of their ultimate purpose (3.4.7–9, 3.4.10–12). After the Greeks temporarily shake off the Persian pursuit, they reach the banks of the Tigris. They encounter two deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila.⁹⁰ Xenophon recounts a pair of stories associated with these cities. Both had been inhabited long ago by the Medes before they were conquered by “the King of the Persians.” Cyrus the Elder managed to conquer these cities despite the massive defensive ramparts protecting them. (These ramparts are described in some detail: they stood over one hundred feet high and were made of brick, resting on stone foundation as wide as fifty feet: 3.4.7, §10–11). The descriptions of Xenophon highlight the military achievements of Cyrus the Elder, who could take seemingly impregnable fortresses. They also indict the military ineptitude of present-day Persians. Yet Xenophon's retelling of Cyrus's conquest of these cities raises a question in the mind of the inquisitive reader: To what cause(s) did “the King of the Persians” owe his successes? For Cyrus had been initially incapable of capturing the two cities. His first target, Larissa, he was unable to take by a siege. Yet one day, a cloud shrouded the sun and caused it to disappear from the sky until the frightened inhabitants took to flight.⁹¹ In this way, the city was taken. A similar scenario unfolded around Mespila, the second city, where Mēdeia, the wife of the king of the Medes, was said to have taken refuge after the Medes lost their empire to the Persians. The King of the Persians laid siege to the place but could not take it by time or by force. But once again, heaven came to his aid: “Zeus struck fear in the inhabitants with his thunder and thus he took it” (3.4.12).

That the stories of Larissa and Mespila contain material of dubious historicity—the wife of the last king of the Medes, for example, was named Aruēnis, not “Mēdeia,” according to Herodotus⁹²—adds to our perplexity: Why does Xenophon insert these tales here? He must have known that

⁹⁰ Scholars identify these cities with the settlements of Calah and Nineveh of biblical fame: *Genesis* 10.11–12. Calah is also known as Kalhu or Nimrud. See Ainsworth (1875) pp. 305–9 and Kuhrt (1995) p. 243.

⁹¹ The passage at 3.4.8 appears to be corrupt, but its meaning is clear: a meteorological event caused the inhabitants of Larissa to flee the city. Tuplin (2003b, 381) rightly compares the passage to the prophecy against Egypt at *Ezekiel* 32:7.

⁹² *Histories* 1.74.4. Lendle (1995) is surely correct to say that the story of Mēdeia “mit historischer Wirklichkeit hat [...] nichts zu tun” (p. 177). To the same effect is Lane Fox (2004) p. 207.

(some of) the material was unhistorical.⁹³ The answer, I believe, is this: the tales highlight the significance of the human belief in divine providence. Cyrus the Elder conquered a pair of cities he could not otherwise take because of the local inhabitants' fear of (what they took to be) signs of divine wrath. No prudent ruler can afford to disregard the political significance of such pious or superstitious beliefs.⁹⁴ The account of the seizure of Mespila, in particular, confirms that the attainment of kingly rule was widely believed even among the Greeks to be effected by the will of Zeus.⁹⁵ For it was the thunder of Zeus, not the art or prudence of Cyrus, that ultimately caused the downfall of the city.

The pair of "digressions" thus supports my interpretation of book three: the Ten Thousand were afraid of the consequences of their attempted overthrow of Artaxerxes, the legitimate king of Persia. Much like the populations of Larissa and Mespila, they feared the wrath of heaven. Yet a careful reading of these stories shows that *Xenophon* doubted the causal agency of Zeus. Whereas the capture of Larissa is brought about by the operation of a natural cause—a cloud obscures the sun and causes it to disappear—the capture of Mespila is accomplished by the operation of divine will—the thunder of Zeus. Yet the seizure of Mespila—and

⁹³ To my knowledge, there is no known Mēdeia, queen of the Medes, and she goes unmentioned in Xenophon's own *Education of Cyrus*. Why is this queen named "Mēdeia" in the *Anabasis*? The mention of this probably fictitious character is all the more surprising given that Xenophon neglects even to name Cyrus the Elder, who is referred to throughout as "the King of the Persians" (3.4.7–9, 3.4.10–12). The explanation of "Mēdeia" is, I believe, as follows: Xenophon is trying to heighten the symmetry between the story of the conquest of Larissa and the story of the conquest of Mespila. To a Greek mind, the name "Mēdeia" evokes the notorious sorceress and granddaughter of Helios. Hence a mere cloud prevailed over the sun in the conquest of Larissa, while Zeus himself prevailed over (the grand-daughter of) the "sun" in the conquest of Mespila. Moreover, the name "Mēdeia" suggests a possible cause for the initial incapacity of Cyrus the Elder to capture Mespila: he could not overpower the sorceress' magic by the purely human art of war. The help of Zeus was decisive for his attainment of the kingship. In other words, the name "Mēdeia" is meant to raise the question of whether Cyrus became king by purely human art and prudence or through divine providence. (The same question is raised by *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.1.)—It should be said, however, that the stories of Larissa and Mespila are not likely to have been mere inventions by Xenophon. The "feel" of the digressions is historical. Indeed, these stories tend to confirm that Xenophon regarded his own *Education of Cyrus* as a work of fiction. Larcher (1778) correctly observes that Cyrus the Elder would *not* have needed to besiege these two cities, nor would Xenophon have spoken of the "force" employed when he "took the rule from the Medes" (3.4.11–12), had Cyrus the Elder ascended the throne of Media peacefully, as the *Education of Cyrus* suggests that he did (Vol. 1, pp. 218–19, note 22).

⁹⁴ Consider also *Hellenika* 3.1.7.

⁹⁵ The same idea is found in the Bible, which ascribes the victories of Cyrus not to Zeus, of course, but to the Lord: *Isaiah* 45.1–13.

only the seizure of Mespila—is “said” (LEGETAI) to have occurred in this way. Xenophon views the causal agency of a cloud as historical; he views the causal agency of Zeus as mythical.⁹⁶ Here again, Xenophon is a Socratic, at least in the Aristophanean sense of the term. Book three of the *Anabasis* had begun with the thunder and lightning of Zeus (3.1.11–12). It ends with the primacy of the Clouds. The book had also begun with a presentation of Socrates as the “father” of Xenophon. Book three begins and ends with concessions to Aristophanes.



In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, book three sketches how the Socratic King reconciles piety with the imperatives of safety and political advantage. This issue has proved to be twofold because piety is twofold: it is a virtue in its own right as well as a foundation for other individual virtues. In the remainder of this study, we must consider how piety affects how the Socratic King conjoins or reconciles the noble with the good in the case of courage (book four), justice (book five), gratitude (book six), and the love of the soldier (book seven).



The last reported action in book three is a sacrifice—the one and only sacrifice performed in the wake of Xenophon’s election. The generals of the Ten Thousand decide that it is necessary (ANAGKAÏON) to march north and enter the mountains of Kardouchia (3.5.17). No other road is viable. They then offer a sacrifice in order that they might be ready to begin their march whenever it should seem time (3.5.18). The sacrifice determines neither the direction of the march nor the moment of the departure. It does not determine anything. The departure is timed to ensure that the army arrives at the mountains at daybreak (4.1.5).⁹⁷ Piety bows before necessity.⁹⁸ For, the generals fear that the pass over the mountain might be seized in advance by the Kardouchoi.

⁹⁶ Cf. Strauss (1983) p.116.

⁹⁷ This decision proves to be a key to the success of the march in the mountains of Kardouchia: 4.1.10–11.

⁹⁸ In the last portion of book three, the Greeks are “taught” or guided by necessity: 3.4.32, 3.4.19–23.

“THE SOCRATIC KING” (CONTD.)

CHAPTER 4

COURAGE (BOOK FOUR OF THE *ANABASIS*)

Book four of the *Anabasis* is the book of necessity. This characterization, suggested by the frequent use of ANAGKĒ in chapter 4.1, is supported by an analysis of the contents of the book.¹ For the Ten Thousand encounter several necessities, several mortal dangers, in book four: a succession of hostile and warlike tribes, including the Kardouchoi, the Kolchoi, and the Chalubes, hamper their retreat and launch a series of deadly attacks that result in the loss of good soldiers; the army also struggles through a bitter winter in Armenia, where starving men and pack animals, marching through six feet of snow, are frozen stiff by glacial winds and dying of cold and exhaustion. Book four thus paints the struggles of the Ten Thousand during their forced march to the sea. It culminates on Mount Ēchēs, where a worn out host famously glimpses its long-awaited goal—The Sea! The Sea!

Yet uplifting as the scene on Mount Ēchēs is, it is preceded by some of the most melancholy episodes of the *Anabasis*. In order to overcome their mortal dangers—as well as the recurrent despondency of the soldiers—the rulers of the Ten Thousand are compelled to resort to a series of unsentimental measures. Book four is the book of death. The jaws of Hades are visible on its every page.² More precisely, it is the book of the human

¹ ANAGKĒ (“necessity”) and the cognates of the word occur six times in the relatively short chapter one (§9, §12, §15, §16 [2X], §19). One of these occurrences is found only in the best MSS. (at §16). No other chapter of the *Anabasis* contains as many occurrences. (Chapters 3.4 and 6.4 contain five each and chapter 5.5 contains four.)

² The first deaths are mentioned at 4.1.10. Death is thenceforth a regular occurrence among the Greeks (4.1.18–20, 4.2.17–18, 4.2.23–34, 4.5.4, 4.5.12, 4.7.13) and their enemies alike (4.1.22, 4.2.5, 4.2.7, 4.4.21, 4.6.26, 4.7.13–14).

response to death. Recall that Xenophon suggested, in and through his speech to the rulers in book three, that the human awareness of death is somehow linked to the love of the noble (3.1.43). On this basis, it is reasonable to anticipate that book four will explore the theme of the noble. This expectation will be fully met, as we shall see—so much so that book four is rightly described as the book of *both* necessity *and* the noble; it is the book of the noble precisely because it is the book of death. For, while book four depicts many scenes of loss of life, it also celebrates the noblest men among the Ten Thousand. These men distinguish themselves by their courage amid mortal perils—Eurulochos of Lusía, Kallimachos of Parrasia, Agasias of Stumphalia, and several others.³ The *Anabasis* commemorates the deeds of such noble men and wreathes them with a garland of immortal glory. If the imminence of death sinks humanity to the level of its necessities, it also uplifts our soul to the level of our aspirations.⁴

1. Necessity and the Noble (Courage)

In the last scene of book three, the Greek generals had considered what options remained open to them as the path along the Tigris ended abruptly. They concluded that it was necessary to go north (3.5.17). As book four opens, they endeavor to invade Kardouchia at dawn. They are trying to escape the locals' notice and, at the same time, to get a jump on them in capturing the heights. For Kardouchia is a very mountainous country. In this effort they succeed: led at a quick pace by Cheirisophos, the vanguard of the army crests the first peak before being noticed. The Kardouchoi are caught unawares and they flee to the higher ground with

³ In book four, Xenophon uses the formula "a good man" (AGATHOS ANĒR) to speak of a courageous or brave man. Courage is also conveyed by the single word ANDREIA (4.1.18, 4.1.26, 4.2.23, 4.3.29). On one occasion, Xenophon speaks of two "noble and good men" (KALŌ TE KAGATHŌ ANDRE: 4.1.19). To interpret book four properly, however, we must also be mindful of the adjective ITĒS, which means to be "forward," "bold," "audacious," or "daring." The word is related to the verb "to go" (EĪMI) and can have a noble meaning (e.g., Plato's *Protagoras* 349e3) or a shameful meaning (e.g., Aristophanes's *Clouds* 445). This ambiguity must be kept in mind throughout. The passage from the *Clouds* connects shameful audacity with Socrates and his disciples, of whom Xenophon was of course one.

⁴ More individual men are named in book four than in all the other books of the *Anabasis* combined: 4.1.18, 4.1.27–28, 4.2.13, 4.2.21, 4.2.28, 4.3.22, 4.4.15, 4.5.24, 4.6.1, 4.6.20, 4.7.8–2, 4.7.13, 4.8.18, 4.8.25. But observe that the two youths who contribute decisively to the safety of the army at 4.3.10ff. are *not* named. Was their action not noble?

their wives and children. On the first day, successive waves of Greeks ascend the first summit and descend again into the villages scattered in the hollows and nooks of the mountain. Yet the march soon becomes laborious. The Greeks would like to traverse Kardouchia as through a friendly territory since they too, like the Kardouchoi, are enemies of the King. To this end they spare the Kardouchoi a little, leaving untouched the bronze implements in their houses and not giving chase to their people. But perhaps not surprisingly, the Kardouchoi pay no heed to the calls of the Greeks nor do they make any friendly gestures of their own. In fact, since the Greeks seize whatever provisions they chance upon—"it was necessary"—war breaks out (4.1.9).

The road cuts a sinuous path through the mountains. The enemy, having recovered from his surprise, mounts a series of attacks. The Kardouchoi are excellent archers. Their ponderous arrows can penetrate right through shields and breastplates. On the third day, after some skirmishes, a great storm arises. But the Greeks are compelled to push on since their supplies are running low. The Kardouchoi begin to apply intense pressure. The Greeks are compelled to march slowly as they pursue and force the Kardouchoi, in turn, to retreat. More than once, as the enemy is pressing hard, Xenophon sends word to Cheirisophos from the rear to halt the march. The latter does so. Yet once Cheirisophos disregards the request and leads on quickly. The march becomes like a rout for the rearguard. At that point, two good men⁵ are killed, Kleōnumos the Laconian and Basias the Arcadian. When the army reaches the day's station, Xenophon goes up to Cheirisophos, just as he is, and he blames him for having refused to wait "whereby we were compelled to flee and fight at the same time. And now two noble and good men are lying dead, and we were unable to take them up or bury them" (4.1.19).

Cheirisophos points ahead and says: "Look at the mountains and see how inaccessible they all are. There is only this one road, which you see—a steep one—and beside it you can see what throng of people have seized the pass and are standing guard over it. This is why I made haste and did not wait for you, that I might somehow seize the pass before they did. The guides say that there is no other road" (4.1.20–21). "But," Xenophon replies, "I have two men. When the enemy was giving us troubles, we set an ambush, which enabled us to catch our breath, and we

⁵ To be more precise, Xenophon describes only the first of these two individuals as a "good man" in his narrative (ANĒR AGATHOS: 4.1.18). But in his rebuke of Cheirisophos, he describes both of them as "noble and good men" (KALŌ TE KAGATHŌ ANDRE: 4.1.19).

killed some of them; we were also eager to capture some alive in order that we might have the use of guides who know the country”:

They brought in the people right away and cross-examined them separately about whether they knew any road other than the one that was visible. The one denied that he did, even when threatened with many frightening things. When he kept failing to say anything beneficial, he was slaughtered in sight of the other. The one left said that the former had denied knowing because he chanced to have a daughter living there with a man to whom she had been given in marriage. He himself said that he would lead them on a road on which it was possible even for baggage animals to pass. Asked if there was any place on it that was hard to pass, he said there was a summit that would be impossible to get by unless someone took it in advance. (4.1.23–25)⁶

Few scenes of the *Anabasis* are equally moving. A man tries to hide the existence of a road to protect his daughter. He is slaughtered trying to save her from slavery or worse.⁷ The Greeks act like barbarians, while the Kardouchian father glows with the fire of noble dedication. Compounding the pathos of the scene is the realization that the father's sacrifice was made in vain. The episode, however, is arresting beyond its dramatic power. For it raises hard questions about necessity and the noble. In one sense, these notions are of course mutually exclusive: no human being can be reasonably praised or blamed for doing (or failing to do) what is beyond his control, that is, for acting (or failing to act) under necessity. Noble action requires choice. Yet the episode makes us wonder whether necessity is ever present in human affairs aside from cases of strict involuntariness. Though death is widely believed to be the greatest evil, the avoidance of death is manifestly not “necessary” in the sense of being a compulsory or an irresistible end. The natural impulse to self-preservation, imperious as it is in the human breast, can be subdued by higher or more potent concerns. Some people, like the Kardouchian father, will choose to die protecting loved ones, or serving ends they view as worthy of their dedication.

Of course, this choice is not made by everyone. The second captive reveals the hidden road, though he must have known that doing this would harm his fellow Kardouchoi (cf. 4.2.22). Did he act shamefully? We may concede that he did not act courageously. But was he blameworthy? On the one hand, it could be argued that self-preservation excuses

⁶ Translation by Ambler (2008).

⁷ Consider 4.1.14 and 4.3.19.

otherwise shameful actions if they are forced upon us by necessity. On the other hand, however, an action like harming one's compatriots is inherently wrong, it is often said. Besides, the example of the father shows that the second captive could have acted differently. To the second point, however, one might reply that the sacrifice of the father, precisely because it was so noble and impressive, went above and beyond the call of duty. The second captive might have been a hero had he chosen to die for his compatriots but was probably not a criminal for refusing to make that choice. Can the same argument be used to justify the unnamed Greek who slaughters the father? Though the army's survival hinged on the discovery of the second road (4.2.2–4)—and though the killing of the father did lead to that discovery—it is not entirely clear that this harsh interrogation method was strictly necessary to secure the information in question. This much, at any rate, is obvious: the slaughter of the father was *not* a noble deed. Book four opens with a melancholy illustration of the weakness of the noble against necessity even as it shows how necessity brings nobility to the fore.

i) Necessity and the Noble: The Longing for Immortality

The contrast between the father and the second captive finds a parallel among the Greeks.⁸ Indeed, Xenophon adduces powerful evidence of the existence of such a thing as human nature, amid the infinite variety of laws and customs under which human beings always live, when he depicts the enduring appeal of the noble for Greeks and non-Greeks alike. We witness this appeal at once. When the generals learn that a summit must be captured if the army is to travel safely on the second road, they make a call for volunteers from among the captains: Is anyone willing to be a good man, they ask, and offer to march on to seize the summit in question (AGATHOS ANĒR: 4.1.26)? Three captains step forward: Aristōnumos of Methudria, Agasias of Stumphalia, and, in rivalry with them, Kallimachos of Parrasia. All three are Arcadian Greeks (4.1.26–28 cf. 6.2.10). Necessity creates a need for noble deeds but it would be reductionist and distorting to conceive of noble deeds as a mere means for the taming of necessity. ANAGKĒ creates an opportunity in the eyes of these gallant captains: they are *welcoming* the chance to be good men. They are manifestly pursuing the noble as something intrinsically choice worthy even apart from considerations of honor, superiority, or reputation. Yet why is the noble so attractive to them? After all, courage is risky. Most of

⁸ Of course, fathers vary in point of nobility as well: 4.6.1–3.

the captains actually refused to offer their services.⁹ Why is the noble so attractive to a high-minded minority?

Let us go back to the sacrifice of the father, perhaps the noblest of the noble deeds depicted in book four. Evidently at the root of the father's deed is parental love or, more generally stated, *eros*. We are therefore invited to reflect on the relation between *eros* and the noble. Xenophon helps us see that that relation is not a simple one. In the wake of the invasion of Kardouchia, the generals of the Ten Thousand release most of the pack animals and all the recently captured slaves. Smarting from their first losses, they seek to reduce the size of the baggage-train:

This having been decided, [the generals] had it proclaimed to [release animals and the slaves]. When [the troops] had had breakfast and were marching, the generals stood in a narrows, and if they found anything that had been mentioned but had not been discarded, they took it away. *And the troops obeyed, unless someone concealed something, for example out of desire for an attractive boy or woman.* (4.1.13–14, my emphasis)¹⁰

Eros caused the father to die trying to protect his daughter; *eros* causes soldiers to smuggle slave-boys or concubines (cf. 4.3.19). Evidently, these soldiers think less of the common good than of their own private desires (EPITHUMEŌ). *Eros* is somehow at the root of *both* noble dedication *and* selfish gratification; it underlies the egoistic pursuit of the good as well as the selfless disregard or seeming overcoming of that pursuit. The *Anabasis* does not provide a sufficient textual basis to analyze *eros*. In fact, a comparative glance at the *Education of Cyrus* reveals that the theme of *eros* is almost completely *absent* from the work. This is an absence that needs to be explained. We will return to the issue.¹¹ But for now, recall that the awareness of death has been linked to the noble by Xenophon. Moreover, if we peek at his *Symposium*, we discover that he links there the performance of noble deeds to the longing for immortality, that is, to the longing to *overcome* death.¹² But how are “death” and “nobility” linked?

⁹ Not a single captain of the light-armed troops, as opposed to the captains of the hoplites, steps forward in the first call for volunteers (4.1.26). Only after a second call is made does Aristes the Chian step up (4.1.28). In view of this coolness, MSS. CA describe the light-armed captains as “GUMNITŌN” at 4.1.28 instead of the usual GUMNĒTŌN (GUMNITŌN=GUMNOS-ITĒS: “those-destitute-of-daring”—see the *apparata* of Hude/Peters and Dindorf.) The same “misspelling” occurs at 4.1.6 (in MSS. CA) and 6.3.15 (in MSS. CBA).

¹⁰ Translation by Ambler (2008).

¹¹ For an interpretation of this absence, see pp. 299–300). The word ERŌS occurs only once in the *Anabasis* (2.5.22).

¹² Xenophon indicates that the noble deeds of gentlemen are done “with seriousness” (META SPOUDĒS: *Symposium* 1.1). He then links the capacity for seriousness to the

Many of the good things of everyday life, beginning with food and drink, must be consumed by us humans to be enjoyed. Our needs or desires for them soon reassert themselves. Greater or more intense goods, such as honors or erotic pleasures, are notably fleeting, and even a good of the soul like knowledge can be and is eventually lost by forgetfulness. The impermanence of our needs and desires, rooted in our finitude, poses the greatest difficulty of all. Present satisfaction, however genuine and deep, is somehow always qualified by an awareness that all satisfaction will one day cease. Yet our human nature is not satisfied with the enjoyment of some goods for some of the time. We long for happiness—a complete, permanent and self-sufficient good.¹³ Can the noble enable us to achieve it?¹⁴ Recall in this connection that Xenophon inspired a group of lovers of the noble by articulating the promise of the noble that it will lead somehow to happiness (3.1.43).

To repeat, *eros* cannot be analyzed adequately on the basis of the *Anabasis*. But it is no accident, I contend, that the lovers of the noble among the Ten Thousand come to the fore as the army is facing its gravest threats yet. Being confronted with death on every side, these men become eager to dedicate themselves. Precisely their readiness to expose their needy and desiring being, and even to sacrifice this being, should it become necessary to do so, instills a hope in their souls that they will thereby lay hold of a good that is unsullied by mercenary considerations. They will partake of a good that is pristine and pure—good-in-itself—not merely as a means to fill the needs and desires of a being at once changing and impermanent, but as the end of all ends. To state this point paradoxically, the lovers of the noble hope to achieve happiness by overcoming or silencing their concern for their own good. The noble is deeply appealing, then, because it promises a kind of self-transcendence—a victory over a human nature steeped in change, becoming, and finitude. And insofar as the noble is put in the service of a higher cause—in this case, the welfare of the army—it promises a participation in the perennity of that cause.

That the Greeks ascribe signal importance to the recovery of the bodies of the slain is stressed in the present context (4.1.19, 4.2.18–19). Of course, burying the dead was a duty of Greek piety. Yet it is less this duty than

preoccupation with immortality or, more precisely, he links the *incapacity* for seriousness to an easygoing dismissal of the very idea of becoming immortal (1.15).

¹³ As the Platonic Diotima puts it: “*eros* is of the good, being one’s own forever” (*Symposium* 205e7–206b8).

¹⁴ If death as such cannot be overcome, a state of happiness can perhaps be approximated by dulling one’s *awareness* of death. J.-J. Rousseau was apparently tempted by this path: see the *Promenade du Rêveur Solitaire* (fifth promenade). For a discussion, Bruell (2007).

the resolve of the Greeks to do, within the limits of the possible, “everything that is customary for good men” that is stressed by Xenophon here (ANDRASIN AGATHOÏS: 4.2.23).¹⁵ The generals even agree to exchange their one and only guide—amid mortal dangers—to recover the bodies of the slain (4.2.23). Even and precisely in death, good men possess a worth that must be acknowledged by the living. The brave must be honored. And their ultimate sacrifice is honored partly by a smaller, yet not insignificant, sacrifice on the part of the living (4.2.23–24). What is thereby being honored is not just the serviceability of these men—some of whom died in vain—but their dedication. The living and the fallen alike reach for self-transcendence.



Let us return to our story. About two thousand troops march into the mountain toward the evening. They are led by the volunteers and by the second captive who acts as their guide. A heavy rain helps conceal this departure (4.2.1–2). To ensure that they escape the enemy’s notice as much as possible, Xenophon leads the rearguard toward the visible pass, drawing his attention to himself. Meanwhile, the troops in question circle around and easily capture the hidden summit. They hold it overnight. At dawn they proceed silently along the path leading from the hidden summit to the visible pass that commands the main road. Their approach is concealed by a morning mist. When the two sides detect each other, the Greeks sound the trumpet, sing the war cry, and they attack. The Kardouchoi turn and flee. The pass is captured and the volunteers are reunited with the main army.

From the point of view of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, the main event of the day involves Xenophon and the rearguard (4.2.9ff.). He had been marching on the second road along with the pack animals, positioning half his troops in front of them and half behind. He chances upon a hill that is occupied by the enemy. Since the hill commands the road, it is necessary either to dislodge the enemy or to get separated from the main army. The Greeks therefore charge the hill in straight columns, leaving a path for the enemy to escape. The column marches safely by the hill. A second hill is soon encountered that is likewise occupied; it seems best to attack this one also. Yet if the first hill is abandoned (Xenophon reflects) the enemy will perhaps recapture it and fall upon the baggage-train as it

¹⁵ Xenophon is silent about the duty of burying the dead as a duty of piety. Contrast the context of the burial of the dead at 6.4.9.

proceeds along. (The column stretches a long way along a narrow road.) Xenophon therefore leaves three captains to guard the hill: two of them are Athenians (Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs) and one is an Argive exile (Archagoras). Leading the other troops he seizes the second hill. But a further effort is still needed: the Greeks stand before a third hill, by far the steepest, which lies above the summit previously captured by the volunteers. To the Greeks' surprise, however, the enemy evacuates this position: he has gone off to attack the Hellenic rearguard. Xenophon (who does not yet realize this) ascends the third peak with his youngest men and he orders the rest to go on ahead and put down their weapons on the level ground.

At that moment, the captain Archagoras comes fleeing and says that they have been cut off from the first hill and that Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs have both been killed, along with the troops that did not leap down the rocks to reach the rearguard (4.2.17). Having accomplished this, the enemy is now gathering on a hill nearby. The next moment, Xenophon is conversing with the Kardouchoi about a truce and for the recovery of the dead. Meanwhile the Greek column marches by while the enemy is gathering in strength. Soon, the Kardouchoi break off all negotiation and make a stand. Xenophon evacuates the hill and descends slowly toward his troops. But the Kardouchoi roll down rocks from the summit. The leg of one soldier is shattered, and Xenophon's shield-bearer deserts him, taking his shield with him. Thankfully, Eurulochos of Lusia, an Arcadian hoplite, rushes up the hill and throws his shield in front of Xenophon and himself. The other troops reach the men on the level ground. The entire Greek army is finally reunited. That evening, the Greeks are lodged comfortably. The joy is palpable. The day had been hard (4.2.22).

The scene of the seizure of the hidden summit highlights the appeal of the noble even as it calls attention to its problematic character. If our spirit is buoyed by the gallant and successful action of Eurulochos, who probably saves Xenophon's life, the unhappy fate of the captains Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs gives us pause. Both men are killed while protecting the baggage train.¹⁶ The captain Archagoras, by contrast, throws himself down the rocks and he saves his skin. The fate of the three captains mirrors the fate of the Kardouchian father—who resisted his interrogator and was slaughtered—on the one hand, and of the second captive—who gave in and survived—on the other (4.3.23). The scene thus illustrates

¹⁶ The central character at 4.2.13 is "Amphikratēs, son of Amphilēmos, an Athenian." "Amphilēmos" means "for-the-sake-of-the-people" (AMPHI-DĒMOS).

the possible disjunction between the noble and the good.¹⁷ To be sure, Eurulochos shows that the noble and the good can be conjoined.¹⁸ But insofar as the Socratic King orders Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs to stand guard over the hill—and both men are killed—his rule falls short of conjoining these considerations for the benefit of the two captains and of some of his men.

To this conclusion it can be objected that it is wrong to suggest that the noble action of Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs was not good. It *was* good precisely because it was noble. It was intrinsically good—good-in-itself—if perhaps not good in an instrumental sense.¹⁹ Of course (the argument runs) the noble action of the two men caused their death. But what human action can guarantee success? To this line of argument, however, it can be countered that if the noble action of these men was, per hypothesis, intrinsically good, or good-in-itself, it must have been profitable for them—good for their souls, if in no other way. (Otherwise, it is hard to see how their action can be said to be *good*. For, we are assuming that it was not good merely for the army.) Yet precisely if the action of the two men was good in the sense of being somehow profitable for them, in what sense was it selfless? The selfless and the profitable are mutually exclusive notions. On the other hand, if the action was *not* selfless—if it was merely the (potentially) most profitable action that was possible under the circumstances—in what sense was it a *noble* action? We are once again hitting against the core dilemma we discussed in chapter two. It seems that it cannot be resolved on the terms hitherto considered.

¹⁷ The scene also illustrates the possible disjunction between the common good and the good of the individual. Moreover, it highlights a tension between the noble and the demands of humanity. For, the noble—that is, the noble understood as political courage—is inseparable, so to speak, from the infliction of harm. The volunteers are running risks for the sake of the Greek army. Their very success is bound to inflict harm upon the locals, however, including perhaps the daughter of the Kardouchian father. Indeed, without the slaughter of the father, there would have been no occasion for the volunteers to act courageously. Conversely, the courage of the father might have saved his daughter, but it would have done so at the cost of many Greek lives, perhaps even the destruction of the entire army (cf. 3.5.16). While the goal of courage need not be the infliction of harm, such harm follows closely in the wake of courage. The love of the noble is rooted in the longing for immortality, but it issues—paradoxically—in deeds that cause deaths. Another illustration of the problem is 4.7.1–14, esp. §13–14.

¹⁸ There is no doubt that Xenophon's sympathies lie with Eurulochos and his likes, not with Archagoras. Xenophon notes that Archagoras was an Argive "exile" (PHUGAS: 4.2.13) who saved himself by "flight" (PEPHEUGŌS: 4.2.17). He was in the habit of leaving the scene.

¹⁹ Consider what Socrates says about the good at *Memorabilia* 3.8. For the noble, consider *Symposium* c.5 and *Memorabilia* 3.8.

ii) *Necessity and the Noble: An Example from Piety*

Of the seven books of the *Anabasis*, book four is the only one from which the gods are, so to speak, absent. No oath is pronounced by any character at any point, and the book contains only rare references to sacrifices, prayers, divinations, omens, and the like. Moreover, a series of atmospheric events, including a heavy rain, a snow storm, and a morning mist are all described as natural occurrences. Yet these events, or the helpful ones among them, could have been interpreted as partial fulfillments of the omen of safety of Zeus Savior (3.2.9). Of course, the virtual absence of piety and the gods from book four is appropriate in one respect: in the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, these themes are treated in book three (in the context of the rule of the Socratic King at least). Yet in another respect, the absence of piety and the gods is surprising. As we have seen, the noble holds out a promise of happiness even as the attainment of happiness is rendered problematic, on the plane of courage, by the prospect of death in battle. Divine providence represents a possible solution to a dilemma illustrated vividly by the melancholy fate of Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs.²⁰ Yet our expectation that piety and the gods will be major themes of book four is defeated: the gods essentially vanish from view as necessity comes to the fore.²¹

²⁰ Consider Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1117a29–1117b20, esp. b11–20. The problem is insoluble if we accept the assumption made at 1115a24–27.

²¹ In chapter 4.4, the Greeks conclude a truce with the governor of Armenia. According to the terms of that truce, the Armenian governor will do no injustice to the Greeks, who will be allowed to take whatever provisions they need from his country; in exchange, they will not burn local houses. Libations are poured to confirm these terms (4.4.6; for the significance of libations, cf. 4.3.13–14). Not long afterward, the Greeks transgress the truce. After a snowstorm, the companies of the army are quartered separately in a local village. There seems to be no danger in doing so since the Greeks see no enemy and the snow is thick. Yet the generals soon obtain intelligence that a hostile army is gathering somewhere in the hills (4.4.9). They collect their host again, fearing vulnerability. A group of soldiers, vexed at having to bivouac yet again, and perhaps also in a state of drunkenness, set fire to the houses. Will this transgression of the truce be punished by the gods? The very next night, an enormous amount of snow (CHIŌN APLETOS) is dumped upon the Greeks. It covers both weapons and people and hampers the baggage animals. The army is benumbed and slow to get up. The storm occurs unexpectedly: the weather had been clearing just previously (4.4.10–11). Xenophon comments as follows:

After [this snowfall, the generals] decided they had to go back to quartering in the villages, under separate roofs. Here, of course, the soldiers went with a great shout and with pleasure to their roofed quarters and provisions. But all those who from presumptuous sin (ATASTHALIA) had burned down their houses when they had left previously now suffered the punishment of being badly quartered. (4.4.14; translation by Ambler [2008], which I modified slightly)

The sinners were punished by the necessary consequence of their own action.

The disappearance of piety and the gods is virtually complete in the first five chapters of book four, where necessity prevails (4.1–4.5).²² Yet it is precisely in that group of chapters, and in the central chapter, that the pattern of disappearance is spectacularly broken. At the river Kentritēs, Xenophon becomes a vessel of divine providence as he guides the Ten Thousand across the waters after the discovery of a ford harbingered by a

Let me add an observation about this episode. Wishing to know the truth about the stragglers' report that a hostile army is gathering somewhere in the hills, the Greeks dispatch a scouting party led by a certain DĒMOCRATĒS. This scout deserves our attention. The MSS. unanimously dub him a "TEMENITĒS" (4.4.15). Many scholars have wondered, however, about his actual place of origin. "TEMENITĒS" is an obscure word that does not refer to any obvious city. Some scholars have concluded (on the authority of Stephanus of Byzantium) that the word refers to the citizens of a minor city located somewhere in Phrygia, or perhaps to the citizens of an equally small place in Sicily (e.g., Dindorf). Yet it is not even clear that these hamlets actually existed. Others invoke Thucydides (6.75, 6.100) to conclude that "TEMENITĒS" must refer to an inhabitant of a particular district of Syracuse (e.g., Dakyns). But in that case, why not simply say that DĒMOCRATĒS is a Syracusan (cf. 1.2.9, 1.10.14)? Most scholars, however, have chosen to emend the unanimous MSS. By far the most popular proposal reads TĒMNITĒS instead of TEMENITĒS, which would make DĒMOCRATĒS a citizen Temnus, in the Asiatic Aeolid (e.g., Masqueray, Hude/Peters, Marchant, and Gemoll.) Another proposal, based on Strabo and Pausanias, reads TEMENITĒS, which would make DĒMOCRATĒS a citizen of Temenum in the Argolid.

I fear that this abstruse scholarly controversy clarifies nothing except the dangers of historical knowledge about petty facts. But it does have the merit of calling attention to a puzzle which, if resolved properly, illuminates Xenophon's manner of writing about piety and the gods. The obscurity or nonexistence of any city whose citizens were known as "TEMENITĒS" should lead us to consider the possibility that Xenophon is *not* referring to the citizenship of DĒMOCRATĒS in this passage. Rather, he is describing his *character*: "TEMENITĒS" is a nickname. Observe that this so-called "TEMENITĒS" is mentioned in the same breath as the burning of the houses (4.4.14–15). "TEMENITĒS" is a Xenophic neologism to be read as TEMENOS-ITĒS: "he-who-is-rash-in-his-treatment-of-the-sacred-precincts." Xenophon is adumbrating, I believe, that DĒMOCRATĒS was among the soldiers who set fire to the houses protected by the truce: he did *not* treat them with the reverence due to consecrated ground. (TEMENOS, which means "consecrated ground" or "sacred precinct," occurs fairly often in Xenophon: e.g., *Education of Cyrus* 7.5.35, 8.3.1; *Hellenika* 6.5.27, 7.1.31; also *On Revenues* 4.19.) My interpretation of "TEMENITĒS" is confirmed by the following consideration: the deed of DĒMOCRATĒS, and the view of the divine which must have underlain it, unlocks the meaning of Xenophon's otherwise oddly pointed description of the man: HOŪTOS GAR EDOKEI KAI PROTERON POLLA EDĒ ALĒTHEŪSAI TOIAŪTA, TA ONTA TE HŌS ONTA KAI TA MĒ ONTA HŌS OUK ONTA (4.4.15). Regarding this last sentence, Flower (2012) observes that "the last part of [it] sounds odd" but suggests quite plausibly that the sentence is a version of the famous dictum of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not" (p. 37). Yet the key question Flower eludes: What could have possessed Xenophon to compare the inconsequential scout DĒMOCRATĒS to the famous sophist Protagoras? If the parallel drawn by Flower is correct, the reason would have to be this: both believe that *man* is the measure of being.

²² Aside from the episode of the crossing of the Kentritēs, piety and the gods make a single appearance in the first five chapters, at 4.5.3–4. I offer the following explanation

dream (4.3). The episode depicts the workings of divine providence—the single most conspicuous illustration of the workings of divine providence during the entire march to the sea.²³ We must therefore explain how this episode illuminates the theme of book four: how the Socratic King endeavors to conjoin or reconcile the noble (courage) with safety and advantage. We will discover that this episode shows the kind of courage—nay, the kind of audacity—that successful rule requires under *ANAGKĒ*. But since I wish to convey Xenophon's thought with a light touch, let me simply tell the story of the crossing of the *Kentritēs*. I will add seven notes of my own.



The river *Kentritēs* is about two hundred feet wide. It marks the border between *Kardouchia* and *Armenia*. On their last night in *Kardouchia*, the Greeks bivouac comfortably in hillside villages, about two-thirds of a mile from the river. They are pleased to see the plain. For during their week-long march through *Kardouchia*, they suffered more evils than all they had suffered at the hands of the King and of *Tissaphernēs* (cf. 3.5.16). In the belief that they are rid of these troubles, they sleep pleasantly this night (4.3.2).

But at dawn the Greeks see horsemen across the river, fully armed as though to prevent the crossing, as well as infantry stationed on the high banks, above the horsemen, as though to prevent an invasion of *Armenia*. The Greeks attempt to cross at a favorable point. But the waters are more than breast-deep and the riverbed is rough with large slippery stones. Nor can they maintain their grip on the weapons when immersed. The current is too strong. And if they carry their weapons on their heads they leave themselves vulnerable. They must therefore retreat. But once they are encamped along the banks, they see a large band of armed *Kardouchoi* gathered in the hills where they themselves had been encamped the night before.

At that point, deep despondency seizes the Greeks. They see a river in front of them that is hardly passable, men who intend to prevent the crossing, and the *Kardouchoi* who will fall upon their rear if they attempt to cross. The rest of the day and the next night is spent in great perplexity.

of that single occurrence. Chap. 4.5 is divided into two well-marked moments: the worst of times (4.5.1–22) and the best of times (4.5.23–36). The first moment is introduced by a diviner (4.5.3–4), the second moment by a “hunter” (4.5.24). Piety and the gods gradually return to the fore after chapter five—the nadir of the Greeks’ necessities—and especially after the scene atop Mount *Ēchēs*: 4.6.23, 4.6.27, 4.8.7, 4.8.16; also 4.8.25.

²³ Between the army's vow to offer sacrifices to the gods upon reaching a friendly country (3.2.9) and the actual performance of these sacrifices on the shores of the Black Sea (4.8.25).

But at this low ebb of their fortune, heaven intervenes. Much like what had happened when the generals were ensnared by Tissaphernēs—the other nadir of Greek despondency and perplexity—Xenophon has a dream.²⁴ In it, it seems to him that his feet are bound in fetters. But they spontaneously fall off so he is free to walk around or cross over (DIABAINŌ) as he wishes (4.3.8).²⁵ At daybreak, Xenophon imparts the contents of the dream to Cheirisophos, and he says that he is hopeful that all will be fine (KALOS: 4.3.8). Cheirisophos is pleased to hear of the dream. With the first gleam of daylight all the generals offer a sacrifice. On the first attempt the victims are propitious (KALA: 4.3.9). Order is then given to the army to prepare breakfast. The ensuing scene deserves to be quoted in full:

While Xenophon was having his breakfast, two youths ran up to him; for they all knew it was possible to go up to him as he was having breakfast or dinner or, even if he were sleeping, to wake him and tell him anything one had to say that related to the war. And on this occasion they said that they chanced to be collecting sticks for a fire, and then—on the opposite bank, among some rocks that came down right to the river itself—they caught sight of an old man, women, and young girls, putting, it appeared, bags of clothes in a cavernous rock. When they saw this, they said, it seemed safe to cross over, for it was not at this point accessible even to the enemy's horsemen. So, they said,²⁶ they stripped naked, keeping only their daggers and began to cross, intending to investigate. But going forward, they were across before they got their genitals wet. Once across, they took the clothes and came back again. (4.3.10–12)²⁷

Immediately upon hearing this story, Xenophon pours a libation and bids the youths fill the cup and pray to the gods—who have shown the dream and the ford—to bring to fulfillment the good things remaining (AGATHOS). Having poured the libation, Xenophon immediately takes the youths to Cheirisophos. Upon hearing their story, Cheirisophos pours a libation as well. After pouring the libation, they pass the word

²⁴ The other dream of Xenophon is at 3.1.11–12.

²⁵ Xenophon's second dream depicts a spontaneous liberation, whereas his first dream had depicted an imprisonment (3.1.11–12). The imprisonment was at the hands of Zeus the King. The word I translate as "spontaneously" is AUTOMATA. In keeping with this, the two youths "chanced to be" collecting sticks for a fire when they discovered the ford (TUGCHANŌ: 4.3.11).

²⁶ Consider the repeated use of "they said."

²⁷ Translation by Ambler (2008). I chose to modify it. The fastidious reader must compare 4.3.12 with 1.4.17 and 3.2.22. The use of the double adverb PROSTHEN...PRIN creates a studied ambiguity of epiphanic proportions.

along to the others to pack up. They themselves gather the generals to discuss how best (KALLISTA) to cross the river so as to defeat those in front and suffer no evil (KAKOS) from those at the back. It is decided that Cheirisophos will lead the way with half the troops; Xenophon will stay behind with the other half; the pack animals and the noncombatants will cross between the two divisions.

The crossing of the Kentritēs highlights the tactical skills and cool-headedness of Xenophon. If I were being less than fastidious, I would say that it illustrates his audacity as well. The ford is about half a mile away. The Greeks march with the river on their left, guided by the two youths. The Armenian cavalry keeps apace of them on the opposite bank. When they reach the ford, they put down their weapons. Cheirisophos first wreathes himself and strips down. He then picks up his arms and orders all to follow his example. Meanwhile, the enemy shoots his arrows and slingstones but is out of range. The Hellenic soothsayers slaughter victims to the river. The victims are propitious (KALA: 4.3.19). All the soldiers sing the paean and raise the war cry. All the women join in the screaming (SUNŌLOLUDZŌ), “for,” Xenophon observes pointedly, “there were many concubines in the army” (4.3.19).²⁸ The dream of Xenophon and above all his response to the story of the two youths have spawned a fever pitch of confidence and enthusiasm. Cheirisophos steps into the waters. Xenophon takes his most nimble men and runs at full speed *back* toward a point of possible crossing. His feint is intended to suggest that he will intercept the enemy on the other side after fording there. When the Armenian horsemen see that Cheirisophos is easily crossing and that Xenophon is racing back, they fear being intercepted and flee at full speed. They race uphill and disappear into the mountain; close on their heels are their own infantry troops.

When Xenophon sees that the situation across the river is fine (KALOS), he races back to the army as quickly as possible. For the Kardouchoi are coming down from the hills and into the plain to attack the Hellenic rear. The baggage-train and the noncombatants are still crossing the river. Xenophon turns around to face the approaching enemy. Orders are given: the quarter-companies will be led leftward to deploy the phalanx; the captains and the heads of quarter-companies are to meet the Kardouchoi while the rear-leaders will stay along the river. The Kardouchoi now

²⁸ According to *LSJ*, SUNOLOLUDZŌ (“to scream with,” “to chant together”) is *hapax legomena*. Presumably, it has the same double meaning as OLOLUDZŌ—joyous scream or painful scream. Of course, the women here are screaming with joy. They are grateful to the gods for the discovery of the ford. The scene occurs on the spot where other women had been sighted earlier (4.3.11).

advance more rapidly, seeing that the ranks of the Hellenes are sparse. Since the situation is safe on his side of the river, Cheirisophos sends the army's peltasts and light-armed troops back to Xenophon, ordering them to do whatever he bids. But as soon as Xenophon sees them starting to re-cross, he countermands Cheirisophos's order. They are to go into the water *only* when his rearguard starts to ford—as if they meant to re-cross on each side of the rearguard. They are also to keep their javelins and their bows at the ready. But they are *not* to advance far into the waters. As for those with him, Xenophon gives them their final orders: when the slings of the enemy begin to reach, they must sing the paean and take a run at them; when the enemy is put to flight and the trumpet sounds the charge, they must turn around and flee as fast as they can, crossing the river while keeping their place: "The best man will be the one who gets to the other side first" (ARISTOS [ANĒR]: 4.3.29). Courage sometimes means to be first in flight.

The Kardouchoi press the rearguard hard with their slings and bows. But the Greeks sing the paean and take a run at them. The Kardouchoi, ill-equipped for hand-to-hand combat, turn and flee. When the trumpet sounds the charge, the Kardouchoi redouble their speed. But the Greeks turn around and flee across the river as quickly as possible. Some Kardouchoi realize what is happening and run back toward the river, wounding a few soldiers. But most are still visibly fleeing when the Greeks are standing safely across the river. Some Greeks try to be manly, however (ANDRIDZOMAI: 4.3.34), and advance too far into the river. Some of these are wounded by the Kardouchoi as well.

The crossing of the Kentritēs is thus a remarkable success. The dream of Xenophon, the deed of the two youths, and the restored confidence of the army all made it possible. But without the astonishing audacity of Xenophon these causes would not have come together to produce this effect. It is in memory of that audacity that Xenophon renamed the river the "Kentritēs"—"The-River-That-Spurred-Audacity" (KENTRIDZŌ-ITĒS).²⁹ Yet there is another, less evident cause of Xenophon's success. In his final exhortation to the rearguard, Xenophon equates "the best man" with "the man who is first in flight" (4.3.29). He equates the noble with the good (understood as the useful or the safe). He exhorts on the basis of the moral utilitarianism of Socrates. To be sure, it would have been ill-advised and potentially disastrous for the soldiers to stand their ground and "try to be manly," as some soldiers in fact did. To run fast was critical. But Xenophon was a master orator. He could have exhorted his troops to

²⁹ KENTRIDZŌ means "to spur" or "to prick." It is used at *Education of Cyrus* 8.7.12, *Symposium* 8.24; also at *On Horsemanship* 11.6.

run fast without making the equation in question. A single exhortation admittedly cannot establish Xenophon's stance toward Socratic utilitarianism. In fact, book four of the *Anabasis* is conspicuous for *not* equating (for the most part) the noble with the good. The text remains close to the everyday moral perspective, where the noble is both distinct from the good and in some degree of tension with the good. Xenophon does not attempt to define (or to redefine) the noble as whatever is useful or necessary. For the noble cannot be adequately understood if it is readily conceived of as a mere means, or if it is summarily redefined as the useful or the necessary. The deepest appeal of the noble lies in the fact that it makes *demands* on us, calling for dedication and self-sacrifice, as we have seen. To understand the noble is thus, in part, to understand this appeal.

This said, Xenophon makes it clear that the noble cannot be understood apart from the good either. Courage becomes indistinguishable from recklessness unless we take into account the good, beyond courage itself, which courage somehow serves: the welfare of the army. The soldiers who were "trying to be manly" were not only risking their own lives needlessly, they were undermining the collective safety; they were standing their ground not least to avoid the *appearance* of fleeing before an enemy they had defeated once before. Xenophon's derogatory use of ANDRIDZOMAI indicates that he denies that such actions are genuinely courageous (4.3.34). More generally, he causes us to wonder whether an action that severs the link between the noble and the good can ever be genuinely noble. And yet the example of the soldiers who tried to be manly illustrates that courage is liable to drift in that direction. Precisely because courage stands in some degree of tension with the good—precisely because its deepest appeal is its nobility—courage is prone to cast away the good altogether and become mere unyieldingness, blind to circumstances or consequences. But Xenophon rejects this temptation. And though the present scene is insufficient to establish this conclusion, it is hardly a stretch to suggest that Xenophon's Socratic education underlies his rejection.³⁰

³⁰ Consider *Symposium* c. 5 and *Memorabilia* 3.8. The word KALOS is used seven times in the present chapter (4.3.8, §9, §14, §16, §19, §24, §25). AGATHOS is used only once, but in a prominent place (4.3.13). KAKOS ("bad") is also used once (4.3.14). The passage at 4.3.14 is interesting: the situation in the van of the army is judged by the standard of KALOS; the situation in the rear of the army (where Xenophon is stationed) is judged by the standard of AGATHOS (4.3.14). This observation is confirmed by 4.3.24–25 (2X), on the one hand, and by 4.3.29ff., on the other. Indeed, it is the light-armed troops who are sent from the van to the rear—once the situation in the van has become boringly safe (ASPHALOS: 4.3.27)—who will pursue the noble, "try to be manly," and get wounded (4.3.34).

iii) Necessity and the Noble: Pointing toward the Philosophic Life

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the epoch of belief, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.

The fortunes of the Ten Thousand reach their low ebb in the uplands of Armenia (4.5).³¹ After three desolate stages, they cross the Euphrates with waters reaching up to their navels. They are then compelled to march for four consecutive days through as much as six feet of snow with sandals and no winter clothing.³² Several pack animals and slaves perish, and upward of thirty soldiers. On the third day after crossing the Euphrates, a glacial northerly wind blows opposite them, parching everything on its path and freezing the men stiff. The night is spent burning fires. The first men to arrive at the day's station find much wood there. Yet none is left for the latecomers and the first group will not let them near the flame except in exchange for food. The men thus share with each other what little they have.

The next day is spent marching through deep snow. Several human beings suffer from hunger-faintness. Xenophon, who commands the rear-guard, encounters people lying on the ground and does not know what ails them. But someone with experience tells him that they are clearly suffering from hunger-faintness. "If they eat something, they'll get up" (4.5.8). Xenophon therefore scours the pack animals in search of food or drink. Whatever he finds he distributes to the afflicted: he takes care of the men. Meanwhile, Cheirisophos and the van reach a village around dusk. They catch a group of women and girls fetching water outside a stockade. Since darkness is setting in, they follow them inside. But all the

³¹ Ainsworth (1875) writes: "The knowledge which we now possess of the great elevation of these Armenian uplands explains the extreme severity of the winters, which has been the subject of much controversy; [...] The Hon. Mr. Curzon, who spent the winter of 1842–1843 at Arzrum, speaking of the intense cold experienced at that city, the present capital of Armenia, says, 'During great part of the year [sic], and naturally in the winter, the cold was so severe that any one standing still for even a very short time, was frozen to death. Dead frozen bodies were frequently brought into the city; and it is common in the summer, on the melting of the snow, to find numerous corpses of men and bodies of horses, who had perished in the preceding winter. So usual an event is this, that there is a custom, or law, in the mountains of Armenia, that every summer the villagers go out to the more dangerous passes and bury the dead whom they are sure to find.' [...] This will give some idea of what the Greeks had to suffer during a winter journey across the uplands of Armenia" (pp. 319–20).

³² Soldiers make rough boots for themselves from the hide of flayed oxen (4.5.14).

soldiers who fail to complete the day's march must bivouac overnight in the plain without food or fire. And some of them perish.

Xenophon paints a pitiful portrait of the hindmost portion of the column. He acknowledges that some men were left behind due to manifold necessities (4.5.15; §12). For, there were bands of enemies hanging on the heels of the marching army, snatching exhausted pack animals and fighting over the spoils. Among the abandoned soldiers were some who were suffering from snow blindness and others with toes rotted off by the cold. A group of exhausted soldiers had noticed a spot in a dell where a spring was melting the snow. They turned their steps thither, sat down, and refused to march. When Xenophon saw them, he begged them with every art and every device not to be left behind. In the end he got angry: "But they bid him slaughter them. For they said they could not march any more" (4.5.16). Moved by such pitiful distress, Xenophon thinks it best to attempt to scare off the pursuing enemy if he can, lest they attack the sick: for the first time in the *Anabasis*, a group of Hellenes has given up, defeated by the power of necessity. Xenophon succeeds in his feint. He reassures the soldiers that a rescue party will come for them the next day before resuming his own march. Soon, however, he stumbles upon scattered soldiers who are lying in the snow, all covered up, and without any guard being posted anywhere. Since the column is at rest in this way, further advance becomes impossible. Xenophon and the rearguard must bivouac without fire or dinner. The next morning they manage to reach Cheirisophos after rescuing their exhausted comrades.

If the Ten Thousand experience the worst of times during the first seven days they spend in the uplands of Armenia, the next seven days usher in the best of times. The companies of the army are quartered separately in villages that they discover near the first stockade. The troops regain their strength there. Local houses are underground structures where space is shared between humans and animals—goats, sheep, cattle, fowls, and their offspring. Also discovered there is an abundance of wheat, corn, beans, as well as large bowls of a strong but very pleasant barley wine. Needless to say, the starving Hellenes feast on these victuals. The morning after his arrival, Xenophon visits the scattered encampments. Everywhere he is offered meals of lamb, kid, piglets, veal, and fowl, along with loaves of wheat or barley bread. The soldiers are enjoying the barley wine and drinking to each other's health. Xenophon finds Cheirisophos and his men comfortably encamped, crowned with wreaths of dry grass and being served by Armenian children (4.5.33).³³

³³ Evidently, Cheirisophos had performed a sacrifice of thanksgiving, though Xenophon does not say this in so many words: piety and the gods are, so to speak, absent from

There, too, a feast is proceeding in an atmosphere of hearty comradeship. In the midst of harsh necessity the Ten Thousand experience a moment of well-earned comfort and joy.

The philosopher Leo Strauss has observed that the march in the uplands of Armenia is located at the center of the *Anabasis*: chapter five is the twenty-sixth of the fifty-one chapters of the work.³⁴ Chapter five is also near the center of book four, which is itself the central book of the work. What is the reason for this manifold centrality? Is it that chapter five is at the halfway point of the march? For, while the Greeks are hardly out of the woods yet, their situation will improve henceforth. Yet this reason does not explain why about half of chapter five describes the best of times. A better reason is pointed to by Strauss:

When we turn from the *Anabasis* to the *Education of Cyrus* (III 1.14 and 38–39), we find in the latter work and only there a kind of explanation of the distinction accorded to Armenia in the *Anabasis*. The son of the king of Armenia had a friend, a “sophist,” who suffered the fate of Socrates because the king of Armenia was envious of his son’s admiring that “sophist” more than his own father and therefore accused that “sophist” of “corrupting” his son.³⁵

A close reading of chapter five lends support to this interpretation. For the chapter in question contains several pointers to Socrates and “sophistry.” Xenophon says, for example, that the Armenian village where he and his troops were encamped had been captured with all its inhabitants inside, including the daughter of the village chief. She was a young bride wedded just a few days earlier: “But her husband had gone off to hunt hares and he was not caught in the village” (4.5.24). The remark is curious. Why does Xenophon pause to mention an anonymous hunter—who plays no role in the story—let alone his preference for hunting hares? One scholar evokes Xenophon’s love of hunting: “Here was a man, one feels, who

4.5.23–36. (Consider, e.g., the central placement of CHOIREIA at 4.5.31 and cf. 7.8.5: piglets are here but food on a table.) For his part, Xenophon expressed his gratitude in his own characteristic way. He had a rather old horse, he writes, which he gave to the village chief to fatten up and sacrifice because he heard that the animal was sacred to the Sun. He feared that the horse, maimed by the march, might actually die. To replace the horse, he took for himself one of the seventeen colts that he found in his village. These colts were being nourished (he says twice) “as a tribute for the King” (4.5.24, §34). The purpose of the tribute is indicated in the *Education of Cyrus* (8.3.12, §24).

³⁴ Regarding the authenticity of the division of the *Anabasis* into fifty-one chapters, see Appendix 2.

³⁵ Strauss (1983) p. 119.

was after Xenophon's own heart."³⁶ This suggestion is helpful provided we keep in mind that "hunting" is a frequent metaphor in Xenophon for "philosophy." For Xenophon explicitly and repeatedly compares Socrates to a hunter (of good friends), and his "hunting" is once likened to the hunting of hares. The metaphor occurs not only in two of the Socratic writings—the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium*—but also in the *Education of Cyrus* and in *On Hunting with Dogs*.³⁷ Moreover, the closing scene of the *Symposium* shows that, like the Armenian husband, Socrates preferred to be out "hunting" than at home with his wife. He was a "de facto bachelor."³⁸ Chapter five lies at the exact center of the *Anabasis* because it beckons toward Socrates and the activity he embodies.³⁹

Yet this explanation of the centrality of chapter five of book four seems incomplete. After all, it would have been easy for a man endowed with Xenophon's literary talents to choose any geographic location for the center of his work and to include *there* unobtrusive and fictional pointers to Socrates. For, let me be clear: there is no evidence that philosophy existed among the Armenians. If the unnamed hunter of hare was a real person, he was surely no Socrates. In other words, the center of the *Anabasis* was created by Xenophon's artfulness; it was not foreordained by geographic or historical considerations. Why, then, does Armenia *in particular* deserve to be put at the center of the *Anabasis*?⁴⁰

³⁶ Lane Fox (2004) p. 188.

³⁷ *Memorabilia* 2.6.28ff., 3.11 as a whole (esp. §7–8); consider how Socrates speaks of his KUNODROMEŌ ("hunting with running dogs") at *Symposium* 4.63; *Education of Cyrus* 3.1.38; "hunting" as a metaphor for "philosophy" is a major thread of the *Kunēgetikos*. The central chapter of the treatise, for example, discusses how puppies should be reared for the hunt. Xenophon stresses that the best-endowed "puppies" should be held back for a while lest they hurt themselves through their very vigor (7.7–9). The metaphor in question also explains the otherwise enigmatic fact that the final chapter of the opusculum discusses and criticizes the sophistic education (chap. 13). Plato, too, uses "hunting" as a metaphor for philosophy: for example, *Laws* 822d3–824a22.

³⁸ Bartlett (1996c), p. 183.

³⁹ Indeed, the chapter does so in other ways as well: see Appendix 2. In addition to the evidence adduced in that Appendix, Xenophon stresses that the best of times last seven days (4.6.1). The number seven was endowed with symbolic meaning by the Pythagoreans: it was apparently the number of nature (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1093a13ff.). Once we recall that Xenophon was somehow thinking of Pythagoras at the beginning of the *Anabasis* (1.4.2), we see that he allowed himself to relapse into a "philosophic" frame of mind, if only for a moment, amid the comfort and joy of Armenia.

⁴⁰ I thus disagree with Strauss on one point. The *Education of Cyrus* cannot explain "the distinction accorded to Armenia in the *Anabasis*." It is rather the other way around: the historical work, the *Anabasis*, explains the fictional *Education of Cyrus*. It is because of what Armenia means to Xenophon—because of his experience of Armenian *necessity*—that a "sophist" is given a cameo in the fictional Armenia of the *Education of Cyrus*.

To discover the missing explanation, we must interpret the events of Armenia in light of the fact that book four is the book of both necessity and the noble. Book four points to the plane on which these two notions need to be considered. For, my analysis hitherto has been inadequate. I have been using the word “necessity” to mean “great difficulty” or “mortal danger.” But of course, the primary meaning of necessity is not difficulty or mortal danger but “what is unchanging” or “permanent.” The necessary is what *must* exist in the exact way that it does. The necessary is the eternal and the eternal is the necessary.⁴¹ Moreover, knowledge in the highest sense is knowledge of the necessary and thus *the* goal of philosophy, it seems, must be knowledge of necessity.⁴²

Chapter five of book four is at the exact center of the *Anabasis* because it points to the peak of the analysis of necessity and the noble. The brief moment of comfort and joy experienced by the Ten Thousand amid the manifold necessities of Armenia adumbrates the lasting contentedness that *is* possible amid the all-encompassing necessity—a possibility embodied by the nominal husband who would rather be out “hunting” than at home with his bride.⁴³ Moreover, the fact that this hunter makes a cameo at the heart of the book of the noble suggests that he embodies the highest form of nobility. The philosopher brings together in his own life the noble with the good.⁴⁴ He even achieves immortality insofar as this is possible for man. For if knowledge in the highest sense is knowledge of the necessary, and thus of the eternal, the philosopher can be said to partake of immortality insofar as he grasps, through thought, eternal being.⁴⁵ Chapter five is thus at the exact center of the *Anabasis* because it points toward the peak of the *logos* of the work.

⁴¹ Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* 337b33–338a3. The two senses of “necessity” are linked through the concept of perishing.

⁴² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139b18–24. Cf. *Memorabilia* 1.1.11–16.

⁴³ Consider Grant (1871): “The greater part of the ‘Cynegeticus’ is devoted to the subject of hunting the hare; and it is perhaps a little disappointing, after all that Xenophon says about hunting in general as a preparation for war, to find such a very safe kind of sport made so prominent” (p. 164). This charming and justified complaint finds a partial explanation in the parallel between the hunting of hares and the Socratic “hunt.” We must also be mindful of the connection between “safety” and “Socratism”: *Memorabilia* 3.10.9–15. Unlike the two Cyruses, Xenophon had little interest in hunting wild beasts (*Anabasis* 1.9.6, *Education of Cyrus* 1.4.7–15).

⁴⁴ *Memorabilia* 1.6.14, 4.8.11.

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b30–1178a8. We have seen that Xenophon links seriousness to the preoccupation with immortality (note 12). He also depicts Socrates becoming “most serious” when his “dancing” is the topic of discussion (MALA ESPOUDAKOTI TŌ PROSŌPŌ: *Symposium* 2.17). For “dancing” as a metaphor for “philosophy,” see chapter six, pp. 222–29 and Appendix 1.—I must stress, however, that the *Anabasis* provides an insufficient basis to explore whether or how the preoccupation

2. The End of Necessity

Let us not dwell on these divine heights. Though the *Anabasis* points toward philosophy as the noblest and best life for man, it merely points in that direction. The primary aim of the book is to analyze the nobility and goodness of the *political* life. Let us repair, then, to the valley of courage. I have analyzed hitherto how the Socratic King conjoins or reconciles the noble (courage) with safety and advantage. This reconciliation—achieved under conditions of ANAGKĒ—has been less than perfect. Xenophon has been repeatedly compelled to choose between the noble and the safe course—once upon entering Kardouchia, again at the crossing of the Kentritēs, and finally in the snows of Armenia—and he has bowed repeatedly before necessity. Now consider how his rule changes when necessity ends or, at least, is no longer so exacting as to negate meaningful choice. Does Xenophon abide by the noble even at a significant cost to the good? Does he choose the good over the noble? Is he able to conjoin the noble with the good without sacrificing either? In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, these issues are analyzed through a trio of episodes: the fight against the Chalubes (4.6), against the Taochoi (4.7), and against the Kolchoi (4.8).⁴⁶

i) *Fighting Nobly against the Chalubes*

After the Armenian respite, the Ten Thousand resume their march in the snow (4.6.1). Their guide keeps failing to lead them to any villages. On the third day, an angry Cheirisophos strikes him. But he neglects to tie him up. The guide runs away during the night (4.6.3). The Greeks have little choice but to follow the stream of a local river—the so-called “Phasis”⁴⁷—hoping that its waters will flow into the sea. Eventually, they resume their march inland. They encounter the Chalubes (and some of their allies), who occupy a mountain pass. Cheirisophos assembles the

with immortality remains operative in the philosophic life properly understood, to say nothing of whether philosophy has access to eternal being, if there be any such. In this connection, we have the good fortune that the best treatment of what a philosophic science is since Antiquity has been recently completed: *Aristotle As Teacher: His Introduction to a Philosophic Science*, by Christopher Bruell (St. Augustine’s Press, forthcoming).

⁴⁶ These episodes are closely related. In each, Xenophon is seen to respond to the challenge of fighting nobly: 4.6.7 (...HOPŌS HŌS KALLISTA AGŌNIOUMETHA), 4.7.3 (EIS KALON HĒKETE), and 4.8.9 (...HOPŌS HŌS KALLISTA AGŌNIOŪNTAI).

⁴⁷ The name “Phasis” has caused difficulties, as we saw in the introduction (p. 24). Xenophon is said to mistake the Araxes of Armenia (which he calls the “Phasis”) for the well-known Phasis of Colchis (Masqueray [1930] p. 180, Baslez [1995] p.81). Yet does he really? Even if he mistook the Araxes for the Phasis at the time of the march, Xenophon

generals and the captains to deliberate about how they might fight as nobly as possible (HOPŌS HŌS KALLISTA AGŌNIOUMETHA: 4.6.7). Should the Greeks attack right away, he asks, or wait until the next day? Kleanōr urges an immediate and frontal attack. But Xenophon proposes an alternative: the Greeks should try to “steal” the mountain:

This is my judgment (Xenophon says). If it is necessary to fight, we must prepare to fight with as much strength as possible. But if we wish to cross over as easily as possible, it seems to me we must consider how we might receive fewest wounds and lose as few bodies of our men as possible. Now, what we see of the mountain extends to more than sixty stadia, but men are nowhere visible guarding against us except along the road itself. Now, it is much better to try to steal a bit of the deserted mountain, by being unobserved, and to seize it by getting the jump, if we can, rather than to fight against strong places and men who are prepared for us. For it is much easier to march over steep ground without a battle than over level ground with enemies on this side and that [...]. To steal [the mountain] does not seem to me to be impossible, since it is possible to march at night, so as not to be seen, and it is possible to go far enough away so as not to permit any perception [of our movements]. And it seems to me that if we should pretend to attack here, we would find the rest of the mountain even more deserted, for our enemies would remain assembled here that much more. (4.6.10–13)

Xenophon ends with a jocular barb:

But why should I be the one to contribute thoughts on stealing? For I hear, Cheirisophos, that you Lacedaemonians, as many of you as are Peers, practice stealing from the time that you are boys, and it is not shameful but noble to steal anything and everything not prevented by law. And in order that you steal as quickly as possible and try to escape detection, it is therefore the law that you be whipped, if you get caught while you are stealing. Now, then, it is very much the critical moment for you to display your education and to be on guard, of course, that we do not get caught stealing some of the mountain, so we do not get a beating. (4.6.14–15)

would have known that this was an error at the time of writing the *Anabasis*: he refers to the “real” Phasis—the Phasis of Colchis—as a distinct body of water (5.6.36, 5.7.1, §5, §9). Why, then, does he preserve the mistake? To highlight the consequences of the loss of the guide? I am inclined to think that this is actually a case of renaming. The unaccented word “Phasis” (PHĀSIS) has the same spelling as the unaccented word for “accusation” (PHASIS). Xenophon has just accused Cheirisophos of mistreating and neglecting the guide, “the only disagreement between them during the march” (4.6.3). Xenophon is conveying his lingering annoyance with Cheirisophos, whose brutality and carelessness forced the army to meander for a while along “The-River-of-Accusation.”

Cheirisophos replies in kind:

But I too hear that you Athenians are clever at stealing public funds, and this even though the danger is quite extreme for the thief; and, indeed, the best do it the most, if indeed the best among you are those considered worthy of ruling. So it is the time also for you to display your education. (4.6.16)⁴⁸

This playful exchange is revealing.⁴⁹ First, Xenophon invokes the Lacedaemonian law to convince Cheirisophos that stealing is noble and not shameful. Yet an important difference between the two men becomes visible. Cheirisophos is looking to fight “as nobly as possible” (HŌS KALLISTA).⁵⁰ Xenophon speaks of fighting “with as much strength as possible” (HŌS KRATISTA).⁵¹ Xenophon wishes to avoid all manner of fighting unless fighting is “necessary” (ANAGKĒ). He would prefer to cross over “as easily as possible” (HŌS RASTA). Specifically, he would like to “steal” the mountain, at least if stealing the mountain can produce a victory just as well as a frontal attack. Second, the exchange draws an oddly asymmetrical parallel between the Lacedaemonian education and the Athenian education. Cheirisophos (says Xenophon) will display his education (PAIDEIA) by showing off his skills as a thief. He was reared under a law that teaches that successful stealing is noble under certain circumstances.⁵² But how can Xenophon show off *his* education by displaying these same skills? Since the law in Athens teaches that stealing is shameful and unjust, will he not be displaying only the *failure* of that education?⁵³ Of course, this may be precisely Cheirisophos’s point: he disdains the lowly and corrupt ways of the Athenians. But why does Xenophon, the author, draw attention to the effects of the Athenian education on himself? Or are we to recall here that Xenophon had received not just one but *two* educations? Paradoxical as it might sound, it may be that the tactic chosen for fighting the Chalubes will entail a display of the Socratic education of Xenophon.⁵⁴ Stated more generally, the three

⁴⁸ The translation of the entire passage 4.6.10–16 is by Ambler (2008).

⁴⁹ The jocularity signals the end of the rift between Cheirisophos and Xenophon. See note 47 above.

⁵⁰ Cf. 3.3.3, where the speaker is Cheirisophos.

⁵¹ To the same effect: 5.2.11. In the midst of mortal dangers, however, Xenophon recognizes the aptness of an exhortation to the lovers of the noble to fight or contend “as nobly as possible”: 3.1.16 (cf. how he speaks to the army: 3.2.27).

⁵² Cf. *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, 2.6–8. In fact, it was permitted to steal in Sparta only to relieve hunger.

⁵³ Cheirisophos remarks that in Athens “the danger is quite extreme for the thief” (4.6.16).

⁵⁴ Cf. *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.27–34.

episodes we are about to consider will be displaying the Socratic education in relation to the noble (courage).

The plan to steal the mountain is accepted. Xenophon volunteers to capture the part of the mountain that is not occupied by the Chalubes. He says that he has learned from some captives that the mountain is not inaccessible but that goats and cattle graze upon it. He adds that he hopes or expects (ELPIDZŌ) that the Chalubes will not hold their ground once they see the Greeks on a level with them: his offer of services is gallant but not especially steeped in perils. Nevertheless, Cheirisophos does not accept it. He has learned to value his colleague. Xenophon should remain with the rearguard, he says, and send others unless some volunteers show themselves. During the military operation proper, part of which takes place during the night, the deserted mountain and the pass are successively captured by volunteers. They encounter the kind of opposition that Xenophon had expected would not materialize. Xenophon himself is not mentioned in the episode (4.6.20–27). Before the final attack, Cheirisophos sacrifices to the gods. More sacrifices are performed in the wake of the attack, and a trophy is erected. The end of necessity returns piety and the gods to the fore (4.6.23, §27).

ii) Fighting Nobly against the Taochoi

The Ten Thousand now invade the land of the Taochoi. They soon run out of provisions (4.7.1–14). Nothing can be collected from the local territory because the Taochoi have sought refuge in strong places where they have carried all their possessions. Cheirisophos makes a frontal attack against one such place, as soon as he reaches it, but is held in check. The place is surrounded by a river, and a promontory jutting over the access road enables the defenders to roll and throw stones from above. Xenophon and the rearguard reach the place in the wake of the failed attack: “You have come at an opportune moment,” Cheirisophos says to him. (Literally, Cheirisophos says “You have come for the noble”—EIS KALON HĒKETE: 4.7.3). Xenophon notices that about two-thirds of the access road is protected by large pine trees, planted at some distance from one another, behind which the men (ANDRES), he says, could easily take cover; from there the danger of assailing the place would be greatly reduced; for, in the first attack, the stones had crushed many a Greek’s legs and ribs. Xenophon therefore suggests stationing a company of soldiers behind the trees. Cheirisophos objects that as soon as the soldiers approach the trees, the Taochoi will pelt them with stones. “But this is the very thing that is needed,” Xenophon replies (4.7.7). For once

the Taochoi run out of stones, the place, otherwise weakly defended, will become an easy prey. Xenophon advocates “hiding” behind the trees in the wake of advocating “stealing” the mountain. He is not fond of frontal attacks.

A group of about seventy human beings thus take position behind the trees while the rest of the army looks on from a safe distance. The reader’s attention is directed to a captain named Kallimachos—the “Noble-Fighter.” Kallimachos is reluctant to follow Xenophon’s safe tactic. Instead, he comes up with a profitable if risky maneuver: stepping away from his tree, he goads the enemy to aim his stones at him. Only he steps back before he is hit. Every time he does this, the Taochoi use up large amounts of stones. At that moment another captain, Agasias of Stumphalia, enters our field of vision. He is not hiding behind the trees but sees from afar what Kallimachos is doing. And he sees that the entire army is looking on (4.7.11). Fearing that he might not be the first to race into the place, Agasias spontaneously takes off by himself without calling on any of his comrades. He runs right past Kallimachos and darts for the place amid flying stones. But Kallimachos is not one to be outdone. He grabs Agasias’s shield and the two run side by side. Then two more, Aristōnumos of Methudria and Eurulochos of Lusia, enter the contest, and they, too, make a dash for the place. Xenophon comments as follows: “For all these contended for virtue, and they vied with one another. And competing in this way, they took the place; for once they ran in, not a single rock came down from above” (4.7.12).

The four captains in question thus benefit the army at a time of great need: a large amount of provisions is obtained. Xenophon stresses that the four are contending for virtue: they are preeminent examples of lovers of the noble (ARETĒ: 4.7.12). Indeed all four had distinguished themselves previously in book four. Three had been among the volunteers in the opening scene (4.1.26–27) and the fourth had saved Xenophon’s life (4.2.20–21).⁵⁵ Yet the present episode marks an important advance in the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. It now seems that these four captains are *not* pursuing the noble for its own sake. Nor are they primarily concerned with the welfare of the army. Agasias evidently seeks to be seen by the entire army as the first to race into the place (4.7.11). It is less virtue than *superiority* in virtue—and the reputation and honors attendant upon superior virtue—that he seeks. And insofar as the others are in rivalry with him, they appear to be seeking the same things as well.

⁵⁵ One man repeated his exploits in the victory over the Chalubes (Aristōnumos: 4.6.20).

Are we to conclude that the lovers of the noble are but lovers of their own good? Is a genuinely selfless action impossible? But isn't this to forget about the noble sacrifice of the Kardouchian father? Nor should we forget that the noble actions of the four, if perhaps not selfless, evince strength of soul, which few have and many admire.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the issue of the motivation underlying noble action remains as a gray cloud on our horizon. Consider the scene once the four captains enter the place of the Taochoi:

Here, then, was a terrible sight. Throwing their children down from the cliff, the women then would throw themselves down afterwards, and the men were doing likewise. Then Aeneas the Stumphalian captain saw that someone with a beautiful robe was running to throw himself down, and he seized him in order to stop him; but [the Taochian] dragged Aeneas along, and both went tumbling down the rocks and were killed. (4.7.13–14)⁵⁷

In trying to stop the Taochian, what was Aeneas after? Was he seeking to save the life of a stranger or to steal his beautiful robe (KALOS)? Was he high-minded or low-minded? By leaving this question unanswered, Xenophon causes us to wonder about the motivation of the lovers of KALOS.⁵⁸



Xenophon plays a secondary role in the attack against the Taochoi. While he devises the successful tactic and joins the soldiers who are stationed behind the trees, he looks on as the four compete with one another.⁵⁹ His courage remains within certain limits, we might say. He does not expose himself for the sake of being the first to race into the place or to gain a reputation for superior courage or the honors attendant upon it. But what are the limits of his courage? Heretofore, Xenophon has occasionally set aside the noble or disregarded the welfare of individuals to secure the common good. But when is he ready to set aside or sacrifice his own

⁵⁶ However, Agasias's courage is rooted in a certain kind of fear: he is "afraid that he himself may not be the first to race into the place" (4.7.11). The stones of the Taochoi scare him less than the failure to obtain the superiority in question. On the other hand, Xenophon indicates that daring (TOLMAÖ) is sometimes displayed in actions where few look for it (4.4.12). This last scene proves that Xenophon does *not* eschew frontal attacks because he is soft. He is as tough as they come.

⁵⁷ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁵⁸ The *Memorabilia* analyzes the character of the longing of "those who long for noble things" (3.1.1; generally 3.1–3.7). See also *Memorabilia* 1.1.8 and 3.8.4–7.

⁵⁹ It is not entirely clear that he himself is hiding behind the trees: cf. 4.7.6–8.

welfare for the sake of the army? How does he conceive of the relation between his good and the potentially divergent good of those he rules? With the end of necessity, such questions will gain in importance since the mortal dangers, which have hitherto constituted a common good, or something like a common good, are rapidly disappearing. We shall be returning to these questions.

iii) Fighting Nobly against the Kolchoi

The lawless deeds of godless men are sanctioned by madness.

Ascribed to F. Dostoevsky

The necessities of the Ten Thousand come to an “official” end on Mount Êchēs. There they behold the Black Sea in the distance. During the last leg of the march, they are guided by a local who, for reasons of his own, promises to lead them in five days to a place where they will see their long-awaited objective. “And if I do not,” he announces, “I am prepared to die” (4.7.20). The man keeps his word. On the fifth day, the Ten Thousand reach Mount Êchēs and climb it. The van of the host crests the summit and soldiers begin to scream for joy—The Sea! The Sea! Soon, the whole column is running for the peak. The Ten Thousand contemplate what they have long yearned for. They embrace each other, the generals and the captains as well, and they cry. A stone cairn is erected.⁶⁰ The Ten Thousand have come home. Their ordeal is over.⁶¹

But not yet. They must first reach the shores of the Black Sea. This requires an invasion of the territory of the Kolchoi, a hostile and warlike tribe.⁶²

As they approach a great but accessible mountain, the Ten Thousand see on it the Kolchoi drawn up for battle. At first, they deploy their

⁶⁰ Remnants of this cairn have apparently survived down to our own day. See the picture in Waterfield (2006) p. 153.

⁶¹ Note the central placement of “walking sticks” at 4.7.26. The troops assume that their march is over.

⁶² Before the Greeks reach the Kolchoi, they encounter a tribe called the Macrōnians (4.8.1–8). A peltast in the army who claims to have been enslaved in Athens—where he apparently learned dialectics—is able to converse with the Macrōnians. The encounter shows that Xenophon prefers to deal with non-Hellenes on the basis of peace and friendship whenever possible. Is there a link between this preference and his Socratic education? The episode centers on a “conversation” (DIALEGESTHAI) between Xenophon and the Macrōnians (“The-People-of-the-Long-Heads”), which begins with a “What is . . . ?” —or rather, with a “Who are . . . ?”—question (TINES EISIN: 4.8.4). However that may be, the episode illuminates a later speech of Xenophon (5.5.13–23, esp. §18: see chapter five, p. 207, note 78).

phalanx. But then it seems best to the generals to deliberate in order that they might fight as nobly as possible (4.8.9). Once again, Xenophon comes up with the successful tactic.⁶³ He argues that the phalanx is ill-adapted to the terrain: the Ten Thousand shall be marching uphill and find it easy in places, impassable in others. The phalanx will therefore be dislocated and thrown into confusion before it makes contact with the enemy. Besides, if the phalanx is drawn up in depth, the line of the enemy will extend beyond it; if it is drawn up to a shallow depth, it might well be cut down. Thus the companies should be arranged in columns, spacing them so that the outer ones will be outside the wings of the enemy. With this arrangement, the best troops will advance first, and each company will pick its way wherever the ground is easiest. Nor will it be easy for the enemy to force his way into the intervening gap since companies will be on each side of him. And if a company is hard pressed, the one next to it shall help it.

The proposal is accepted. The companies are arranged into columns. Going along the line from right to left, Xenophon delivers an exhortation: "Men," he says, "these whom you see are the only ones who are still preventing you from being where you have long been hastening. If we are somehow able, we must eat them raw" (4.8.14).

The Ten Thousand begin their ascension of the mountain after a prayer and a paean. The Kolchoi extend their phalanx toward the right and toward the left so as not to be outflanked. But as they run in both these directions, their center becomes hollow and vulnerable. Soon, they turn and flee. Their defeat is accompanied by little apparent slaughter: the Kolchoi are not "eaten raw." Nevertheless, it is disturbing to hear Xenophon use such cruel language.⁶⁴ Does the imperative of defeating the Kolchoi justify any and all methods of combat? For a moment, the Socratic King is guided solely by the good, understood as victory at all costs. Yet an epilogue casts this scene in its proper light. Right after the victory over the Kolchoi, the Greeks encamp in many local villages where they find abundant supplies. But an incident occurs:

In other respects, there was nothing which amazed [the Greeks]. But the beehives were numerous there, and all of the soldiers who ate of the honeycombs lost their wits, vomited, and had diarrhea, and none was able to

⁶³ Xenophon's is the only voice heard at this assembly: his prestige has been growing with every new success. Compare the assembly described at 4.6.7–16 (to say nothing of 3.3.11ff.).

⁶⁴ On the brutality implied by the phrase "to eat men raw," see *Hellenika* 3.3.6. *LSJ*'s entry for ὄμος ("raw") reads: "to eat one *raw*, prov. of savage cruelty." See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1148b19ff.

stand upright; but those who had eaten only a little resembled the exceedingly drunk, and those who had eaten a lot resembled madmen, while still others even resembled the dying. Many were lying there as though there had been a rout, and there was great despondency. (4.8.20–21)⁶⁵

The effects of the poisoned honey lasts three or four days. Eventually, all recover their wits. Was this divine punishment? Were the Greeks sanctioned for their readiness to heed Xenophon's cruel exhortation? After all, they *did* "eat these raw"—not the Kolchoi, of course, but the honeycombs.⁶⁶ Hence they suffered "as though there had been a rout." Or was this merely poetic justice? Xenophon does not mention the gods in this passage but they are unmistakably hinted at.⁶⁷ The episode eases the reader's mind, or is meant to ease our mind: the Ten Thousand were punished for losing sight of the noble. It also intimates what is at stake in the question of the gods.



The Ten Thousand reach the Black Sea at Trapezonte, an inhabited Greek city and a colony of the Sinopeans. Here they remain about thirty days. They prepare the thank-offerings they had vowed to sacrifice upon first reaching a friendly country (3.2.9). The sacrifices are offered "to Zeus Savior, Hēraklēs Leader and the other gods" (4.8.25). The mention of Hēraklēs Leader at the center is noteworthy. This god or deified hero had not been named in the original vow (3.2.9). In keeping with this addition, the generals of the army receive no special thanks from the troops. Instead, the troops elect a Spartan named Drakontion to the honorific post of organizer of the foot race and president of the games.⁶⁸ True to his

⁶⁵ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁶⁶ Consider the precise wording of Xenophon's exhortation at 4.8.14: "Men, *these* [HOUTOI] whom you see are the only ones who still prevent you from being where you have long been hastening. If we are somehow able, we must eat *these* [TOUTOUS] raw." Oddly enough—or not so oddly—he never actually names the Kolchoi.

⁶⁷ The central group of the afflicted suffers from "madness" (MAINOMAI: 4.8.20). The gods are thought to make human beings mad, not least the goddess ATĒ: cf. *Anabasis* 3.3.6 and pp. 23–4, 99, 101–02, 144, note 85. At *Education of Cyrus* 8.3.27–30, the man described as "mad" is Pheraulas (§30). He is conveying an order from Cyrus—the Godlike King. In the *Anabasis*, the recovery of the soldiers' wits (ANAPHRONEŌ) signals the end of their punishment (4.8.21).

⁶⁸ Drakontion is mentioned here for the first time. A rough and undistinguished character, he had been exiled from Sparta as a boy for involuntarily killing a lad with a dagger. To preside over games honoring the gods and the god's saving leadership, the Ten Thousand elect, not their deserving generals, but a man polluted by a serious crime! A prelude of things to come.

name, “Little Drako” lays down a severe law: a rough patch of ground is selected for the venue of the wrestling competition so that those who are thrown, he says, “will feel the pain rather more” (4.8.26).⁶⁹ The games are a splendid success. Many join in the competitions of racing, boxing, and pancratium.⁷⁰ Since the spectators are the companions of those participating, there is much emulation. A horserace is even organized down a hill:

[The] riders had to ride down the steep bank, turn [the horses] around in the sea, and lead them back up to the altar. Many of them rolled over on the way down, while on the way back up, against the steeply inclined hill, the horses made their way at barely a walking pace. Then there was much shouting, laughter, and cheering. (4.8.28)⁷¹

These games were a beautiful sight.⁷² They conclude fittingly the book of KALOS.

⁶⁹ On Drako, see *Oikonomikos* 14.4–5.

⁷⁰ Note the central placement of “boxing” (4.8.27). Amid the camaraderie and emulation scores were being settled *mano a mano*.

⁷¹ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁷² Only the games are praised as beautiful (KALOS), not the sacrifice honoring the leadership of Hēraklēs (4.8.27).

“THE SOCRATIC KING” (CONTD.)

CHAPTER 5

JUSTICE (BOOK FIVE OF THE *ANABASIS*)

The end of the mortal dangers recasts the dynamics of the army and brings to the fore the question of justice. It is common among interpreters of the *Anabasis* to describe the Ten Thousand as a “city on the march”—a roving democracy of soldiers-citizens who deliberate about shared problems and emerging threats.¹ But this description, though accurate to a point, is somewhat misleading. In the first place, it is applicable only to the portion of the retreat that *follows* the arrival at Trapezonte (4.8.22). No assemblies of soldiers are held during the march from the river Zapatan (3.3.6) to the Greek city in question.² Moreover, the Ten Thousand never transform themselves into a city. To mention here only two areas where they clearly fall short: there are no families in this “city”—though there are women and children among the captives—and the Ten Thousand never settle on any portion of territory (5.3.1). When they are presented with the possibility of staying in Asia to found a city there, they reject it overwhelmingly because they want to return home to their loved ones (6.4.8). It is therefore better to say that book five describes an attempt to *transform* the army into a city. And this attempt fails. Thus while book five marks the high point of Xenophon’s rule—he is the *de facto* King of the Ten Thousand throughout—it also marks the

¹ The best-known proponent of this view is Nussbaum (1967) but there have been several others: e.g. Hornblower (2004). For a useful critique: Lee (2007) p. 9. It has been claimed that, at their best, the Ten Thousand represent “an ideal Xenophonic community or a utopia”: Dillery (1995) p. 63.

² The assemblies depicted always involve the generals or, sometimes, the generals and the captains: 3.3.11–19, 3.5.7–12, 3.5.14–17, 4.1.12–13, 4.1.18–28, 4.3.10–15, 4.4.22, 4.6.6–21, 4.7.3–7, 4.8.9–14.

limit of this ascent. Xenophon never becomes a founder.³ Nor does he rise to the rank of lawgiver.

The emergence of the question of justice is thus coeval with the birth pangs of politics, or of political life. In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, book five explores how the Socratic King endeavors to reconcile justice with safety and advantage, just as the two previous books analyzed piety (book three) and courage (book four) from the same standpoint. But book five introduces a new complexity. Piety and courage pertained primarily to the internal operations of the army. By contrast, justice has an external component as well, imposing obligations on the Ten Thousand in their dealings with outsiders. But what are these obligations? They are mainly defined by unwritten laws that Xenophon calls the “Hellenic laws” (HELLĒNIKOI NOMOI: 5.4.34). For, despite some appearance to the contrary, the Ten Thousand do *not* hold that they are at liberty to treat outsiders—whether they be Hellenes or non-Hellenes—however they please. The Ten Thousand eschew a war of choice against a non-Hellenic tribe, for example, when the gods signal their disapproval. They do this even though they would like to plunder their territory (5.5.1–3). To be sure, the obligations defined by the Hellenic laws are much more elaborate and extensive when the Ten Thousand encounter fellow Hellenes. And the Ten Thousand often honor the Hellenic laws in the breach. Nevertheless, obligations of some sort exist in all cases.⁴

1. Justice, Private Interest, and the Common Good

Before we can consider the Hellenic laws we must examine the question that the Ten Thousand are faced with as soon as they reach the sea: Who

³ Founders of cities among the Greeks were greatly honored in their lifetime and revered as heroes after their deaths: consider the case of Brasidas in Thucydides (5.11.1) as well as Herodotus 1.168. Generally, see De Coulanges (1900) book three, c. 5. To become a founder was to become a quasi-divine being.

⁴ Here it could be objected that Xenophon makes no effort to stop the plundering raids against the non-Hellenes in his opening speech (5.1.5–14). He seems to regard unlimited acquisitiveness as morally permissible in that case. But the reason for Xenophon’s attitude is probably that significant restrictions on such raids would have been futile. As it is, the modest restrictions he *does* impose are disregarded (cf. 5.1.8–9 with 5.7.14). Observe also that in his opening speech, Xenophon distinguishes sharply between “getting provisions” and “going to plunder” (5.1.6–8). Getting provisions is necessary and thus just—or at least not unjust—but going to plunder is more questionable morally. Above all, note that Xenophon remarks that the local enemies of the Ten Thousand are “*justly* (DIKAIŌS) plotting against [the army], for we have *their* things (TA EKAINŌN)” (5.1.9, my emphasis). The word “justice” (DIKAIOS) occurs twice in chapter one (5.1.9, §15). Each time the Ten Thousand are on the wrong side of justice.

shall rule the army? The question of justice obtrudes at the beginning of book five as the question of distributive justice. The troops answer that question by deed, and they answer it in their own favor. Book five opens with a general assembly of the army, the first such assembly to occur since book three. At issue is how to complete the journey back to Greece. The first speaker is a private who declares that he is tired of packing up, walking, running, bearing weapons, marching in order, standing guard, and fighting. Henceforth (he proclaims) "I desire to put an end to these toils and, since we have the sea, to sail the rest of the way and arrive in Greece stretched out like Odysseus" (5.1.2).⁵ The assembly clamors that he speaks well. Someone else says the same thing, and then all those present say it as well. The general Cheirisophos therefore proposes to get ships from the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibios, a friend of his who holds a command in the Pontos. The army should await his return. "I shall come back quickly," he says (5.1.4). The soldiers are pleased by this offer and vote that Cheirisophos should sail out as quickly as possible. Xenophon then speaks up and he, too, submits five proposals for the approval of the soldiers, explaining what they should do while they await Cheirisophos's return (5.1.5).⁶ The shift of authority in the army is thus unmistakable: the generals are now expected to minister to the wishes or the decisions of the troops. The shift is also instructive. During the retreat, the generals showed themselves to be both able and prudent. Yet as soon as the sea is reached, their authority is curtailed.⁷ The beginning of book five illustrates the weakness of virtue as a title to rule. Short of mortal perils, virtue is largely impotent to rule in its own name and by dint of its intrinsic authority. Virtue requires the support of consent even as it risks being undercut by the demagoguery of lesser men or the foolishness of the crowd.⁸

⁵ The soldier is referring to the moment in the *Odyssey* when Odysseus is about to reach Ithaca (13.70ff.). Of course, Odysseus's ordeal is far from over. He will suffer much in Hellenic land.

⁶ Each of the five proposals is adopted by a vote of the majority ("EDOXE TAŪTA") except for the third and central one (5.1.9). At the end of his speech, Xenophon proposes to order the coastal cities to fix the roads so that the army will march more easily if need be. But the soldiers will not hear of a journey by land. So intense is their hostility to this merely precautionary measure that Xenophon does not even put the proposal to a vote. Success has inflated the soldiers' hopes: they have become immoderate (APHROSUNĒ: 5.1.14).

⁷ Of course, the soldiers had implicitly consented to the rule of the generals, many of whom were elected (3.2.47).

⁸ Few of the gallant men who found themselves at the forefront of the action in book four play a significant role in book five. When the dangers recede, less distinguished men come to prominence. The opening of book five brings to mind the British election of 1945.

This conclusion is eminently applicable here, where the ruled are armed to the teeth, roughly equal to one another, and much more numerous than their rulers. Yet none of the foregoing is to deny that book five is *the* book of the kingship of Xenophon.⁹ For the superior abilities and prudence of Xenophon are felt at all times behind the decisions of the soldiers. And he sometimes corrects their errors (e.g., 5.1.13–14 cf. 5.3.1). Besides, military authority is exercised by him and by the generals, not by the soldiers.

Aside from the Hellenic laws, justice will now be defined by the assembly: laws or decrees are adopted by majority votes (“EDOXE TAŪTA”). Yet the new situation heralds new difficulties. In the first place, it is unclear who will enforce the law against the soldiers who break it.¹⁰ The authority of the generals has begun to ebb, as we just saw.¹¹ Indeed, the Ten Thousand will prove to be remarkably reluctant to obey their own laws or decrees.¹² The cause of this reluctance is easy to discern: the army is no longer held together by mortal dangers.¹³ But the first chapter indicates this cause more precisely. Xenophon proposes to the soldiers to collect as many ships as possible while they await the return of Cheirisophos. This way, the Greeks may be able to have enough ships to sail with even if Cheirisophos’s mission should fail. The proposal is approved by the assembly (5.1.11). The Greeks therefore borrow some warships from the people of Trapezonte in a bid to commandeer merchantmen they see sailing by along the coast. A warship of fifty oars is entrusted to a certain Dexippos, a Laconian perioikos. Dexippos neglects to collect any ships, however; instead, he sails out of the Pontos and steals the warship. Dexippos transgresses the army’s decree and serves his own good. The specific cause of the soldiers’ lawlessness is private interest (5.1.15). The arrival at the sea returns to the fore the perennial political tension—a tension muted during the mortal dangers—between self-interest and the common good. Since the Ten Thousand are a community

⁹ The *primus inter pares* Cheirisophos leaves the army at the beginning of book five and returns at the beginning of book six. He is replaced by Xenophon.

¹⁰ The votes are not unanimous: 5.1.7, §8, §11, §12; cf. however the vote at 5.6.33–34.

¹¹ A market manager barely escapes a stoning when he tries to enforce strictly the law of the market: 5.7.13–33.

¹² On the lawlessness of the soldiers, cf. 5.1.8 and 5.6.33–34 with 5.7.13–33, esp. §14–15 and §31–33.

¹³ Even the “laws” that are proclaimed by the assembly can be of dubious justice. Since the Ten Thousand have gone many months without receiving a wage, they are eager to make up for lost time: for example: 6.2.9–12. Of course, individual actions can be unjust as well. The first soldier to speak at the assembly is named “Leōn”—“The Lion”—and Xenophon warns the troops that they might be “hunted” by the local enemy (THĒRAŌ: 5.1.9).

of mercenaries, their love of the “city,” never nourished by civic discipline, is too tepid to counteract the powerful operation of self-love. Indeed, the authority of the generals is beginning to ebb not least because the troops distrust their motives. The common good has been rooted in a shared need for safety, and since the passing of the mortal dangers has weakened this good, the troops begin to suspect their generals of pursuing their private interest at their expense. The law *does* retain its appeal for the high-minded, however. An Athenian captain named Polukratēs, for example, is put in charge of a warship of thirty oars, and *he* conducts to harbor as many ships as he captures (5.1.16).¹⁴



The first military operation of book five is a provisioning party launched against the “Drilai,” a tribe otherwise unknown, at least under that name (5.2). In his opening speech, Xenophon had proposed to use provisioning parties (PRONOMAI) to supply the army from hostile territory. The proposal was approved (5.1.6–7). To grasp the significance of the provisioning party we now witness for the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, it is imperative to keep in mind that it is a *public* expedition: the aim is to get provisions for the army (as opposed to booty for individuals).¹⁵ The scene thus illustrates how the Greeks attend to “the common” after reaching the sea (TO KOINON: 5.1.12).¹⁶ It illustrates, moreover, how the Socratic King endeavors to reconcile justice with the good.

The provisioning party is set in motion when the supplies from the nearby country have been used up (5.2.1). Xenophon takes some Trapezontians as guides and he leads half the army against the Drilai, the most warlike tribe of the Pontos. (He leaves the other half to guard the camp.) When the foragers reach the difficult uplands where the warlike Drilai live, they find that the earth has been scorched.¹⁷ No provisions are to be found anywhere. The locals have streamed into their metropolis—a fortress protected by an extremely deep ravine, difficult access roads, and

¹⁴ Flower (2012) suggests that “the contrasting behavior [of Polukratēs and Dexippos] signals the breakdown of the Athenian-Spartan cooperation that was so delicately forged by Xenophon and Cheirisophos in book 4” (p. 199).

¹⁵ For the distinction between getting *provisions* (PORIDZESTHAI TA EPITĒDEIA) and getting *booty* (EKPOREUESTHAI EPI LEIAN) see 5.1.6–8 and note 4.

¹⁶ The adjective “common” (KOINOS) and its cognates occur more frequently in book five than in any other book: 5.1.12, 5.4.15, 5.6.27 (2X), 5.7.17, 5.7.18.

¹⁷ The provisioning party is an “ascent” both geographically and politically. For it is Xenophon’s first command in the absence of Cheirisophos. Yet it is the word KATABASIS (“descent”), not ANABASIS, that is used four times in the chapter: Xenophon ascends but the army descends (5.2.6, §26, §28, §30). Note that the Trapezontians decline to

by a ditch and a palisade on top of the earthwork with wooden towers. The peltasts and the spearmen who accompany Xenophon run ahead of the hoplites. They allow themselves to become separated from the heavy infantry. Right away they cross the ravine and attack the place. (They see many sheep and other property there.) Despite their numbers—over two thousand strong—they fail to take the fortress. They attempt a retreat. But since the descent from the place is difficult and the enemy is making sallies, they are unable to get away. Hemmed in, they call on Xenophon for help. He soon reaches the scene and crosses the ravine to see whether he should organize an evacuation of the light-armed troops or get the hoplites across on the assumption that the fortress can be taken. It seems that an evacuation will cost many lives. However, the captains who accompany him suppose that the fortress is pregnable. Xenophon agrees to the attack, trusting in the sacrifices: “For the soothsayers were of the opinion that though there would be a battle, the end (TELOS) of the excursion would be noble” (5.2.9).

The hoplites are gotten across the ravine. Xenophon orders his captains to set their companies in whatever order they suppose it will fight most effectively. For, the captains who at all times had been competing with one another over manly goodness (ANDRAGATHIA) were positioned near one another (5.2.11 cf. 4.1.26–28, 4.7.8–12). Then the contingents of light-armed troops are given the order to prepare their javelins, arrows, and stones.¹⁸ When all the preparations are complete, “the captains, the under-troops and those deeming themselves no worse than them” were looking at each other at a glance, “for the agitation was uniform.”¹⁹ Despite this uncharacteristic unsteadiness, the Greeks sing

lead the Greeks to places where provisions can be obtained easily because “these [people] were their friends” (5.2.2). The Trapezontians lead the Greeks eagerly instead against the warlike Drilai, at whose hands they had suffered harm, and who dwell in a difficult and mountainous region. The Trapezontians are better friends to the local barbarians than to a Greek army: the Hellenic law—which decrees an obligation of mutual benevolence among Hellenes (5.5.7–12; 5.5.20–22)—is honored in the breach.

¹⁸ Tellingly, Xenophon sends around reliable assistants to ensure that this order to the light-armed troops is carried out (5.2.12).

¹⁹ I read *MONOEIDĒS GAR DIA TO CHŌRION HĒ TARAXIS ĒN*, with the best MSS. CBA, instead of *MĒNOEIDĒS GAR DIA TO CHŌRION HĒ TAXIS ĒN*, as most modern editors would have it (5.2.13). The point here is not that “the formation” (TAXIS) of the Greeks is “crescent-shaped” (MĒNOEIDĒS) but that the “agitation” (TARAXIS) in the ranks is rampant or “uniform” (MONOEIDĒS). The text of chapter 5.2 has been marred by incautious emendations and by undue reliance on the inferior MSS. FM. The reader must keep in mind that chapter 5.2 depicts the *decline* of the army, both martial and otherwise. Hence, only a single Greek captain is seen to escalate the palisade (Agasias of Stumphalia) and he must “drag” another (HELKŌ: 5.2.15 [in the best MSS. CBAE] cf. 4.7.8–14). I also accept the authenticity of the admittedly unattested “HUPOLOCHOS,”

the paean and sound the trumpet. They also raise the war cry to Enualios (“The-Warlike”). The hoplites start their run and the light-armed troops unleash a hail of missiles, arrows, and stones, some even using fire. Under the weight of the onslaught the enemy abandons the palisade and the wooden towers. The place appears to be taken. Victory is momentarily secured by the characteristic gallantry of Agasias (5.2.15).

But the battle is far from over. Only the first phase of it is. The Greek peltasts and the light-armed troops rush into the fortress and plunder whatever they can. Xenophon stands at the gates and tries to keep as many of the hoplites out as he can. For, other enemies are visible who are occupying some strong heights. The next moment, a shout arises from within. The Greeks who are inside take to flight. Some are clutching what they have snatched; soon others come out who are wounded. There is much jostling at the gates. The men who are rushing out report that there is a citadel inside and many enemies as well, and that those have sallied forth and are pelting the people who are inside:

At that point [Xenophon] orders the herald Tolmidēs to announce that anyone who wants to snatch something is to go inside. And many go inside, and those pushing to get in [i.e. mostly the Greek hoplites] win the victory over those rushing out [i.e. mostly the Greek light-armed troops] and they shut the enemies again inside the citadel. And everything lying outside of the citadel was plundered and the Greeks carried it away. (5.2.18–19)

The second phase of the battle thus ends in another Greek success. This time, however, success is achieved not through the virtue of a few good men but through the thirst for plunder of many of the hoplites. What is the significance of this? Once the herald Tolmidēs announces that “anyone who wants to snatch something (ΤΙ ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ) is to go inside,” the provisioning party becomes a plundering raid. The character of the expedition is transformed. All will be permitted to keep what they can

which I believe is a playful neologism: the “under-troops” (ΗΟΙ ΗΥΠΟΛΟΧΟΙ) are “the-troops-that-hide,” that is, “the cowards” (5.2.13, in the best MSS.). Thus the sentence “those deeming themselves no worse than [these under-troops]” has been, I think, misconstrued; it is emphatically *not* a term of praise (5.2.13). In keeping with this interpretation, observe the presence of the herald Tolmidēs in the episode (5.2.18). Tolmidēs—“The-Son-of-Daring”—makes three appearances in the *Anabasis*. Each time the Greeks are scared (see also 2.2.19–21, 3.1.46). Generally, the best MSS. CBAE have preserved the authentic readings of important passages: we should read SATHROUS (to cull “unsound [troops]”) instead of STAUROUS (to remove a “palisade”) at 5.2.21 and APOTHARREÏN (“to regain confidence”) instead of APOCHOREÏN (“to retreat”) at 5.2.22. The few good men “regain their confidence” after the “unsound troops” have been culled.

get their hands on. In other words, the public aim has been jettisoned: the Greeks act as a collection of greedy individuals whose ability to attend to “the common” is decaying along with their discipline and martial spirit.²⁰ Even though a large booty is eventually exacted from the Drilai, the army *qua* army gets nothing.²¹ The cause of the Greek success in the second phase of the battle is thus clear: it is Xenophon’s substitution of “plundering” for “provisioning.” The Socratic King collapses a distinction he had himself insisted upon.²² He is able to secure the common good but at a cost to justice. And the common good itself is reduced to a collection of private interests. Given the state of discipline and martial spirit, success could probably not have been achieved in any other way. But the cost is clear.

The third and final phase of the battle brings out the full impact of the march of the Ten Thousand on the local populations of the Pontos:

The hoplites halted under arms, some about the palisade, others along the road leading up to the [inner] citadel. Xenophon and his captains were examining whether it was possible to take the citadel; in that case their safety would be safe. Otherwise, their retreat seemed exceedingly difficult. But as they examined it, the fortress seemed altogether impossible to take. They then began preparing their retreat, and each group began culling the unsound troops by their side. And they sent back those people who were useless, those carrying burdens, and also the bulk of the hoplites, while each of the captains kept the troops he trusted. When they began to regain confidence, many [of the enemies] rushed out against them armed with wicker shields, spears, greaves, and Paphlagonian helmets. Others went up on the houses on both sides of the road that led to the citadel, so it was not even safe to pursue by the gates that led toward the citadel. For from above, they were throwing large logs at [the Greeks], so both remaining and retreating were difficult. And it was frightening that night was coming on.

As they were fighting and were at a loss [as to what to do], some one of the gods granted them the means to safety. For suddenly one of the houses on the right flared up, since someone had set fire to it; and when it caved

²⁰ Note the central placement of “those carrying loads [of booty]” among the unsound troops that must be culled (5.2.21).

²¹ Consider the final sentence of the episode: “The next day [i.e., the day after the attack on the Drilai] the Greeks went away *to get* provisions” (5.2.28, APĒESAN... ES TA EPITĒDEIA, MSS. CBAE, my emphasis). Modern editors uniformly reject the preposition “ES” (“[to go] *to* [get provisions]”) on the grounds that it makes no sense: Why would the Greeks need to go to get provisions since they have already gotten provisions from the Drilai? The answer is that they have *not*. Individual soldiers got booty (LEIA), but the army *qua* army got no provisions (EPITĒDEIA). The admittedly surprising ES, found *only* in the best MSS., is authentic. It reflects the central lesson of the chapter.

²² 5.1.6–8. See note 4.

in, they fled from the houses on the right. When Xenophon learned this from chance, he ordered them to set fire also to the houses on the left, which were wood, so that these too were soon on fire. They fled, then, also from these houses. The only troops still troubling them were those directly in front, and it was clear that they would attack on their retreat and descent. Here, then, he passed the word to all those who were out of bowshot to bring logs into the area between themselves and the enemy. As soon as there were enough, they set fire to them; they were setting fire also to the houses beside the palisade itself, so the enemy might be occupied with this too.

Thus they barely got away from the fortress, by putting fire in the area between themselves and the enemy. And the entire city was burned down, houses, towers, palisades, and everything else but the citadel. (5.2.19–27)²³

In the first phase of the battle, success was achieved through virtue or manly goodness, and in the second phase, through liberated greed. But without the ability of Xenophon to learn from chance (or was it from “some one of the gods”?) the few good men who were accompanying him until the end would have been destroyed (MANTHANŌ: 5.2.25). The Socratic King saved the virtuous by destroying the city of the Drilai.

Let us leave this melancholy scene and consider the end of the expedition. For the soothsayers had predicted (as we recall) that “the end would be noble” (TELOS: 5.2.9):

On the next day, the Greeks went away to get provisions. Since they were fearful of the descent to Trapezonte, for it was steep and narrow, they set a feigned ambush. A man born in Mysos, and named Mysos, took ten Cretans and waited in an overgrown place, and he pretended to be trying to avoid detection by the enemy. Their shields, however, being of bronze, would now and again shine through. So on seeing this, the enemy was frightened as if it were an ambush. Meanwhile, the army was making its descent. When it seemed they had come down far enough, a signal was given to the Mysian to flee headlong; so he stood up and took to flight, as did those with him. The others, the Cretans—for they later said that they were being overtaken on the run—plunged from the road and into the woods and were saved by rolling down the vale. As he fled along the road, the Mysian shouted out for help. They did help him, and they picked him up, wounded. And then those who helped him themselves began to retreat at a walking pace, even while being hit, and some of the Cretans shot their bows in response. It was in this way that they all returned safely to the camp. (5.2.28–32)²⁴

²³ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

²⁴ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

“A man born in Mysos and named Mysos” lies in ambush at the head of Ten Cretans. To understand this funny scene, recall that the Greeks despised the people of Mysos for their cowardice and unmartial character, which was proverbial among them. Yet our Mysian—a superlative Mysian, as it were²⁵—behaves like a hero compared to the Ten Cretans who save their skins by plunging headlong into the woods.²⁶ To be fair, the Cretans were being overtaken on the run—or so they said. But of course, Cretan mendacity was proverbial.²⁷

It would be difficult to convey more gracefully the martial decline of the Ten Thousand. That they “all returned safely to the camp” is surely the most that could be said in praise of a thoroughly unedifying day (5.2.32). Recalling the less than noble TELOS of the excursion—and the fact that the Greek hoplites “won the victory” (NIKŌSI) over *their own* light-armed troops in the decisive moment of the second and central phase of the battle—Xenophon renames the enemy of the host (5.2.18). The etymology of the name “Drilai” suggests “The-Troops-[hiding-in]-the-Woods” (DRIOS-ILĒ).²⁸ The Ten Thousand have become their own worst enemies.

2. Hellenic Laws, Mossunoikoi Laws, and Nature

“That is true,” Sansón replied, “but it is one thing to write as a poet and another to write as a historian: the poet can narrate or sing events not as they were but as they should have been, and the historian must write about them not as they should have been but as they were, without adding or subtracting anything from the truth.”

Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Part II, c. 3.

In view of the reluctance of the Ten Thousand to obey their own laws or decrees, and given their strong attraction to plundering, the Hellenic laws become increasingly important as a source of moral limits as well as

²⁵ According to Dillery (1998), “The name [of the superlative Mysian], if authentic, would be rare [...]” (p. 399, note 7). Indeed.

²⁶ The Mysian is pointedly described as a “real man” (ANĒR: 5.2.29). Not every Mysian is so lucky: 6.1.9–13.

²⁷ The Cretans in the army were outstanding runners: 4.8.27!

²⁸ The word “troops” (ILĒ; nominative plural “ILAI”) occurs at 1.2.16; see also *Education of Cyrus* 6.2.36 and *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 2.11. To my knowledge, the rare word DRIOS (“wood,” “thicket”) does not occur in Xenophon, but consider Homer’s *Odyssey* 14.353 or Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 530 in light of the repeated mention by Xenophon of “overgrown place” (LASIŌ CHŌRIŌ: 5.2.29) or “woods” (HULĒN: §31). The real name of the “Drilai” was probably the Sanni: Dindorf (1855) p. 221, note 1; Chambray (1967) p. 492, note 102.

of internal unity for the army. For although the host is becoming ever-more fragmented by private interest—and by ethnic differences²⁹—the Greeks share a common Hellenic heritage and are, as such, held together by an array of ethical conceptions and sensibilities.³⁰

A substantial portion of the remainder of book five analyzes how the Socratic King endeavors to conjoin or reconcile the Hellenic laws with safety and advantage. I will consider this issue in the next section (section three). To prepare my analysis, I must follow Xenophon as he “digresses.” The function of the next two chapters of the *Anabasis* for the *logos* of the work is to clarify what the Hellenic laws are (5.3–5.4). Xenophon sketches the obligations defined by these laws and he analyzes the relation they bear to nature (PHUSIS). For if the Hellenic laws are purely conventional, the obligations that they define will be correspondingly demoted. The structure of the next two chapters is therefore as follows: chapter 5.3 sketches the Hellenic laws in the famous “digression” on Skilloūs; the almost equally famous chapter 5.4 sketches the laws and customs of the “Mossunoikoi,” a tribe that was, according to those who took part in the campaign, “the most barbaric people they had passed through” and “the furthest removed from Hellenic laws” (5.4.34). The diptych 5.3–5.4 is thus a study in contrast: from Hellenism at its peak we are cast into a pit of barbarity. Yet the careful reader soon discovers that the Hellenic laws and the laws of the Mossunoikoi are not simply opposed. They share more than first meets the eyes. Moreover, insofar as these two sets of laws *do* stand at the opposite ends of the spectrum of political and moral excellence, their separation is not always a tribute to the greater glory of the Hellenic laws. This will become clear as we proceed. Once I complete my analysis of the Hellenic laws (section two), I shall return to the analysis of the guiding thread of book five: how does the Socratic King endeavor to conjoin or reconcile justice with safety and advantage (sections three and four)?



The Greeks decide to leave Trapezonte when Cheirisophos is late in returning from his mission, when the ships they have collected prove to be too few, and when it is no longer possible to get provisions locally. The sick and the old are allowed to board the available ships (along with

²⁹ Cf. the festival and athletic contest described at 5.5.5 with the ones described at 4.8.25–28.

³⁰ The increased prominence of the Hellenic laws is accompanied by heightened prominence for soothsayers and sacrifices: 5.2.9, 5.4.22, 5.5.2–3, 5.5.5–6, 5.6.16–18 and §28–29, 5.7.35.

the women and children) but the rest must march. The roads have been rebuilt.³¹ On the third day they reach Kerasoūs, a coastal city and a colony of Hellenic Sinope. There they stay ten days and perform a review under arms and a counting of the troops. There are eight thousand six hundred men: "These were saved," Xenophon declares, rather pointedly (5.3.3).³²

The remainder of chapter three is the excursus on Skilloūs (5.3.4–13). The occasion for the passage is as follows: Xenophon had been entrusted with a substantial sum of money at Kerasoūs and he must now explain what he did with it.³³ During their stay in that city, the Ten Thousand divvy up the money raised by the sale of the captives and they select the tithe of Apollo and of Ephesian Artemis. The tithe is then entrusted to the generals—each taking a share of the sacred money. But what did Xenophon do with *his* share?

Xenophon tells us that with the portion of the sacred money that belonged to Apollo he made a votive offering. He set up the offering in the treasury of the Athenians at Delphi and inscribed it with his own name and that of Proxenos, who had been his guest-friend (XENOS: 5.3.5). Xenophon then dedicated the (apparently larger) portion of Artemis some years later, after his return to Greece. He used the money to purchase an estate at Skilloūs in the vicinity of Olympia. The god indicated the exact

³¹ 5.3.1 cf. 5.1.13–14.

³² This declaration of salvation is oddly premature. The single greatest defeat suffered by the Ten Thousand—no fewer than five hundred men are killed—occurs not long *after* it (6.4.23–27; cf. also 5.6.12–13, 5.6.32–33, 6.1.29, 6.3.1–9, 6.3.17, 7.2.5–6.). Is Xenophon applying here a purely formal criterion of "salvation": since the Ten Thousand have reached the sea, they can be said to have been "saved" even though they will continue to lose men? Yet if we accept this explanation, why then does Xenophon not declare the Greeks "saved" at Trapezonte, where the army reaches the sea for the first time? Xenophon's declaration of salvation is either oddly premature or else strangely belated. To see what is being suggested by this "error," observe the following facts: (1) The Greeks reach in succession three Hellenic and coastal cities; all three cities are colonies of the same metropolis (Sinope). (2) The army performs sacrifices of thanksgiving at the first of these cities (Trapezonte: 4.8.25) and again at the third (Kotuōra: 5.5.5) but not at the second and centrally located Kerasoūs; these sacrifices make clear that the troops believe they owe their salvation to the *gods*. (3) Instead of sacrifices of thanksgiving, the centrally located Kerasoūs witnesses a review under *arms* (5.3.3). (4) It is at Kerasoūs that Xenophon declares *in his own name* that the Greeks have been saved. The "error" adumbrates a claim about cause.

³³ Chapter 5.3 also contains, I believe, a sketch of the main periods of Xenophon's life after the *Anabasis*. The order of his presentation suggests the following sequence: (1) Xenophon briefly returns to Greece after the *Anabasis* and he deposits Apollo's votive offering in the treasury of the Athenians at Delphi: he is not yet an exile. (We leave Xenophon at the end of the *Anabasis* preparing for a return home: 7.7.57); (2) Xenophon travels back to Asia when he experiences the hostility of the Athenians, who view him as a friend of

location. Watering the land was the river Selinoūs, Xenophon observes, and in Ephesus, too, there was a river called Selinoūs next to the temple of Artemis, and both rivers had fishes and mussels.³⁴ The estate of Skilloūs was rich in all the animals of the hunt. A part of the sacred money was employed to build an altar and a temple. Afterward Xenophon always sacrificed to the goddess a tithe of the fruits of the season from the field. All the citizens and the neighbors—men and women—would participate in the festival:

For those who tented there the goddess provided barley meal, loaves of bread, wine, sweets, and a portion of the sacrifices from the sacred herd, as also of those animals hunted in the chase. For both Xenophon's sons³⁵ and those of the other citizens used to hold a hunt for the festival, and the men who wished would join the hunt with them. Boars, gazelles, and deer were captured from the sacred precinct itself, as well as from [Mount] Pholoe. The place is on the road which people travel coming from Lacedaemon to Olympia, about twenty stadia from the temple of Zeus in Olympia. In the sacred precinct are both a meadow and hills full of trees, sufficient to nourish pigs, goats, cattle, and horses, so that even the baggage animals of those that come to the festival have their feast. Around the temple itself a grove of cultivated trees was planted, as many as yield sweet fruits in season. The temple is like the one in Ephesus, though as small is to large, and its statue is like the one in Ephesus, though as cypress wood is to gold. And a marker with the following inscription stands beside the temple: THIS PLACE IS SACRED TO ARTEMIS. THE ONE WHO HOLDS IT AND GATHERS IN ITS FRUITS MUST OFFER EVERY YEAR

the recent enemy of the city (Cyrus) and a Socratic. (Socrates had been executed by the Athenians in 399 BC only a few weeks or months before the end of the *Anabasis*. That Xenophon did not witness the trial, however, is proved by *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors* §1 and *Memorabilia* 1.1.1); (3) Xenophon rejoins the remnants of Cyrus's army and campaigns in Asia with Thibrōn, Derkulidas, and Agesilaos (cf. *Hellenika* 3.2.7); (4) Xenophon makes his second and definitive return to Greece, fighting on the Spartan side and against the Athenians at Korōneia (394 BC); (4) Xenophon is exiled by the Athenians and settled by the Spartans at Skilloūs. The above sequence of events suggests that Xenophon was exiled for fighting against the Athenians at Korōneia, *not* for befriending Cyrus. (Read also 5.3.7 together with 5.3.6: Xenophon's being saved from "danger" [KINDUNEUŌ] somehow produces both "escape" and "exile" [PHEUGO].) Cf. Flower (2012) p. 24. For a survey of various views held about the vexed question of the epoch and cause of Xenophon's exile, see Tuplin (1987).

³⁴ According to the best MS. C, the names of the two rivers were not quite identical: the river in Skilloūs was called "Elinōūs," and the river in Ephesus, the "Selinoūs."

³⁵ Since the adolescent sons of Xenophon are (in this passage) old enough to hunt, it is clear that it sketches a vision into the far future. At the time of the *Anabasis* Xenophon has no children (7.6.34). This fact proves, I believe, that the *Anabasis* was published years or, rather, two or three decades after the end of the expedition.

THE TITHE IN SACRIFICE. FROM THE SURPLUS HE MUST REPAIR THE TEMPLE. IF ANYONE DOES NOT DO THESE THINGS, THE GODDESS WILL TAKE CARE OF IT. (5.3.9–13)³⁶

Scholars have long been puzzled by this attractive scene of pastoral serenity and pious reverence. Why (it is asked) does Xenophon digress in this way and at such length? But the inability to account for the scene has stemmed from a failure to attend to the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. As I have already indicated, the purpose of the scene is to sketch the Hellenic laws. (To be more precise, the most important purpose of the scene is to sketch the Hellenic laws. Its most evident purpose is apologetic.³⁷) Let us consider the obligations that are defined by the Hellenic laws and, more generally, the activities or way(s) of life that they praise as noble.

Piety is at the heart of the pastoral way of the life in question. Xenophon secures the guidance of Apollo to determine where he should

³⁶ Translation by Ambler (2008).

³⁷ Xenophon must explain what he did with the sacred money. For in dedicating the sums in question, he was carrying out his final duty as ruler of the Ten Thousand. The passage is thus a defense against a serious (if implicit) charge of embezzlement. And it is worth noting that the passage illustrates how Xenophon reconciles the noble with the good (*Memorabilia* 3.8; *Symposium* c. 5). But the passage is apologetic in a second sense as well. Xenophon admits in chapter 5.3, for the first time in the *Anabasis*, that he was exiled by the Athenians in the wake of his return from Asia (5.3.7). The attractive picture he draws of the Hellenic laws—and of his own dedication to these laws—is thus intended to soften the impact of his admission. Xenophon may have been a bad Athenian—so, at least, the Athenians thought—but his dedication to Hellenism was unimpeachable. The attractive scene of chapter 5.3 interrupts a long sequence of melancholy episodes in book five. Consider in particular 5.7.13–35, an episode which actually occurs at Kerasoūs. But Xenophon makes no mention of it in chapter 5.3 because he does not wish to mar “[a]n idealized scene of Greek piety and *xenia*,” as Dillery nicely puts it (1998, p. 403, note 18).—Masqueray (1930) notes that the reference to Mount Pholoë at 5.3.10 has been thought to be erroneous because this mountain is rather too distant from Skilloūs to be a good hunting ground (Vol. 2, p. 184, note to p. 59). But the critique overlooks that Mount Pholoë was the residence of Pholos, a wise centaur who became unfortunate because he shared with a guest the wine that had belonged to the centaurs in common. And of course, Pholos was the son of Silene. That Xenophon is liable to think of himself as a wise centaur is also indicated by the *Kunēgetikos*. That work opens with a discussion of how Cheirōn received the gift of “hunting” from the gods because of his justice and became a teacher of it and of other noble things. Cheirōn had many pupils who became outstanding for their virtue, including Achilles, Odysseus and, above all, Palamēdēs, who surpassed his contemporaries in wisdom (1.1–2, §11 cf. *Memorabilia* 4.2.33). But it is of course *Xenophon* who teaches hunting in the *Kunēgetikos*. Toward the end of the work, he discusses his own educational intention and method (chap. 13). He has written his works, he tells us, with the aim of making the young “wise and good” (13.7). Consider in this connection Machiavelli’s discussion of Cheirōn in the *Prince* (chap. 18).

buy an estate. The land is sacred because it belongs to Artemis (HIEROS: 5.3.10).³⁸ And the goddess is to be thanked for the fertility of the land, which is well stocked with game as well. From the bounties of the earth and from the sacred herd Xenophon selects an annual tithe and he maintains a temple and an altar. The generosity of Artemis carries with it an obligation of gratitude. This generosity makes possible Xenophon's own generosity. For the tithe and the sacrifices are offered up during plentiful festivals. Both men and women are participants in the festivals, though the natural differences between the sexes are preserved or magnified in accordance with the Hellenic law that praises outdoor work for men and indoor work for women.³⁹ In particular, the hunt is the exclusive preserve of men.⁴⁰ For in addition to procuring fresh game, hunting strengthens both body and soul in preparation for war. Hunting is training in virtue. The Hellenic laws thus contribute to the inculcation of vigor and manliness without which the republican way of life characteristic of Hellas could not long endure.⁴¹ Appropriately enough, chapter three makes mention of the Olympic Games, which were both a stimulus for, and a display of, some of the educational fruits of the Hellenic laws: vigor, manliness, love of competition, and reverence toward the gods (5.3.7).⁴² Insofar as the athletes competed naked at these Games—that is, free of the convention of clothes—they embodied the claim of the Hellenic laws to praise or decree a way of life that is wholly in accord with nature. Finally, Xenophon's votive offering to Apollo reminds us of the institution of the *xenia*, and of the Hellenic law requiring cities to maintain a treasury at Delphi (THĒSAUROS). Large sums of money were dedicated to the deity there. For gratitude was expected not only of individuals but of cities as well (5.3.5). And if this obligation was skirted, "the god would take care of it."

There is no good reason to doubt that Xenophon was attracted to the pastoral way of life sketched in chapter 5.3 and that he lived that life to a not insignificant extent. Hunting, for one, was much to the taste of the

³⁸ The adjective HIEROS (and cognates) occurs six times in this short chapter.

³⁹ This law praises as noble a rather precise division of labor between husband and wife: *Oikonomikos* c. 7, especially §30.

⁴⁰ This is so even though the patron saint of the hunt is a female, the goddess Artemis. Consider also the last line of the *Kunēgetikos*. It somehow reflects, I believe, Xenophon's view that the highest form of "hunting" is less than manly.

⁴¹ *Kunēgetikos*, c. 1, 12–13 and *passim*; *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.10–11. Yet the hunt described in *Anabasis* 5.3 is largely of harmless animals—"boars, gazelles, and deer." Cf. chapter four, p. 170, note 43.

⁴² Nor is it a coincidence that Xenophon declares the Greeks to be "saved" in the chapter where he sketches the Hellenic laws: he thereby intimates the contribution of these laws to that outcome.

author of the *Kunēgetikos* (“*On Hunting with Dogs*”).⁴³ Yet this fact does not prove that Xenophon was a votary of the Hellenic laws. After all, the obligations defined by the Hellenic laws and the activities or way(s) of life that they praise as noble either belong to piety⁴⁴ or are supported by piety.⁴⁵ And we have seen in chapter three that the piety of Xenophon was not above suspicion. Moreover, chapter 5.3 makes no mention of the activities that we know from Xenophon’s own corpus occupied his mature years: philosophic reflection and writing.⁴⁶ The vision of Skilloūs is an account of Xenophon’s later years that owes much to art. To discover

⁴³ It is also noteworthy that in this passage—the only passage where Xenophon discusses his life after the *Anabasis*—he stresses its *private* character. He says nothing about any further political involvement, though many scenes of the *Hellenika* suggest that he campaigned in Asia after the *Anabasis*. Xenophon never names himself as a political actor in the *Hellenika* (though I believe he is alluding to himself at 3.2.7). The main reason for his silence, I believe, is this: Xenophon wants his readers to assess his stance toward the political life on the basis of the *Anabasis*, *not* the *Hellenika*. For, the political involvement of Xenophon after the *Anabasis* was, to a significant extent at least, accidental or involuntary. He could not go home because of his exile. His later political involvement—such as it was—arose from the fact that the life of the stranger everywhere is not viable (*Memorabilia* 2.1). I would add that it is probably not an accident that Xenophon does not mention himself by name in a book dedicated to “Hellenic Things”: he is apparently not a “Hellene” in the most important respects. In this connection, note that Xenophon consistently calls the Ten Thousand “the Hellenes” (HOI HELLĒNES) in the *Anabasis* but rarely calls them by that name in the *Hellenika*. Instead, he uses such formulations as “the Cyreans” or “the Cyrean army” (3.1.6, 3.2.7, 3.2.18, 3.4.20, see also 6.1.12; cf. 3.1.2). Xenophon goes so far as to describe the Cyreans once as a “foreign” (XENIKOS) contingent (4.3.15 and §18; that this “foreign” contingent is indeed the Cyrean army is proved by 3.4.20). What does this pattern mean? To answer this question would require that we explain what being a “Hellene” means in the context of the “Hellenic Things.”

⁴⁴ For example, sacrifices, prayers, Delphic deposits, divinations, and annual festivals.

⁴⁵ For example, the works of farming, the *xenia*, republican freedom, and the division of labor between husband and wife. On the importance of divine support for the marital division of labor praised as noble by the Hellenic law, see *Oikonomikos* c. 7 and Bruell (1984) pp. 289–94. According to Ischomachos, certain tasks by nature are more capable of being carried out by men and certain others by women. These tasks are praised by the law as well. There is “perhaps” divine punishment for the failure to perform these tasks, or for a man to perform a woman’s tasks (7.30–31). But (we must ask) if nature is simply supportive of this division of labor, why are both praise and punishment needed? The goodness of the division of labor praised by the law is not beyond question, especially for the wife.

⁴⁶ Interestingly, chapter 5.3 is the only chapter of the *Anabasis* to contain a quotation from a writing (GRAMMATA), albeit only from an inscription (5.3.13 cf. 7.5.14). And of course, the chapter stresses Xenophon’s “hunting.” Other features of the vision of Skilloūs tend to reinforce our doubts about Xenophon’s dedication to the Hellenic laws. Consider Hirsch (1985): “One concrete example of the way in which Xenophon was influenced by Persian practices which he learned about on the *Anabasis* is the hunting park which he built on his estate at Scillus after his return from Greece. His description of this park in

how Xenophon assessed the Hellenic laws, we must consider the laws and customs of the Mossunoikoi (5.4).



The “Mossunoikoi” are so named because they inhabit wooden houses or towers (MOSSUN-OÏKOS). They are indoor dwellers. Since the men of the tribe stay indoors no less than the women, their complexion is just as pale (5.4.33).⁴⁷ The men do not hunt. The Mossunoikoi feed on grain and especially on nuts, which they bake into loaves. They keep to the vegetarianism of early times.⁴⁸ Though they live in cities and are not nomadic, they are ruled by primitive kings and have little knowledge of the technical arts.⁴⁹ They mutilate the bodies of the enemies they kill so as to prevent proper burial (5.4.17 cf. 5.3.5). The military orders of the Mossunoikoi mirror their unmanly habits. Soldiers are compared to “choral dancers” who “sing in rhythm” as they march (5.4.12, §14). The troops are decked out with leather helmets that look very much like tiaras, with a tuft of hair in the middle, and the shields have the shape of ivy leaves (5.4.12–13). The soldiers resemble Bacchic dancers.⁵⁰ Their breastplates have the thickness of linen bags made for bedclothes and the spears are so long that a man can barely carry one (!) (5.4.13, §25). The Mossunoikoi soldiers are more at home onstage than in the field. Not surprisingly, these dancing soldiers are soundly defeated when the Ten Thousand put their mind to it.⁵¹

the *Anabasis* (5.3.7–13) is reminiscent of the Persian paradises described elsewhere [...]” (p. 153, note 11). Along the same lines is Dillery (1998): “Artemis Ephesia is otherwise never found in mainland Greece” (p. 404, note 19).

⁴⁷ Brulé (1995) rightly observes that “tout le passage sur les Mossynèques abonde en traits caractéristiques du féminin pour les Grecs” (p. 18). The observation is confirmed by *Hellenika* 3.4.19 and *Agésilas* 1.28.

⁴⁸ As I indicate in the text, the reference to “dolphin” at 5.4.28 is of religious, not of dietary, significance.

⁴⁹ Consider the description of their canoes: 5.4.11–12.

⁵⁰ The Greek word for “ivy” is KISSOS or KITTOS: cf. Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazousai* 988; Euripides, *Bakchai* 81.

⁵¹ The military clash between the Ten Thousand and the Mossunoikoi can be briefly summarized. The Greeks reach the border of the Mossunoikoi’s territory and ask for permission to traverse it as friends. They are rebuffed. The Mossunoikoi put their trust in their fortresses. The Greeks therefore conclude an alliance with the Mossunoikoi who dwell on the far side (the western side) and who are the enemies of the nearer Mossunoikoi. With their help, the Greeks defeat the latter, though not without difficulties. They suffer their first defeat of the campaign when scores of undisciplined soldiers are routed during a hapless plundering raid (5.4.16). The Greeks launch a second, more orderly attack, which is successful (5.4.22–26). The capture of the metropolis of the Mossunoikoi signals their

The children of the prosperous Mossunoikoi are kept in a state of lazy idleness. Unlike the boys in Hellas—who are exercised by the hunt (5.3.10), to say nothing of gymnasia and athletic contests (cf. 5.3.7)—the children of the prosperous Mossunoikoi, both boys and girls, are fattened up indoors on a regimen of boiled nuts (5.4.32). They are described as “exceedingly tender and white, and almost as wide as they are long; their backs are painted with many colors and the front parts of their bodies are tattooed all over with flowers” (5.4.32). Yet although they are undeniably barbaric, the Mossunoikoi do not live in a “state of nature.” They, too, have laws. They try to have intercourse with the concubines of the Greeks in the open, for example, “for this was their law” (NOMOS: 5.4.33). Generally, the Mossunoikoi do when they are in a crowd what others do in private, and they do when alone what people do when they are with others. They talk to themselves, laugh at themselves and dance—again dancing!—stopping wherever they chance to be, as if to make a display to others (5.4.34). Finally, there is not a single mention of the gods or of piety in the sketch of the laws and customs of the Mossunoikoi, a striking contrast with the vision of Skilloūs. It is as if the barbaric Mossunoikoi are somehow “enlightened.” Of course, the Ten Thousand do not view them that way. “Those who took part in the campaign” said that the Mossunoikoi were “the most barbaric people they had passed through” (5.4.34).

The description of the Mossunoikoi bears directly on Xenophon’s assessment of the Hellenic laws. Let us begin at the beginning. Why does Xenophon fail to endorse in his own name the unfavourable judgment of the Mossunoikoi expressed by “those who took part in the campaign” (HOI STRATEUSAMENOI: 5.4.34)?⁵² Is he more sympathetic to the barbarians than the troops? He indicates that the Mossunoikoi resemble the Greek in some respects. When the places of the Mossunoikoi are plundered, for example, the Greeks discover jars of dolphin blubber, a substance used by the Mossunoikoi, Xenophon emphasizes, “just as the Greeks use olive oil” (5.4.28). But the Greeks use olive oil to rub their bodies during and after workouts. Are the Mossunoikoi less unmanly or physically inactive than it appears? It seems so. They may even be

total defeat. The Greeks launch the second attack after sacrificing and receiving favourable omens (5.4.22). To prevent any flight of the troops, “the sharpest of the hoplites” (TOUS TOMŌTATOUS TŌN HOPLITŌN) are positioned (probably by Xenophon) a short distance behind the columns (5.4.22). This evocative reading, recalling the sharpness of the blade, is found only in the best MSS. It is rejected by most modern editors, who fail to take due notice of *Education of Cyrus* 3.2.5–6, 3.3.41–42, 7.1.34, and, above all, of 6.3.26–27.

⁵² Compare how Xenophon expresses himself, for example, at 4.7.15.

enjoying a measure of political freedom, for the smell of the olive was associated with the labors and practices of freedom among Greeks.⁵³

The point of similarity just mentioned, though admittedly minor, invites a search for weightier ones. In our search, we soon encounter Xenophon's enigmatic description of the ancestral bread of the Mossunoikoi (5.4.27). The Greeks discover in the houses of the Mossunoikoi, alongside the dolphin blubber, "magazines of loaves, pile upon pile, which the Mossunoikoi said were their ancestral magazines" (5.4.27). But what exactly are "ancestral magazines" of bread? Were these loaves handed down from generation to generation like edible heirloom? But isn't bread perishable? (To highlight the difficulty, Xenophon speaks in the next sentence of "slices of *pickled* dolphin." No preservatives are mentioned in connection with the bread.⁵⁴) In fact, the difficulty is so obvious and intractable that editors emend the unanimous MSS.⁵⁵ I suggest a better solution: the intention of Xenophon in describing this bread is precisely to adumbrate that "pile upon pile" of it was being wasted.

To grasp the import of my suggestion, observe that the word I have just translated as "magazine" (THĒSAUROS) is the same word I translated (in the excursus on Skilloūs) as "treasury" (THĒSAUROS)—the very word used in the phrase, "the treasury of the Athenians at Delphi" (5.3.5).⁵⁶ Observe also that the adjective "Delphic" and the noun "dolphin" can have identical spellings (DELPHIS) and Xenophon uses the noun "dolphin" twice in the same breath with which he mentions the "treasury of

⁵³ *Symposium* 2.1–6.

⁵⁴ Amigues (1995) is puzzled by the bread's unexplained "conservation exceptionnelle," probably due in part, she surmises amusingly, "à la qualité de la farine" (p. 73). Masqueray (1930) thinks that the bread is a kind of "biscuit des soldats." But even the "biscuit des soldats" eventually rots (Vol. 2, p. 64, note 1).

⁵⁵ The unanimous MSS. for 5.4.27 read THĒSAUROUS...ARTŌN...PATRIOUS ("ancestral magazines of bread"), but Hude/Peters, Marchant, Couvreur, and Brownson/Dillery emend the text to THĒSAUROUS...ARTŌN...PERUSINŌN ("magazines of last year's bread"). The reading of the MSS. is preserved by Masqueray, Dindorf, and Gemoll.

⁵⁶ The word THĒSAUROS is used only these two times in the *Anabasis*. Elsewhere, Xenophon uses the word TAMIEÏON, not THĒSAUROS, to speak of a "magazine" or "storehouse" (*Hellenika* 5.4.6, *Memorabilia* 1.5.2; see also *On Horsemanship* 4.1). What Xenophon regards as genuine "THĒSAUROI" is indicated at *Memorabilia* 1.6.14, 4.2.9. In the *Education of Cyrus*, the word THĒSAUROS is used no fewer than nine times. Five of these occurrences are concentrated in a single brief scene between Cyrus and Croesus (8.2.15–23). In that scene, Cyrus boasts to the deposed ruler of Lydia: "Do you see, Croesus, that I too have treasures (THĒSAUROI)?" (8.2.19, my emphasis). The THĒSAUROI of Cyrus turn out to be his friends, who are ready to dedicate vast amounts of gold to his service. To grasp the overtones of the adverb "too" (KAI), we must appreciate

bread” of the Mossunoikoi (5.4.28). (The Delphic god was represented as a dolphin because of this etymological closeness.) The point adumbrated by Xenophon is therefore clear: the ancestral treasuries of bread served, among the Mossunoikoi, a function analogous to that of the Delphic treasuries among the Greeks. The ancestral loaves were offerings of the barbarians to their gods, just like the Delphic treasures were offerings of the Greek to *their* gods. In each case the offerings had the same usefulness. The chapter of the Mossunoikoi is thus not silent about the gods or about piety after all, though the reference to the matter is obviously inexplicit. There was, among the Mossunoikoi, both more freedom and more piety than first appears. Xenophon’s description of the Mossunoikoi, insofar as he presents them as “enlightened,” is a caricature.

To this line of analysis, it will be objected that Xenophon defends the inviolability of the Delphic treasuries in the *Hellenika* and elsewhere too. But how could he have defended these treasuries if he viewed them critically? Besides, if Xenophon really intended to draw the mischievous comparison just sketched, why leave it so inconspicuous?

Readers of Xenophon must concede that the Delphic treasuries are defended in several places in his corpus.⁵⁷ These defenses throw the full weight of Xenophon’s authority behind the Hellenic law that praises or demands such deposits. Nevertheless, to claim that Xenophon is “a deeply religious supporter of Delphi,” as one scholar put it recently, is to fail to appreciate the perspective from which these deposits are defended or justified.⁵⁸ In chapter three, I argued that Xenophon develops his critique of piety esoterically because of what he views as the prerequisites and implications of a politics of virtue. Since Xenophon is a defender of the politics of virtue, he sees it as his responsibility to defend and justify, occasionally to correct, and in any case not to attack openly the core of

that Cyrus is not only comparing his THĒSAUROI to those of the once fabulously rich Croesus (7.2.14, 7.3.1). Above all, he is comparing them to the THĒSAUROI of Delphic Apollo. (Croesus makes a cameo in this scene because of his own entanglements with Apollo: 7.2.15–28). Like Apollo, Cyrus has “friends” who dedicate vast amounts of gold to his service. He is a Godlike King.

⁵⁷ Consider the story of Jason of Thessaly (*Hellenika* 6.4.27–32). Jason was suspected of planning to seize the Delphic THĒSAUROI. The inhabitants of Delphi were concerned: “It is said that when the Delphians asked the oracle what should be done if [Jason] took the money of the god, the reply was: ‘The god will take care of it’” (6.4.30). In the next sentence Jason is murdered (6.4.31–32).—Xenophon also praises Agesilaos in the panegyric bearing his name for setting up a large votive offering at Delphi (1.34, but cf. *Hellenika* 4.3.21–23, especially what immediately follows the offering). It is only fair to note, however, that Xenophon himself deposited only the (smaller?) portion of Apollo in the treasury of the Athenians. In the same vein, consider *Hiero* 11.13.

⁵⁸ Thomas (2009) p. xvii.

the piety and of the pious practices upon which this politics partly rests. The diptych Skilloūs-Mossunoikoi provides a remarkable illustration of this aspect of his manner of writing. Xenophon eschews open criticism of the Delphic treasures—nay, he paints himself as paying homage to them (5.3.5)—though he adumbrates a critique of the institution as well. He is content to whisper that once we abstract from the political and moral usefulness of the institution—and this civilizing usefulness is undeniable—the treasures amount to a vast waste of resources. And it is a waste that connects Hellas to a most barbaric tribe. Xenophon *does* whisper these truths, however, because he is above all a philosopher.

The last remark points to the most important reason why Xenophon chose to present the Mossunoikoi as enlightened, though they obviously were not: “the Mossunoikoi” are stand-ins for “the Socratics.” This suggestion will perhaps strike the reader as odd or fanciful. But take a moment to review the depiction of Socrates and his followers in Aristophanes’s *Clouds* along with some passages of Xenophon’s Socratic writings. The similarities between the Mossunoikoi and the Socratics are many and striking: the Mossunoikoi spend most of their time indoors and are exceedingly pale (cf. *Clouds* 92–104, 120, 186, 194–99, 718, 1112, 1171 and *passim*); they are unmanly and (apparently) shun the gymnasia (cf. *Clouds* 670ff., esp. 678–79, 417, 836); they are great lovers of the heights or of summits (AKRA), for their cities and for their towers, imitating in this Socrates, who investigates the things aloft from high-hanging baskets (cf. *Clouds* 223–38, 868–69); like Socrates, they argue with themselves and “dance alone” (cf. *Symposium* 2.15–20); the king of the Mossunoikoi even meets a fate identical to that which threatens Socrates, “king” of the Socratics, at the end of the *Clouds* (cf. *Anabasis* 5.4.26 with *Clouds* 1478–end). The barbaric Mossunoikoi and the enlightened Socratics are somehow interchangeable.

But what is the meaning of this preposterous comparison? What can the Mossunoikoi and the Socratics possibly “share”?

The diptych Skilloūs-Mossunoikoi—and the comparison between the Hellenic laws and the Mossunoikoi laws that it contains—is an analysis of the relation between law and nature, between NOMOS and PHUSIS.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ The word “law” (NOMOS) occurs three times in the chapter on the Mossunoikoi (5.4.17, §33, §34). This is more than in any other chapter except for 7.3 (six occurrences). And while the word “nature” (PHUSIS) does not occur in our diptych—it does not occur in the *Anabasis*—two of the three words formed on a PHUSIS-root that *do* occur in the work occur in our diptych. These words are “to plant” (PHUTEUŌ: 5.3.12) and “natural separation” or “natural division” (DIAPHUĒ: 5.4.29). The third word is “to grow” or “to bring forth by nature” (PHUŌ), used at 1.4.10. About this word, see notes 61 and 62, below.

This relation is complex because human nature does not exist in a state of “purity” anywhere. Nature is always shaped and moulded by law. To that extent, “law is natural to man or law belongs to man’s nature.”⁶⁰ This does not mean that the distinction between NOMOS and PHUSIS is unimportant, or that it can be dispensed with. Nor does it mean that all laws are equal. While some laws develop and in a sense perfect human nature, others distort and debase it. The Hellenic laws, for example, are genuinely superior—superior by nature—to the laws of the Mossunoikoi insofar as they inculcate a greater capacity for political virtue and for freedom. The Mossunoikoi are not greatly capable of either. This is one thing they have in common with the Socratics. However splendidly a man like Xenophon was able to combine political virtue with philosophic virtue, a perennial tension exists between their respective demands. The depiction of the Mossunoikoi reminds us that a community of philosophic “dancers” would not be marked by particularly high levels of political virtue in particular.

Of course, the Hellenic laws are not simply natural, nor are they simply in accordance with nature. Comparing the Delphic THĒSAUROI to large heaps of spoiling bread made that clear. In fact, the Mossunoikoi laws are *more* in accordance with nature than the Hellenic laws insofar as they leave more freedom for—or rather, insofar as they require as a matter of “obligation”—the gratification of such natural desires as the sexual desire. The Mossunoikoi exhibit little or no “separation” from nature.⁶¹ Nevertheless, from the point of view of education—the standpoint which concerns me above all in this study—it is precisely the “enslavement” of nature characteristic of the Hellenic laws (and of other similar laws) that marks them as superior to the laws of the Mossunoikoi, and therefore also and in a higher sense more in accordance with nature.⁶² For the primary

⁶⁰ Strauss (1983) p. 123.

⁶¹ Consider the suggestive description of the nuts eaten by the Mossunoikoi—“OUK ECHONTA DIAPHUËN OUDEMIAN” (5.4.29, my emphasis). See note 59, above.

⁶² Consider Xenophon’s suggestive use of the word “to plant” (PHUTEUŌ) at 5.3.12. The root of PHUTEUŌ is of course PHUSIS, the only occurrence of “nature” in the chapter on the Hellenic laws (5.3). Yet PHUTEUŌ points *away* from nature as well as toward it. It calls attention to the role of convention, or rather of cultivation, in the production of otherwise stunted natural fruits. The use of PHUTEUŌ thus adumbrates the contribution of the Hellenic laws to education, a contribution which presupposes an initial curbing, ordering, and shaping of nature. Of course, the Hellenic laws do not suffice to yield the most perfectly formed fruits of nature. In this connection, consider that Xenophon chooses to use the word “to grow” or “to bring forth by nature” *only* in a parallel passage (PHUŌ: 1.4.10) and *not* in chapter 5.3. Manifestly, he did not wish to speak of what nature “grows” or “brings forth” when he spoke of the fruits of the Hellenic laws. The reason for this refusal is not only that these fruits are the result of cultivation. It

deficiency of the Mossunoikoi laws is that they place hardly any restrictions on nature.⁶³ They permit or require untrammelled and public sexual intercourse, for example, fostering both promiscuity and shamelessness.⁶⁴ The reader is left to imagine the effects on the family.⁶⁵ Most importantly, the unblushing and unrestricted hedonism permitted or required by the Mossunoikoi laws is but the reverse side of a relative indifference to the noble. These laws teach that one must surrender to the promptings of nature, as a matter of “obligation” even. The Mossunoikoi laws hardly look beyond gratification at all.⁶⁶ Yet the attainment of the end of our nature requires that nature first be “enslaved” by law. The raw natural impulses must be curbed, ordered, and shaped, first of all in children. Beyond this, human nature must be made to experience the uplifting and invigorating appeal of the noble. In time, if a Socratic education intervenes and is successful, human nature turns to philosophy, *the end of nature*.

Thus the serious meaning behind the funny⁶⁷ comparison between the Mossunoikoi and the Socratics is this: both groups live “free” from the restraints of law and “in accordance with nature.”⁶⁸ I hasten to add that the parallel is not exact: the natural life among the Mossunoikoi, though foreshadowing the Socratic equation of the noble with the good, crudely equates the good with bodily pleasure. The continent and ascetic Socratics do not fall into that trap. Yet they, too, seek something pleasurable—knowledge. Moreover, the character and scope of their pleasurable quest for knowledge is shaped by a critique of law-based nobility, a critique in

is also that they are enmeshed in law. From the standpoint of nature, these fruits remain immature. The distinction between planting and growing is central to Homer’s account of the “state of nature.” According to the poet, the “arrogant and lawless” Cyclops “plant (PHUTEUŌ) nothing with their hands, nor plow; but all things grow (PHUŌ) for them without planting or plowing” (*Odyssey* 9.105–115).

⁶³ Consider the eating habits of the children of the Mossunoikoi: 5.4.32.

⁶⁴ On the Socratics and shame, see *Clouds* 445ff., 1236 and *passim*.

⁶⁵ Though Xenophon does not say this explicitly, his description suggests that the Mossunoikoi offered up their children in exchange for sexual intercourse with the concubines of the Greeks. Neither marital fidelity nor, we can surmise, the prohibition against incest were of special concern to them (5.4.32–33). On the issue of incest, see *Clouds* 1369–76, 1439–51.

⁶⁶ Admittedly, the western Mossunoikoi accuse their eastern tribesmen of injustice or “getting more than their share” (PLEONEKTEÏN: 5.4.15). The notion of obligation is not unknown to the Mossunoikoi. The description of Xenophon is a caricature, but precisely as a caricature it exaggerates a genuine tendency.

⁶⁷ The definitive commentary on the “Mossunoikoi” is the remark that they would laugh at themselves alone (5.4.34). Xenophon is thinking of himself.

⁶⁸ Both groups could also be said to be walking embodiments of “pure” *eros*. This characterization is merely adumbrated here, however, because *eros* is essentially absent from the *Anabasis*. See pp. 299–300.

which the Mossunoikoi “share.”⁶⁹ Socrates and the Socratics stand at the end of the educational road. The Mossunoikoi stand at the beginning of it—or rather, they stand at a crude or debased version of the beginning. And a crucial way-station along the educational road are the Hellenic laws (or some such equivalent). From a political and moral standpoint, the Hellenic laws *are* the peak. Moreover, since the Hellenic laws impose obligations—they do not equate the noble with the good—they must be buttressed by piety. The laws of the Mossunoikoi permit or require self-gratification and do away with shame; they have little need of the gods. The surface silence about the gods in chapter 5.4 adumbrates this fact. The Mossunoikoi resemble the Socratics “philosophically.” We might even say that their laws foreshadow the political hedonism of the Enlightenment.

3. Hellenic Laws, Founding a City, and the Good

We now return to the analysis of the guiding issue of book five: How does the Socratic King endeavor to conjoin or reconcile justice with safety and advantage? Meanwhile we will have gained a deeper understanding of the Hellenic laws and of Xenophon’s assessment of them.⁷⁰ Indeed, the guiding issue was quietly treated even in the diptych 5.3–5.4.⁷¹



The Ten Thousand reach Kotuōra, a Hellenic city and a colony of Sinope, after traversing the territory of the Mossunoikoi (and of other tribes). They remain there for forty-five days (5.5.5). Once again they perform public sacrifices and they organize processions and athletic games. The arrival at Kotuōra marks the end of the retreat by land. Henceforth the

⁶⁹ For the Socratic equation of the noble with the good, see *Memorabilia* 3.8; *Symposium* c.5. On the notion of law-based nobility, see *Memorabilia* 3.3.1; on the relation between the noble and pleasure, see *Memorabilia* 3.8.8–10.

⁷⁰ It is remarkable that, despite his quiet critique of the Hellenic laws, the first thing Xenophon allows us to witness after his account of these laws (5.3–5.4) is that they *can* be effective in curbing plundering (5.5.1–3). In the scene in question, Xenophon bows to the judgment of the soothsayers, though he suspects that they have been bribed. Consider how he uses the phrase “showed the judgment” (APODEIKNUMI GNŌMĒN) at 5.5.3; the same phrase is used in the next chapter to refer to the (egregious lack of) judgment of the general Timasiōn, who had most likely been bribed (5.6.37, 5.6.21). (The sum of money mentioned at 5.6.18 is half again as large as the sum mentioned at 1.7.18 in the best MSS. CBA. To accuse soothsayers of taking bribes was, of course, not unheard of: e.g., 6.4.14; *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.2).

⁷¹ The issue was treated in chapter 5.4: Xenophon offers the Western Mossunoikoi his help in avenging the wrongs they suffered at the hands of their Eastern counterparts—if

Ten Thousand will travel by sea. They take some of their provisions from Paphlagonia and some from the land of the Hellenic Kotuōritans. (The latter do not open a market for them.) The Kotuōritans also refuse to receive the sick or the wounded inside their walls. After a while, the city of Sinope dispatches ambassadors to Kotuōra. The Sinopeans fear for their colony, which pays them a tribute, as well as for the land which is being plundered, as they hear. The Sinopean ambassadors address the Ten Thousand through Hecatōnumos, a man believed to be a clever speaker:

Men and soldiers, the city of the Sinopeans sent us both to praise you, because you, being Greeks, are victorious over barbarians and, secondly, to join with you in pleasant rejoicing, because you have gotten here safely, having made it through many and dangerous challenges, as we hear. We think we deserve, since we ourselves are Greeks, to experience some good at your hands, since you are Greeks, and nothing harmful, for we have never begun to do you any harm. These Kotuōritans are our colonists, and we gave this country over to them, after we took it from barbarians. Therefore they pay us an assigned tribute, as do those of Kerasōūs and Trapezonte as well, so that whatever harm you do to these, the city of the Sinopeans believes it suffers. Now we hear that after entering into their city by violence, some of you are lodging in their houses, and that you are taking whatever you want from their lands by violence, without persuading anyone to allow it. These things, then, we do not deserve. If you keep doing them, it will be necessary for us to make friends with Korulas [the non-Hellenic ruler of Paphlagonia] and with the Paphlagonians and anyone else we can. (5.5.8–12)⁷²

The Ten Thousand thus stand accused of committing injustice: they have transgressed the Hellenic law. For Hellenes deserve (AXIOŌ)⁷³ to experience some good at the hands of fellow Hellenes and no harm. And since the Ten Thousand have allegedly used violence, the charge amounts to an accusation of hubris (cf. 5.5.16). The Socratic King rises from his seat, in the plenitude of his authority and power, and he answers the charge “on behalf of the soldiers” (5.5.13).⁷⁴ His apology turns the tables on Hecatōnumos. It is the Kotuōritans (and the Sinopeans), he pleads, who have transgressed the Hellenic law. For if the Kotuōritans have perhaps never harmed the army, they have not done it any good either: no markets were opened,

they suffered any—and in the future to have them as their subjects (5.4.6). The wrong is corrected in a manner by the Greeks (5.4.15 cf. 5.4.30). The issue in question was treated in chapter 5.3 as well: consider note 37 above.

⁷² Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁷³ AXIOŌ is used twice by Hecatōnumos.

⁷⁴ The phrase “on behalf of the soldiers” points to the fact that the authority and power of Xenophon have now reached their zenith. They are about to be shattered in the wake of his

no gifts of hospitality were sent, and the sick were not received inside the walls. Xenophon then recounts the dealings the Ten Thousand had with the Trapezontians to prove that *they* have abided by the Hellenic law in the past. They are models of Hellenic justice. He contrasts the friendly reception of the Trapezontians with the unfriendly reception of the Kotuōritans, who have only themselves to blame if something was taken from their land. It was taken out of necessity. Nor did the Ten Thousand enter Kotuōra violently. They merely walked in where the place was accessible and settled their sick and wounded inside the houses. For these men, being Greeks, deserved (AXIOŌ) as much.⁷⁵ Finally, if the Sinopeans think it best to make Korulas their friend against the Ten Thousand—as Hecatōnumos threatens to do—the latter will wage war on them all. The Ten Thousand may even befriend Korulas by gratifying his desire to acquire Sinope and its fortresses along the sea (5.5.23).

This forceful apology of Xenophon apparently persuades the Sinopean ambassadors that the army has acted justly.⁷⁶ At any rate, the ambassadors are visibly very angry with Hecatōnumos for what he has said (5.5.24). Xenophon has defended the army while remaining on the plane of the Hellenic law. For, he has stressed the army's observance of this law. Toward the center of his apology, however, he beckons in a different direction:

Wherever we may arrive and do not have a market, whether it is a barbarian land or a Greek one, we take our provisions—not out of hubris, but out of necessity. Even though the Kardouchoi, the Taochoi, and Chaldeans were not subjects of the King, and though they were also very frightening, we nevertheless took them on as enemies, because it was necessary to take our provisions, since they did not provide a market. Since the Macrōnians, however, even though they were barbarians, provided us such a market as they could, we both believed them to be friends and did not take by violence anything that belonged to them. But as for the

failed attempt to found a city in Asia (5.6). This attempt will spawn accusations (5.7) and a charge of hubris (5.8). Since chapter 5.5 marks the zenith of the authority and power of the Socratic King, it is appropriately the eighteenth of the thirty-five chapters of Part III.

⁷⁵ Xenophon also says that the Ten Thousand are now guarding the gates to protect their comrades from the “harmost” of the Sinopeans, a word he uses twice (5.5.19–20). “Harmosts” were Spartan imperial governors, often oppressive and corrupt. The barb is clear: the Sinopeans are small-time imperialists with no regard for Hellenic freedom.

⁷⁶ Compare 5.5.14–15 with 5.2.2 and note 17. Xenophon surely idealizes the Ten Thousand's relations with the Trapezontians. Moreover, while he discusses this relation at length, he is silent about how the Ten Thousand dealt with the Kerasoūstians. (Hecatōnumos had mentioned Kerasoūs in the central position at 5.5.10). The reason for the silence is obvious: 5.7.13–35. To hear Xenophon tell his story, the Ten Thousand never plunder when they have a market where they can buy provisions. He uses the word “provisions” (EPITĒDEIA) three times and “booty” (LEIA) not once.

Kotuōritans, whom you declare to be yours, if we took anything of theirs, they themselves are the causes; for they did not deal with us as friends, but locking their gates, they neither received us inside nor sent a market to us outside. (5.5.16–19)⁷⁷

What begins as a remark of Xenophon about hubris and the necessity to take provisions becomes an explanation of what a “friend” is (PHILOS). According to him, the Ten Thousand regard as “friends” all those who help them. The “friend” is not defined by his Hellenic ethnicity—to say nothing of more exalted considerations— but by his serviceability. The example of the Macrōnians, at once friends and barbarians, indicates this.⁷⁸ The implications of this definition are obvious: the Hellenic Kotuōritans and the Hellenic Sinopeans risk becoming the enemies of the Ten Thousand if they refuse to help. It thus seems that the principle underlying Xenophon’s rule is not the Hellenic law as such, but a maxim that can be stated as follows: requite the benefit and pay back the harm (cf. 5.5.21). This maxim is not coterminous with the Hellenic law—though the two principles will overlap—since the maxim takes its bearing by the good of the army. Hellenes *qua* Hellenes have no claim to the consideration of the Socratic King.

Having thus beckoned beyond the Hellenic law and toward the plane of the good of the army, Xenophon concludes by returning to the plane of the Hellenic law. But he does not simply return to it. He replies to the threat of Hecatōnumos with a threat of his own. More precisely, Xenophon restates the threat of Hecatōnumos, whom he credits with having threatened to fight the Ten Thousand *willfully*.⁷⁹ And it is *that* threat that Xenophon answers in kind. For after saying that the Ten Thousand will wage war on all their opponents all together if necessary, he adds pointedly, as we just saw:

If it seems good to us, we will make the Paphlagonian (i.e. Korulas) a friend. For we hear that he desires your city and your fortresses along the

⁷⁷ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁷⁸ The Macrōnians are mentioned at the exact center of the speech (5.5.18). According to the description of book four, the Macrōnians exchanged pledges with the Ten Thousand, calling upon the gods as witnesses in a rather elaborate ceremony (4.8.7). Because of these pledges, and as a result of them, the non-Hellenic Macrōnians became the friends of the Ten Thousand. Only *then* did they proceed to open a market for them (4.8.8). According to Xenophon, however, the Macrōnians became the friends of the Ten Thousand *because* they opened a market for them and as a result of *that* act.

⁷⁹ Hecatōnumos had indicated that the Sinopeans might be compelled by necessity (ANAGKĒ) to fight the Ten Thousand (5.5.12). Xenophon ascribes to him the threat that they might fight the Ten Thousand “if it seems good to you” (ĒN HUMĪN DOKĒ: 5.5.22).

sea. We will attempt to become his friends by bringing about for him what he desires. (5.5.23)

Xenophon threatens to help a barbarian regain control of the coastline now in the possession of Hellenic Sinope (cf. 5.5.1). He might disregard Hellenic friendship. But of course, self-defense against a willful aggressor is just or lawful, as Hecatōnumos himself has conceded (5.5.9, §12).⁸⁰

That the rule of the Socratic King is guided by the good of the army rather than by the Hellenic law must be properly understood. Xenophon's perorating threat is intended to prompt the Sinopeans and the Kotuōritans to act in a more friendly fashion: that is, to bring about their compliance with the Hellenic law. And the threat works. Following Xenophon's apology, one of the Sinopean ambassadors declares that they have not come to wage war on the Ten Thousand but to show that they are their friends.⁸¹ He says that there will be gifts of hospitality for the Ten Thousand if they come to Sinope, adding that meanwhile they will order the people of Kotuōra to give them what they can: "For we see that everything you say is true" (5.5.24). Gifts of hospitality are duly sent to the army. The generals of the Greeks host (EXENIDZON) the Sinopean ambassadors, who are also Greeks. The two groups discuss in a friendly manner (PHILIKA) subjects of shared interest or need, including how to complete the journey back to Greece. The peroration of Xenophon has benefited the army. It has brought about compliance with the Hellenic law. The Socratic King has reconciled the noble with the good.



"This was the end of that day" (TELOS: 5.6.1). The next day the Greek generals gather the soldiers. It seems best to call on the Sinopeans and deliberate with them about the rest of the journey. For, if the army decides to travel by foot, it seems that the Sinopeans will be useful because they have experience of Paphlagonia. And if the army decides to sail, the Sinopeans, who alone seem⁸² capable of providing enough ships, will also be needed. The generals begin the deliberations by saying that "they deserve (AXIOŌ) to get from the Sinopeans, as Greeks to Greeks, a noble

⁸⁰ But note that while Xenophon uses the word ANAGKĒ three times in his apology, he threatens to make Korulas a friend "AN DE DOKĒ HĒMĪN" (5.5.23).

⁸¹ Hecatōnumos, who was reputed to be clever at speaking, uses the word "friend" (PHILOS) only once in his speech—to threaten the Ten Thousand to "make Korulas a friend." Xenophon uses "friend" five times and "friendship" once (PHILIA).

⁸² The verb "to seem" (DOKEIN) occurs five times in the opening paragraph of 5.6.

reception (KALŌS),⁸³ first by being shown goodwill and by being given the noblest advice” (TA KALLISTA SUMBOULEUEIN: 5.6.2).⁸⁴ The generals thus appeal to the Hellenic law just considered, or to an aspect of this law, as they seek advice from the Sinopeans. For as we saw in chapter two, the giver of noble advice must consider the interest of the advisee, even at significant cost to himself. The name of Xenophon is not mentioned in this scene (5.6.1–11). No threats are uttered.

Once again, Hecatōnumos speaks on behalf of the Sinopeans. He begins with an apology for his speech of the previous day, claiming that what he had meant was *not* that the Sinopeans would wage war on the Greeks but that “while it was possible to be friends with the barbarians, [the Sinopeans] would choose the Greeks” (5.6.3). When they bid Hecatōnumos give his advice, he opens with a prayer:

If I advise the things that seem best to me, may good things come to me, and if not, the opposite. For I seem to be presented with the task of giving what is called “sacred counsel.” For if I manifestly advise well now, many will praise me; but if I advise badly, many will call down curses upon me. (5.6.4)

This grandiloquent prayer reminds us that the Hellenic law that requires the giving of noble advice creates a duty enforced by the gods. But does Hecatōnumos believe in the existence of avenging gods? We do not know. (It is noteworthy that he speaks of advising “what seems best to me,” not [as the generals had requested] “what is noblest.”) Hecatōnumos advises the Ten Thousand to travel by sea. This is his advice even though (as he stresses) the Sinopeans will have greater troubles if the advice is accepted. For, if the Ten Thousand travel by sea, the Sinopeans will have to provide the ships whereas if they set out by land, they themselves will have to do the fighting. But does Hecatōnumos set aside the interest of Sinope, as well as his own private interest, to consider the interest of the Ten Thousand? In the audience, some suspect that he is motivated by his friendship for Korulas, his public guest-friend or proxenos; others, that Hecatōnumos expects to receive gifts for his advice; yet others, that he speaks out of fear that the Ten Thousand will ravage the country of the Sinopeans.⁸⁵ Despite these suspicions, the soldiers vote to make the journey by sea. They are weary of marching.

⁸³ The phrase “KALŌS DECHESTHAI” (5.6.2) refers back to 5.5.24 and context.

⁸⁴ The inferior MSS. FM have “the best advice” instead of “the noblest advice” at 5.6.2.

⁸⁵ Of the three grounds of suspicion, the most serious is of course the second and central one (5.6.11).

How well did Hecatōnumos fulfill his task of giving “sacred counsel”? His speech expatiates upon the many military and geographic obstacles that the Ten Thousand will encounter if they set out by land. These obstacles are so numerous and of such magnitude that (he says) “I believe that the march is not difficult but altogether impossible for you” (5.6.10). Is this report truthful? The Ten Thousand have few means to find out how things really stand (cf. 5.6.7). But they will discover the truth as they sail westward along the coast. Suffice it to observe here that Hecatōnumos exaggerates almost comically the difficulty of crossing the several rivulets that flow into the sea along the littoral: he is indeed “The-Man-Of-The-Hundred-Pretences.”⁸⁶ In book five, Hecatōnumos is the first man to invoke “Hellas” as a pretext for self-interested goals. Despite the threat of divine punishment, and in the absence of human threat, the Hellenic law is honored in the breach. “Hellas” has become a fig leaf for a scoundrel.



We have seen that the tension between private interest and the common good reasserts itself once the army reaches the sea. This tension will now reach a fever pitch in the wake of Xenophon’s attempt to found a city in Asia. For, as he awaits the arrival of the ships of the Sinopeans, Xenophon thinks of transforming the army into a city: “It seemed to [him] noble to increase the territory and power of Hellas,” he writes; given the soldiers’ hard-earned experience and numbers, as well as the numbers of those dwelling in the Pontos, he thought that “this city would become great” (5.6.15–16). Xenophon thus begins to offer sacrifices for this before speaking to any one of the soldiers. He calls to his side Silanos of Ambracia, formerly the soothsayer of Cyrus. Silanos, however, leaks word to the soldiers that Xenophon wishes to remain in Asia to found a city and gain “a name and power for himself” (5.6.17). In thus leaking the plan, Silanos is motivated by private interest: he wishes to arrive in Hellas as quickly as possible because he has kept safe a large sum of money he received from

⁸⁶ HECATON-ONOMA. The man claims that the Greeks will need to cross *four* rivers to reach Sinope. But the river Parthenios, which he claims is “uncrossable” (ABATOS), is situated *west* of Sinope (cf. 6.2.1). Note also the absence of OIDA (“I know”) at 5.6.9, and compare 5.6.7 and 5.6.8: Hecatōnumos does not claim to know what he reports about the rivers along the littoral. He even dubs one of these rivulets “the Tigris,” an amusing reading found in the best MSS. (see the apparatus of Hude/Peters and Dindorf for 5.6.9). When the Greeks actually see the river for themselves, it is demoted to the rank of “little tiger” (TIGRIOS: 6.2.1). The unusual spelling of Tigris at 5.6.9—TIGRĒN instead of TIGRĒTA—is also used by Herodotus (e.g., 1.189, 1.193).

Cyrus after making an accurate prediction (5.6.18 cf. 1.7.18). When the soldiers get wind of Xenophon's plan, some think it best to remain in Asia but most do not: they are not willing to bid farewell to Hellas. (We learn later that many soldiers had livelihoods and families back home [6.4.7–8]. These considerations are not mentioned here, however, because the focus of the *logos* is on the attachment to Hellas.) The widespread opposition of the soldiers creates an opening for other rulers who outline alternative plans for the army. Timasiōn the Dardanian, for example, tells the assembled soldiers that “they should not consider remaining [in Asia] nor esteem anything more highly than Hellas” (5.6.22). Timasiōn offers to lead the soldiers to the Troad and promises various spoils and a monthly wage. He is apparently intent on seizing the tyranny of his native city on the strength of the soldiers: his attachment to Hellas, genuine or feigned, does not conceal extensive political ambitions. A second ruler, Thōrax the Boeotian, also argues in the assembly against remaining in Asia in the name of Hellas and he, too, promises a wage. His ambition is equally evident (5.6.25–26).

Is Xenophon motivated by ambition when he considers founding a city in Asia? We have seen that he depicts himself as a ruler committed to the noble task of increasing the territory and power of Hellas. He does not admit to any private ambition for “name and power.”⁸⁷ But should we accept this self-presentation at face value? After all, the very readiness to remain in Asia casts something of a shadow over his attachment to Hellas. Xenophon's self-presentation appears to be designed to offset the impression left by that readiness. It seems better to assume, in other words, and more in keeping with common sense, that Xenophon is motivated by a measure of ambition, at least, when he considers founding a city in Asia: increasing “the territory and power of Hellas” does not exhaust his concerns.⁸⁸ To this line of argument, it will perhaps be objected that Xenophon does acknowledge openly his ambition for the “monarchy” of the Ten Thousand later in the *Anabasis* (6.1.20–21, §31). Why, then, is he coy about his ambition to found a city? Yet the objection overlooks that founding a city among the barbarians is a much more delicate or ambiguous ambition than exercising the monarchy of the Ten Thousand. For, let us be clear about his goal: Xenophon means to seize

⁸⁷ Xenophon claims to have been “slandered” (DIABALLEIN) by Silanos (5.6.29). But he was “slandered” only if we put words in Silanos's mouth. See chapter one, p. 43, note 10. Consider also the report of Timasiōn, who was privy to Xenophon's plan and who uses (in reporting that plan) the verbs “to wish” (BOULOIMAI) and “to will” (ETHELŌ) respectively thrice and twice (5.6.20).

⁸⁸ Recall that Xenophon had threatened to help *reduce* the territory and power of Hellas in the episode of the Kotuōritans (5.5.22–23).

an *existing* barbaric city and to colonize it.⁸⁹ He is contemplating some kind of “mixing” of Hellenism and barbarism. The projected founding would entail an ethical separation from Hellas, not just a geographic one (5.6.20, §30). Yet the readiness of Xenophon to jettison (or improve upon) the Hellenic laws is not altogether surprising: he is a sympathizer of the “Mossunoikoi,” after all, and the “Mossunoikoi” were “barbarians.”⁹⁰

Xenophon keeps silent in the assembly while he is being publicly (though only implicitly) accused by Timasiōn and Thōrax of esteeming some things more highly than Hellas (5.6.27). When a pair of other speakers accuse him explicitly of persuading in private, and of sacrificing in private, instead of bringing these issues to the assembly for open consideration, Xenophon is compelled to defend himself: “I do sacrifice, men, as you see,” he begins, “as much as I can both on your behalf and on my own in order that I may chance to say (LEGEIN), think (NOEÏN), and do (PRATTEIN) the sort of things that are going to be most noble and best both for you and for me” (5.6.28). (In other words, there is no tension between Xenophon’s private interest and the interests of the soldiers, contrary to what Silanos has suggested.) “I was just now sacrificing about this very thing,” Xenophon continues, “whether it would be better to begin to speak (LEGEIN) to you and to act (PRATTEIN) about these things, or not even to lay hold of the matter at all” (5.6.28).⁹¹ Xenophon claims to have learned the most important point from Silanos already: the sacrifices are propitious for “the matter” (TO PRĀGMA). He does not spell out what “the matter” is anywhere in his speech however—that is, what he has been “thinking” (NOEÏN) about. The closest he comes to stating his

⁸⁹ Xenophon says publicly that he had intended to seize an existing city of the Pontos (5.6.30). This is confirmed by those who report his private words: TĒS...CHŌRAS OIKOUMENĒS...HOPOI AN BOULĒSTHE KATASCHEÏN, “to seize an *inhabited* territory, wherever you wish” (5.6.20, my emphasis). In the best MSS., the verb KATOIKEŌ occurs at 5.6.15, *not* KATOIKIDZŌ, accepted by modern editors but found only in the inferior MSS. The meaning of these two verbs appears to overlap, but KATOIKIDZŌ appears to mean primarily “to found” a new city whereas KATOIKEŌ appears to mean primarily “to inhabit or colonize” an existing place (consider Aristotle, *Politics* 1266a40–1266b5, as well as the use of OIKIDZŌ at 6.6.3, where a new city is being contemplated.) Even if the Ten Thousand were to found an altogether new city, they would have to find wives among the locals, with predictable results: cf. 3.2.25 with *Genesis* 31.19ff. See also Herodotus 1.146.2.

⁹⁰ Xenophon uses the word “the matter” (TO PRĀGMA) to refer to his project to found a city among the barbarians (5.6.28). He then uses the same word with great frequency to refer to a series of *transgressions* of the Hellenic laws: 5.7.12, 5.7.18, 5.7.20, 5.7.22, 5.7.23, 5.8.7.

⁹¹ Strauss (1983) comments: “This means in plain English that [Xenophon] did not consult the sacrifices regarding the advisability of *thinking* about founding a city” (p. 125, my emphasis).

thought is to acknowledge that he had intended to seize an existing city to relieve the poverty of the soldiers, who could then sail home if they wished, leaving the rest of the army to follow at a later point. But the plan to *remain* in Asia is never acknowledged publicly (5.6.30 cf. 5.6.20).

Xenophon goes on to state that he has had a change of mind: since the local cities are sending transport ships, and since Timasiōn and Thōrax are promising a wage, “it seems to me noble to arrive safe where we wish to go, and to receive a wage for our very difficulties, and I myself give up that thought (DIANOIA), and I say to those who used to come to me saying that we ought to undertake it that they need to give it up as well” (5.6.31). Xenophon gives up his “thought” almost as soon as he conceives it. This is the result not of irresolution but of superior prudence: the projected founding threatens the unity and, therefore, the safety and well-being of the army (5.6.32).⁹² For, if the power of the Ten Thousand is scattered, they will lose their ability to get provisions and “you will not depart from [Asia] rejoicing” (5.6.32). Xenophon is attracted to rarefied political prospects but never loses sight of the more prosaic components of the good. At no point is his survey of the political landscape dulled or dazzled by such prospects, and he accepts their loss with dignity and self-composure.⁹³ It would be excessive to claim, however, that he was not a bit disappointed.⁹⁴ To found a city would have been a signal achievement—the peak of his political anabasis. Yet the good fortune of human beings is envied by the gods.⁹⁵ Was the ascent of Xenophon thwarted by heaven?

Timasiōn and Thōrax had promised a wage to the soldiers on the strength of a secret promise by the Sinopeans and the Hērakleōtans to send them funds. Yet once it becomes known that the army has decided to go back to Hellas and that Xenophon himself has put the proposal to

⁹² Xenophon had to abandon his ambition for another reason as well: the requisite ships would not have been sent by the Sinopeans and the Hērakleōtans had he declared his intentions and abided by them. They did not wish for the Ten Thousand to remain permanently in Asia.

⁹³ Xenophon leverages the loss of his prospects to shore up the unity of the army (5.6.33–34). He gets the army to decree that it will be a crime (ADIKOS) for individuals to leave before the entire host is safe. The Ten Thousand do not form a liberal community existing solely for the sake of the all-important individual. The removal of any individual weakens the whole. The reader should also compare 5.6.12–14 with 5.6.32–33: either the Greeks will become slaves in Asia (if they allow their power to be splintered) or they must be slaves to the law (to preserve their power): slavery is a political inevitability (cf. *Memorabilia* 2.1).

⁹⁴ Cf. 5.6.28: “[TA] KALLISTA KAI ARISTA” with 5.6.31: “KALON MOI DOKEI EĪNAI.” To give up the project to found a city is to abandon “the best things” (my emphasis). In keeping with this, Xenophon is compelled (ĒNAGKASTHĒ) to make the speech in which he gives up his project (5.6.27).

⁹⁵ Herodotus 8.109, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 982b32. Cf. *Memorabilia* 3.9.8

a vote, the cities send the ships but not the money.⁹⁶ They no longer fear a permanent settlement of the host in Asia. Timasiōn and Thōrax, unable to fulfill their promise to the soldiers, become terrified of them. They impart their secret dealings to the other generals. (A general named Neōn is not informed, however.⁹⁷) And they go to Xenophon and confess that they regret what has happened. Since the ships have arrived, they say, it seems best to them to sail eastward and seize the land of the Phasians. They rally Xenophon's plan belatedly. Yet Xenophon refuses to speak to the army: "But if you wish," he says, "*you* gather the army and speak to it" (5.6.37). Timasiōn then "shows the judgment" *not* to call an assembly, but that each general should first attempt to persuade his own captains (5.6.37). And they go and do these things.

The attempt to persuade the captains secretly was bound to be leaked to the soldiers. When it becomes known by them, Neōn immediately accuses Xenophon of persuading the other generals and of having it in mind to lead the soldiers back to the Phasis after deceiving them (5.7.1). Of course, the accusation is false. Yet it has every appearance of being true. Xenophon has just admitted publicly that he once wished to sail into the Phasis. When Xenophon notices angry gatherings of soldiers, he immediately calls together an assembly and states that he hears that "someone is slandering me" (5.7.5). "Hear me, before the gods," Xenophon exclaims, "and if I appear to have manifestly done an injustice I must not leave this place before I pay the penalty. On the other hand, if the injustice is being manifestly done by those who slander me, you need to deal with them as they deserve" (5.7.5). Xenophon speaks as if he is about to turn the assembly into a court of law assembled for the purpose of trying the generals. Yet he defends himself in the sequel without accusing the generals, as he himself stresses (5.7.4).

Xenophon demonstrates with the greatest of ease the foolishness of supposing that he, a single man, might be able to deceive thousands of soldiers and lead them against their will into the Phasis. He would literally have to convince them that the sun rises where it sets and sets where it rises. And if he did lead them eastward, he could not possibly escape punishment when these armed men reached destination and realized that they had been deceived. In reality (Xenophon says) he is being slandered by men who are foolish and by the envious, because he is honored by the soldiers. Yet this envy is not just, he insists, and he explains why. Yet Xenophon never accuses the generals, as I just noted, nor does he identify Neōn as the author of the slander. Why not? After all, the

⁹⁶ Cf. 5.6.35: Apparently, only the Hērakleōtans were false to their promise.

⁹⁷ The name "Neōn" and his city of origin are variously spelled in the MSS. I suspect that he was originally renamed "The-One-Who-Remains-Blameless" (MENŌNOS ASINEŌS: see the *apparata* of Masqueray and Dindorf for 5.6.36).

generals *had been* plotting secretly against the soldiers, and Neōn, though an unwitting slanderer, was evidently ill-intentioned toward Xenophon. Why not accuse them all publicly? The answer, I believe, is that an accusation would have shattered the soldiers' remaining confidence in their rulers. Though the generals had been deceptive, a public accusation was sure to elicit counteraccusations. And since the plot could not be established by indisputable evidence, any "trial" would have turned into a bout of mudslinging. A generalized loss of confidence would have been the inevitable result at a time when the troops were already inclined to act as "self-appointed generals" (5.6.29). Xenophon was attempting to stave off a descent into chaos.

Is my reading too sympathetic to Xenophon? After all, his refusal to accuse the generals publicly had the effect of shoring up the authority of a group of rulers among whom he was preminent. Was Xenophon perhaps more concerned with the continuation of his own rule than with the good of the army? The second half of his speech allays this suspicion in a striking manner.

Upon concluding his defense against the slander,⁹⁸ Xenophon says that when the soldiers have had their fill of these things, they should not depart before he tells them the kind of matter he sees developing in the army. If it continues, he says, this matter will turn them all into "the worst and most shameful men in the eyes of gods and human beings and of their enemies" (5.7.12).⁹⁹ Xenophon turns his defense into an attack.¹⁰⁰ The second half of his speech details a series of lawless actions perpetrated by various groups of soldiers. These actions include (among others) a thuggish night attack on a small and friendly village; a stoning to death of three elderly heralds who had come to the army for a peaceful parley; an attack and subsequent drowning of Hellenic envoys; a hunting down of a market manager pursued "like a wild boar or a deer" (5.7.24). These actions were not only transgressions of the army's own laws or decrees.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Though Xenophon's defense is completely successful, it does not answer every part of the original slander. That slander was twofold: (1) Xenophon has *persuaded* the other generals; (2) Xenophon has it in mind to lead the soldiers back to the Phasis after *deceiving* them (5.7.1). Xenophon defends himself only against the charge of deception. Having done so, he "forgets" about the charge of persuasion, makes a deliberate pause and, in a deft rhetorical move, offers to gratify the curiosity of the soldiers—a curiosity he has himself kindled—thus enabling himself to move on seamlessly (5.7.12). Xenophon cannot easily address the charge of persuasion without exposing the duplicitous part played in the affair by Timasiōn and the other generals.

⁹⁹ With the best MSS., I omit the word "friends" at 5.7.12: the Ten Thousand have become incapable of friendship with anyone.

¹⁰⁰ Strauss (1983) pp. 126–27.

¹⁰¹ In his speech, Xenophon refers to the assembly of the Ten Thousand as "TO KOINON" (5.7.17, §18). But in his narrative, he refers to it as the "AGORA" (5.7.3, 2X).

They were breaches of hallowed Hellenic laws. And they were so numerous and extensive that it will be thought proper to purify the army following Xenophon's speech (5.7.35). Yet here again, the speech is remarkable for what it *omits*: Xenophon makes no call to put on trial the soldiers who were involved in these incidents. The omission is especially noteworthy given that he had made just such a call in the preceding chapter (5.6.33–34). And even in the present speech, Xenophon deplores that an alleged wrongdoer has perhaps gotten off “without a trial” (AKRITOS: 5.7.29; see also 5.7.28). Yet he ends his speech with a modest suggestion: “consider putting some stop to these [lawless actions]” (SKOPEÏTE PAÛLAN TINA AUTŌN: 5.7.32). Why not propose trials? The answer, I believe, is that the culprits were simply too numerous to be tried safely.

Let me spell out this suggestion. The good of the army and the demands of (punitive) justice are irreconcilable in this case. The military power of the Ten Thousand must be preserved if they are to be able to secure the provisions they need and ward off hostile threats. Yet they will destroy their power if they turn on each other and begin to execute one another judicially (cf. 5.7.32 *in fine*). Capital trials on a large scale—assuming such trials could be organized at all—would have led to the downright implosion of the army at a time when lawlessness had multiplied the enemies of the Ten Thousand even among the Hellenes (cf. 5.7.30). The Ten Thousand could not afford to thin their ranks in this way.

Should Xenophon have sought to punish the transgressions of the Hellenic laws despite the risks involved? *Fiat justitia, et pereat mundus*. Yet by attempting to try the culprits, Xenophon would have shattered the common good, as we just saw. And isn't the common good a crucial meaning of justice? Does an action that destroys the common good deserve to be called a just action? To attain justice entire is impossible in this case because justice is at odds with itself. *Fiat justitia* expresses a contradictory imperative. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that justice entire requires divine providence. Only a god at once powerful, just, and willing to fight on behalf of the Ten Thousand could enable them to try the culprits without shattering the common good. Yet according to Xenophon, *no one* is fighting on behalf of the Ten Thousand.¹⁰² The Socratic King must ensure that they can carry out this task for themselves.

What is happening to the AGORA of the Ten Thousand is illustrated by the utter inability of the market managers—the “AGORANOMOI”—to apply the law. The Ten Thousand have become an “AGORA” without a “NOMOS” (5.7.2, 5.7.24–25).

¹⁰² That Zeus does not rule or fight on behalf of the Greeks, and that he remains passive in the face of injustice and fails to support the just, is suggested repeatedly: 5.7.22, 5.7.32, 5.8.6 and, above all, 5.8.21. The passage on envy (PHTHONOS: 5.7.10–12), located as it were in the middle of the two parts of Xenophon's apology, is also important here. This

The assembly's reaction to Xenophon's speech is remarkable. All rise to their feet and say that the men who began the lawlessness must pay the penalty. In the future, to begin lawlessness will no longer be permitted and those who make a beginning of it shall be punished with death. The generals shall put all these men on trial. There shall also be trials for any wrong committed since the time of Cyrus's death. The captains are made jurors. Yet this is the first and the last we hear of soldiers being put on trial. The chapter ends on an exhortation of Xenophon, who, supported by the soothsayers, urges the assembly to purify the army. "And the purification took place" (5.7.35). Only the purification. The army was cleansed of its sins in a manner that was consistent with its safety. While the Ten Thousand—many of whom had committed serious crimes—hankered for punitive justice, Xenophon—who had committed no crime—felt no such hankering.

4. Justice and the Good

The soldiers now gratify their suspicions of, and their animosities toward, their generals. The assembly resolves that all the generals shall undergo a trial for their past conduct. Three generals are fined for breaches of duty. Xenophon himself is accused of having struck men without necessity, that is, he is charged with hubris (5.8.1).¹⁰³ (It is crucial to recall here that Socrates was accused by the Athenians of making his pupils hubristic. The accusation reflected a charge leveled in Aristophanes's *Clouds*.¹⁰⁴) Xenophon faces his accusers. He asks the first one to say where

passage must be read on two levels. First, it is a reply to Neōn and the others who slander Xenophon partly out of envy. But we must also think of divine envy. The passage calls to mind a notion familiar to Greek piety: the gods are envious of the good fortune of human beings. We are meant to consider that Xenophon's ascent was perhaps thwarted by heaven. He is replying to this putative envy, too, I believe, when he describes it as unjust: "Whom among them do I hinder from speaking with a view to some good among you, if anyone is able, or from fighting on our behalf and his own if he is willing, or from being wakeful about our safety, if he cares to be?" (5.7.10, my emphasis; I follow the best MSS.; see also Strauss [1983], p. 126). Xenophon is even willing to cede his place to the envious deity: "Let him rule, I yield. Only let it be clear that he is doing us some good." (In support of my interpretation, observe how Xenophon begins his speech with an ostentatious reference to the gods: "Hear me, then, before the gods..." [PROS THEŌN: 5.7.5, my emphasis]: the speech is delivered within the hearing of the gods and is in a way addressed to them.) Xenophon's view of divine envy is well captured by a somewhat mischievous remark of Aristotle: *Metaphysics* 983a2–4 and context. That a Godlike King can be superior to the gods from the point of view of envy is suggested by *Education of Cyrus* 2.3.12.

¹⁰³ The accusation is a GRAPHĒ HUBREŌS. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1402a1–3.

¹⁰⁴ *Clouds* 1298, 1505. Kritias and, especially, Alcibiades later provided real-life illustrations of the problem: *Memorabilia* 1.2.12–48 (as well as 1.2.9–11).

he received the blows. The incident had occurred in the mountains of Armenia, when the army was marching through deep snow and the soldiers were hungry and dying of cold and exhaustion. Xenophon had compelled the man now accusing him to carry a soldier who was too weak to march. Xenophon had then encountered the same man again, a bit later, as he was digging a grave and about to bury the soldier in question. Xenophon had stopped and praised the digger for his act of piety—until he observed that the “dead” soldier could move his leg! “And so I beat you,” Xenophon admits, “you are telling the truth, since you seemed to me like someone who knew that the man was alive.” “So what?” the accuser retorts, “Did he die any less after I showed him to you?” “We all will die,” Xenophon shoots back, “must we on this account be buried alive” (5.8.10–11)? At that point the assembled soldiers cry out that the accuser was struck with too few blows. Thereupon Xenophon bids the other accusers say why each of them was beaten. But no one is willing to stand up and accuse Xenophon anymore. He therefore goes on the offensive once again: “I agree, men, that I did beat men” (5.8.13). His apology purports to justify these beatings.

Xenophon makes clear that he used his fists in three different kinds of cases. First, he would strike soldiers who were content to be saved by the army’s orderliness and discipline while they themselves left the ranks to snatch plunder and get more for themselves. “And if all of us had done this, we would all have been destroyed” (5.8.13). The common good uniting the Ten Thousand is at all times an imperfect good, and free riders must be kept from exploiting this imperfection. Second, Xenophon used his fists to compel individuals, who were going soft and abandoning themselves to the enemy, to get up (5.8.14–15). These incidents occurred during the Armenian winter. Xenophon had sat down once in a bad storm waiting a long time for others who were packing up. Afterward he learned that he could hardly stand up and stretch his legs. Having gained this experience in his own case, he would drive away anyone he saw sitting in the snow and being lazy. The third kind of cases involved lackadaisical individuals who fell behind and hindered the forward march of the army (5.8.16–17).

“My argument is simple,” Xenophon says. “If I punished anyone for the good, I deserve to suffer the same penalty as parents do who punish their sons, and as teachers do who punish their pupils. And doctors, too, burn and cut for the good” (5.8.18). Xenophon deserves to be honored like a father or a teacher, and rewarded like a doctor. But what does it mean to say that he beat the soldiers “for the good” (EPI AGATHŌ)? It means that he beat the soldiers for the good of the army—think of the first kind of cases—though these beatings were obviously *not* good for

the free riders themselves. In the third kind of cases, too—stragglers hindering the march of the host—the beatings were good for the army and (unlike the first kind of cases) perhaps even for the stragglers themselves: “I struck them with my fists so that they would not be struck by the spear of the enemies” (5.8.16). The most interesting and revealing kind of cases, however, is the second and central kind. Xenophon beat soldiers in order to get them to stand up. He knew¹⁰⁵ that in the dead of winter, sitting idly on the frozen ground would cause “curdling of the blood and rotting away of one’s toes” (5.8.15). Xenophon beat soldiers for their own good. Just like a doctor whose treatment, though painful, is of benefit to the patient, Xenophon is guided not by the law but by the good—by his *knowledge* of the good. He justifies his beatings of the soldiers and to the soldiers much like Pheidippidēs justifies his beating of his father to Strepsiadēs: the knower can justly beat the nonknower for his own good.¹⁰⁶ Like a consummate Socratic, Xenophon looks down on bad or harmful laws.¹⁰⁷ In the *logos* of the *Anabasis*, book five ends like book four and book three, pointing to the primacy of the good of the army.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Xenophon uses the word KATEMATHON (“I knew” or “I learned”) at 5.8.14, as well as the phrase (in reference to the soldiers) KAI HUMEIS ISTE (“you too know”) at 5.8.15.

¹⁰⁶ *Clouds* 1321–1438; cf. *Memorabilia* 1.2.49–50.

¹⁰⁷ *Clouds* 1400; *Memorabilia* 1.2.9–11. To be sure, Xenophon’s defense is much more persuasive than Pheidippidēs’s. In the first place, he casts himself, in his relation to the army, in the role of the benevolent father rather than that of the ungrateful son. Besides, the benefits Xenophon conferred upon the soldiers were manifest and tangible (if also painful), whereas the “benefits” conferred upon Strepsiadēs were dubious at best. Hence, Xenophon can persuasively appeal to the common opinion, which belongs to ordinary morality, that a law must be good in order to be a law; otherwise, it is perhaps neither a law nor binding (cf. Alcibiades’s refutation of Pericles’s view of law at *Memorabilia* 1.2.42.) Moreover, Xenophon reminds his audience that the Armenian winter was exceedingly difficult and unforgiving (5.8.20). Under normal circumstances—when the Ten Thousand enjoy “fair weather”—Xenophon, too, abides by the law that prohibits beatings (5.8.19). Yet it is noteworthy that Xenophon does not invoke ANAGKĒ to justify or excuse himself (cf. his defense at 5.5.16, §17; also §22). The harsh Armenian winter was *not* his justification. Rather, it helped illuminate the principle underlying his habitual observance of the law.

¹⁰⁸ Book four and book five share a deeper similarity. The purpose of chapter 5.8 is identical to the purpose of chapter 4.8 (i.e., the episode of the Kolchoi). Both these books culminate in scenes that adumbrate the primacy of the good (of the army), and both link this primacy to the question of the gods. Note what Xenophon says to the soldiers at the end of chapter 5.8:

You have also judged that I struck [the bad soldiers] justly: you were there with swords, not pebbles, and it was possible for you to come to their aid if you wished. *But, by Zeus, you did not come to their aid, nor did you assist me in striking whoever was out of order.* You therefore gave license to the bad among them, since you allowed them to be insolent. (5.8.21, my emphasis)

To complete his defense, Xenophon argues that the soldiers themselves have judged that his beatings were just.¹⁰⁹ For, they were present when the beatings took place and could have come to the aid of the soldiers who were being struck. But they did not. Nor did they assist Xenophon in striking whoever was disorderly. They therefore gave license to the bad among the soldiers and allowed them to be hubristic.¹¹⁰

Xenophon ends his apology by once again turning the tables on the soldiers. For it is the soldiers who deserve to be put on trial for hubris (he implies) insofar as to indict a benefactor for his very benefaction is hubris.¹¹¹ It is also a form of ingratitude:

But I am amazed that if I am hateful to anyone among you, you recall it and do not stay silent, but if for anyone I lightened the burden of winter, or kept an enemy away, or joined in providing something for one who was weak or at a loss, no one recalls it; nor if I praised someone who acted nobly or if I honored as well as I was able anyone who was good, you recall nothing of it. And yet it is noble, just, pious, and more pleasant to recall the good things more than the bad.

Then they got up and began recalling them, and all ended well. (5.8.25–26)¹¹²

The book of justice—which has featured more than one melancholy episode of wrongdoing—ends attractively with the soldiers expressing their gratitude to Xenophon.

The soldiers stood by while Xenophon beat the bad soldiers. They thereby granted the justice of his beatings. The inaction of the soldiers mirrored the inaction of the bystander-in-chief. For the oath of Xenophon is meant to suggest what was also suggested by the epilogue to the fight with the Kolchoi: Zeus concedes, by his inaction, that deeds that are lawless but good are just or not unjust. More generally, Zeus alone can anchor an obligation to a law that is bad or harmful.

¹⁰⁹ Xenophon never quite says that his beatings were just. He even almost acknowledges that some of his beatings were “contrary to what is just” (5.8.17). And although he goes on to insist that the soldiers, by their inaction, have conceded the justice of the beatings, he does not quite claim as much in his own name (5.8.21).

¹¹⁰ Xenophon gives the example of the boxer Boiskos, whom he was apparently unable to curb with his fists.

¹¹¹ Addressing the Ten Thousand, Xenophon repeatedly uses the contrafactual formula “if you are moderate” (5.8.24). Moderation (SŌPHROSUNĒ) is the opposite of hubris (e.g., *Memorabilia* 1.2.19. ff., 3.10.5). To be ungrateful toward a parent is a form of immoderation, and Xenophon compares himself to a father (*Memorabilia* 2.2.13–14). For the deeper meaning of the comparison to the father, see chapter three, pp. 122, note 36.

¹¹² Translation by Ambler (2008).

“THE SOCRATIC KING” (CONTD.)

CHAPTER 6

GRATITUDE (BOOK SIX OF THE *ANABASIS*)

The closing words of Xenophon in book five provide a most perfect transition to book six, the book of gratitude. Xenophon will now analyze how he conjoins or reconciles, as a ruler, the demands of gratitude with the exigencies of safety and advantage. Thus we continue to follow the plan of Part III: piety (book three), courage (book four), justice (book five), gratitude (book six), and the love of the soldier (book seven). Yet book five and book six are more closely connected than any of the earlier or later books. In the introduction, I noted that each of the books of the *Anabasis* (after book one) begins with a summary of the preceding *logos*. No such summary is affixed to book six. The transition between book five and book six is seamless.¹ Xenophon thus brings it about that these two books constitute a single stage or moment in the *logos* of Part III, itself the most important stage of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. What gives this pair of books their stage unity? They are united by their themes. Though justice (book five) and gratitude (book six) are distinguishable virtues, they are not fully separable: gratitude is a part of justice.² The analysis of gratitude thus continues the analysis of justice.³ More precisely, book six analyzes

¹ Book five and book six are even connected syntactically by a “MEN...DE” clause: the last line of book five begins with “EK TOUTOU MEN”; the first line of book six begins with “EK TOUTOU DE.” See the useful discussion of Høeg (1950) p. 164.

² In a conversation with the admittedly limited Hippias, Socrates suggests that it is both just and lawful everywhere to do good to those who have treated one well: *Memorabilia* 4.4.24 (and context). See also *Symposium* 4.2–3.

³ The theme of justice remains conspicuous at the beginning of book six: 6.1.1 (read together with 6.1.2–3). The “most just men” mentioned at 6.1.3 seem to be those who live from the market (AGORA) as opposed to those who go out for plunder (6.1.1). The purpose of inviting these most just men to dinner is thus to honor and encourage what they

an aspect of what we can call prepolitical morality. For since the army of the Ten Thousand never transforms itself into a city, the concept of law, and thus of justice, never comes fully into its own. Gratitude is a nascent expression of justice and operates as a partial substitute for it, not unlike the Hellenic laws. Moreover, since justice remains in a sense the theme of book six, the question of founding, closely linked to the theme of law, remains important here as well.⁴

1. Gratitude, Dancing, and Philosophy

Thus, in the tightest circle, that girds
the universe's center, seat of Dis,
all traitors are consumed eternally.

Dante, *Inferno* (Canto XI)

When we turn to book six, we are confronted with a perplexing difficulty. The book opens with a symposium (6.1.1–13). The bulk of that episode contains an extensive description of five dances performed by Hellenic and non-Hellenic soldiers. Why does the book of gratitude begin with an elaborate scene of dancing?

The scene in question serves several purposes in the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. First, it deepens the analysis of Hellenism begun in book five (and book three). The dances depicted therein shed light on how Hellenism differs from barbarism, that is, how Hellenism and barbarism each reconciles (or fails to reconcile) the imperatives of freedom with the imperatives of civilization. And as we will see, the five dances in question bring to light the virtues or qualities that are especially esteemed by Hellenic and barbaric stocks. Second, the dances illuminate the diversity *within* Hellenism. For Hellenism is not a monolithic notion but includes disparate or conflicting manifestations, some superior to others. Indeed, insofar as it is the conflicts *within* Hellenism that cause the greatest difficulties to the Ten Thousand in book six, the scene of dancing is an apt opening for it.⁵ Yet neither of these two reasons explains why the book of gratitude begins with a scene of dancing. Are we to remember here that intra-Hellenic divisions will cause the breakup of the army, and that during this breakup

embody: cf. *Education of Cyrus* 2.1.30. Note also that like book five, book six ends with a trial, or something resembling a trial (6.6.19–34).

⁴ Gratitude exists in the “state of nature” and prefigures the coming-into-being of justice. Gratitude is not dependent on law and the city, or not nearly as dependent on them as justice is: cf. Machiavelli (1996) 1.2.3. See also *Memorabilia* 2.2.1–3. Regarding the question of founding, see 6.4.1–8 and 6.6.1–4.

⁵ In book six, the army clashes with Sparta for the first time: intra-Hellenic divisions begin to affect *external* relations, not just the internal dynamics of the army (6.6).

the soldiers will prove ungrateful to Xenophon (6.2.9–12)? But perhaps it is best to analyze the scene of dancing first, before we attempt to answer our question. To anticipate, we will discover that according to Xenophon, “dancing” is a solution to the problem of ingratitude.



The symposium opens with a sacrifice to the gods (6.1.4). The Hellenes feast and drink with Paphlagonian guests with whom they wish to conclude a truce (SPONDĒ). They pour libations and sing a paean. Then the entertainment begins. The first performance is conducted by the Thracians (6.1.5–6).⁶ They dance to the air of the flute with their weapons on. The Thracians leap high and nimbly, brandishing their swords. The end or climax (TELOS) of the dance is a physical beating: one man strikes another and apparently kills him (he does not kill him, however). He then strips his victim of his weapons. The show is obviously barbaric. Nevertheless, the Paphlagonians in attendance like what they see. They bellow “bravos!” The Thracians are able to please the Paphlagonians because they, too, are barbaric. Both tribes esteem raw strength and vigor. The Thracians have remained unconquered through the cultivation of these specific qualities—they sing their own national anthem⁷—but they do not cultivate beauty much. They are stragglers and robbers who partake neither of civilization nor of genuine freedom.

The second dance is conducted by the Thessalians (6.1.7–8).⁸ It is called the *Karpaia*—“The Fruits of the Earth”—and it, too, is performed with weapons on. A man puts his weapons aside and begins to sow and plow. He looks over his shoulder frequently as if in fear. A robber approaches. When the plowman sees him, he grabs his weapons and fights in front of his team of oxen. This is done to the rhythm of the flute. In the end or climax (TELOS) of the dance, the robber ties up the plowman and leads away his oxen. Yet sometimes the plowman has the upper hand and ties up the robber and drives off. The dance reflects the backward state of Thessaly. Though formally Hellenic and more civilized than Thrace, Thessaly is a territory that lacks security. (The dance is performed *rhythmically*⁹ and celebrates agriculture rather than force in the

⁶ The Thracians were part of Klearchos’s original contingent: 1.2.9.

⁷ The Thracian leaves the stage singing the “Sitalcas” (6.1.6). Sitalcas was a Thracian founder and king (Thucydides, 2.29).

⁸ The Thessalians are from Aeniania and Magnēsia. The Aenianians were part of Menōn’s original contingent: 1.2.6.

⁹ Whereas the Thracians dance to the air of the flute (PROS AULON), the Thessalians perform *rhythmically* to the air of the flute (EN RUTHMŌ PROS TON AULON).

service of rapine.) The “Fruits of the Earth” belong to the stronger. The arts of war still prevail over the arts of peace. The dance elicits no reaction from the spectators. Xenophon does not praise it.

The attentive reader expects that the third dance of the evening will depict Hellenism at its peak. For, the performances hitherto have followed an ascending order: barbarism (Thracians) and primitive Hellenism (Thessalians). Yet this expectation is met only belatedly by the fourth dance. The anomalous third and central dance of the evening is performed by a non-Hellenic Mysian (6.1.9–10). The dancer comes onstage holding a small shield in each hand. He starts dancing, pretending at one point to fend off two people drawn up against him, at another using his shields as if against one, at yet another he whirls about and somersaults while holding his shields, “so that the sight appeared beautiful” (KALOS: 6.1.9).¹⁰ This is the only one of the five dances that Xenophon praises as appearing beautiful in his own name. In the end or climax (TELOS), the Mysian performs a Persian dance whose central movement is “a bowing of the knee” (OKLADZŌ).¹¹ The Mysians cultivate beauty more artfully than either the Thracians or the Thessalians. They are civilized. But they are deficient in manliness and martial valor. Hence our Mysian dances with a shield in each hand. He bears no offensive weapon. He is better at warding off blows than at landing them.¹² The people of Mysia “bow the knee” before the Persian King because of these martial deficiencies. They are civilized but unfree.

Xenophon’s appreciation of the unmartial beauty of the Mysian dance sets him apart from all the other spectators, Hellenes and non-Hellenes. For the Mysian receives no applause. He is even chased off the stage by some Mantinean and Arcadian Greeks who are disgusted by his slavish dance and blind to its superior aesthetic merits.¹³ The Mantineans and the Arcadians (close neighbors of the Spartans) perform the fourth dance

Rhythm is also mentioned in the Mysian dance and in the Arcadian dance—a *martial* rhythm in the latter case (6.1.11).

¹⁰ MSS. FM read “so that the sight was manifestly beautiful” (6.1.9).

¹¹ OKLADZŌ is a rare word. It occurs only once elsewhere in Xenophon, I believe, to refer to a horse “bending the hind legs.” The horse does this movement to let a rider mount it (*On Horsemanship* 11.3)!

¹² The deficient armament of the Mysian does not prevent him from “pretending to use his shields [offensively] against one [man]” (6.1.9). This occurs at the center of the part of the dance that precedes the TELOS. But how do you land blows with a pair of shields? A fine example of Xenophon’s deadpan humor. The Mysian is the antithesis of Cyrus, who goes into battle with a javelin in each hand but without a shield (1.8.3). For Socrates’s affinity with the Mysian in this respect: *Memorabilia* 3.10.9.

¹³ Xenophon writes that the Mantineans “attack” (EPIONTES) the Mysian dancer, a funny and authentic reading characteristically expunged by the incautious Cobet (6.1.11).

(6.1.11). They have armed themselves as beautifully as they could. They move onstage to a martial rhythm, sing a paean, and dance as they would in the processions to the gods (6.1.11). Their dance mixes pious reverence and martial valor: freedom and civilization are reconciled in Hellenism at its peak, insofar as they can be reconciled, in and through service to the gods. For, the Hellenes bow to the gods and only to the gods, unlike the Mysians, who bow to the King (3.2.13). But Xenophon does not praise the Arcadian or “Spartan” dance. It is not nearly as beautiful as the Mysian dance. Nor does Xenophon state the end or climax of the dance—the only instance where he omits the TELOS (6.1.11).¹⁴

The Paphlagonian spectators are struck that all the dances so far have been performed with weapons on. Seeing their astonishment¹⁵, the unsuccessful Mysian resolves to put on a second show. For, he wants applause. So he tries again (6.1.12–13). This time, however, he changes his strategy. He borrows a female slave dancer from one of the Arcadians¹⁶ and dresses her as beautifully as he can manage, giving her a light shield. The woman dances nimbly the so-called Pyrrhic, an emphatically martial dance.¹⁷ And though she is a female and a slave—an unmanly and unmartial performer if ever there was one—her dance is the biggest hit of the evening, eliciting much applause. Xenophon goes so far as to write that the dance in question is the end or climax of the entire night (Τῆ ΜΕΝ ΝΥΚΤΙ ΤΑΥΤῇ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ: 6.1.13). The martial movements and the martial garb of the woman cause the audience to forget about—nay, to embrace enthusiastically—her unmanly and unmartial inner nature.

What is the meaning of the TELOS of the night for the *logos* of the *Anabasis*? To answer this question, recall that Xenophon presents Socrates as a dancer in the *Symposium*.¹⁸ Xenophon is known to use “dancing” as a metaphor for “philosophizing.” The scene of dancing in the *Anabasis* is, I believe, a quiet but illuminating analysis of how to present philosophy

¹⁴ Does Xenophon omit the TELOS because the peak of Hellenism is obvious—the gods? The deeper reason is stated in note 26, below.

¹⁵ “Astonishment” translates a passive form of the verb ΠΛῆσσῶ (“to strike”: 6.1.12). ΠΛῆσσῶ occurs one more time in the scene, at 6.1.5. There a Thracian strikes another man physically and apparently kills him: to win applause, the Mysian dancer must “strike” his audience with a show that is cruder or less genuinely beautiful than the first one he presented. But the first show was a failure. It elicited no applause. This is a crucial point that bears directly on the character of the self-presentation of the philosopher Xenophon in the *Anabasis*.

¹⁶ That the woman is a slave belonging to an Arcadian reminds us that Hellenism—even or precisely Hellenism at its peak—achieves freedom at a cost.

¹⁷ The Pyrrhic is described by Plato: *Laws* 815a1–b3. See also Aristophanes, *Birds* 1169.

¹⁸ *Symposium* 2.15–20.

attractively to a Hellenic public that esteems manliness, piety, and martial valor above all other qualities. For philosophy is (we might say) an unmanly cultivation of beauty.¹⁹ It is “Mysian.” As such, it is unattractive to a Hellenic public.²⁰ How does one win applause for philosophy? Dress it in a martial garb. Put weapons on it, and make it go through a martial “dance.” This is exactly what Xenophon did in the *Anabasis*. He dressed *himself* in a martial garb. The final dance of the evening gives us the principle of Xenophon’s self-presentation in the *Anabasis*: he depicts himself as a virtuous soldier to earn a measure of toleration and even applause for philosophy. He conceals his philosophic “dancing” or gives that “dancing” an attractive public presentation.²¹

To develop this thought: Xenophon’s rhetorical strategy in the *Anabasis* is to make himself, or his military virtues and accomplishments, a bridge between philosophy and the cities of Hellas. He depicts himself, as much as possible or desirable, as someone who shares the concerns, qualities, and traits of military and political types. Hence he contrives to create the impression that he yearns for a political life and is ready to leave Socrates for Cyrus.²² At the same time, however, he celebrates Socrates. In the

¹⁹ Xenophon does not list manliness (ANDREIA) among the virtues of Socrates: *Memorabilia* 4.8.11.

²⁰ Consider, for example, Callicles’s attack on philosophy as an unmanly pursuit: *Gorgias* 484c4ff., esp. 485b7–e2.

²¹ See also note 15, above. That the slave woman who dances the Pyrrhic is an embodiment of philosophy under arms is confirmed by the penultimate line of the episode. The Paphlagonian spectators, astonished by the performance of the woman, ask the Greeks whether even the women fight alongside them: “And they said that they were the very ones who had driven the King from the camp” (6.1.13). This Hellenic boast refers to an earlier scene of the *Anabasis*, where Greek attendants defend their camp against the King and his troops (1.10.2–3). The meaning of the boast is clear on one level: *even* women are able to rout Persian troops. On another level, however, the boast is odd. The women in question—a pair of Hellenic mistresses of Cyrus—are *not* shown to fight at all. They are completely vulnerable. One of the women barely escapes the grip of the Persians, almost naked, while the other—a Phocaean said to be “wise and beautiful”—is actually captured by them (1.10.2). Why does Xenophon refer back to this scene? It emphatically does *not* prove the martial valor of Greek women. The explanation for the reference, I believe, is this: Xenophon wants the reader to think of the female slave dancer of the Pyrrhic (6.1.12–13) alongside the mistresses of Cyrus. While the female slave dancer is armed, the mistresses are defenseless. But otherwise their inner nature is the same. Why is this important? Because one mistress is said to be “*wise* and beautiful” (SOPHOS: 1.10.2, my emphasis). The *only* other reference to wisdom in the entire *Anabasis* is to the wisdom of Marsyas-Socrates (SOPHIA: 1.2.8). In other words, the female slave dancer is an embodiment of the wisdom of philosophy under arms; she is a literary stand-in for Xenophon. Note also that Cyrus is given an erotic connection to wisdom through his “wise” mistress. Why? In the *Anabasis*, Cyrus is somehow *the* embodiment of “ascending.” See pp. 299–300.

²² See chapter three, pp. 113–17.

Anabasis, Xenophon depicts his own accomplishments in a way that is bound to elicit the respect and the admiration of the military and political types, while he indicates that, these successes notwithstanding, Socrates is superior to him, even a primary cause of the successes in question (3.1.5–8). Xenophon thereby instills in the cities of Hellas and their leaders, if not an acknowledgment of the superiority of philosophy, then at least a measure of toleration for it. Stated differently: the *Anabasis* makes the freedom of Hellas more accepting of the highest manifestation of civilization—philosophy.

The foregoing interpretation conveys the most important meaning of the TELOS of the night of dancing for the *logos* of the *Anabasis*. And as I show in Appendix 1, this interpretation provides the key to solving a never-resolved problem in Xenophon scholarship: Why does our author present himself under the pseudonym of “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” at *Hellenika* 3.1.2? Yet my interpretation of the TELOS of the night has yet to explain why “dancing” is linked to gratitude at the outset of book six of the *Anabasis*. To solve this riddle, we need to recall the reason why a rhetorical defense of philosophy is needed in the first place.

I have hitherto argued on the basis of the assumption that philosophy is unattractive to a Hellenic public. But in fact philosophy is objectionable. And it is objectionable because it is thought to be an impious and corrupting activity. The trial and death of Socrates made that clear. The two charges leveled against the philosopher at the time—Socrates does not believe in the gods in which the city believes but brings in new deities, and he corrupts the young—can both be restated in terms of gratitude. The philosopher is ungrateful to the gods because he denies the benefactions that he and the city have received from heaven. In the *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors*, for example, Socrates defends himself by “talking big” or “boasting” to the Athenians: he uses “MEGALĒGORIA” (§1–2). To spell out what “talking big” means in that context and clarify Socrates’s rhetorical strategy at his trial would require a detailed interpretation of that text. I cannot offer one here. But for my purpose it is enough to observe that the word “gratitude” is used only once in the *Apology*—at the exact center of the work—in a pregnant remark of Socrates: “No demand is made on me by anyone to return benefits, but many admit that they owe *me* gratitude (CHARITAS: §17, my emphasis).²³ Socrates does not owe gratitude to anyone. *He* is owed gratitude. The significance of this boast can be brought out most simply by observing that the word MEGALĒGORIA—an exceedingly rare word—occurs once in

²³ The statement is remarkable, especially in light of what Socrates says to Hermogenēs he will make clear in his defense speech: §9.

the *Anabasis* as well. It is used in reference to a group of soldiers who had boasted of achieving safety for the entire army of the Ten Thousand *by themselves*, that is, without any help from the gods.²⁴ Philosophy claims for itself a self-sufficiency that is objectionable to the city because it amounts to a form of boastful ingratitude toward the gods.

The charge of corrupting the young can also be restated in terms of gratitude. In the *Memorabilia*, more than half of Xenophon's reply to the corruption charge is taken up by an apology for the notorious cases of Kritias and Alcibiades (1.2.12–48). Recall that Kritias and Alcibiades, two onetime "pupils" of Socrates, had been supporters of Sparta during and after the Peloponnesian War. They were traitors to Athens. They displayed criminal ingratitude. The readiness of Xenophon to befriend Cyrus, the enemy of Athens during the Peloponnesian War, was another case viewed by many in a similar light. At any rate, Xenophon will be exiled by the Athenians after the expedition of the *Anabasis* (5.3.7). Philosophy needs to be defended against the charge that it teaches civic ingratitude. And in all fairness, the charge is not without plausible grounds. How does the "dancing" of Xenophon help resolve what I have called the problem of ingratitude?

Xenophon's "dancing" in the *Anabasis* shows that philosophy—or, more precisely, the Socratic education which prepares for philosophy proper—can produce the most outstanding political fruits. The rule of the Socratic King helped save thousands of Hellenes. It laid the foundations for the conquest of Persia in the fourth century BC. These were impressive achievements in the eyes of most Hellenes. They redounded to the glory of Hellas. And recall that Xenophon stresses his own dedication to Hellenism in the sketch of his life after the *Anabasis* (5.3). Dedication to Hellas and to the Hellenic laws can help compensate for a perceived lack of dedication to the city.

But there is more. It is with regard to the charge of impiety that the "dancing" of Xenophon is a most effective rhetorical strategy. In this study, I have been compelled to cast a critical glance at Xenophon's many professions of gratitude to the gods. But I would never deny that Xenophon uses phrases like "with [the help of] the gods," "thanks be to gods," "let us sacrifice thank-offerings to the gods" more often than we can count them. The demands of successful rule and the demands of effective rhetoric come together in a text like the *Anabasis*. And we need only recall Xenophon's present-day reputation as a man of signal piety—a reputation he has enjoyed more or less continuously since Antiquity—to

²⁴ Of course, this MEGALĒGORIA occurs in the book of gratitude (6.3.18). The word occurs in verb form, MEGALĒGOREŌ.

see that he was extraordinarily successful in combating the view that philosophy is an inherently impious activity. The “dancing” of Xenophon—much like the dancing of the slave woman in the symposium—is more than martial dancing. It is “dancing” performed to the greater glory of providential gods.²⁵

As I will argue at the end of this study, the *Anabasis* is ultimately an introduction to philosophy in the guise of a chronicle and a soldier’s memoir. Through his depiction of his political and military accomplishments, Xenophon puts the best of the young on a path toward the philosophic life. But for now, let me note that the TELOS of the night of dancing has a further meaning beyond what has already been indicated. Xenophon is more than a “Mysian” who dresses up as a soldier. He performs the works of war and freedom more skilfully than any “Spartan.” The TELOS of the night of dancing adumbrates the true apex of Hellenism—the highest form of harmony between freedom and civilization, which combines “Mysianism” with “Spartanism.” The TELOS of the night is a quiet celebration of Xenophon himself.²⁶

2. The Gratitude of the Army and the Gratitude of Xenophon

In his defense speech of book five, Xenophon had complained of the ingratitude of the soldiers (5.8.25–26). He appears to have been heard: no sooner is his trial over than the troops consider electing him sole ruler of the army (6.1.19). For as they appear to be nearing Hellas, the soldiers begin to consider more attentively than before how they will get home with something to show for their efforts. They suppose that by electing a sole ruler with full executive authority—a “monarch” (6.1.31)—they will take in more plunder, for the army will then operate more stealthily and decisively.²⁷ The public goodwill toward Xenophon also reflects a disappointment with Cheirisophos, who now returns to the army after an absence of two months (6.1.16). Cheirisophos had been tasked with

²⁵ That dancing can be a form honoring the gods is clear: for example, *Laws* 815d4–7 and context; *Clouds* 987–89.

²⁶ As I observed in note 14, Xenophon omits to state the TELOS of the “Spartan” dance at 6.1.11. The deepest reason for this omission is that the TELOS of Hellenism—harmony between freedom and civilization—is, as it were, attained only by Xenophon. The political peak of Hellenism—“Sparta”—falls well short of the TELOS. Xenophon embodies what Hellenism at its peak aspires to but cannot attain.

²⁷ Xenophon speaks of the “monarchy” (MONARCHIA: 6.1.31) in his address to the army; he uses the formula “plenipotentiary ruler” (AUTOKRATŌR ARCHŌN: 6.1.21) in his narrative. The first formula stresses the unity of the rule; the second, that the ruler answers to no higher authority.

obtaining ships but returns with a single trireme (5.1.4). And, though the soldiers expected him to bring them something, he brings nothing at all except the praise of Anaxibios, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who also promises to hire the Ten Thousand if they come out of the Pontos. Given that the other generals had been either discredited (5.6.36) or sanctioned (5.7.1), the goodwill toward Xenophon stemmed to some extent from a scarcity of suitable candidates for the monarchy.

In some ways, Xenophon *is* attracted by the prospect of becoming sole ruler. His honor will be greater among his friends, he writes, and his name will arrive greater “in the city” (i.e., in Athens); he might also perchance be the cause of some good for the army (6.1.20). Yet he hesitates, he goes on to write, because “the future is unclear to every human being” and he might also lose the reputation he has already acquired (6.1.21). (Xenophon does not state why he is so apprehensive about the future.) Being at a loss, he seeks divine guidance. He offers sacrifices to Zeus the King, the deity prescribed to him by the Delphic oracle (3.1.6). But before indicating the outcome of the sacrifice, he recounts the history of his relationship with the deity. Since the Delphic pronouncement, Zeus had sent Xenophon signs on two occasions. First, Xenophon saw a dream that he held was from Zeus the King when he was first beginning to undertake the joint administration of the army. (He had interpreted that dream as an exhortation to rule, as we recall: 3.1.11–12.) Second, Xenophon remembered an eagle screaming on his right when he was setting out from Ephesus to be introduced to Cyrus. (This episode had not been mentioned before in our story.) The eagle was perched and not flying, however, which the soothsayer escorting him at the time had said was a great omen, not of a private man, and indicative of high repute. The omen portended toil, however, “for birds attack the eagle especially when it is perched.” But the omen did not portend enrichment, said the soothsayer, “because it is rather in flight that the eagle takes his provisions” (6.1.23).

So then, when Xenophon sacrificed to Zeus the King, the god made it thoroughly clear that he should neither ask for the sole rule nor accept it. And yet (we wonder) had the omen of the perched eagle not seemed auspicious? A professional soothsayer had interpreted it as a sign “not of a private man.” Indeed, the eagle is the emblem of kings (1.10.12) and no lesser a man than Cyrus the Elder had seen an eagle on his right when he embarked on a campaign that earned him the kingship of much of Asia.²⁸ In other words, a pious man might well have concluded that Zeus the

²⁸ *Education of Cyrus* 2.1.1. That eagle was flying, however. See also *Education of Cyrus* 7.1.4.

King had *already* sent him auspicious signs.²⁹ Yet Xenophon seeks (further) guidance from the deity.³⁰ Why is he being so cautious? What does he fear about the future?

The army assembles and everyone says that *one* man must be elected. When this is decided, the name of Xenophon is proposed. As they seem about to elect him, Xenophon gets up and makes a plea against his own election:

I am pleased, men, to be honored by you, if indeed I am a human being, and I am grateful and pray that the gods grant that I may become the cause of some good to you. However, my being chosen ruler by you, when there is a Lacedaemonian man present, does not seem to me to be advantageous for you, but on account of this you would obtain less, if you should need anything from the Lacedaemonians. As for me, in turn, I do not believe this to be very safe at all. For I see that the Lacedaemonians did not cease making war on my fatherland until they made the entire city agree that they were their leaders. When they agreed to this, the Lacedaemonians stopped making war right away and no longer continued to besiege the city. So if I, in spite of having seen all this, should seem—wherever I might have the power to do so—to be undermining the authority of their position, I am concerned that I would be quickly brought to moderation. As for what you have in mind, that there would be less faction when one rules rather than when many do, know well that if you choose someone else, you will not find me being factious. For I believe that whoever is at war and is factious against his ruler, this one is also factious against his own safety. But if you elect me, I would not be amazed if you should find someone being vexed at both you and me. (6.1.26–29)³¹

Why does Xenophon withdraw his name from consideration and support the candidacy of the “Lacedaemonian man present” (i.e., Cheirisophos)?³² His speech is intended to indicate to the soldiers perhaps as much *who* they should elect as why *he* should *not* be elected.³³ Xenophon appears to be especially concerned with the issue of safety.³⁴

²⁹ Consider the willingness of Xenophon to heed a diviner at a later point when an auspicious eagle is spotted (6.5.2ff.).

³⁰ Xenophon sacrifices without any witnesses, contrary to what he did when he tried to found a city: cf. 6.1.24 (“*AUTŌ*”), §31 (“*IDIŌTĒN*”) with 5.6.16–18.

³¹ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it.

³² Xenophon does not actually name Cheirisophos to avoid generating speeches in opposition to him. Cheirisophos has just failed the army.

³³ Strauss (1983) p. 130.

³⁴ Xenophon’s safety is mentioned twice in this short speech: 6.1.26, §29. To be sure, Xenophon also claims that the army will get less from the Lacedaemonians if a

(Observe that he has yet to reveal to the assembly the result of his sacrifice to Zeus the King. So far, Xenophon has invoked only prudential considerations: if “the future is unclear to every human being,” he evidently thinks that a “human being” can make an educated guess about the future [6.1.21].³⁵)

In view of Sparta’s newfound hegemony over Hellas, it would be unsafe for an Athenian to rule a host that could be seen to challenge that hegemony. Indeed, the power of the Lacedaemonians will henceforth weigh heavily on Xenophon’s decisions pertaining to the army. Second, Xenophon wishes *not* to alienate Cheirisophos. He realizes that his colleague is an ambassador of goodwill to the Lacedaemonians (cf. 6.1.32). He therefore cultivates his gratitude by stepping aside.³⁶ Finally, Xenophon is concerned about the issue of faction within the army.³⁷ The soldiers, who just recently put all their generals on trial, are not likely to submit tamely to the rule of a single man who will have been elected by them. The Ten Thousand are now entering Hellenic territory. Curbs on plundering will have to be imposed. Recent experience suggests that they will be disregarded.

Xenophon’s concerns over safety are not limited to his preoccupation with the Lacedaemonians. This becomes clear once we compare his speech to the assembly with his third-person narrative. According to the narrative, Xenophon is attracted to the sole rule because (1) his honor will be greater among his friends; (2) his name will arrive greater in the city (of Athens); and (3) he might perchance be the cause of some good for the army (6.1.20). This list of goods is then “repeated” in the first sentence of his speech to the assembly. In the public setting, Xenophon

non-Lacedaemonian is at the head of it. But consider the result of Cheirisophos’s mission to the Lacedaemonian Anaxibios (6.1.16).—It is striking that Xenophon acknowledges that his motivation in regard to the sole rule is self-interested. The good of the army comes into the picture, but only as something of an afterthought, especially in the narrative (6.1.20). Yet recall that the soldiers are here asking Xenophon to join *their* plan. He is being enlisted. Xenophon cannot then be accused of trying to use the army for his own ends, as he was earlier, when he tried to found a city, and when the narrative gave a nobler account of his motivation (5.6.15–16).

³⁵ Or is Xenophon *not* a “human being”? Consider again 6.1.26: “*if indeed* I am a human being” (*EIPER ANTHRŌPOS EIMI*). The question of whether Xenophon is a human being is linked to the theme of Hēraklēs Leader. See section three.

³⁶ That Cheirisophos is eager to rule is shown by the fact that he accepts the commission of the soldiers without even inquiring of the gods whether he should do so (6.1.32–33).

³⁷ Xenophon suggests that the election of a sole ruler might help reduce faction. He ascribes this thought to the soldiers. But the soldiers had thought only of stealth and decisiveness in action (6.1.18). In other words, he is indicating his own concerns.

claims that he is (1) pleased to be honored by the soldiers; (2) grateful; and (3) offering prayers to the gods to be the cause of some good for the army (6.1.26). Of the several differences between the original list and the public restatement, the most significant change occurs in the second and central position. Xenophon replaces a wish to have his name “arrive greater in the city (of Athens)” by a claim: “I am grateful”. But what is the connection between “a greater name (in Athens)” and “gratitude”?³⁸

As Xenophon approaches Hellas, he is thinking of his return to Athens. He remembers the earlier warning of Socrates that to befriend Cyrus might be viewed as a chargeable offense by the city (3.1.5). I suggest that Xenophon is attracted to the sole rule because he thinks that a greater name will help him avoid, or defend against, a charge born of perceived ingratitude. Xenophon might be charged by the Athenians because he befriended Cyrus, the zealous supporter of the archenemy of Athens during the Peloponnesian War (3.1.5). Cyrus helped bring about the defeat of Xenophon’s own fatherland,³⁹ a defeat that caused massive suffering.⁴⁰ If Xenophon is grateful to the soldiers, he would evidently *not* be considered grateful by his fellow Athenians. He might even be considered a traitor. Hence the metaphor of the perched eagle: Xenophon might be able to ward off the attacks of smaller “birds” by taking flight. (For the Athenians as “birds,” consider Aristophanes’s play by that title.) And, if Xenophon ultimately rejects the idea of “taking flight,” it is because greater or more immediate dangers lie on the side of the sole rule.⁴¹

The speech in which Xenophon withdraws his name from consideration fails to convince the assembly. Many more men stand up to say that he must rule. The public discontent with Xenophon is such that even the captain Agasias, a close friend of his, speaks up against him (cf. 6.6.11). Agasias dismisses as ridiculous the idea that the Lacedaemonians will be angry with Xenophon if he rules (6.1.30). Agasias himself seems to be

³⁸ This is the sole occurrence of the word “gratitude” (CHARIS) in the book of gratitude (6.1.26). This fact highlights the significance of the passage. The word does occur at 6.1.31, but only in one of the better MSS. The cognate verb “to gratify” (CHARIDZESTHAI) occurs at 6.4.23.

³⁹ This is the only time in the *Anabasis* Xenophon calls Athens “my fatherland.”

⁴⁰ Observe the otherwise unnecessary reference to “the siege of the city” at 6.6.28. Many Athenians died of starvation during the siege: *Hellenika* 2.2, esp. §11, §14, §16, §21.

⁴¹ In fact, the omen of the perched eagle indicates that *two* considerations are paramount on Xenophon’s mind as he thinks about his return to Athens: safety and “provisions” (6.1.23–24). The same pair of considerations had caused his original departure from the city.

angry with the Lacedaemonians for hindering the election of Xenophon, a man who is at once most capable of ruling and most deserving of gratitude. The Lacedaemonians are being unjust. But he appears to be angry with Xenophon as well.⁴² For the gallant Agasias has supported and assisted Xenophon at several critical junctures in his rule (3.1.31, 4.1.27, 4.7.9–12, 5.2.15; see also 6.4.10–11). Agasias seems to believe that if gratitude is shown by all, the good things will flow to all—honor to Xenophon and booty to the troops. Gratitude is not only noble. It is also good, both in itself and in its consequences. The hegemony of the Lacedaemonians is irrelevant. In book six, the fate of gratitude mirrors the fate of Agasias.

Seeing that more is needed, Xenophon makes known the unfavorable signs he received from Zeus the King (6.1.31). He had not yet done so. Only at that point does the assembly relent and agree to elect Cheirisophos. Zeus is able to persuade where Xenophon is not.⁴³ We are not surprised that the deity is able to persuade Agasias.

3. Ingratitude toward Gods and Men

The next day—and following a decision of the new monarch Cheirisophos—the Ten Thousand set sail for Hellenic Hērakleia.⁴⁴ It is a two days' sail from Hellenic Sinope. From onboard their ships they observe Cape Jason, where it is said that the Argonauts came to anchor during their quest for the Golden Fleece. After arriving in Hērakleia, the Ten Thousand come to anchor near the Acherousian Chersonese, where Hēraklēs is said to have descended into Hades to fetch the dog Cerberus (6.2.1–2). Why does Xenophon pause to mention these myths? The myth of the Argonauts and the myth of the descent of Hēraklēs into Hades are connected through the Greek hero.⁴⁵ For Hēraklēs was a member of the expedition of the Argonauts. But after he had done much to ensure the safety of his companions, they left him behind. According to one version of the myth, his superiority over them was too great.⁴⁶ He was the son of the king of the gods, after all. Book six tells the story of the descent into hell of the hero Hēraklēs, who experiences the ingratitude of his fellow

⁴² This is suggested by Agasias's later action as well: 6.2.7.

⁴³ Larcher (1778): "Xénophon, s'étant aperçu que la raison n'avoit pas assez d'empire sur les esprits, est obligé de recourir à la superstition qu'il savoit exercer sa tyrannie sur la plupart des hommes" (Vol. 2, p. 111, note 17).

⁴⁴ This is the only decision Cheirisophos ever makes as monarch (6.1.33).

⁴⁵ The whole of book six takes place in a region known as the "Hērakleiotid" (6.2.19).

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *Politics* 1284a23ff. The reference to Hēraklēs occurs in the context of Aristotle's discussion of whether politics can do justice to outstanding virtue.

voyagers only to re-emerge, more glorious than ever, after he rescues them despite their sin.⁴⁷

The soldiers behave as if no election has taken place. They arrive in Hērakleia and discuss whether to continue the journey by land or by sea. No word is heard from the “monarch.” In the assembly, one Achaean soldier blames “the generals” for failing to provide the army with adequate funds for food (6.2.4). Gifts of hospitality have been sent by the Hērakleitans but will not suffice to feed the army for three days. The soldier therefore proposes to “ask” the Hērakleitans for an exorbitant sum of money (6.2.4).⁴⁸ The proposal is strongly resisted by Cheirisophos and Xenophon. To no avail. The soldiers convey their demand to the Hērakleitans. They even resort to threats. The Hērakleitans ask for some time to deliberate. But they immediately bring in their possessions from the fields and remove their market inside the walls. The gates are shut and weapons appear at the battlements.

The ringleaders of the extortion then blame the fiasco on “the generals” (6.2.9). The Arcadians and Achaeans, more than half the army, decide to assemble by themselves. They argue that it is shameful for “an Athenian” to rule Peloponnesians and Lacedaemonians even though he provided no contingent of troops to the army, that *they* have the toils while others have the profits, and that this is so even though “they have done the work of achieving safety; for it is they—the Arcadians and the Achaeans—who achieved [safety,] while the rest of the army, they say, is nothing” (6.2.10). If they are moderate (their argument runs) they will band together, elect their own generals and march by themselves, trying to lay hold of something good along the way. The proposal is adopted. Every Arcadian and Achaean then leaves Cheirisophos—if any happens to be with him—and they leave Xenophon, too, and elect ten generals of their own. The rule of Cheirisophos over the whole is thus dissolved on the sixth or seventh day after he was elected (6.2.12).

Intra-Hellenic jealousies exacerbated by disputes over distributive justice thus cause the implosion of the army. Yet there is no doubt that it is the Arcadians and the Achaeans who commit a grave injustice here. Their ingratitude toward Cheirisophos and, above all, toward Xenophon,

⁴⁷ Consider the reference to the river “Lukos” at 6.2.3. This river was named after a mythical king of the Mariandunians who hosted the Argonauts during their passage there. The Hērakleitans (6.2.3) thus receive the Ten Thousand much like the hospitable Lukos had received the Argonauts. Yet their hospitality is requited with extortion! (Consider, however, 5.6.35.) In several places, the *Anabasis* echoes the expedition of the Argonauts, suggesting that the Ten Thousand are re-enacting it in reverse (by proceeding *westward*).

⁴⁸ This ferocious soldier bears a ferocious name: “the wolf” (LUKŌN).

is stunning. Didn't they owe him their lives? Didn't Xenophon rescue them from mortal dangers? Yet they abandon him. He will be forced to make his way through a hostile country with few troops (6.2.18–19).⁴⁹ To this line of argument, however, it can be objected that the contribution of Xenophon to the salvation of the army, though substantial, should not be overstated. Gratitude for the collective safety is owed above all to Zeus Savior and Hēraklēs Leader. This is the view of the soldiers, at any rate (4.8.25). But precisely if we grant this, the boast of the Arcadians and the Achaeans to “have done the work of achieving safety” amounts to a belittling or a denial of the gods’ assistance. These soldiers are being ungrateful not only to Xenophon and Cheirisophos but above all to “Zeus Savior, Hēraklēs Leader and the other gods” (4.8.25).⁵⁰ To understand the sequel, we must keep this thought in mind.

Xenophon and Cheirisophos react very differently to the ingratitude of the soldiers. Xenophon still wishes to march alongside the Arcadians and the Achaeans (if in a separate formation), believing that this will be safer than to march alone (6.2.13). Cheirisophos, on the other hand, is both dispirited and full of hatred toward the army (6.2.14).⁵¹ He allows his lieutenant Neōn to undermine the safety of the Arcadians and the Achaeans. When Neōn hears that Kleander, the Lacedaemonian harmost of Byzantium, will come to Kalpe Harbor with triremes, he ensures that all the contingents will march separately. He thus tries to ensure that only Cheirisophos and his troops will get to sail on board the triremes.⁵²

The army is broken up into three contingents: the Arcadians and the Achaeans, who are more than 4500 strong, are all hoplites; the second contingent, headed by Cheiriophos, includes up to 1400 hoplites and up to 700 peltasts; the third, headed by Xenophon, includes up to 1700 hoplites and up to 300 peltasts. Only Xenophon has a squadron of cavalry, about forty horses. After securing ships from the Hērakleitans, the Arcadians set sail for Kalpe Harbor and disembark there during the night. They attack the Thracians of Asia at dawn. Cheirisophos and Xenophon make their way to the same place, the former by a march along the sea

⁴⁹ Though both Cheirisophos and Xenophon were forced to proceed by land, at least for much of the way, the march of Cheirisophos was bound to be safer than Xenophon's because his contingent included “the Thracians of Klearchos,” and they were marching through Asiatic Thrace (6.2.16; §17–19). In the event, Cheirisophos reaches Kalpe Harbor without incident: 6.3.10.

⁵⁰ The ungrateful neglect the gods: *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.7; cf., for example, *Education of Cyrus* 4.1.2.

⁵¹ Ingratitude is a great cause of hatred: *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.7.

⁵² Of course, Neōn was also nursing a grudge against Xenophon (5.7).

and the latter, after sailing for part of the way, by a march through the interior of the country.⁵³



The plundering campaign of the Arcadians proves to be a disaster.⁵⁴ At first, the Arcadians surprise the Thracians and seize large amounts of plunder. But the enemy soon recovers from his initial surprise, gathers his forces, and causes them serious losses. The Arcadians have no archers, peltasts, or cavalry. They are not able to keep the Thracian peltasts at bay, nor can they organize any kind of pursuit. The Thracian peltasts are both nimble and protected by their own cavalry. Two Arcadian companies are destroyed (6.3.4–5). The Arcadian survivors are eventually besieged on a hill and in danger of being annihilated. Hemmed in and cut off from water supplies, their plight appears desperate. Meanwhile, Xenophon is marching through the interior of the country. He learns what has happened. (Cheirisophos has already reached Kalpe Harbor safely: 6.3.10.) Xenophon gathers his men and urges them to go to the rescue of the Arcadians.

His speech is short but impressive (6.3.12–18). Xenophon is not tempted to avenge himself on the sinful Arcadians if doing so would endanger both his men and himself. He keeps his eyes on safety: “I believe that if [the Arcadians] are destroyed, there is no safety for us either, such being the numbers and the confidence of [our] enemy” (6.3.12). Xenophon seeks the reunification of the army and sees the plight of the Arcadians as an occasion to bring it about.⁵⁵

But he faces a substantial difficulty: Aren’t his men bound to be reluctant to help the Arcadians and the Achaeans, who had been exceedingly selfish? They had jeopardized the lives of fellow soldiers in order to get more plunder for themselves. The temptation to abandon them to their fate must have been strong. Besides, the rescue advocated by Xenophon

⁵³ Xenophon considers for a moment sailing away and being relieved of the burdens of rule. But “Hēraklēs Leader” gives him signs that he should keep campaigning (6.2.15). The passage is not without humor.

⁵⁴ Recall that disputes over distributive justice fueled the desire of the Arcadians to break up the army (6.2.10). They seem to have thought that by splitting off from the rest, they would no longer have to share their plunder. Yet the issue of distributive justice continues to plague them. Some companies of Arcadians seize things while others do not (6.3.6). Distributive justice is coeval with political life. (The word I translate as “things” might equally well be translated as “troubles,” however [PRAGMATA].)

⁵⁵ Xenophon speaks at first of “the Arcadians” but they are once again “Hellenes” by the end of his speech (6.3.12; §17).

was not free of substantial risks (6.3.17). Yet his speech is successful, and no opposition is heard. Xenophon's rhetorical feat is partly due to the composition of his army: the men most opposed to his rule were no longer with him.⁵⁶ Yet the content of the speech—as well as his manner of delivering it—are here most important.

At the outset, Xenophon insists that the safety of his troops requires a rescue of the Arcadians, as we just saw. His first words are: "Men and soldiers, some of the Arcadians have been killed" (6.3.12). By stressing these Arcadian deaths, he mollifies the anger of his troops, fuels their pity, and makes them more likely to want to help. Then, in an unusual move, Xenophon *interrupts* his speech in order to send away some of his light-armed troops. These troops are to act as sentinels and are ordered to set fire to anything inflammable they chance upon (6.3.15). Xenophon then resumes his speech to address the hoplites. And it is only *then*—when speaking to the flower of his army—that he acknowledges the perils of the proposed rescue: "We must march, having prepared our mind that we will either die gloriously or accomplish a most noble deed, saving so many Hellenes" (6.3.17). Xenophon does not acknowledge the perils of the rescue to the light-armed troops—the so-called "GUMNITAI"⁵⁷—because he fears their reaction (6.3.15).⁵⁸ Indeed, even with the gallant hoplites, Xenophon emphasizes that a noble success is somewhat likely. For the cause of the Arcadians disaster (he suggests) is of divine origin: "And the god, perhaps, is conducting things in this way because he wishes to humble the boasters (MEGALĒGORĒSANTAS), who have too high an opinion of themselves, and to put those, like ourselves, who begin everything with the gods, in a place of greater honor" (6.3.18).⁵⁹ The reverent can hope to be assisted by the god, just like the Arcadian boasters were perhaps divinely punished for their ingratitude.⁶⁰

The rescue engineered by Xenophon is a success. On the eve of the expected battle, he orders to burn as many fires as possible and then

⁵⁶ Besides, the troops who trusted his leadership must have chosen to follow *him*.

⁵⁷ "GUMNITAI" = "those-destitute-of-daring": see chapter four, note 9. Most editors rearrange the speech of Xenophon at 6.3.12–18 without any MS. authority (Masqueray, Marchant, Gemoll, Hude/Peters). They place the central narrative passage (6.3.15) at the end of the speech. This is a serious mistake. These editors fail to appreciate that the anomaly they seek to "correct"—Xenophon interrupting himself to send away the light-armed troops—contributes substantially to his rhetorical success. As usual, Dindorf (1855) is more cautious.

⁵⁸ They might have pressed Xenophon to abandon the Arcadians to their fate and proceed directly to Kalpe Harbor: cf. 6.3.16.

⁵⁹ For an alternative suggestion about cause, consider 6.3.6.

⁶⁰ The reference to "boasters" (MEGALĒGORĒSANTAS) who have "too high an opinion of themselves" (PLEON PHRONOŪNTAS) reminds us of Socrates (*Apology* of

to extinguish them. Seeing many fires illuminate the evening sky, the Thracians fear an attack by superior numbers.⁶¹ They break their siege of the Arcadians at nightfall and allow them to escape (6.3.23). The three Hellenic contingents are soon reunited at Kalpe Harbor. The soldiers are glad to see one another and they greet each other like brothers. Intra-Hellenic jealousies have been soothed.

And the Arcadians asked the troops with Xenophon why they had extinguished the fires. “For when we no longer saw the fires,” they said, “we thought at first that you were coming against the enemy during the night. And the enemy, as it seemed to us, at least, went away in fear of this; for it was about that time that they went off. But when you did not arrive, although enough time had gone by, we thought that you had learned what had happened to us and, having become afraid, had gone and run away to the sea [i.e. to Kalpe Harbor]. And we decided not to be left far behind you, so we too thus marched here.” (6.3.25–26)⁶²

The boastful Arcadians have been thoroughly humbled. They had once claimed to have done the work of achieving safety *by themselves*. They were now afraid of being left behind by Xenophon’s puny contingent. For, it was the Arcadians who ran away to Kalpe Harbor like runaway slaves (APODIDRASKŌ), not Xenophon and his troops.⁶³ Yet no word of thanks is heard from the Arcadians—not surprisingly, given their interpretation of events. Habits of ingratitude die hard.

4. Atoning for Ingratitude toward the Gods

Since Xenophon is concerned for his safety should he return to Athens, it is not surprising that he is less than eager to go back and has yet to

Socrates to the Jurors §1–2), who “boasts” or “talks big” at his trial, and of the Socratic circle generally, whose members are shown to have “a high opinion of themselves” (MEGA PHRONEŌ: *Symposium*, c. 3–4.) Even in the *Apology*, Socrates has a high opinion of himself (§24, §26). Generally, the passage from the *Anabasis* (6.3.18) calls attention to a significant difference between Xenophon’s public self-presentation in the *Anabasis* and Socrates’s self-presentation in the *Apology*. The model for Xenophon’s self-presentation in the *Anabasis* is the reverent Socrates of the *Hellenika* (1.7.15), *not* the boastful Socrates of the *Apology*. See Appendix 1, *in fine*.

⁶¹ Xenophon deceives the Thracians by making his small army appear much larger than it really is. He succeeds by boasting, as it were.

⁶² Translation by Ambler (2008).

⁶³ By the phrase, “when you did not arrive, although enough time had gone by” the Arcadians try to imply that they waited for the troops of Xenophon (6.3.26). But witnesses report that the Arcadians left at dawn (6.3.23).

abandon the idea of staying in Asia.⁶⁴ Chapter 6.4 accordingly begins with an extensive description of Kalpe Harbor. The description highlights the suitability of the place for a new settlement (6.4.1–6). The idea of founding a city, however, is still opposed by a majority of the soldiers. They yearn to return to their children and former lives (6.4.8).⁶⁵ Thus Xenophon never openly acknowledges his ambition to found a city there. Nor does he take any obvious steps in that direction, a move that was sure to reopen old wounds (6.4.7–8, §14, §21–22).⁶⁶ But for a moment, he clearly hoped that the improving situation would enhance the appeal of the idea of staying in Asia and convince enough men to support it (6.6.1–4 and context). In the end, nothing will come of the project. So Xenophon is content to describe Kalpe Harbor in the *Anabasis* to encourage a founding that would benefit Hellas (6.4.2–3). But the glory shall belong to another.⁶⁷

The main difficulty confronting Xenophon as he resumes his position over the army grows out of the disaster experienced by the Arcadians (6.4.10–11). We have seen that Xenophon encouraged a certain interpretation of the cause of that disaster. Yet that interpretation—an interpretation which helped crystallize the army's own interpretation—yields a difficulty of its own: the Arcadians, humbled and dispirited, are now eager to atone for their sin. It is clear that they will not act—or not act well—unless they are persuaded that the gods approve of what they wish to do.⁶⁸ And since they are more than half the army and the core of its fighting power, Xenophon cannot afford to overlook their new

⁶⁴ Cf. 6.2.15. Xenophon is also less than eager to go back to his family. Consider that some among the Ten Thousand, he says, had “fled their fathers and mothers like run-away slaves” (6.4.8). Odd as an explanation of why most of the soldiers “yearned to return safely to Hellas,” the remark makes perfect sense as an autobiographical hint (6.4.8, my emphasis).

⁶⁵ The troops now oppose the founding of a city in the name of “family.” Earlier, they had opposed it in the name of “Hellas” (5.6.22, §25). This shift accords with the change of circumstances. Since Kalpe Harbor is much closer to Hellas than the Kolchis, the idea of founding a city *there* must have been less objectionable. Besides, the uninhabited location could have been colonized by Hellenes and only Hellenes. On the other hand, the project would have amounted to a curtailment of Xenophon's original ambition. A city established at Kalpe Harbor would have been a “small town” (POLISMA: 6.4.7). Xenophon had thought that a city founded in the Pontos would become “great” (MEGALĒ: 5.6.16).

⁶⁶ But consider 6.4.17–19, §21–22 and notes 73 and 74, below.

⁶⁷ Never settled in Antiquity, Kalpe Harbor is today a quiet resort developed recently by some promoter. See the picture in Waterfield (2006, p. 169).

⁶⁸ When Xenophon arrives at Kalpe Harbor, he offers sacrifices with a view to going out: “for it was necessary to get provisions” (6.4.9). He also had it in mind, he says, to bury the dead: “When the sacrifices were favorable, the Arcadians followed along *too*” (KAI: 6.4.9, my emphasis). It is noteworthy that Xenophon's account of the provisioning

cast of mind. He is accordingly very attentive to matters of piety in chapter 6.4. He sacrifices without fail before military operations or provisioning parties—seven times in all—and he runs significant risks to bury the slain. But are the duties and practices of piety always consistent with political advantage and safety? The *logos* of the *Anabasis* will now analyze how the Socratic King reconciles the heightened piety—nay, the exacerbated devoutness—of the Arcadians with the demands of necessity (6.4–6.5).⁶⁹



As soon as Xenophon is reinstated,⁷⁰ he delivers a short speech: “Men and soldiers, the journey, as it seems, must clearly be done by foot. For, there are no ships. And it is necessary to set out now. For, there are no provisions for those who remain” (6.4.12). Xenophon adds that “we will be sacrificing” for the departure: he subordinates the necessity to get provisions to the obtaining of favorable sacrifices. The generals then offer sacrifices in the presence of a new head soothsayer named Arēxiōn (“He-Who-Gives-Help”: 6.4.13). That this soothsayer is an *Arcadian* suggests that obtaining favorable sacrifices has gained great importance for the ethnic group to which he belongs.⁷¹ But can Arēxiōn help overcome the despondency of his fellow Arcadians?

party focuses exclusively on the burial of the dead, which is described at some length (6.4.9–10). Not a word is said about the necessary provisions—the nominal goal of the party—though provisions must have been discovered since the Ten Thousand prepare their dinner upon returning to camp (6.4.10). Piety trumps the “necessary” provisions at the outset of chapter 6.4.

⁶⁹ The word “necessity” is used five times in chapter 6.4 (§9, 12, 17, 19, 21). Only chapter 4.1 has more occurrences.

⁷⁰ The soldiers, chastened by the recent disaster, decide that (1) henceforth the death penalty shall be imposed on anyone who mentions splitting up the army; (2) the army will go back to its prior arrangement; (3) the former generals will rule. (Since Cheirisophos has meanwhile died of a fever, his lieutenant Neōn inherits his affairs.) Masqueray (1930) observes that the death of Cheirisophos is mentioned by Xenophon only in passing. By failing to honor Cheirisophos with an obituary, he claims, Xenophon betrays some bad will toward his late colleague (Vol. 2, p. 187). But this is simply not so. In the *Anabasis*, receiving an obituary is not necessarily a proof of Xenophon’s goodwill. The obituary of Menōn proves this (2.6.21–29). Xenophon’s portrait of Cheirisophos is almost uniformly favorable. He does not write an obituary for Cheirisophos for a different reason: Cheirisophos does not embody a distinct model of rule. In the *Anabasis*, obituaries are reserved for those who do—Cyrus, Klearchos (and, to a lesser extent, Proxenos and Menōn). Cheirisophos is a Pious King, though a less domineering one than Klearchos, more amenable to Xenophon’s guidance.

⁷¹ Compare how Arēxiōn is described at 6.4.13 and 6.5.8. (The description at 6.5.2 will be considered in its proper place.) See note 79.

The sacrifices for an immediate departure are not favorable. So they cease their offerings that day. Some even dare say that Xenophon has bribed the soothsayer to say that the sacrifices are unfavorable because he wishes to colonize the place. To allay these suspicions, Xenophon announces that anyone who so wishes may attend the sacrifices the next day. Word is also passed along to anyone who may be a soothsayer to attend and inspect the sacrifices. A throng is therefore present the next day. Yet the sacrifices, offered three times, keep being unfavorable. The soldiers take it hard because their supplies have run out and there is no market (6.4.16). And it must have crossed some minds that the gods were exacting further punishment for the earlier ingratitude of the Arcadians.

Xenophon makes the best of a difficult situation. He speaks to the soldiers for a second time, acknowledging that the sacrifices are “not yet” favorable for a departure (6.4.17). But since the troops are in need of provisions, he adds, “it seems to me necessary to sacrifice for this very thing [i.e. to go out and get provisions]” (6.4.17). But someone interrupts him: “It is reasonable (EIKOTŌS),” the fellow says, “that the sacrificial victims are not favorable for us, since I heard from someone off a ship that arrived yesterday, spontaneously, that Kleander, the harmost in Byzantium, is going to come [here] with ships and triremes” (6.4.18).⁷² The fellow offers a favorable interpretation of the unfavorable sacrifices: the gods are actually trying to *help* the Ten Thousand. Did Xenophon have a hand in this interruption?⁷³ However that may be, “after [the interruption] it seemed best to all to remain” (6.4.19).⁷⁴ But favorable sacrifices must still be obtained for the provisioning party to get underway.

⁷² Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁷³ The use of “spontaneous” (APO TOŪ AUTOMATOU) at 6.4.18 should be compared with the use of the same formula at 1.3.13: if the ship came “spontaneously,” it is not clear that the interruption was equally “spontaneous.” The fellow’s speech is also noticeably vague: he heard from someone off a ship of unknown origin that came to Kalpe for some unknown reason (cf. 6.5.1). The interrupted speech is the central speech of Xenophon in 6.4.

⁷⁴ But what was *Xenophon’s* view of the matter? It is intimated as follows. In his first speech, Xenophon says of the impending departure from Kalpe Harbor that “the journey, as it seems, must clearly be done by foot. For, there are no ships” (6.4.12). The formula is awkward (as the emendations proposed by Gemoll and Krüger recognize). For how can it “seem” that the journey “must clearly” be done by foot? The awkwardness calls attention to what Xenophon does *not* say: that it is “necessary” to journey by foot. Why not say it? (He uses the word “necessary” in the next sentence: 6.4.12). The answer is that Xenophon is apprised of the rumor that Kleander is coming to Kalpe Harbor with ships and triremes (cf. 6.2.13–14). In other words, while there is some chance that the army might be able to travel by sea, Xenophon does not hold his breath—a prudent attitude vindicated by subsequent events (6.6.5). If Xenophon contrived the “spontaneous” interruption of the fellow, he did not believe in the reasonableness ascribed by him to the victims. Nevertheless, the

And though sacrifices are offered three times, they keep being unfavorable. Men keep coming to the tent of Xenophon to say that there is no food. “But [Xenophon] said that he would not lead the army out while the sacrifices were unfavorable” (6.4.19).

This answer of Xenophon is remarkable.⁷⁵ He would rather let the army go hungry, it seems, than defy the will of heaven. One scholar has observed that “this incident is very regularly cited to illustrate the willingness of some Greek generals to neglect, in obedience to omens, what ordinary human calculation would judge the best policy. It is one of the two stock examples of this phenomenon, Nicias’ disastrous delay at Syracuse in 413 in response to an eclipse being the other.”⁷⁶ Should we accept this parallel? The answer is that Xenophon is no Nicias. For, unlike the superstitious Nicias, Xenophon refuses to take “no” for an answer. The next day, as the sacrifices are again unfavorable and the sacrificial victims are running out, Xenophon suggests to the soldiers to offer more sacrifices—not for a departure or a provisioning party, but for doing battle with the Thracians: “Perhaps” (he says) “the enemies are gathered together and it is necessary to fight” (6.4.21).⁷⁷ For doing battle with the Thracians, who in fact show no sign of being “gathered together,” could of course be accompanied by some “incidental” provisioning.⁷⁸ An important remark occurs at this juncture. Xenophon is about to offer the sacrifice and he “asks Kleanōr the Arcadian *to show good spirit* in case this might make a difference” (PROTHUMEĪSTHAI, 6.4.22 my emphasis).⁷⁹ But even in this way, the sacrifice is still unfavorable.

The pious Arcadian Kleanōr had been a paragon of firmness and resolve hitherto. He had defied the King and proclaimed (in the wake of Cyrus’s death) that he would sooner die than give up his weapons (2.1.10). He had been a staunch supporter of Xenophon’s strategy of all-out war (3.2.4–6).

fellow’s interpretation has the (further) advantage of keeping the Ten Thousand at Kalpe, which Xenophon would like to colonize.

⁷⁵ The answer of Xenophon is pronounced in the wake of the fourth and central sacrifice of 6.4.

⁷⁶ Parker (2004) p. 135.

⁷⁷ Note Xenophon’s repeated use of “perhaps” at §21.

⁷⁸ Consider what happens after Xenophon goes to the rescue of the failed provisioning party: the Greeks, who had had no food hitherto, prepare their dinner (6.4.25–26).

⁷⁹ Some editors adopt the emendation proposed by Bornemann and read “PROTHUESTHAI” (“to sacrifice on behalf of”) instead the unanimous MSS. reading “PROTHUMEĪSTHAI” (“to show good spirit”). These editors overlook the significance of the despondency of Kleanōr. (The verb PROTHUMEĪSTHAI is common in Xenophon.) Note that Xenophon stresses *here* that Kleanōr is an Arcadian (6.4.22; Kleanōr is not described as an Arcadian in other contexts: for example, 2.5.37, 4.8.18, 7.1.40, 7.5.4). Xenophon does something similar with Arēxiōn at 6.4.13. See note 71.

That he must now be encouraged to “show good spirit” is revealing: his customary firmness and resolve have melted like snow in the sun. They are not born of unambiguous strength. They are liable to turn into inconstancy and dispiritedness when Kleanōr becomes convinced that he has sinned and is being punished by the gods.⁸⁰ Moreover, the attitude of Kleanōr makes clear that the Arcadians, his countrymen, could not fight well in their present state. They are profoundly dispirited. Xenophon has to fear that a battle fought at this juncture will result in a defeat at the hands of a Thracian enemy said to treat Greeks with terrible hubris (6.4.2). The piety of the Ten Thousand, hitherto a source of strength, has now become a source of weakness. To disregard the unfavorable sacrifices in the name of necessity would be to overlook that favorable sacrifices are now a necessity. Xenophon has no choice but to await favorable omens while sacrificing often.⁸¹

When Neōn, now a general in the place of Cheirisophos, sees that the men are terribly in need, he wishes to gratify them.⁸² He decides to organize a provisioning party in spite of the omens. He discovers “some Hērakleitan fellow” who says that he knows of nearby villages where provisions can be obtained (6.4.23). Neōn then announces through a herald that “there will be a leader” for anyone who wishes to go out to get provisions (6.4.23). Two thousand human beings answer the call. They

⁸⁰ The plight of the Ten Thousand is now less precarious than it had been in the wake of the death of Cyrus, or of the ensnaring of Klearchos and the other generals. Yet Kleanōr is much more despondent.

⁸¹ In his second and central speech of the chapter, Xenophon says that it is “necessary to sacrifice” in order to go out and get provisions (6.4.17). In his narrative, however, he says only that it is “necessary to get provisions” (6.4.19). From a certain point of view the sacrifices are *not* necessary. But from a practical standpoint they *are* necessary, at least within certain limits that are about to be reached. Consider also what the opening of Xenophon’s speech indicates (6.4.17): while the men are looking at the unfavorable sacrifices (HORAŌ), Xenophon is looking at the men in need (HORAŌ). In a sense, the Greeks have lost the ability to be guided by what they see in front of them—by “what ordinary human calculation would judge the best policy.” Yet when Neōn tries to be guided by what he sees—“human beings in terrible need”—he brings about a disaster, not because his eyes deceive him, but because he fails to appreciate the depth of the Greek predicament (6.4.23). Only when favorable sacrifices and omens are obtained do the Greeks recover the ability to be guided by what they see. This occurs at the beginning of 6.5, when the soothsayer Arēxiōn (among other things) “sees” a favorable eagle (§2 cf. note 89). During the decisive battle of chapter 6.5, the Greeks are repeatedly said to be guided by what they see (6.5.29, 6.5.30). Generally, HORAŌ (“to see”) occurs with remarkable frequency in that chapter (6.5.2, §7[2X], §10 [2X], §14, §16, §21, §29, §30).

⁸² “To gratify” (CHARIDZOMAI) is a verb from the same root as “gratitude” (CHARIS). Neōn comes to sight, with regard to gratitude, in his *difference* from Xenophon. Neōn is overcome by the prospective pleasure of securing the gratitude of the soldiers—a politically significant form of incontinence.

leave the camp equipped with poles, leather bags, sacks, and other containers. But once they reach the villages and scatter to get provisions, they are surprised by the Thracians.⁸³ No fewer than five hundred men are massacred (6.4.24).

How should we interpret this melancholy episode? Is it a reminder of the importance of heeding the results of the sacrifices? After all, Neōn flaunts the sacrifice and he suffers the consequences. Such an interpretation, however, though not inconsistent with Xenophon's intention, is not ultimately satisfactory. For one, it is hard to see how *two thousand* human beings would have followed Neōn if he was known to flaunt the sacrifice. Was the collective hunger so ravenous that the will of heaven had become a matter of indifference to so many? I propose an alternative interpretation, which is better supported by the text: when Neōn announces that "some Hērakleitan fellow" (ΤΙΝΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ ΗΕΡΑΚΛΕΩΤΗΝ) will be the "Leader" (ΗΕΓΕΜΩΝ) of the provisioning party, what is being adumbrated, I think, is that Neōn is announcing that "Hēraklēs Leader" (ΗΕΡΑΚΛΗΣ ΗΕΓΕΜΩΝ) has agreed, through a fresh sacrifice, to lead the provisioning party (6.4.23, cf. *Hellenika* 6.4.7 and context). On *this* basis, two thousand human beings are convinced to follow along. Yet while these hungry people apparently trust in Neōn's announcement, they wish to abide by the verdict of Xenophon's earlier sacrifice, which prohibited any going out "ready for battle": that is, armed (6.4.21). They attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. The result is deadly: the people follow "Hēraklēs Leader" completely unarmed! Carrying poles,⁸⁴ leather bags, sacks and other containers, they are defenseless against the Thracians (6.4.23). In their state of exacerbated piety, they are fain to abide by the earlier sacrifice; in their state of exacerbated hunger, they cannot resist the alluring announcement of Neōn.⁸⁵ Besides, the collective recklessness reflects a wish to atone: by leaving themselves vulnerable, these people wish to make a display of their trust and confidence in the strong arm of Hēraklēs Leader, the hero toward whom (among

⁸³ The Thracians are supported by the cavalry of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos, who seeks to keep the Ten Thousand out of his dominions (6.4.24).

⁸⁴ The word I translate as "poles" is ΔΟΡΑΤΙΟΝ, which can also mean "little spear." (Poles were used to carry provisions.) The very ambiguity of the word is intended to suggest that these human beings went out with minimal weaponry.

⁸⁵ The announcement was probably mendacious. Xenophon writes that Neōn "discovered" (ΗΕΥΡΙΣΚΩ) the "Hērakleitan fellow" in question. Consider how ΗΕΥΡΙΣΚΩ is used at 2.3.21.—Xenophon repeatedly refers to the followers of Hēraklēs as "human beings" (ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ): hunger has destroyed their manliness. Even Hēraklēs is a mere ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ (§23). This makes sense: his voracity and incontinence were proverbial: he was hungry too. Hēraklēs's education at the hands of Virtue is recounted at *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34. See Buzzetti (2001) pp. 6–7.

others) the Arcadians had been so ungrateful.⁸⁶ The worst disaster ever to befall the Ten Thousand is the outcome.

The survivors of the provisioning party flee to a nearby hill. One survivor brings a report of what happened to camp. Xenophon, since the sacrifices were unfavorable that day, takes an ox from a chariot—there are no other victims—slaughters it and goes in aid with all those up to thirty years of age. He does not tell us whether the sacrifice is favorable—a telling omission. Beyond a certain point, the Socratic King *will* heed necessity (6.4.25). It is one thing to let an army go hungry for a few days, quite another to let hundreds of defenseless human beings be slaughtered. And to the objection that a rescue with despondent soldiers might have aggravated the situation of the army, I answer that Xenophon goes in aid with his youngest troops only. The inborn confidence of youth, he apparently thought, would dampen the effects of despondent piety.⁸⁷



In section three of this chapter, I suggested that book six is the story of the descent and rise of Hēraklēs. Having now witnessed the low ebb of Hēraklēs's rule—or was the low ebb reached in chapter 6.2?—we turn to the moment of his greatest triumph. Only one day⁸⁸ after suffering a crushing blow, the Ten Thousand win a decisive victory over the Thracians and their Persian allies, a victory prefaced by Xenophon's exhortation to the troops to follow Hēraklēs Leader (6.5.24). The choice of password—"Zeus Savior and Hēraklēs Leader" (6.5.25)—apparently elicits the assistance of the hero (and of Zeus). The Ten Thousand will erect trophies of gratitude after their triumph (6.5.32). They have atoned for their sin against heaven.

Xenophon gets up early in the morning and offers sacrifices for a going out. (A ship from Hērakleia had meanwhile brought barley meals,

⁸⁶ There were Arcadians among the members of the provisioning party. This is proved by reading 6.5.4 together with 6.5.11: those who had gone out with Neōn were ashamed not to follow along in the later sortie (6.5.4). Among those ashamed was an Arcadian renamed "Purrias" ("The-Red-Faced-One": PURROS: 6.5.11). Purrias is a good example of the weakest troops being put at the center.

⁸⁷ Those most visibly affected by the Arcadian disaster were the elderly Kleanōr (6.4.22 cf. 2.1.10) the elderly Hierōnumos (6.4.10 cf. 3.1.34), and, generally, "the eldest of the Arcadians" (6.4.10). That Kleanōr is elderly is playfully confirmed by the gift he does *not* get at 7.2.2.

⁸⁸ Note the repetition of the phrase "around sunset" at 6.4.26 and 6.5.32. The repetition invites us to appreciate the extraordinary reversal of circumstances that occurs within a single day.

sacrificial victims, and wine.) The sacrifices are favorable on the first victim. The soothsayer Arēxiōn then sees an auspicious eagle⁸⁹ just as the sacrifices are ending (6.5.2).⁹⁰ He bids Xenophon lead the way. They⁹¹ cross the defensive ditch that protects the camp and put down their weapons. A herald announces that after breakfast the soldiers will go out *with their weapons* (6.5.3, my emphasis). Nothing is said about poles or containers.

The first task taken up by the provisioning party is to bury the dead. Xenophon and the generals remain cautious. They do not permit the troops to break out of the phalanx formation or to get dispersed (6.5.7 cf. 6.4.24). It is already past midday when they begin to gather provisions. Suddenly, the phalanx of the enemy appears on a hill—a throng of ordered cavalry and foot. The soothsayer Arēxiōn quickly sacrifices and once again the victims are favorable. Xenophon proposes to the other generals to deploy some reserve companies behind the phalanx. The reserve companies will give aid wherever it is needed, and the enemy, after falling into disorder, will come upon troops that are ordered and fresh. The proposal is approved by all.⁹²

Xenophon tells the generals to lead the phalanx against the enemy while he himself arranges the reserve companies. In a manner, Xenophon forfeits the leadership of the battle. But as they advance, the first ranks of the host encounter a large ravine that is difficult to get across. Those in the lead (HOI HĒGOUMENOI) stand still, not knowing what to do (6.5.12). Word is passed along to the generals and captains to come up to those in the lead: the real leaders are *not* “those in the lead.” Xenophon rides up to the front as quickly as he can. Once the rulers gather, Sophainetos, the eldest of the generals, says that it is not even worth discussing whether or not to cross such a ravine. But Xenophon cuts him off energetically: “But you know me, men, I have introduced you to no danger willingly yet.” However, “there is no leaving this place without a fight. For if we do not attack the enemy, they will follow and fall upon us as we retreat” (6.5.14–15). Xenophon stresses the dangers of being attacked from behind with weapons facing away from the enemy. He also suggests (among other things) that a retreat would dispirit the troops and

⁸⁹ Arēxiōn is here said to be a “Parnasian” (PARNASIOS) in the best MSS. CB (6.5.2, see the apparatus of Hude/Peters and Dindorf). Are we to think of the hero Parnassos, who *invented* the art of bird-divination? See 6.5.21 (at the center).

⁹⁰ Literally: “And just as the sacrifices have their end” (KAI ĒDĒ TELOS ECHONTŌN TŌN HIERŌN). The sacrifices have their end because they are favorable.

⁹¹ “They” apparently refers to Xenophon and the soothsayer Arēxiōn, who is carrying arms (6.5.3).

⁹² A similar tactic was used before: chapter five, note 51. It is intended to prevent a rout.

inspirit the enemy. Even if the army should retreat to Kalpe Harbor, there are neither ships nor provisions there. And as soon as they reach Kalpe they will have to go out again. Better to fight today on a full stomach than tomorrow on an empty one: “Men, the *hierā* are propitious, the bird omens auspicious, and the *sphagia* most propitious. Let us go out against the enemy. Since they have surely seen us, they must not be allowed to dine pleasantly or encamp wherever they wish” (6.5.14–21).

The captains bid Xenophon lead (HĒGEĪSTHAI) the way. No one—that is, no one among the generals—gainsays. Xenophon leads the way, giving orders for the soldiers to cross the ravine. Once they are across, Xenophon rides along the phalanx and he urges the soldiers to remember how many victories they have won, with the help of the gods, by going to close quarters, and what those suffer who run away. They should also bear in mind that they are at the gates of Hellas: “But follow Hēraklēs Leader and call on each other by name. Surely it is pleasant, by saying and doing something courageous and noble now, to leave a memory of oneself among those whom one wants to” (6.5.24).⁹³ The striking difference of outcome between the triumph of chapter 6.5 and the massacre of chapter 6.4 reflects the active rule and involvement of Hēraklēs Leader.⁹⁴

5. Gratitude and the Good

Our analysis of gratitude hitherto may have given the impression that all the struggles of the Ten Thousand in book six stem from an inveterate propensity to be ungrateful. But this impression is incorrect. Not only are the Ten Thousand capable of gratitude but it is this very capacity, or the exercise of it, that will involve them in a crisis that shall endanger their return to Hellas (6.6).

After their victory over the Thracians, the Ten Thousand no longer face any significant threats. They await the triremes and ships of Kleander

⁹³ Translation by Ambler (2008). Chapter 6.5 depicts one of the most impressive military feats of the *Anabasis*. Consider in particular the danger involved in fighting, as the Greeks did, with a large ravine at one’s back: cf. 6.5.18 with 6.5.31 (6.5.18 is at the exact center of Xenophon’s speech.) Had the Greeks been turned—as it looked for a moment that they might be—they would have been destroyed.

⁹⁴ Read 6.5.24 together with 6.5.22.—The reader should also compare 6.5.24 with 5.8.26: the prospect of being remembered for saying and doing something courageous and noble is pleasant—more unambiguously pleasant than gratitude or “to remember the good things.” On the other hand, since remembering the bad things is not altogether unpleasant (*pace* 5.8.26), Xenophon may have derived some pleasure when he recorded the speech and deed of Sophainetos in order to leave a certain memory of *him* (6.5.13). Sophainetos is allowed to speak only this once in the *Anabasis*. On Xenophon’s critique of that general, see pp. 35–6, note 88; p. 104, note 68 and Appendix 3, note 6.

at Kalpe Harbor, supposing that he will come.⁹⁵ Each day they go out and gather large amounts of provisions without any fear. On the days when the army does not go out but rests, plundering raids are permitted. The booty belongs to those who seize it. But on those days when the army *does* go out, anything seized by anyone who goes off on his own is voted to be public property (6.6.2). This is the law or decree of the army (DOGMA: 6.6.8, §27). There is now a great abundance of everything. Traders arrive from the Hellenic cities from every direction, and those who sail by are glad to put in, hearing that there will be a city with a harbor. Even the nearby Thracians come to ask Xenophon what they need to do in order to be his friend. For they hear that he is settling the place. Xenophon simply shows these to the soldiers.⁹⁶ At that point Kleander sails into Kalpe with two triremes and not a single transport ship (6.6.5). That he *does* sail in, however, means that the wait at Kalpe is over. The soldiers will no longer allow themselves to bask in the nascent prosperity of what could become a city. But they will have to proceed by land. In other words, the arrival of Kleander at Kalpe means the worst of both worlds for Xenophon. The very idea of founding a city is dropped definitively in the wake of the crisis alluded to a moment ago.

On the day of Kleander's arrival, the army chances to be out provisioning.⁹⁷ Some men have gone off on their own and captured lots of herd animals. Hesitating lest the animals be taken away as public property, they speak to Dexippos the Laconian—the same Dexippos who had betrayed the army at Trapezonte when he ran off with the ship of fifty oars (5.1.15; Dexippos sails into Kalpe with Kleander). The men bid Dexippos save the animals, and, after taking some for himself, return the rest. Dexippos immediately drives away the soldiers who are standing in a circle and insisting that the animals are public property. Dexippos complains to Kleander that the soldiers are trying to steal the animals. Kleander bids him bring the thief to him. Dexippos grabs a soldier. But Agasias chances by and sets the soldier free (6.6.7).⁹⁸ For, the soldier belongs to his company. The others attempt to stone Dexippos, calling him a traitor. In the ensuing commotion, many who had sailed in with

⁹⁵ Xenophon does not urge a departure from Kalpe.

⁹⁶ That Xenophon does not report the response these ambassadors meet with makes the matter perfectly clear.

⁹⁷ "Chance" (TUCHĒ) plays a crucial role in this chapter: 6.6.5, 6.6.7, 6.6.25 (in the best MSS.), 6.6.32, 6.6.38. See note 113.

⁹⁸ The verb "to set free" (APHAIREŌ) occurs no fewer than ten times in chapter 6.6. In all but one instance, it refers to the setting free of a serviceable soldier. The one exception is 6.6.5, where it refers to the setting free of animals being put to public use. Xenophon can be hard-headed.

Kleander flee to the sea. Even Kleander himself flees. Xenophon and the other generals must intervene to prevent a stoning. They explain that the decree of the army is the cause of what happened. But incited by Dexippos and vexed at his own fear, Kleander threatens to sail away and announce by herald that no city is to receive the Ten Thousand since they are enemies: "And at that time the Lacedaemonians ruled all the Greeks" (6.6.9). The problem seems to be a bad one. The Greeks ask Kleander not to do these things. He insists that he will not act otherwise unless they surrender to him the man who began the stoning and the man who set the soldier free. They are apparently one and the same: "The one being sought was Agasias, the friend of Xenophon through to the end" (TELOS, 6.6.11).

Now since they are at a loss, the rulers gather the army. For Agasias is a noble captain. He repeatedly volunteered for dangerous missions, risking life and limb for the host (4.1.27, 4.7.9–12, 5.2.15). Being respected and honored, the assembly was bound to resist surrendering him to Kleander, especially since he had rescued a blameless soldier from the claws of the traitor Dexippos. The army felt gratitude toward Agasias, who could even be said to have justice on his side. Indeed, Dexippos was involved in a fresh act of fraud when Agasias intervened. Some of the rulers even belittle Kleander (6.6.11).

But Xenophon regards the belittling of Kleander as something paltry or thoughtless (PHAULOS). He declares to the army that if Kleander sails away in his present state of mind, the affair will not be a trivial one: "The Hellenic cities are near, and the Lacedaemonians are at the head of Hellas. Even a single Lacedaemonian is able to accomplish whatever he wishes in the cities" (6.6.12). Hence, if Kleander shuts the soldiers out of Byzantium and then announces to the other harmosts that they are not to receive them in the cities because the soldiers are disobedient to the Lacedaemonians and lawless—and if, further, this speech reaches the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibios—it will be hard for the army either to stay put or to sail away. For at the present time the Lacedaemonians rule alike on land and at sea. For the sake of "one or two men," Xenophon insists, the army must not be debarred from Hellas (6.6.14). Rather, they must obey whatever the Lacedaemonians order. For, the cities whence the soldiers come will obey the Lacedaemonians.

It is a measure of the power of gratitude (and of justice) that the speech of Xenophon is less an attempt to convince the assembled soldiers than to convince Agasias himself to submit willingly to a trial. Xenophon's manner of convincing Agasias is also interesting. He does not invoke prudential considerations. Agasias has already shown his reluctance to heed the rule of the Lacedaemonians, irrespective of prudence, when this

rule appears unjust to him.⁹⁹ Instead, Xenophon gives Agasias a noble example to imitate:

Now I, for my part (says Xenophon)—for I hear that Dexippos says to Kleander that Agasias would not have done these things if I had not ordered him to do so—for my part, I say, I absolve you and Agasias of blame, if Agasias himself says that I am in any way the cause of these things; and I condemn myself as deserving the extreme penalty, and I will submit to this penalty, if I initiated the stone throwing or any other sort of violence. And I say that if he blames any other person, that person must present himself for Kleander to judge, for in this way you would be absolved of blame. But as it is now, it is a difficult matter if while thinking that we will obtain both praise and honor in Greece, we will instead not even be on like terms with others but will be shut out of Greek cities. (6.6.15–16)¹⁰⁰

The noble Agasias responds to Xenophon's noble example—that is, to Xenophon's stated willingness even to die to absolve the army of any blame—as expected: swearing by the gods and by the goddesses, he exculpates both Xenophon and everyone else, and he agrees to surrender himself to Kleander to be tried: “Do not go to war with the Lacedaemonians on account of this, but may you be saved and arrive safely, each one wherever he wishes” (6.6.17–18). Agasias also provides an explanation of his action: “I saw a good man of my company being taken away by Dexippos, whom you know betrayed us, and that seemed terrible to me. So I took him away, I agree” (6.6.17). Agasias could not stand that a good man was being destroyed by a bad man. Holding the opinion that gratitude is noble and good, he was pained and angered by the sight of ingratitude triumphant. He took it upon himself to protect a good man as he deserved. He supported the just while acting out of justice and gratitude. He tried to give to each what each deserved.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ See p. 233–34. Consider how the phrase “the rulers” (HOI ARCHONTES) is used at 6.6.11. Why does Xenophon use this phrase instead of the more precise formula “the generals” (HOI STRATĒGOI), used just a few lines above (6.6.8). The less precise phrase means that some among “the rulers”—but not “the generals”—are belittling Kleander. It means that some among *the captains* are belittling Kleander. Who among the captains? The answer must be Agasias. The less precise phrase indicates that (for all his gallantry) Agasias's thoughtless attitude is threatening the army. The less precise phrase is thus most precise: it allows Xenophon to censure Agasias quietly but with perfect clarity.

¹⁰⁰ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

¹⁰¹ It is noteworthy that Agasias never mentions the proximate crime of Dexippos—defrauding the army of the herd animals. He manifestly views that crime as a minor transgression compared to his treason.

Having thus freed the army of the unpleasant task of feeding him to the wolves, Agasias ends his speech by asking for a favor: "Send along with me to Kleander some men chosen from among yourselves who will speak and act on my behalf if I omit something" (6.6.18). The army grants Agasias the privilege of choosing whichever advocate he wishes. He chooses "the generals." This is a fine choice. An outstanding lawyer is among them. Yet this lawyer holds his tongue and stays his hand in the immediate sequel (6.6.19–28). We hear only a brief speech from "the generals" (6.6.19–20). Why does he fail to speak or act on behalf of Agasias? Is he ungrateful to his "friend through to the end"?

Of course, he *does* rescue Agasias before the end (6.6.29–34). Yet his manner of doing so differs markedly from Agasias's rescue of the man of his company. For, the predicament of Xenophon is nearly as precarious as that of Agasias at this juncture. Xenophon has just insisted publicly that for the sake of "one or two men" the rest of the army must not be debarred from Hellas (6.6.14). This means in plain English that Kleander *must* be given satisfaction. But, as the formula "one or two men" indicates, Xenophon is aware that if Kleander demands the surrender of more men, he will have to be obeyed.¹⁰² The implications for Xenophon himself are clear enough: Dexippos has been slandering *Xenophon* at every opportunity (6.1.32); he has been telling Kleander that *Xenophon* is inciting the army to revolt from the Lacedaemonians (cf. 6.6.34); it is even out of animosity toward *Xenophon* that Dexippos is slandering the lesser Agasias (6.6.11). Xenophon must tread with extreme care if he is to be able to assist Agasias. He must first assuage the suspicions of Kleander. Otherwise, he too may have to be fed to the wolves (cf. 6.6.34).

A delegation consisting of Agasias, "the generals," and the man rescued by Agasias goes to Kleander (6.6.19).¹⁰³ "The generals" speak first. They profess their unconditional obeisance:

The army sent us to you, Kleander, and they bid you, if you blame all of them in some respect, to judge them and deal with them as you see fit; and if you blame some one or two or even more, they deem that these ought to submit themselves to you to be judged; and if you blame some of us, we are here before you; and if you blame someone else, say who it is. For no one who is willing to obey us will stay away from you. (6.6.20)

¹⁰² Note the central placement of "two" (DUO) at 6.6.20 ("if you blame some one or two or even more"). All the editors except Dindorf mistakenly refuse to follow the near-unanimous reading of the MSS.

¹⁰³ "The generals" are in the center because we must keep an eye on what they say and do—or fail to say and do.

Agasias then comes forward and he makes a full confession of his crime: "I am the one, Kleander, who took away this man, whom Dexippos was taking away *and I gave the order to strike Dexippos*" (6.6.21, my emphasis. This is the first time we hear of Agasias ordering his men to strike Dexippos: he was trying to get him *killed*.) "For I know," Agasias continues, "that this is a good man, and I know that Dexippos, who was elected by the army to rule a warship of fifty oars which we asked of the Trapezontians to gather ships so that we might be saved—Dexippos ran away [with the ship] and betrayed the soldiers with whom he was saved" (6.6.22). Agasias then asserts that Dexippos destroyed the army insofar as was in his power since he knew that the host could not return safely to Hellas without ships. He adds that if Kleander (or someone else of his circle) had been the one leading the soldier away—and not one of the army's deserters—"know well that I would have done none of these things. But if you kill me now, believe that you are killing a good man because of a cowardly and bad man" (6.6.24).

The confession of Agasias makes it clear that if he wished to rescue a good man from the claws of Dexippos, he yearned above all to punish a traitor.¹⁰⁴ Agasias states emphatically that he *knows* (OIDA) that the man of his company is good, and he *knows* (OIDA) that Dexippos betrayed the soldiers (6.6.22). His moral clarity, which is based on knowledge, as he claims, gives him the strength to act as he does.¹⁰⁵ Yet this clarity fades by the end of his speech. As he faces the prospect of being executed for his rescue, Agasias tells Kleander that he should "believe" (NOMIDZE) that a good man is about to be killed because of a cowardly and bad man. Agasias is no longer entirely confident, it seems, of his own goodness, and perhaps even of the cowardice and badness of Dexippos. He no longer *knows* that gratitude and justice are parts of virtue. His opinion is shaken when goodness proves to be bad and badness good or profitable.

Kleander is not unmoved by the impassioned speech of Agasias. He says that he does not praise Dexippos if he in fact did these things. But even if Dexippos were altogether bad, he adds, he should not have suffered violence but should have received his just punishment in a trial "just

¹⁰⁴ Agasias describes the treason of Dexippos at length. He merely states, albeit emphatically, that the man he rescued is good.

¹⁰⁵ See also Agasias's emphasis on knowledge at 6.6.17. But does Agasias really *know* what goodness or virtue is? Xenophon adumbrates a negative answer to this question by having Agasias overstate the badness of Dexippos. Dexippos could not have heard that the army could not return safely to Hellas without ships, as Agasias claims that Dexippos had heard (6.6.23). For this claim refers back to 5.6.6–10—but Dexippos is long gone by then (cf. 5.1.15). Dexippos never heard the speech of Hecatōnumos, a speech which overdid the difficulties of a land march in any case.

as you too now expect" (6.6.25). (Kleander does not offer to organize the trial of Dexippos; he merely "does not praise him.") "But now go away," Kleander says, "and leave this man here [i.e. Agasias]. When I order it, be present for his trial. I no longer blame the army or anyone else since he himself agrees that he took away the man" (6.6.25).

So, the Ten Thousand are off the hook. Xenophon is off the hook. But Agasias will most likely die. "The generals" say nothing. Their silence is too much for the rescued man to bear. *He* speaks up, trying to rescue Agasias as he had himself been rescued by Agasias. The man says to Kleander that he should not suppose that he did anything wrong. He hit no one and threw no stones. He merely said that the herd animals were public property, in accordance with the decree of the soldiers (6.6.27). The real culprit here is (the unnamed) Dexippos, who tried to silence all opposition in order to have his share of the stolen animals. The rescued man speaks up in the belief and with the expectation that his blameless justice will help exonerate Agasias. He is in for a surprise: "Since you are so sharp," Kleander replies curtly, "remain, so that we might deliberate about you too" (6.6.28).¹⁰⁶ The man is on the hook once again. His attempt to rescue Agasias is as unsuccessful as was the attempt of Agasias to rescue him. Both are defenders of justice, and both act out of justice and gratitude. Their deeds are noble. Yet both end up facing execution. They help no one and harm themselves. They are unable to give to *themselves* what they deserve.

As soon as the delegation returns to camp Xenophon moves into action. He gathers the army and advises to send a delegation to Kleander to intercede on behalf of the two men. It is decided that the generals, the captains, the Spartan Drakontion and some others will go and beg Kleander in every way to release the two men. This time, Xenophon takes the lead. His words to Kleander reaffirm the army's obedience: "You have the men, Kleander, and the army yields to you to do whatever you wish with them and with all of themselves." "But," he continues, "they ask you and beg you to give them the two men and not to kill them. For in the past they have wearied themselves with toils for the army" (6.6.31). Xenophon proceeds to offer Kleander a plum prize: if the Ten Thousand obtain the two men from him, and if Kleander wishes to lead the army, they promise (should the gods be kindly disposed) to show him how orderly they are and how capable of obeying their rulers and of not fearing their enemies with the help of the gods. Xenophon offers Kleander the rule of the Ten Thousand. He appeals

¹⁰⁶ The text of the best MS. C contains a lacuna. "Sharp" (TOROS) is the reading of the inferior MS. FM. MS. B reads "since you are such" (TOIOÛTOS).

to Kleander's ambition and solely to his ambition.¹⁰⁷ And he calls on Kleander to become their judge: "[The soldiers] also beg this of you that, after presenting yourself and ruling them, you will make a trial of them and of Dexippos, to see of what sort each is, and give to each what each deserves" (6.6.33). Kleander will bring justice to the Ten Thousand and to Dexippos. He will do what Agasias and the rescued man tried to do but could not.

The offer of Xenophon proves irresistible. Swearing an oath, Kleander accepts to release the two men on the spot. He will lead the Ten Thousand back to Hellas, he says, if the gods permit it. From that point on he and Xenophon associate on friendly terms. They contract ties of guest-friendship (6.6.35). And when Kleander sees the orderliness of the Ten Thousand, he desires to become their leader (HĒGEMŌN) even more. Yet though he offers sacrifices for three days, the sacrifices keep being unfavorable: the gods are dead set against his becoming the HĒGĒMON of the Ten Thousand. Kleander summons the generals: "Do not be dispirited on account of this" he says, "for it has been given to you, as it seems, to lead the men. Forward then! We shall be receiving you as nobly as we are able when you come there [i.e. to Byzantium]" (6.6.36 cf. the reception given to the Ten Thousand in chapter 7.1).

Xenophon's offer of the rule of the Ten Thousand to Kleander is a fitting conclusion to book six, which began, as we recall, with a search for a "monarch" (6.1.31). And though Xenophon quietly doubted that the Ten Thousand would heed the will of a single man—the sole rule of Cheirisophos collapsed almost immediately—the more powerful Kleander might have been successful where Cheirisophos (and Xenophon) could not be. To have Kleander as a leader would have the further advantage of freeing Xenophon from the burden of taking the army back to Hellas.¹⁰⁸ There is little doubt that he was disappointed when the sacrifices proved unfavorable.¹⁰⁹

The issue of the leadership of Kleander calls to mind the issue of the leadership of Hēraklēs, a major theme of book six. Textual evidence suggests that Xenophon entertains the notion that Kleander could be

¹⁰⁷ At no point does Xenophon object that the two men will be executed unjustly, nor does he allude to the crimes of Dexippos.

¹⁰⁸ Consider the use of the verb *EKKOMIDZŌ* at 6.6.36. The verb means "to carry [a heavy burden]" (cf. 1.5.8, 5.2.19). In private, Xenophon has been deliberating about an early departure from the army (6.2.15). He will soon express publicly his desire to leave (7.1.4).

¹⁰⁹ This is one of the two meanings of the phrase, "Do not be dispirited on account of this" (*MĒ ATHUMEĪTE TOUTOU HENKA*: 6.6.36). The other meaning is indicated in the next note.

a “Hēraklēs Leader.”¹¹⁰ Kleander could become a hero-like leader who rules with unfettered power and gives to each what each deserves.¹¹¹ Does this mean that Xenophon entertains the notion (more generally) that the Lacedaemonians could be the dispensers of a kind of panhellenic justice? Is *this* the deeper significance of the several references to Lacedaemonian rule in the chapter (6.6.9, §12; §13)?¹¹² Yet the notion that the Lacedaemonians could be the dispensers of panhellenic justice is far-fetched, not to say absurd. The Lacedaemonians are *not* known for their attention to justice. Even Kleander, a man who is rather superior to his fellow Lacedaemonians in this regard (e.g., 7.2.6), never puts the traitor Dexippos on trial and he almost executes two noble soldiers, one of whom was entirely blameless. The justice of Kleander is more akin to chance.¹¹³ That Agasias and the man he rescues are spared—that their noble actions ultimately are not bad for them—is entirely due to the Socratic King. *He* successfully conjoins or reconciles the noble with the good. He gives to each what each deserves within the limits of his powers. But if he reconciles the noble with the good through his rule, he himself transcends the plane of gratitude, as he has made clear. Neither

¹¹⁰ (1) Consider what the verb “to intercede” (PARAITEOMAI) suggests about Kleander (6.6.29): unless I am mistaken, this verb is used only once elsewhere in Xenophon: *Memorabilia* 2.2.14; (2) Kleander is repeatedly called a (potential) HĒGEMŌN (6.6.32, §35); (3) The word KRISIS (“trial”) is used twice in the chapter to refer to the trial over which Kleander will preside (6.6.20, §26). Though we witness several trials in the *Anabasis*, the word KRISIS is used only once elsewhere—to refer to the trial presided by the Godlike King Cyrus (1.6.5); (4) When Kleander tells the generals “MĒ ATHUMEĪTE TOUTOU HENEKA,” he means (or rather, the playful Xenophon means) that they should not be dispirited that a “Leader” will not rule them; (5) Consider the use of DECHOMAI at 6.6.37: the sacrifice of the Ten Thousand is “accepted” by Kleander (see the discussion of how DECHOMAI is used at 1.8.17 in chapter one, pp. 63–4). (6) The speech of Xenophon to Kleander contains echoes of a prayer: he expresses submission to the “deity,” along with a promise of renewed obedience (if a certain wish is granted) and a humble request for justice (6.6.31–33).

¹¹¹ The verb NEMŌ (6.6.33) has two main meanings: (1) to give to each what each deserves; (2) to graze herd animals. These two meanings come together in divine providence where the gods are thought of as divine shepherds giving to each what each deserves. The opening of the *Education of Cyrus* must be read in this light.

¹¹² The Ten Thousand are in danger of becoming the “enemies” of the Lacedaemonians, whose rule over all the Greeks is unchallenged (6.6.9, 6.6.18). Compare this description of the Lacedaemonians with the description of the gods at 2.5.7. Consider also that Dexippos ultimately “suffered what was just” at the hands of a Lacedaemonian (5.1.15). But one swallow does not make a summer.

¹¹³ Consider the kind of justice to be obtained from Kleander: TUCHEIN (6.6.25), TUCHONTES (6.6.32). The *absence* of Kleander does not alter the role of chance: the army “chances” to be out when he arrives in Kalpe (6.6.5); the army “chances” upon no plunder after he leaves (6.6.38).

Kleander nor the Lacedaemonians enforce justice. No one with adequate power gives to each what each deserves. Book six ends like books four and five.



The final scene of book six is an attractive reminder of the power of gratitude in human affairs. The Ten Thousand are thankful to Kleander for sparing the two men. They resolve to offer him the animals that had prompted the crisis. Kleander accepts the gift. He then graciously gives it back to them. The Ten Thousand soon resume their march. On the sixth day they reach Chrysopolis on the Bosphorus. They have seized much plunder along the way (6.6.38). Book six had begun with some movement *away* from “plundering” and toward “the agora.”¹¹⁴ But the Ten Thousand never transform themselves into a city.

¹¹⁴ 6.6.1 and §2–3.

“THE SOCRATIC KING” (CONTD.)

CHAPTER 7

THE LOVE OF THE SOLDIER (BOOK SEVEN OF THE *ANABASIS*)

Why did Xenophon choose to continue to write the *Anabasis* beyond book six? The retreat of the Ten Thousand is over. The army has reached the Bosphorus and is safely encamped in and around Hellenic Chrysopolis (6.6.38). Henceforth soldiers begin to leave and the army is disbanding (7.2.3–4 cf. 7.7.23). Even Xenophon attempts to leave (7.1.4, §40 cf. 7.2.8–9). His rule has reached a successful conclusion. Why is book seven included in the *Anabasis* at all? How does it “complete” the account of the retreat?¹ That the book contains interesting episodes—it undoubtedly does—is not a sufficient explanation of its inclusion. For, even aside from the issue of how book seven relates to the retreat proper, we are bound to be perplexed by several enigmatic scenes found in it (e.g., 7.4.7–10). Above all, we are perplexed by the notorious final scene of the *Anabasis* (7.8.8–23). Xenophon could have spared us this unedifying conclusion by ending the *Anabasis* with book six. He could have ended on a high note. Instead, he chooses to end on a disappointment. Why? Did he choose to include book seven (and its final scene) because his own anabasis is as yet unfinished? Recall that he befriended Cyrus for the sake of money, in part, at the outset of our story. He is “King Midas.” Though impoverished through much of

¹ Bradley (2010) correctly observes that Diodorus Siculus marks the end of the campaign of the Ten Thousand at Chrysopolis (pp. 526–27; see *The Library of History* [2000] 14.31.5). The campaign in Thrace is treated by Diodorus as an entirely separate and somewhat secondary episode (14.37.1–4).

book seven, Xenophon acquires substantial property at the end (7.3.20, 7.8.1–4).² But is it the function of book seven to show that the anabasis of Xenophon is a monetary success?

The foregoing explanation of the function of book seven is not misleading insofar as the final scene is concerned. But is obviously insufficient as an explanation of the book as a whole. I therefore propose to show that book seven of the *Anabasis* marks the final stage of the *logos*.³ While the retreat of the Ten Thousand is over, the argument of the *Anabasis* is not. To see this, recall what has been uncovered in Part III so far: when the noble and the good come into conflict and cannot be reconciled, the rule of the Socratic King is guided by the good. Each book of Part III has culminated (in its own way) in the same suggestion. Yet that suggestion is in need of further clarification. For, what exactly is the good? What if the good of the army and the good of the ruler are at odds? This issue surfaced briefly in book six when it seemed for a moment that Xenophon might have to be fed to the wolves to keep the Gates of Hellas open for the rest of the army (6.6). But the issue was not pursued. Here it becomes the guiding thread. The function of book seven in the *logos* of the *Anabasis* is thus once again to analyze how Xenophon endeavors to conjoin or reconcile, as a ruler, the demands of the noble with the exigencies of the good. But the noble is now understood as dedication to the welfare of the army or—to use the rare word that Xenophon employs twice in this context—it is understood as the virtue or the quality of the PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS—the “love of the soldier”.⁴ The analysis of PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS completes Part III and is the capstone of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.

1. PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS and the Good

At the outset of book seven, Pharnabazos fears that the Ten Thousand will campaign in his satrapy in Asia Minor. He asks Anaxibios, the

² Other generals have gotten rich during the retreat: for example, Timasiōn: 7.3.18, §27. See also 7.2.1–2.

³ Flower (2012) correctly observes that book seven has an important apologetic function (p. 152). But we must not conclude from this that the *primary* function of the book is apologetic. The emphasis on apology is the direct consequence of the contribution of book seven to the *logos*.

⁴ PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS is not used anywhere else in Xenophon. It is used twice in book seven, at 7.6.4 and 7.6.39. The word is so rare that its use here is “completely arresting”: Gray (2011) p. 42. Yet PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS is not easy to translate. There is no suitable single English equivalent. To be a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS is to possess a virtue or a quality, which, in a general, corresponds to the virtue or quality of the PHILOPOLITĒS

Lacedaemonian admiral in the Pontos, to transport them across the Bosphorus. He promises to do everything for him that is needed (7.1.2). Anaxibios summons the generals and the captains of the host across the waters to Byzantium. He promises that there will be a wage for the soldiers if they cross the strait. The generals say that they will deliberate and report back to him. Xenophon, however, says that he wishes to leave the army and sail away at once.⁵ At Anaxibios's urging, he agrees to cross the Bosphorus with the others first. He will leave afterward.

After this all the soldiers cross the strait. Yet instead of paying the wage he promised, Anaxibios announces that the soldiers must leave Byzantium at once. He will send them off, he says, after ascertaining their number. The soldiers are understandably vexed. They have no money to buy provisions for the march. They collect their weapons and baggage sluggishly. Eventually, all but a few men evacuate Byzantium. The Lacedaemonian Eteonikos stands at the gates, ready, as soon as the last man has exited, to shut them out and thrust in the crossbar for good measure. But while the generals are attempting to determine the best route for the impending march, the soldiers learn that they will be given no provisions by Anaxibios. They shall have to march through a difficult and dangerous region of Thrace and will have to fight for their food. This is too much to bear. They grab their weapons and run back toward Byzantium at full speed. Hammering at the gates, they scream that they are being thrown to the enemy and treated most unjustly. In their anger, they break down the gates, rush into the city and cause a general panic.

At the sight of what is happening, Xenophon fears that the army will begin to plunder and that irreparable harm will come "to the city, to himself, and to the soldiers" (7.1.18). He therefore runs toward Byzantium and throws himself inside the gates along with the mob. The Byzantines flee in all directions.⁶ All think that they will be destroyed. Many soldiers rush to the side of Xenophon: "Now it is possible for you, Xenophon, to become a man," they say. "You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, and you have these many men. Now if you wish, you would benefit us, and we would make you great" (7.1.21). The soldiers evidently

("Love-of-Fellow-Citizen") or, perhaps, to *PHILOPATRIA* ("Love-of-Fatherland", i.e., patriotism) in a statesman or a citizen.

⁵ The phrase "to leave the army" translates "APALLASSŌ [...] APO TĒS STRATIĀS." The verb *APALLASSŌ* is used four times in the first forty lines or so of chapter 7.1, always in relation to the army (7.1.4 [2X], §5, §10). It is also used at 7.6.2 and 4.3.2. *APALLASSŌ* means "to be rid [of a burden]." See also *Hiero* 7.11–12.

⁶ The Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibios flees the scene along with the Byzantines. He escapes on a fishing bark—a vessel commensurate with the dignity of his rule (7.1.20).

think that Xenophon has yet to prove that he is “a man.” His decision (in book six) to turn down the monarchy of the army, along with his readiness to obey submissively, or so it seemed, the harmost Kleander, have apparently left an impression of unmanliness. In a bid to calm the soldiers down, Xenophon claims to be sympathetic to their wishes. But if they desire these things, he says, they must fall into order and ground their weapons as quickly as possible. Thereupon the soldiers order themselves of their own accord. In a short time the hoplites form a body eight deep and the peltasts run to each wing. The area of the city where this happens—it is called the Thracian Square—is devoid of houses and flat, a most beautiful place for forming into order (7.1.24). A lesser man might have become intoxicated at the sight of these ordered and experienced troops. But not Xenophon.

“That you are angry, men and soldiers,” he begins, “and believe that you are suffering terribly, having been so deceived, does not surprise me” (7.1.25). But (he goes on to warn them), should the soldiers gratify their anger and avenge themselves for the deception on the local Lacedaemonians—and sack a blameless city—they will be declared the common enemies of just about the whole Hellenic world. Xenophon reminds the soldiers of the downfall of imperial Athens, which, despite its immense military and financial resources, was defeated by the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the Peloponnesian War. The army would not stand a chance against what would be an even larger Lacedaemonian coalition.⁷ “By the gods, let us not be mad⁸ nor be shamefully destroyed as enemies of our fatherlands, of our very friends, and of our relatives” (7.1.29). “And I advise you, since you are Hellenes, to try to obtain the just things by being obedient to those who are at the head of the Hellenes. And should you be unable to obtain this, we must nevertheless, even though wronged, not be deprived of Hellas at least” (7.1.30).

Xenophon’s advice is thus identical to the advice he had given on the occasion of the crisis over the trial of Agasias: submit to the Lacedaemonians

⁷ Xenophon all but says that the Lacedaemonians and their longtime allies would conclude a Grand Alliance with the Athenians (and their former allies), with Tissaphernēs, and with the King. That Xenophon knows that such an alliance is highly unlikely is intimated by the central placement of Tissaphernēs (7.1.28). Before long the Lacedaemonians will actually go to war with this satrap (7.6.1).

⁸ The oath of Xenophon at 7.1.29 calls attention to the fact that he takes into account only one kind of weapons when he assesses the relative strength of the Greek army, on the one hand, and of the Lacedaemonians and the Persians, on the other. This he does even though the Greeks have been deceived by Anaxibios. But to derive confidence from a wrong suffered amounts to madness. Xenophon stresses that the *Lacedaemonians* will have justice on *their* side if Byzantium is sacked; he does this to help the Greeks avoid the condition of madness (7.1.29).

(6.6).⁹ Disobedience—even disobedience to unjust orders—would jeopardize the return home and possibly even the lives of the soldiers. The majority will heed this advice (“TOIAÛTA EDOXE”). Yet in the wake of the episode, Xenophon’s authority reaches a nadir. He may have saved Byzantium from a melancholy fate, but he thereby confirmed the soldiers’ opinion that he is not “a man.”¹⁰ When he leaves the army, we search in vain for any expression of public gratitude or goodwill. The departure of Xenophon is given the importance of an endnote (7.1.40).

The generals who remain with the army are torn by faction. They cannot come to an agreement about what to do with it.¹¹ Two of them, Kleanōr and Phruniskos, wish to take the army to the Thracian warlord Seuthēs; another one, Neōn, wishes to take it to the Hellenic Chersonese; yet another, Timasiōn, is eager to sail back to Asia and return home from his exile (7.2.1–2). The text makes clear, however, that these conflicting aims are rooted in self-interest: each general wishes to take the army where he believes *he* will fare the best.¹² Faction causes paralysis. The army begins to melt away. Anaxibios rejoices when he hears that the army is breaking up. He supposes that this will please the Persian satrap Pharnabazos greatly (7.2.4). Even aside from his indifference to the welfare of a large

⁹ Xenophon also advises the soldiers to send envoys to Anaxibios to explain their actions and make a profession of obedience (7.1.31). The character of these explanations is adumbrated by the name of the central envoy: “Thrulochos” (7.1.32, MSS. CBAE, from THRULEŌ, “to babble”: see the apparatus of Dindorf and Hude/Peters). “Thrulochos” is likely a renaming of “Eurulochos.”

¹⁰ “There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse [...] are stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality.” Grote (1900) Vol. 9, pp. 160–61.

¹¹ The odd episode that ends chapter 7.1 gives us a measure of the loss of authority suffered by Xenophon and the other generals (7.1.33–41). The soldiers are ready to be ruled by anyone, so to speak, except by their current leaders. Note that a new general appears on the scene at 7.2.1 (Phruniskos). He apparently takes the place of Xenophon, who has just left the army (7.1.40).

¹² Kleanōr and Phruniskos have been persuaded by gifts from Seuthēs to lead the army to him; Neōn expects to become the head of the entire army if the army goes to the Chersonese; Timasiōn aspires to return to his native city, apparently to make himself tyrant of it on the strength of the soldiers’ backing (cf. 5.6.21–24). The central placement of Philēsios (from PHILĒSIS) in the list of generals at 7.2.1 hints at a question: What is the role of love of the soldier in the rule of the generals? Or rather, it adumbrates that the generals do not behave as PHILOSTRATIŌTAI (cf. 7.2.1–2). In this connection, consider the apparent renaming of Philēsios into “Philēx” at 7.5.4 (in the best MSS; see Dindorf’s apparatus). “Philēx” suggests “Out-with-Love [of-the-Soldiers].” Philēsios becomes “Philēx” in the wake of receiving a gift from Seuthēs.

body of men, Anaxibios welcomes the destruction of a major vector of Hellenic strength. His fatherland Sparta *needs* this strength, however.¹³ The patriotism (PHILOPATRIA) of Anaxibios proves to be remarkably weak against the appeal of “gifts.”¹⁴ In this he much resembles the generals of the army, who fail to act as PHILOSTRATIÖTAL.

Anaxibios sails from Byzantium to Kuzikos (on the Asiatic coast) where he meets with the Lacedaemonian Aristarchos, the designated successor of the Lacedaemonian Kleander as the harmost of Byzantium. It is said that Anaxibios’s own successor as admiral in the Pontos is about to reach the Hellespont. Anaxibios orders the newcomer Aristarchos to sell into slavery all the soldiers he shall find still in Byzantium.¹⁵ Kleander, the predecessor of Aristarchos, had not sold anyone. He even tended to the sick out of pity. But Aristarchos sells as many as four hundred men at the first opportunity. Another Lacedaemonian crime. Meanwhile Anaxibios sails into Parion (located west of Kuzikos) and he sends for the Persian satrap Pharnabazos in accordance with their earlier agreement (7.2.7 cf. 7.1.2). But since Aristarchos is now the harmost of Byzantium, and since Anaxibios is no longer the admiral, Pharnabazos disregards Anaxibios. Instead, he makes the same arrangement with the newcomer Aristarchos that he had had with the ex-admiral. Anaxibios is quick to try to avenge himself. He orders Xenophon (who is sailing homeward with him) to use every art and every device to sail back to the army as quickly as possible. Xenophon is to hold the army together, gather as many of the soldiers as he can, and lead the remnants of the Ten Thousand down the coast to Perinthos; thencefrom he is to sail back to Asia as quickly as possible.

Xenophon obeys Anaxibios without saying a word: he lives what he preaches when it comes to submitting to the Lacedaemonians (7.2.8–9).¹⁶ Back at camp, the soldiers receive Xenophon with pleasure. They immediately follow him, glad to hear that they shall be crossing back to Asia.

¹³ Two Laconian envoys will soon reach the army, cap in hand, and request its assistance in a war against Tissaphernēs (7.6.1). Consider the contribution of the Cyreans to the war in question (*Hellenika* 3.1.6–7) as well as their contribution to the victory of Sparta in the battle of Korōneia (*Hellenika* 4.3.15–21; the troops in question are there called the “foreign contingent”).

¹⁴ Compare the reaction of Anaxibios to the offer of a gift (7.1.2–3) with the reaction of Xenophon to the same (7.1.5–6).

¹⁵ 7.2.6 should be compared with 7.1.34. Perhaps Anaxibios orders this to secure his bribe from Pharnabazos. See Grote (1900) Vol. 9, p. 164.

¹⁶ Anaxibios had led Xenophon to expect that he would be permitted to sail home once he got the army across the Bosphorus. But Anaxibios just strung him along. In the *Hellenika*, Xenophon recounts the last moments of Anaxibios in a manner at once critical and fair (4.8.31–39).

They march to Perinthos where Xenophon negotiates to get transport ships (7.2.11–12). But the harmost Aristarchos sails into the place with two triremes. Having been bribed by the satrap Pharnabazos, Aristarchos forbids the shipmasters to ferry the troops across. He tells the soldiers not to be transported back to Asia. When Xenophon explains that Anaxibios has ordered this, and that he has dispatched him for this purpose, Aristarchos retorts that Anaxibios is no longer the admiral in the Pontos. But *he* is the harmost of Byzantium: “If I catch any of you on the sea, I shall sink you” (7.2.13). Aristarchos then retires inside the walls of Perinthos.

The next day Aristarchos summons the generals and the captains of the host to a meeting. As they approach the walls, Xenophon is tipped off that if he goes inside he will be arrested and will suffer something on the spot, or else be turned over to Pharnabazos (7.2.14).¹⁷ Hearing this, he sends his colleagues on ahead with the explanation that he wishes to sacrifice something. He then sacrifices [to know] whether the gods permit him to try to lead the army to the Thracian warlord Seuthēs. For twice before, Seuthēs had tried to persuade Xenophon to lead the army to Thrace, and twice Xenophon had said that this was not possible (7.1.5–6, 7.2.10). This time, however, he rides off to Seuthēs to try to do precisely that. For, Xenophon sees that to cross the Bosphorus is unsafe because Aristarchos has triremes. Nor does he wish to march to the Chersonese, where the army would be blocked up and in severe need of everything. Above all, in the Chersonese “it [would] be necessary to obey the local harmost” (7.2.15). Xenophon is no longer willing to obey the Lacedaemonians.

The generals and the captains return from their meeting with Aristarchos and they announce that he bids them return in the afternoon. From this, the plot against Xenophon seems even clearer. Since the sacrifices seem favorable for him and for the army to go safely to Seuthēs, Xenophon takes along a trusted Athenian captain, and from each of the generals (except Neōn) he takes one man whom each trusts. He rides off to Seuthēs in the night. He ignores Aristarchos.

Xenophon reaches Seuthēs after getting through his network of night-guards. Once in his presence, he establishes his trustworthiness and authority over the army (7.2.23–31).¹⁸ Then the negotiation proper begins. First, Xenophon asks Seuthēs why he needs the army. The warlord

¹⁷ Imagine the reward that the satrap Pharnabazos would have reaped from the King had he captured the man who had exposed Persia’s military impotence. And imagine what the man in question would have suffered.

¹⁸ Note the presence next to Xenophon of Phruniskos (7.2.29), who had already accepted a gift from Seuthēs (7.2.2). Phruniskos is named in the center of Xenophon and Polukratēs.

tells his story. When he was a child, his father used to rule several tribes along the Thracian coast. But he lost his kingdom and eventually his life when the affairs of the Odrusians took a turn for the worse. Seuthēs was raised as an orphan at the court of a neighboring king. He wishes to reconquer his paternal inheritance with the help of the Greek army. For he now lives like a robber, plundering the country of his father. Second, Xenophon asks Seuthēs what wage he would be able to pay the Greeks. Seuthēs states the sum he promises to pay them. (His promise will be reported to the army by the trusted men who accompany Xenophon.) The third and final question of Xenophon gives us an insight into his state of mind. If (he asks) the effort on behalf of Seuthēs is unsuccessful and “there is some fear on account of the Macedonians,”¹⁹ will Seuthēs receive into his domain anyone who wishes to come to him (7.2.37)? Seuthēs answers in the emphatic affirmative: “I will make you brothers, table-companions, and partners of all that we will be able to acquire” (7.2.38).²⁰ To Xenophon, Seuthēs says that he will give his daughter in marriage and will take in marriage Xenophon’s daughter if he has one. Seuthēs will also give him the most beautiful place he has along the sea. Xenophon is aware that his refusal to obey the Lacedaemonians will curtail, perhaps irremediably destroy, his and the army’s ability to return to Hellas. He (and they) may have to settle somewhere in Thrace. Seuthēs has become a refuge (cf. 7.6.34).

The third chapter of book seven is the high point of the group of chapters we are currently considering (7.1–7.3). That chapter is divided into three well-marked sections. First, Xenophon sketches how he manages to persuade the soldiers to follow Seuthēs and to campaign in Thrace (7.3.1–14); second, he describes a dinner hosted by Seuthēs for a group of guests that includes the rulers of the Greek army (7.3.15–33); finally, Xenophon sketches the opening stage of the campaign in Thrace (7.3.34–48). The dinner is thus the second and central section of the chapter. The dinner is itself divided into three well-marked moments: the meal

¹⁹ The best MSS. CBAE read “Macedonians” instead of “Lacedaemonians” here (7.2.37). This unexpected reading—which is rejected by all modern editors—is, I believe, authentic: Xenophon does not wish to scare off Seuthēs or to tip his hand completely. But there is no doubt that his fear is on account of the Lacedaemonians, *not* the Macedonians. The inferior MSS. FM “correctly” read “Lacedaemonians.”

²⁰ “Table-companion” translates ENDIPHRIOS (7.2.38), a rare word also used at 7.2.33. The word suggests that if Xenophon takes refuge in Thrace, he will be in the same position toward Seuthēs as Seuthēs had been toward king Mēdokos—“looking to another’s table, like a dog” (7.2.33). To understand the phrase “like a dog,” consider how guests are fed at a Thracian banquet (7.3.22). This vivid phrase occurs only in the inferior MSS. however.

(§21–25); the toasts (§26–32); and the entertainment (§33). The toasts thus stand at the exact center of the chapter. Even Xenophon (as ruler of the army) offers a toast to Seuthēs (7.3.29).

Let us begin with the persuasion of the soldiers (7.3.1–14). Xenophon and the men who accompany him return to the camp before dawn. At the first glint of daylight Aristarchos summons the generals and the captains. But they ignore him. Instead, they gather the troops. All assemble (except for the troops of Neōn):

Men (says Xenophon) Aristarchos with his triremes prevents us from sailing where we wish. Consequently, it is not safe for us to embark on boats. He himself bids us march by force to the Chersonese, across the Sacred Mountain. If we become masters of it and get there, he says that he will no longer sell you [into slavery], as he did in Byzantium, that he will no longer deceive you but, rather, you will get your pay, and that he will no longer overlook you when you are in need of provisions, as he does now. So this is what he says. But Seuthēs says that if you go to him, he will treat you well.²¹ (7.3.3–4)

The Greek army has only two options left according to this report: to march to the Chersonese or to go to Seuthēs. Xenophon says almost nothing about the second option, choosing instead to stress the difficulties involved in the first (“march by force,” “if we become masters of it,” etc.). Above all, he casts Aristarchos in an exceedingly harsh light.²² But before the soldiers can even consider these two options, Xenophon proposes to head for local villages where there is food to take. For they have no money to buy food from the market: “There, having provisions and hearing whatever anyone asks of you, you will choose what seems best to you” (7.3.5). In effect, the soldiers are invited to put some distance between themselves and Aristarchos even before hearing his proposals. They are invited to begin to burn their bridges with the Lacedaemonians. All raise their hands in support (7.3.6).

The marching army soon encounters Seuthēs. When Xenophon sees him, he tells him within the hearing of as many soldiers as possible that the army is marching where there is food: “If you were to lead us where provisions are most abundant, we would believe that we had been hosted by you” (7.3.9). Seuthēs takes the army to well-stocked villages. There he asks the soldiers to campaign with him, spelling out the conditions of the proposed alliance and the wage he promises. The soldiers agree to follow

²¹ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

²² See Introduction, p. 18.

him (7.3.14). They are never presented with any counterproposal from Aristarchos.²³ Yet the collective haste causes the soldiers to misjudge their predicament:

And many [soldiers] spoke in the same vein [at the assembly]—that what Seuthēs had said was of the greatest value. For it was winter, and it was not possible for anyone who so wished to sail off homeward; nor could one survive in a friendly land if one had to make purchases to live. But if they were to spend their time and feed themselves in a hostile land, it was safer with Seuthēs than alone, when there were so many good things; and if they should get a wage in addition, it seemed a great find. (7.3.13)²⁴

The soldiers overlook the possibility that they could spend the winter in the Hellenic Chersonese, as Aristarchos had ordered them to do, purchasing their provisions with the wage that was promised to them. Admittedly, there is a fair chance that the wage would not have been paid out (7.3.3). Yet even in that case, it might still have been safer to spend the winter in the Chersonese—a “beautiful and prosperous country” (5.6.25 cf. *Hellenika* 3.2.8–11)—rather than in hostile and frigid Thrace. For, the dangers of a winter campaign in Thrace are never weighed by the soldiers.²⁵ These dangers (along with other difficulties) will soon materialize (7.4). Finally and most importantly, the soldiers assume that the alliance with Seuthēs is but a *temporary* measure. In the spring they expect to sail home. But of course, this is the very thing that their action will render difficult if not impossible. By voting to follow Seuthēs and by ignoring Aristarchos, they are shutting the Gates of Hellas on themselves. The Lacedaemonians may not permit them to sail home.²⁶ This risk is not lost on everyone. When the alliance with Seuthēs is put to a vote, it draws the support of only a majority.²⁷ The silent minority was apparently mindful of the oft-repeated exhortations of Xenophon that the new rulers of Greece had to be obeyed. But circumstances have now changed.

²³ Cf. 7.3.14 with 7.3.8, 7.3.5.

²⁴ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

²⁵ Cf. 7.2.21–22, 7.2.17–18. These dangers are acknowledged by Xenophon once the alliance is concluded, but only in a semi-private setting: 7.3.31.

²⁶ Compare the expectation of the soldiers about a spring sailing to Hellas with Xenophon's expectation that he (and they) may have to stay in Thrace indefinitely (cf. 7.3.13 with 7.2.37–38, as well as the reference to Xenophon's children at 7.6.34). Consider also the question that Xenophon puts to Seuthēs at 7.3.12: he gets Seuthēs to state publicly that he will *not* lead the soldiers far away from the sea. Closeness to the sea is closeness to home in the Greek mind.

²⁷ “EDOXE TAŪTA” (7.3.14); cf. the unanimous vote at 7.3.6.

Once the alliance with Seuthēs is concluded, the troops go off and encamp according to their companies. Seuthēs invites the generals and the captains to a dinner (7.3.15–33). These leaders are met at the door by a fellow named Hērakleides who approaches everyone he supposes is capable of making a gift to Seuthēs (7.3.16). Hērakleides approaches some Parian ambassadors, for example, who are on their way to negotiate an alliance with the king of the interior of Thrace. They bring gifts for the king of the interior and for his wife. But Hērakleides points out that since Seuthēs has now recruited the Greek army, he will become the ruler along the coast: “As your neighbor, [Seuthēs] will be most capable to treat you well and to harm you. If you are moderate, you will give him what you are bringing. This will be a better arrangement for you than if you give it to Mēdokos [the king of the interior], who dwells far away” (7.3.17). Hērakleides thus persuades the ambassadors.

Hērakleides also approaches the Hellenic guests of Seuthēs. Having heard that the general Timasiōn owns drinking cups and barbaric carpets, he says to him: “It is the law (NOMIDZOMAI) that whenever Seuthēs invites people to dinner, the invitees give him gifts. And should [Seuthēs] become great here, he will be able both to restore you to your home and to make you rich here” (7.3.18). Hērakleides invokes an unwritten law among the Thracians which enriches the host of the dinner.²⁸ But by observing it, Timasiōn will advance his own interests as well (cf. 7.5.4).

Of course, Hērakleides approaches Xenophon. Since Xenophon hails from the greatest city and since his name is greatest with Seuthēs (he says), Xenophon will perhaps think he deserves (AXIOŌ) to take some strong places in the country and some land, as other Athenians have done before him.²⁹ “It is therefore worthy or lawful (AXIOS) for you also to honor Seuthēs most magnificently. And it is out of goodwill that I exhort you. I know well that the greater the things you give him, the greater the good things you will experience from him” (7.3.20). Hērakleides once again invokes the unwritten Thracian law. In view of Xenophon’s superior status, however, this law demands (AXIOS) that he should honor Seuthēs with more magnificent gifts than Timasiōn. Yet like Timasiōn, Xenophon will advance his own interests if he heeds the exhortation: the greater the gift, the greater the reward. But Xenophon is at a loss: he

²⁸ The word “law” (NOMOS) is used six times in chapter 7.3 (§22, §28, §37 [2X], §39, §41). Cognates of the word are used three more times (§8, §10; also §18). No other chapter of the *Anabasis* contains as many references to law (see also 7.2.23, §38). In keeping with the frequent use of NOMOS, the word “deserving” (AXIOS) and its cognates also occur with notable frequency: 7.3.10 (2X), §12, §13, §19 (2X).

²⁹ These unnamed Athenians include Alcibiades, who dwelled in these places after he became a voluntary exile (*Hellenika* 1.5.16–17, 2.1.25).

crossed back to the army with nothing save a boy and enough money for the trip (7.3.20).

That the Thracian law under consideration is more than a tool for extorting costly gifts from reluctant guests—that the law in question bears the mark of the noble—is made clear during the ensuing meal. The attendants of Seuthēs bring into the banquet hall several three-legged tables full of pieces of meats and large loaves skewered onto the meat. The tables are always set near the guests: “for this was the [Thracian] law” (NOMOS GAR ĒN: 7.3.22). Moreover, Seuthēs gives away the dishes set near him, keeping only enough for a taste. Otherwise, he breaks up the loaves and throws them to whomever it seems good, doing the same with the meat. His guests soon imitate his noble if somewhat uncouth generosity. (In a funny vignette, an Arcadian man described as a “mighty eater” grows tired of this food-throwing. He would rather fill his own belly than give away his dinner. So he puts an enormous loaf on his knees along with pieces of meat and he starts to eat. This Hellenic resistance to Thracian nobility produces a moment of laughter [7.3.23–25].³⁰)

Soon the guests of Seuthēs must fulfill *their* obligation under the Thracian law.³¹ For, despite bearing the mark of the noble, the Thracian law benefits the host of the dinner above all. Six toasts are offered to Seuthēs, three by Thracians and three by Greeks. First, a Thracian man comes forward with a white horse. He takes a horn full of wine and says: “I drink to you, Seuthēs, and I give you this horse. On him, you will pursue and capture those whom you wish, and in retreat you will not fear the enemy” (7.3.26). A second man raises a horn and gives Seuthēs a boy; a third, a coat for his wife.³² The Thracian toasts are followed by the Hellenic toasts. First, Timasiōn gives Seuthēs a silver bowl and an expensive carpet. Next to speak is a certain Gnēsippos, an Athenian. Unlike Timasiōn, Gnēsippos is poor and has nothing to give Seuthēs. Thus he casts aside the Thracian law and appeals to a higher law: “It is an ancient and most noble law,” he says, “that those who have something make gifts to the king for the

³⁰ The captain in question is renamed “Arustas”—“He-Who-Stops-the-Drawing-[of-the-Wine]” (ARUŌ-STAS, the participial form of HISTĒMI). The scene explains the name (7.3.23–25; ARUŌ is used in a similar fashion at *Education of Cyrus* 1.3.9). Arustas is an example of a man who gives to his king for the sake of honor (cf. 7.3.28). His gift makes the *failure* of the king to requite the honor all the more striking.

³¹ It is noteworthy that there are no sacrifices or libations offered to the gods at this dinner (cf. e.g., 6.1.4–5, *Symposium* 2.1). The only gifts offered are to Seuthēs. In fact, the gods are almost absent (but cf. 7.3.31). Is this because the dinner takes place in the cave of the “Cyclops”? For Seuthēs as a “Cyclops,” see note 36 below. Once the dinner is over, the gods reappear (7.3.36, 7.3.43; see also the password “Athena” at 7.3.39).

³² The central Thracian gift is therefore the boy. Is Seuthēs more “Hellenic” than first appears? Cf. 7.4.7–10.

sake of honor, but that the king gives to those who do not have, so that I, too, will be able to give you a gift and to honor you" (7.3.28). The crafty Gnēsippos—he is an Athenian, after all—tries to get out of his predicament by begging gracefully for a handout. The higher law he invokes defines duties between kings and subjects. It is a "most noble law" because it benefits subjects above all, unlike the Thracian law, which benefits the host above all. The higher law demands noble generosity from kings.

The toast of Gnēsippos threatens to put Seuthēs in a difficult position. Since the Greek army is destitute, "king" Seuthēs might have to alleviate their collective poverty. But of course he cannot do this. He is himself poor. By his own admission he lives like a robber (7.2.34).³³ Even his attendant Hērakleides concedes that Seuthēs is not yet a ruler, nor is he great (7.3.16, 7.3.18). Why, then, does Gnēsippos address Seuthēs as the "king"? Is this an anticipation of his success? Shameless flattery? Or are we to think of *Xenophon* here? After all, Xenophon is still the leader of several thousand men.³⁴ He is the only genuine "king" in attendance. Let us consider how *he* lives up to the demands of the "ancient and most noble law."³⁵

Xenophon is poor and has nothing to give to Seuthēs. His predicament is akin to that of Gnēsippos. But he bends over backward to observe the Thracian law. In this he acts more like Timasiōn. In fact, he outdoes Timasiōn, and not just by the magnitude of his gift. Xenophon gets up, he boldly accepts a horn of wine,³⁶ and says:

I give myself to you, Seuthēs, and these, my companions, to be your faithful friends, and not a one unwilling, but all wish to be friends with you even more than I. They are here even now, not asking you for anything but giving themselves up to labor on your behalf and to run risks willingly.

³³ Consider the dance of Seuthēs (7.3.33). It is the dance of a hunted man.

³⁴ That Xenophon is the leader of the army is indicated at 7.3.7, especially when the passage is read together with 7.3.6 *in fine*.

³⁵ That we must do so is clear: read 7.3.29 (TIMŌMENOS) together with 7.3.28 (TIMĒ, TIMAŌ).

³⁶ The horn of wine is poured for Xenophon by Hērakleides, a man described in the best MSS. as a "Marōnides": that is, "the son of Marōn" (MARŌNIDĒS: 7.3.16). Marōn was a mythical character, the grandson of Dionysos, who was said to have given Odysseus some jars of a precious and intoxicating wine. This wine helped Odysseus put the Cyclops to sleep and escape from his cave (*Odyssey* 9.197–198). In the *Anabasis*, "the son of Marōn" Hērakleides is also associated with the giving of wine (7.3.29). And the wine also enables Xenophon to escape from a predicament of his own. Is Seuthēs somehow a stand-in for the Cyclops? Is Xenophon somehow Odysseus? It is striking that Xenophon refers to the soldiers as "my companions" here (TOUS EMOUS TOUTOUS HETAIROUS: 7.3.30), a unique occurrence in the *Anabasis*, but of course strongly reminiscent of Odysseus

With their help, if the gods are willing, you will take back a great deal of land, that which was your father's, and you will also acquire land, and you will acquire many horses, many men, and beautiful women, whom you will not need to take as plunder, but they themselves will come bearing you gifts. (7.3.30–31)³⁷

Xenophon offers Seuthēs an extraordinary gift: his own person and that of all his companions. And judging by Seuthēs's reaction, he likes the gift (7.3.32). Yet, while we may admire Xenophon for “giving himself” to Seuthēs, what are we to think of his “gift” of his companions? Are they “his” to give away? (The central Hellenic speaker in this scene is named “Gnēsippos”—“The-Noble-Horse”!³⁸) Indeed, it is precisely to *avoid* “giving himself” to the harmost Aristarchos that Xenophon led the army to Seuthēs. In his capacity as guest, Xenophon observes the Thracian law. But in his capacity as king, he does not observe the ancient and most noble law. Rather than giving himself to Aristarchos—rather than exposing his life to keep the Gates of Hellas open for the army—he turns the army into a gift. And his purpose is clear (7.3.20). No wonder that Xenophon stresses that he was tipsy when he made the toast (7.3.29).

That Xenophon's observance of the Thracian law is *not* an expression of what we might call multicultural sensitivity, as scholars are sometimes inclined to conclude, is confirmed by the third and final section of chapter three (7.3.34–48).³⁹ No sooner has Xenophon bent over backward to observe the Thracian law than he dismisses this law in favor of the Hellenic law, which he says is nobler (KALLION: 7.3.37). Consider the scene.

At the end of the dinner, Seuthēs calls the Greek generals aside and suggests that they should launch a surprise attack against the enemy. This way, they will most surely capture both human beings and property. The

(e.g., *Odyssey* 9.172, §177, §193, §224, §230, §288 and *passim*). On the other hand, it is the Cyclops who gets drunk in the *Odyssey*. In the *Anabasis* Xenophon is tipsy and Seuthēs remains sober (cf. 7.3.29 with 7.3.35). Besides, Odysseus is able to rescue most of his companions whereas Xenophon “gives” his away. Is Xenophon somehow the Cyclops? Consider *Odyssey* 9.189, 9.215; also 9.428.

³⁷ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

³⁸ This is the only cameo of this manifestly renamed or altogether fictional character. The word I translate as “noble” (GNĒSIOS) could also be translated as “lawful” or “legitimate.” Of the five good things that Seuthēs is about to acquire, according to Xenophon, the third and central one is “many horses” (7.3.31). Consider the gift of the horse at 7.3.26.

³⁹ The third and last moment of the dinner is the entertainment. Musicians come in along with jesters. But the jesters are not reported to produce any laughter (§33 cf. §25). The evening is a descent, and from more than one point of view.

generals praise the proposal and bid him lead the way. Seuthēs's plan involves a march at night. Xenophon, however, proposes an improvement to it: "Consider then, if we are to march at night, whether the Hellenic law [HO HELLĒNIKOS NOMOS] is not nobler [than the Thracian law]" (7.3.37). Among the Hellenes, Xenophon says, when a march takes place during the day, the conditions of the terrain determine which contingent marches in the van. "But at night, it is the law among Hellenes that the slowest contingent takes the lead" (7.3.37). This way soldiers are least likely to become scattered and to attack each other out of ignorance.

Seuthēs is convinced: "You speak correctly, and I am persuaded by your law" (7.3.39). Seuthēs gives his most experienced guides to the Greeks, and, after a short period of rest, the allies set out in the middle of the night. Seuthēs proceeds with his cavalry at the end of the marching column. The next morning—after an uneventful night—he rides up to the van and praises the Hellenic law.⁴⁰ "Many times," he says, "I myself have gotten separated with the cavalry from the infantry while marching at night, even with a small number of men. But now, we find ourselves visibly gathered together with the coming of day, just as we ought" (7.3.41). Because the army is still gathered together, the attack of the allies proves to be very effective. The enemy is caught by surprise. A splendid booty is captured (7.3.48). The Hellenic law is nobler than the Thracian law.

2. The Generosity of the Philosopher

There is no man, doth a wrong, for the wrongs sake; But therby to purchase himselfe, Profit, or Pleasure, or Honour, or the like. Therefore why should I be angry with a Man, for loving himselfe better then mee?

Francis Bacon, *Essays* "Of Revenge"

Xenophon chose to jeopardize the homecoming of the soldiers to save his own life. This much he has made clear. But wasn't his action morally dubious? Wasn't it his duty, as the ruler of the army, to accept what were, after all, merely risks to his own life, if by failing to accept these risks he would be shutting the Gates of Hellas on the soldiers? Shouldn't he have attended to the welfare of the troops first and foremost? To make matters worse, Xenophon ingratiated himself with Seuthēs with or through his choice. Is the Socratic King a PHILOKERDĒS—a lover of gain—rather than a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS?

⁴⁰ Is it even a "Hellenic law"? To have the slowest troops take the lead in a march at night was the practice of the Persian Cyrus as well: *Education of Cyrus* 4.2.12, 5.3.34–45.

The second half of book seven develops a powerful response to this line of criticism. The response might be said to culminate in chapter six, where Xenophon defends himself publicly against the charge that, having smooth talked the soldiers into a campaign in Thrace, he stole their wage (7.6.7–44). I shall consider this memorable apology in its proper place. But first, I must consider chapter 7.4, which contains an element of the response in question whose importance is belied by the relative inconspicuousness of the chapter. In a crucial sense, we have now reached the climax of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.



The campaign in Thrace is harsh. Seuthēs burns villages to the ground to inspire fear in the local populations of what they will suffer if they do not obey him. No house is left standing. And the Thracian winter is extraordinarily rigorous (7.4.3–4). Seuthēs releases some captives to spread word that those who ran away must return to their homes and obey him. Otherwise, their villages and their food will be burned. The runaways include women, children, and the elderly (7.4.5). Perhaps most shocking of all, when Seuthēs captures a group of youths who had refused to heed his threat, he gives them no quarter but “struck down mercilessly as many as he took” (7.4.6).

The mercilessness of Seuthēs contrasts with the generosity of some among the Hellenes. As the warlord is striking down the Thracian youths just mentioned, a Greek pederast named Episthenēs sees a beautiful boy, just then reaching the age of puberty, who is holding a small shield. The boy is about to be slain. Episthenēs runs to Xenophon and begs him, as a suppliant, to give aid to the beautiful boy. Xenophon goes to Seuthēs and asks him not to kill the boy. He explains the way of Episthenēs—that he once enrolled a company of soldiers considering nothing except whether each was beautiful—and with these he was a good man (ANĒR AGATHOS: 7.4.8):

And Seuthēs asked, “Would you even be willing, Episthenēs, to die for him?” And [Episthenēs] stretched out his neck and said, “Strike, if the boy orders it and will be grateful.” Seuthēs asked the boy if he should strike him instead of the other. The boy would not allow it but, as a suppliant, begged him to kill neither. Here, of course, Episthenēs embraced the boy and said, “It is time for you, Seuthēs, to do battle with me over him, for I will not give the boy up.” Now at this Seuthēs laughed and let it go. (7.4.9–10)⁴¹

⁴¹ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

This vignette puts a smile on our face. Episthenēs is a good man when he is surrounded by handsome soldiers. The boy's beauty likewise steels his courage: stretching out his neck, he is ready to give his life for him. Episthenēs dedicates himself to the beautiful. Yet his dedication is not simply or unambiguously selfless. Episthenēs is willing to be struck by Seuthēs (he says)—“if the boy orders it and *will be grateful*.” Episthenēs expects a sweet reward. But how will he enjoy the boy's gratitude if he must *first* be struck dead? Beauty fills Episthenēs with the courage to die for another but also with the hope that, in and through this sacrifice, he will obtain the favors he seeks. Is he really ready to *die* for another?⁴² And we must wonder: How would he react if the boy failed to show proper gratitude afterward? Would he accuse him of ingratitude? Would he feel hatred and seek revenge? We have seen this reaction before with the love of the noble of Cheirisophos.⁴³ The courage of Episthenēs, nourished and steeled by the sight of beauty, is liable to turn against the object of his dedication. *Eros* yields an act of generosity that is susceptible to turn into harshness and inhumanity. The generosity of Episthenēs is not simply or unambiguously generous.

The function of the rest of chapter 7.4 is to adumbrate the character of an alternative and truer form of generosity. Let us call it philosophic generosity. Seuthēs decides to bivouac in the local villages to prevent the Thracians from subsisting out of them. He descends into the plain and sets up his camp there. Xenophon encamps in the highest villages. But his encampment is vulnerable. He complains of this to Seuthēs, who “bids him have confidence” (7.4.13). Seuthēs shows him the hostages he received from the Thracians who came down to negotiate a truce. Some Thracians even ask Xenophon to lend them his assistance in concluding a truce. Xenophon agrees and “bids them have confidence”: he shares in the confidence of Seuthēs (7.4.13). Xenophon pledges that the Thracians will suffer no harm if they obey Seuthēs. But like Seuthēs, his confidence proves to be overconfidence.

The next night the Thracians attack Xenophon's encampment. At few other points in the *Anabasis* is his life as gravely threatened as it is here. The Thracians enter the village under cover of darkness. When they are at the doors of a dwelling, they throw in their javelins, clubs, and they set it ablaze. They call on Xenophon by name to come out and die, or else (they say) he will be burned alive on the spot. Fire is now coming through the

⁴² The verb *HIKETEUŌ* (“to beg as a suppliant”) occurs twice in this scene. The word is used a third time at 7.4.22. The overtones of the word are brought out by, for example, *Hellenika* 2.3.52–53.

⁴³ See 6.2.14 and pp. 235–37. Xenophon causes us to wonder whether the boy was subsequently grateful to Episthenēs. He is silent about their ensuing relationship: cf. 4.6.3.

roof of Xenophon's house. The men around him, with breastplates on, are armed with shields, daggers, and helmets. They leap out of the burning house with their swords drawn. A Greek trumpet signals their peril. Seuthēs, who is encamped in the plain below, hears the signal. The attacking Thracians flee. Some of them are captured while others lose their way in the dark and are slain. Two Greek captains are also wounded, and the clothes and equipment of others are burned. But no one is killed. At length Seuthēs reaches the village. He had galloped to the rescue, trumpet blaring, with a handful of horsemen: "I thought I would find many of you dead," he says (7.4.19).

Xenophon's reaction to the attack of the Thracians is revealing. He asks Seuthēs to give him the Thracian hostages and, if he wishes, to campaign with him in the mountain; otherwise, to let him go himself. Seuthēs gives him the hostages and comes along with his own army, which has now tripled in size.⁴⁴ When from their mountain the Thracians see many hoplites, many peltasts, and many horsemen, they come down and beg as suppliants to be allowed to conclude a truce:

Seuthēs called Xenophon and indicated what they were saying, and he said that he would not make a truce if Xenophon wished to take vengeance against them for the attack. And [Xenophon] said, "But I believe that I have obtained sufficient justice now, if they will be slaves instead of free." He said, however, that he counseled [Seuthēs] in the future to take as hostages those who were most capable of doing some harm, and to leave the old ones at home. (7.4.23–24)⁴⁵

Xenophon agrees to the truce and declines to avenge himself on the Thracian hostages, who were elderly men.⁴⁶ He acts with signal generosity. He believes that he has now obtained sufficient justice, he says: the Thracians have been deprived of their freedom; henceforth they will be slaves. Xenophon does not wish to punish (further) men who fought for the freedom that he, too, values. He does not wish to punish (further) men whose interests clashed with his own, and who defended these interests with deception and force. Xenophon is not angry with them for loving themselves more than him. Of course, his generosity contrasts with the mercilessness of Seuthēs.⁴⁷ But it also contrasts with

⁴⁴ Many joined Seuthēs's campaign when they heard about what he was doing: 7.4.21. See also 7.5.15.

⁴⁵ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁴⁶ Cf. 7.4.21 ("as they said") with 7.4.24.

⁴⁷ Seuthēs could not bear to live slavishly (7.2.33–34). Yet he showed no mercy toward youths who resisted his rule out of a similar concern for freedom (7.4.6).

the generosity of Episthenēs. Xenophon expects no reward for his generous treatment of the Thracians. Quite the contrary: he indicates to Seuthēs that the Thracians are bound to stir up more trouble in the future. They will continue to be troublesome because they will continue to wish to be free. And if they see an opportunity, they will attempt to recover their freedom. Xenophon forgoes the pleasure of revenge without any expectation of future recompense. His generosity is born not only of inner confidence and strength—qualities which the chapter illustrates⁴⁸—but also of his knowledge of human motivations. For, he had learned from Socrates that all human beings, choosing from among the possibilities what they think is most advantageous to themselves, do those things.⁴⁹ Xenophon's generosity is *not* susceptible to turn into harshness and inhumanity when the nonexistent expectation of reward goes unmet. The generosity of Episthenēs, by contrast, typically begets a demand for a recompense that is believed to be owed. Yet Episthenēs—who expects a sweet reward—provides a confirmation in the flesh of the Socratic position. Nowhere else in the *Anabasis* do we see more clearly the difference between Xenophon and the lovers of the noble regarding the basis of their respective noble deeds. Xenophon shows that the enlightened pursuit of the good is not only compatible with—it is in fact a foundation for—true generosity. It is a foundation for the humanity of the philosopher.

3. Xenophon as PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS

In the next group of chapters (7.5–7.7), Xenophon depicts himself as a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS—a lover of the soldier—above all in a memorable apology he delivers to the troops (7.6.7–44). Let us consider this apology as well as the scenes that lead up to and follow it.

The campaign in Thrace yielded a splendid booty, as we saw (7.3.48). Seuthēs's attendant Hērakleides was given the task of selling it. When he returns to the camp, Xenophon declines to accept anything for himself: "It will be enough for me to take something later," he says to Seuthēs, "but give something to these generals and captains who have followed with me" (7.5.3). The leaders of the army are therefore well rewarded by Seuthēs (7.5.4). But the common soldier is paid only for twenty days of campaigning though he has already toiled for a month. When Hērakleides claims that he could not sell the booty for more,

⁴⁸ The chapter also illustrates that inner confidence and strength can be political liabilities. They almost get Xenophon killed in chapter 7.4.

⁴⁹ *Memorabilia* 3.9.4.

Xenophon is vexed and he swears: "It seems to me, Hērakleides, that you do not care for Seuthēs as you ought to. For, if you cared, you would have come bringing the full wage, even if you had to borrow money, and if there was no other way, you would even have sold your own clothes" (7.5.5).

From there the situation of Xenophon deteriorates rapidly. A vexed Hērakleides fears that he will be ousted from Seuthēs's friendship. He begins to slander Xenophon as much as he can to his master. The soldiers reproach Xenophon for not being paid in full. And Seuthēs is vexed with Xenophon, too, because he keeps asking for the wage of the soldiers. Heretofore the warlord had been reminding Xenophon of the fortified places along the sea he would be getting at the end of the campaign. Seuthēs no longer makes any mention of these things. The loss of his prospects must have caused some bitterness to Xenophon.⁵⁰ We have seen that he expected to have to remain in Thrace for an indeterminate period of time. And he could probably have lived contentedly along the Thracian coast (7.2.37–38 cf. 7.6.34).⁵¹ Thus when he "digresses" to describe how the ships that sail into the Pontos are known to wreck their bottoms on the shoals of Thrace, he seems to be musing on his own political shipwreck (7.5.12–13). He will eventually be persuaded by Seuthēs to keep campaigning with him, but he is clearly disaffected. And though it is now dangerous to leave the host, the situation of Xenophon has become precarious even among the soldiers: they are altogether angry with him (PAGCHALEPŌS EICHON: 7.5.16).

At this point two Laconians, Charmiōs and Polunikos, reach the camp and announce that the Lacedaemonians have decided to campaign against Tissaphernēs. The commander Thibrōn is sailing in to conduct the operations. He needs the Greek army. The two men also announce the wage that Thibrōn offers to pay the troops. The arrival of the Laconians is greeted by Hērakleides, the attendant of Seuthēs, as something very fine: "The Lacedaemonians need the army but you do not need it anymore" (7.6.2)! By handing over the army, he reasons, Seuthēs will gratify the

⁵⁰ The last stage of the campaign takes place in the Thracian district of Salmudēssos (7.5.12). But in the better MSS. "Salmudēssos" is renamed "Halmudēssos" (HALMUROS = "bitter").

⁵¹ The three places that Seuthēs had said he would give to Xenophon were called Bisanthēs, Ganos, and Neos Teichos (7.5.8 cf. 7.2.38). The name of the centrally placed "Ganos" means "the joyous place." These three places had once belonged to Alcibiades, "except that Ganos replaced Ornoi" (Stronk [1995], p. 197 cf. Cornelius Nepos [1961] 7.7). "Ganos" is apparently a Xenophonic renaming of Ornoi.—The reference to the many written books that Xenophon saw on the Thracian shores adumbrates the reason why he thought he could live contentedly in Thrace: he could have access to the THĒSAUROI of Hellas: 7.5.14 cf. *Memorabilia* 1.6.14.

Lacedaemonians, the soldiers will stop demanding their wage, and the country will be rid of them. Thus, when the Laconians tell Seuthēs that they have come for the army, Seuthēs responds that he gives it to them. He adds that he wishes to be their friend and ally. He also invites them for a dinner and hosts them magnificently. But he does not invite Xenophon or any of the other Greek generals. During the evening, the Laconians ask what kind of man Xenophon is. “In other respects he is not bad,” Seuthēs answers, “but he is a lover of the soldier, and he is worse off because of it” (PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS: 7.6.4). Even the deceptive Seuthēs thus composes a “little certificate to the disinterestedness of [Xenophon’s] conduct.”⁵² Further inquiries make clear that the Laconians fear Xenophon as a demagogue who could oppose their plans for the army (7.6.4–6). In fact, the proposed friendship and alliance between Seuthēs and the Lacedaemonians bodes very ill for him. Seuthēs is about to become the opposite of a refuge (cf. 7.2.37). Where is Xenophon going to turn now?⁵³

The next day the Laconians declare to the assembled troops that the Lacedaemonians have decided to go to war with Tissaphernēs. The soldiers are well pleased by the offer of employment they carry, and by the prospect of avenging themselves on the satrap Tissaphernēs. But an Arcadian immediately accuses Xenophon:

But we, Lacedaemonians, would have come to you even long ago, if Xenophon had not persuaded us and led us here, where we have not ceased campaigning both night and day during a terrible winter, while he gets [the fruits of] our labors. And Seuthēs has enriched him in private, and defrauds us of our pay. Consequently, if I, the first one to speak, should see him stoned to death and paying the penalty for how he has dragged us about, it would seem to me that I had received my salary and that I would no longer be annoyed at having labored so. (7.6.9–10)⁵⁴

Another man stands up and he speaks in the same vein, and then another. Xenophon must therefore defend himself in what is starting to look like a capital trial. The speech he delivers to the army is an elaboration of the praise of Seuthēs that he is a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS. He argues that his accusers are altogether senseless or very ungrateful to him (7.6.23). Indeed, far from deserving to be put to death, Xenophon is a dedicated ruler who has suffered much for the troops: “I, for my part, say that these very things for which you are so angry with me, you ought

⁵² Grant (1871) p. 76.

⁵³ The gravity of the situation is conveyed by the last line of 7.6.6: “This day ended thus.”

⁵⁴ Translation by Ambler (2008).

justly to be grateful to the gods for them, as good things" (7.6.32).⁵⁵ To assess Xenophon's speech properly, however, we must appreciate that it is directed not just at the soldiers, but above all at the two Laconians. Manifestly, the stoning to death of Xenophon would be welcomed by many in the army. This creates an obvious danger: will the Laconians be tempted to secure the goodwill of the troops with a blood offering? Xenophon must somehow meet this danger. He is remarkably successful in this (7.6.39 cf. 7.6.43). Yet it is only fair to note that his success is facilitated by lack of knowledge. Besides, the soldiers express no support for Xenophon at the end of the speech. His defense is less successful than earlier ones had been (cf., e.g. 5.7.34–35, 5.8.26).⁵⁶ Henceforth he must surround himself with a bodyguard (7.7.2, 7.7.13; also 7.7.20). It would be naïve to think that this precaution is needed only in view of the reported hostility of Thibrōn (7.6.43–44; 7.7.54).

"But a human being must expect everything," Xenophon begins, "when I at least am now even blamed by you in a matter where I am conscious of having shown the utmost eagerness on your behalf, as it seems" (7.6.11). In the first place, Xenophon had to put off his own return to Hellas in order to lead the soldiers into Thrace.⁵⁷ At the time, he had already taken his leave of the host and was sailing home. But he turned around, "not, by Zeus, surely because I found out that you were doing well but rather because I learned that you were facing difficulties" (7.6.11). Xenophon turned around to benefit the army if he could.⁵⁸ He concedes that he did lead the soldiers into Thrace. But he did so *only* when it became clear that the Lacedaemonian harmost Aristarchos would not permit the soldiers to sail back to Asia, where they wished to go. Xenophon tried first to return to Asia: "I held this to be best for you and I knew that you wished it" (7.6.12). When Xenophon gathered the troops and they deliberated about what to do, all said that Seuthēs should be followed, and all voted to follow him. How then could Xenophon have committed a wrong when he merely led where all thought it best to march?⁵⁹ As for the vexing issue of the unpaid wages, Xenophon proclaims forcefully his innocence: he swears by all the gods and all the goddesses

⁵⁵ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁵⁶ We do hear two captains, Eurulochos and Polukratēs, make proposals that help Xenophon insofar as they seek to rechannel the anger of the troops. But both men had been among his staunchest supporters (7.6.40–41).

⁵⁷ The apology of Xenophon is divided into three parts. First, he reminds the soldiers of what he has done for them since he returned to the army (7.6.11–15); second, he addresses three specific objections (7.6.16–30; see note 60); third, he contrasts the soldiers' situation with his own (7.6.31–38).

⁵⁸ Cf. 7.2.8–9 and 7.6.33.

⁵⁹ 7.6.14 cf. 7.3.1–14.

that, far from having stolen anything, he himself received nothing from the faithless Seuthēs, not even what he was privately promised, nor did he accept certain payments that other leaders took (7.6.18–19).

Yet isn't Xenophon ashamed to have been deceived in such a foolish way? Why didn't he demand pledges from Seuthēs? To the first objection, Xenophon answers that the greater shame belongs to Seuthēs, who deceived a friend.⁶⁰ As for the lack of pledges, he answers reluctantly⁶¹—and not in so many words—that he could not secure pledges. The Greeks needed Seuthēs as much as, or even more than, Seuthēs needed them. Indeed, when Xenophon returned to the army, he found that the soldiers were suffering from hunger and cold. They were unable to provision adequately off hostile Thrace because they had no organized body of cavalry or peltasts. The alliance with Seuthēs made them safe:

If, when you were pressed by such necessity, I had not even asked for any salary whatsoever but had merely secured Seuthēs as an ally for you, he with his horsemen and peltasts of which you had such need, would I seem to have deliberated badly on your behalf? For surely when you made common cause with them, since the Thracians were then compelled to flee in greater haste [because of the pursuit of Seuthēs's horsemen and peltasts], you found more abundant food in the villages, and you also got a larger share of herd animals and captives. And after the cavalry unit was attached to us, we never even saw an enemy! [...] So if he who provided you with this safety did not pay a very large salary in addition to this safety, is this suffering so cruel, and do you think because of it that you ought not by any means to allow me to live? (7.6.27–30)⁶²

After adducing a few additional elements of self-defense, Xenophon ends his apology by asking the soldiers to compare their present situation with his own: whereas they spent the winter in Thrace in relative abundance and safety (after having experienced dearth and danger); whereas they

⁶⁰ In fact, this objection is the second of the three objections answered directly by Xenophon in the second part of his speech (7.6.16–30). Each objection begins with a version of the phrase "Someone might say that...": 7.6.16, 7.6.21, 7.6.23. Xenophon's answer to the second objection, which takes up the subject of justice as a "protection" or "guard" (PHULAKĒ) against deception, bears on the issue of the goodness of justice for a ruler (cf. 7.7.41).

⁶¹ Xenophon is reluctant because he knows that his answer will make it more difficult to secure the wage of the soldiers. To suggest that the Greeks needed Seuthēs, at the time of the alliance, as much as or more than Seuthēs needed them, is bound to increase the latter's unwillingness to pay the Greeks what he owes them. The reason why Xenophon could not demand pledges from Seuthēs is not directly stated by him. But it has been made clear.

⁶² Translation by Ambler (2008).

preserved and even added to their glory, by defeating the barbarians of Europe, after defeating those of Asia; and whereas their prospects for the future now seem quite bright, since the Lacedaemonians are offering to hire them, Xenophon has become, through his love of the soldier, the target of numerous slanders and of powerful enmities. He is no longer trusted by the Lacedaemonians and he is hated by Seuthēs, whom he had hoped would be a refuge for himself and his children. And now, despite all that he has suffered for the soldiers—and though he still strives to accomplish whatever good he can for them—they have this judgment of him?

“But you have got me, having captured me without my running away or hiding. If you do what you say, know that you will have killed a man who has passed many sleepless nights on your behalf, who has on many occasions performed hard labor with you and faced dangers both in turn and out of turn, who—with the gods being gracious—has set up with you many trophies over the barbarians, and who has exerted himself for you in everything I could, so that you not become enemies of any of the Greeks. And thus it is now possible for you to travel wherever you may choose, on both land and sea, without being subject to attack or blame. And now, when a great opportunity for you has appeared, and you are sailing just where you have long desired to, when those who are powerful to the greatest extent are in need of you, when pay has appeared, and when those believed to be the best leaders, the Lacedaemonians, have arrived, does it now seem to you to be the appropriate moment in which to kill me as quickly as possible? No indeed, you did not think so then, when we were at such a loss, you people of the keenest memories! But then you even used to call me ‘father,’ and you used to promise that you would always remember me as a benefactor.⁶³ These [two Laconians] are not lacking in judgment, however, these who have now come for you; consequently, as I think, you will not seem better to them by being such as you are to me.”

On saying this he ceased. (7.6.36–38)⁶⁴

Thereupon Charmiōs gets up and says⁶⁵: “You do not seem to me to be justly angry at this man here. And I myself am able to bear witness for him. For when Polunikos and I questioned Seuthēs about what kind of man Xenophon is, he had nothing else to blame, except he said that he

⁶³ The apology of Xenophon begins with an oath “By Zeus!” It ends with Xenophon as the “father” of the soldiers: cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1160b24–28 and *Education of Cyrus* 8.2.9, 8.8.1. See also p. 122, note 36. In adversity, one father did better than the other.

⁶⁴ Translation by Ambler (2008).

⁶⁵ In the inferior MSS., Charmiōs swears “by the twin gods.”

is too much a lover of the soldier, and is worse off because of it, both with regard to us Lacedaemonians and with regard to [Seuthēs himself]" (7.6.39). The Laconian Charmīos has clearly been won over. Yet even as he reports—or rather magnifies⁶⁶—the praise of Seuthēs, he intimates the enduring hostility of Sparta, about which Seuthēs had been silent.⁶⁷ In the sequel, Xenophon is warned from several quarters that he will be put to death if he comes into the power of the Lacedaemonian Thibrōn (7.6.43–44).

The last chapter of our section (7.5–7.7) continues to depict Xenophon as a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS. The high point of it is Xenophon's speech to Seuthēs by means of which he secures the soldiers' wage (7.7.20–54). But the chapter also casts the entire episode of Thrace in a new light, correcting or modifying the impression left by Xenophon's apology.

Seuthēs has gone off to campaign further away. The Greeks are provisioning in local villages in preparation for their march down to the coast. But the villages in question belong to Dēmosadēs, to whom they had been given. (Dēmosadēs [or Mēdosadēs] is the man who had initially approached Xenophon on behalf of Seuthēs to take the Greek army to him: 7.1.5, 7.2.10.) Seeing that the Greeks are consuming all the supplies in his villages, Dēmosadēs is upset. He takes along a powerful Odrusian and as many as thirty horsemen and summons Xenophon forth from the Greek camp: "You are unjust, Xenophon, when you plunder our villages. And we warn you—both I on behalf of Seuthēs and this man, who has come from Mēdokos, king of the interior, to leave the country. If you do not, we will not permit it, but if you harm our country we will protect it as against enemies" (7.7.3).

"When you say such things," Xenophon replies, "it is hard even to give you an answer. But I will speak for the sake of this youth [i.e. the Odrusian] so that he might know what sort of men you are and what sort we are" (7.7.4). Xenophon proceeds to remind the two men of how the campaign in Thrace unfolded. And he succeeds in persuading, if not Dēmosadēs, then at least the Odrusian, who confesses by the end that he is ashamed to have agreed to accompany Dēmosadēs on his errand: "I sink beneath the earth in shame" (7.7.11).⁶⁸

"Before we became your friends," Xenophon says, "we [Greeks] marched through this country wherever we wished, plundering what we

⁶⁶ Seuthēs had said that Xenophon was a lover of the soldier (7.6.4). Charmīos reports that he said that Xenophon is "too much" or "very much" a lover of the soldier (AGAN: 7.6.39). This magnification bears witness to the power of Xenophon's words.

⁶⁷ Cf. 7.6.39 with 7.6.4.

⁶⁸ It is striking that both with his apology and with his speech to Dēmosadēs, Xenophon shows how he persuaded people who had no firsthand knowledge of the facts.

wanted, burning what we wanted.⁶⁹ And whenever you came to us as an envoy, you bivouacked near us, fearing none of your enemies" (7.7.6). By contrast, Dēmosadēs did not even go into the country, or if he did, he kept his horses bridled in order to escape enemies more powerful than he was. But now that the country has, with the help of the gods, become his through the labor of the Greeks—now that "you took [the country] over from us, who held it by our strength"—Dēmosadēs is driving them away without giving them any gifts or doing them any good (7.7.7). He does not even permit the Greeks, insofar as he can, to bivouac. "And saying these things you are not ashamed before the gods and before this man, who now sees you wealthy, though before you became our friend you got your living from robbery, as you yourself said" (7.7.9)? "But why do you even speak to me about these things? I no longer rule; the Lacedaemonians rule, to whom you gave the army to take away and did not invite me, you most marvelous people, so that even as I had vexed them when I led it to you, I might have gratified them by giving it back now" (7.7.10).

Xenophon is surely justified to complain of the duplicity and ingratitude of his erstwhile Thracian allies. Yet fairness requires us to note that he blames Dēmosadēs for the actions and the words of Seuthēs and Hērakleides.⁷⁰ Moreover, his speech sheds retroactive light on his apology.⁷¹ Xenophon presents the Greek army here, at the time of the alliance with Seuthēs, as very powerful and not in need of the warlord. Seuthēs took over the country from the strength of the Greeks. They were Seuthēs's benefactors. In the apology, however, the Greeks were made safe by Seuthēs (7.6.30). Which of these two depictions is more accurate? Seuthēs and the Greeks complemented each other well when they concluded their alliance. Seuthēs had peltasts and cavalry, the Greeks had heavy infantry. By joining forces—and *only* by joining forces—they became a potent military force (7.3.44).



Xenophon secures the wage of the soldiers in the second half of chapter 7.7. He goes to the two Laconians to say that Dēmosadēs is calling on them to say what he (Dēmosadēs) has already told Xenophon—the army must leave the country (7.7.13). Xenophon then offers the Laconians some advice.

⁶⁹ Cf. 7.6.29.

⁷⁰ Cf. 7.7.10 with 7.6.3 and 7.7.9 with 7.2.34.

⁷¹ Xenophon acknowledges that *he* took the army to Seuthēs—a move that, as he indicates he knew, was going to vex the Lacedaemonians.

They might secure the wage owed to the soldiers if they were to say to Dēmosadēs (1) that the army is asking them to secure the wage from Seuthēs whether willingly or unwillingly;⁷² (2) that the soldiers say that once they receive their wage, they will follow the Laconians eagerly; (3) that the soldiers seem to them to say what is just; and (4) that the Laconians have promised the soldiers that they will not depart before the soldiers get what is just. Xenophon thus suggests a way—an alternate way—of securing the goodwill of the troops. The Laconians are convinced. They go straight to Dēmosadēs and tell him that if he has something to say, he should speak up. Otherwise, they have something to tell *him*. A very submissive Dēmosadēs replies that it is not right for his villages to be harmed by friends. In response, the Laconians say that they will leave the country whenever the soldiers have their wage. Yet their speech shows that their educability in matters of diplomacy is limited.⁷³ After a few tense moments, Dēmosadēs says that the Laconians should speak directly to Seuthēs about the wage. If he is not persuaded, they should send both himself and Xenophon. The Laconians do not even try to speak to Seuthēs. They send Xenophon to the Thracian, and, with him, those who seem most suitable.

The speech of Xenophon to Seuthēs is unusually long-winded. It is also noticeably free of any bitterness or recrimination (7.7.20–47). We even hear Xenophon laugh right afterward—the only time Xenophon is reported (by name) to laugh in the *Anabasis* (7.7.54). Xenophon opens his speech by claiming that he has not come to Seuthēs to ask for anything. Instead, he wants to teach Seuthēs, if he is able, that it is not just for him to be vexed because Xenophon has been asking eagerly for the wage that was promised to the soldiers: “For, I held that it was no less beneficial for you to pay than for them to receive” (7.7.21). Xenophon therefore tries to teach Seuthēs where his own true interest lies. This is the burden of the first part of his speech, which has two parts (7.7.20–36). He makes three arguments.

⁷² To secure the wage, and thus the soldier’s goodwill, Xenophon advocates the very tactic put forth earlier by Eurulochos. While he had failed to endorse that tactic publicly at the time (cf. 7.6.40 with 7.6.41), we see here that he did not disagree with it in principle. But Xenophon did not wish to be associated with this tactic lest he burn his bridges with Seuthēs—who was listening in on the speech (7.6.8, §18–19)—and thus destroy any remaining hope of securing the wage.

⁷³ Xenophon had suggested to the Laconians to use both the carrot and the stick. But they forget about the carrot—they do not say that the soldiers say that they will follow the Laconians eagerly once the wage is paid—and they wield a much bigger stick—they bluntly threaten to avenge themselves on Dēmosadēs. The Laconians also accuse Dēmosadēs and his master Seuthēs of having broken their oaths. This is pure Laconic mendacity: there was no oath (7.7.17 cf. 7.3.10–14). The accusation is to be read in light of 7.7.15: so much for Laconic rhetorical skill.

First, Seuthēs has now become a powerful king⁷⁴ and cannot escape the public eye. If he fails to pay, he will seem to be ungrateful—sending away his benefactors—and lose the praise of six thousand men. And the greatest thing is that he will throw discredit upon his word. Yet being trusted is a very great thing for a ruler.⁷⁵ Indeed, Seuthēs acquired a kingship worth many times the thirty talents the soldiers now demand of him because he was trusted to speak the truth and was able to persuade them to campaign with him: “This first thing, then—being trusted—which secured a kingdom for you, you sell it off for this amount of money” (7.7.26).

The second argument of Xenophon is that Seuthēs’s failure to pay will make it harder for him to hold on to his newly acquired kingdom (7.7.27–32). His subjects are obedient out of fear, not out of friendship, he says, and without fear they shall attempt to regain their freedom. But they will be less fearful and moderate if they come to suspect that the Greeks are better disposed toward them than toward Seuthēs himself. Indeed, Seuthēs could probably not secure other troops, besides this Greek army, should he need to do so. He is now distrusted on account of what has happened. The Thracians may even choose leaders from among the Greeks to head the rebellion. And the Lacedaemonians, who need the Greek army, may take up the cause of the soldiers as well.

Finally, Xenophon argues that the country of Seuthēs will suffer greater harm if the Greeks decide to remain in it as enemies instead of leaving it in peace after getting their wage. Seuthēs may have to hire another and larger host—at great expense—to expel the first one (7.7.33–36). It would be less expensive to pay up now. In fact, the sum owed by Seuthēs is much smaller to raise and to pay than a tenth of it would have been before he acquired his kingdom.

The first part of Xenophon’s speech is not without merits. But by itself, it could not have persuaded Seuthēs. For Seuthēs knows that whether or not he pays up, the departure of the Greek army is imminent. And given his own numerical superiority, it is highly unlikely that the two Laconians will launch a punitive expedition to try to extract the soldiers’ wage (7.5.15). Xenophon would be in a stronger position if he could plausibly claim that he might launch such an expedition himself. But his credit with the soldiers has been destroyed (7.7.38). As for the argument that it is a very great thing for a ruler to be trusted, there is surely something to it. Once the faithlessness of Seuthēs becomes known, his ability to hire mercenaries will be reduced (cf. 7.7.50). On the other hand,

⁷⁴ The words “king” (BASILEUS), “kingship” (BASILEIA), and “to rule as a king” (BASILEUŌ) occur a total of four times in the first part of Xenophon’s speech.

⁷⁵ 7.7.24 bears on Xenophon’s own situation as he speaks and tries to persuade Seuthēs.

when it comes to the word of rulers, the manifest capacity and willingness to back up what one says (or threatens) is perhaps as important as the known practice of truthfulness. A ruler does not instill moderation in his subjects or adversaries primarily by being known to be truthful.⁷⁶

To bolster the first part of his speech—which relies on arguments from self-interest—Xenophon argues on the basis of the noble in the second part. It contains some of the most beautiful statements of Xenophon about virtue and the virtuous ruler in the *Anabasis* and, indeed, in his entire corpus (7.7.37–47). Xenophon now presents himself as the friend of Seuthēs. He says that his remarks hitherto have expressed his forethought for him—so that Seuthēs might seem worthy of the good things the gods have given him, and so that Xenophon might not be ruined in the army. Xenophon takes Seuthēs as a witness (along with the knowing gods) that he does not have anything from Seuthēs for the soldiers, nor did he ever ask for the soldiers’ things for his own private use, nor did he ask for what he was himself promised. He even swears that he would not have accepted anything from Seuthēs unless the soldiers were going to get what was theirs as well: “For it would have been shameful to settle my own affairs while overlooking their affairs being in a bad state, especially since I was honored by them” (7.7.40). Hērakleides (he says) seems to think that everything is nonsense next to having money by any and all means. But Xenophon has a different view: “I believe, Seuthēs, that nothing is a nobler and more splendid possession for a man, and especially for a ruler, than virtue, justice, and generosity” (7.7.41).⁷⁷ A ruler who displays these qualities is rich with many friends and with many who wish to be his friends (7.7.42). If Seuthēs cannot learn from his actions and speeches that Xenophon is indeed his friend from the soul, he should consider what the soldiers are saying about him (7.7.43).⁷⁸ For they accuse Xenophon of having a greater concern for Seuthēs than for the Lacedaemonians, and of having received gifts from Seuthēs. Xenophon closes his speech with dignity. He predicts that time will teach Seuthēs that he should pay up. For he will not bear to see his benefactors become his

⁷⁶ Xenophon quietly acknowledges as much: cf. 7.7.24 with 7.7.30. Besides, let us not forget how Xenophon opens his speech: “I have not come to ask you anything, Seuthēs” (7.7.20).

⁷⁷ This beautiful statement should be compared with *Hiero* 11.5, where the “noblest and most blessed possession” is said (by the poet Simonides) to be “being happy without being envied for being happy.” Xenophon speaks in the *Anabasis* of a “noble and splendid possession,” not of a “noble and good possession” (cf., e.g., *Memorabilia* 1.5.1). See Strauss (2000) pp. 84–85.

⁷⁸ Xenophon claims to Seuthēs that he is his friend from the soul (7.7.43); to the soldiers, he claims (implicitly) to be a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS (7.6.15; see also 7.6.39). The truth lies halfway between these statements, so to speak.

accusers: “I therefore ask you, when you do pay, to be eager to make me among the soldiers just such as I was when you took me on” (7.7.47).

After hearing these things, Seuthēs curses the cause of the wage not having been paid long ago. All suspect that this is Hērakleides. “I never intended to defraud, and I will pay up,” he says (7.7.48). Since Seuthēs now intends to pay, Xenophon asks him to pay through *him* in order to end his dishonor in the army. Seuthēs answers that Xenophon will not be less honored because of him if he stays in Thrace with only one thousand hoplites. He will also obtain the places along the sea and the other things that he was promised. Xenophon graciously turns down the offer. After insisting for a moment, Seuthēs gives in:

“Of money I have only a little bit, but this I give to you, a talent, but also six hundred oxen, up to four thousand herd animals, and up to one hundred twenty captives. Take these and take as well the hostages from among the people who were unjust to you, and depart.” Xenophon laughed and said, “If these things do not amount to the wage, whose one talent shall I say I have? Since it is in fact dangerous for me, is it not better that I go off and be on my guard against being stoned? You heard the threats.” [Xenophon] remained there for the time being. (7.7.53–54)⁷⁹

The reported laughter of Xenophon—a unique event in the *Anabasis*—is noteworthy. Seuthēs is offering to pay only a small fraction of the sum he owes.⁸⁰ And Xenophon sees right through him. Moreover, Xenophon gets nothing of what he was himself promised. Yet he is not angry. Instead, he laughs. Is he satisfied to have obtained a fraction, at least, of what the soldiers were owed? Xenophon did his best for them. His efforts were worthy of a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS. But he could not have been entirely pleased. The partial payment of Seuthēs was certain to fuel the anger of the troops. The reference to his being stoned makes that clear. (7.7.54) I suggest that the laughter of Xenophon—and the freedom from moral indignation that this laughter points to and illustrates—issues from the same fundamental causes that led Xenophon earlier to spare the elderly hostages (7.4.20–24).⁸¹ Xenophon’s appeal to the self-interest of

⁷⁹ Translation by Ambler (2008). I modified it slightly.

⁸⁰ In addition to the one talent, Seuthēs is offering about one third of the booty (7.3.48) that yielded earlier (according to Hērakleides: 7.5.1–5) twenty days of wage—that is, he is offering not much more than one week of pay. But the army is owed more than four weeks of pay (cf. 7.6.1)—a full thirty talents (7.7.25). This final act of duplicity is missed by Hirsch (1985), who claims that Seuthēs proves in the end “worthy of Xenophon’s faith in him” (p. 37). More perceptive is Grote (1900): Xenophon did not “obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon the sum due” (Vol. 9, p. 170).

⁸¹ It is no coincidence, I think, that the Thracian hostages are mentioned right before Xenophon laughs (7.7.53). This reference reminds us of the earlier scene (7.4.20–24) and of

Seuthēs was weak, as he knew, and his appeal to the noble was not likely to be effective with a man like him. No doubt, Xenophon would have reacted more vigorously had he thought that Seuthēs’s faithlessness would put him in mortal danger (cf. 7.5.5). But he apparently thought that this partial payment, though deplorable and fraudulent, would suffice to save his reputation and his life, at least if he acted prudently. And he proceeded to do just that.⁸²

Ending at the Beginning: Xenophon the Socratic

The final chapter of the *Anabasis* is at once curious and disappointing (7.8). It is curious because it introduces several new characters who have played no role in our story hitherto, and who play no evidently necessary role in the chapter.⁸³ And it is disappointing because it highlights an unattractive side of Xenophon. Interpreters of the *Anabasis* often point to this chapter to indict his moral character. In the main scene Xenophon enriches himself by kidnapping a Persian grandee along with his wives and children, and by plundering his possessions.⁸⁴ The scene leaves us in no doubt that the rule of Xenophon is a monetary success. Yet the scene is nevertheless—or also for that reason—unattractive. In Xenophon’s defense, the attack in question was not wholly selfish. Xenophon benefited the captains and the soldiers of the army who had been most friendly and faithful to him, and, indeed, the rest of the host as well (7.8.11, §22–23).⁸⁵ The last act of

what it indicated about Xenophon. It is also clear that Seuthēs failed to heed Xenophon’s generous advice (offered at 7.4.24).

⁸² When Seuthēs says that he is ready to pay up, Xenophon asks him to pay through *him* in order to end his dishonor in the army (7.7.49). But as soon as Xenophon realizes that Seuthēs means to pay but a small fraction of the sum he owes, he transfers the honor of paying the soldiers to Charmiōs and Polunikos (7.7.56). The two Laconians accept the animals and the captives and proceed to sell them. Xenophon stays away (7.7.57). The Laconians incurred “considerable blame” (7.7.56).

⁸³ Why does Xenophon introduce for the first time—and why does he mention by name—the inconsequential Biōn (7.8.6), Ameusikleidēs (7.8.6), Daphnagoras (7.8.9), Basias (7.8.10), or Itamelisi (7.8.15)? Are these instances of renaming? The final chapter of the *Anabasis* has suffered more than most from the passage of time. It contains an unusually large number of variants in the spelling of names. To figure out if or when Xenophon is engaged in renaming is sometimes impossible.

⁸⁴ Hutchison (2000) speaks of an act of “banditry” (p. 92); Rood (2004) of a “terrorist attack” (p. 312); Tuplin (2003) of “a peculiarly gratuitous piece of brigandage” (p. 134); Roy (2004) notes that Xenophon “recounts this episode as entirely unexceptionable” (p. 278).

⁸⁵ Grant (1871) offers a half-hearted defense of the final act of rule of Xenophon. He argues that the Hellenes were at war with the Persians at this time. Hence, acts of this sort were permissible. Besides, even in peacetime, such acts against non-Greeks were allowed by “the international morality of the day” (p. 78). To this, I answer that the Greeks were not at war with the Persians at the time, only the Lacedaemonians were, and only with Tissaphernēs.

rule of Xenophon is worthy of a PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS. Still, it comes at a cost.⁸⁶ In fact, it would be more accurate to say that Xenophon goes out of his way to stress his failure to abide by the noble in his last act of rule. But why does he end the *Anabasis* in this way? It would have been easy to omit the scene altogether. He could have let bygones be bygones. Instead, Xenophon chooses to take his leave of the reader with a signal disappointment. Interpreters of the *Anabasis* who contend that the work is but a text of self-apology have failed to explain how their account can be squared with this final scene. Let us see what we can make of it.



Xenophon and the army sail from Thrace to Lampsakos. There Xenophon meets a family soothsayer named Eukleidēs, who rejoices with him on his safe return (cf. 3.1.6). Eukleidēs asks Xenophon how much gold he has got. Xenophon swears that he does not have enough even for the passage home unless he sells his horse and possessions. Eukleidēs does not believe him. Yet when Xenophon receives gifts of hospitality from the Lampsakoi and offers sacrifices to Apollo—with the soothsayer standing by—the latter declares after seeing the sacrificial victims that he is persuaded that Xenophon has no money. (The victims must have been quite inauspicious! The sacrifices were offered to Apollo, to repeat.⁸⁷) “For I know,” Eukleidēs says, “that whenever there is going to be money, an obstacle appears, and, if nothing else, you are an obstacle to yourself” (7.8.3).⁸⁸ Xenophon agrees with this assessment. Eukleidēs continues: “Zeus Melichios is an obstacle to you. But have you already sacrificed to this god, as I was accustomed to do for you at home when I offered sacrifices and burnt holocausts” (7.8.4)? Xenophon answers in the negative: he has not made any sacrifices

Besides, “the international morality of the day”—that is, the Hellenic laws—did *not* grant Hellenes unbounded license to deal however they pleased with non-Greeks. We saw this in chapter five. It is thus more accurate to say, with Dillery (1995), that the raid on the Persian grandee Asidatēs “represents the very kind of independent action aimed at profit that [Xenophon] earlier so often deplored” (p. 91).

⁸⁶ Consider the central placement of PAIDAS at 7.8.22, especially when read together with *Agesilaos* 1.21.

⁸⁷ This is the only time Xenophon sacrifices to Apollo in the *Anabasis*. And Apollo is manifestly hostile. Is the deity still resenting the treatment meted out to “Apollōnidēs” (3.1.26–32)? The *Anabasis* begins and ends by calling attention to the *distance* between Xenophon and Apollo, just as it begins and ends by calling attention to his *closeness* to his “father” Socrates. Once again, Xenophon is “King Midas.”

⁸⁸ According to MS. CBAE, the sentence reads: “Whenever there is going to be money, an obstacle appears, if nothing other than a pig (SŪS) [against] yourself.” This reading, though strange and somewhat strained, is not altogether impossible in view of the sacrifice of the “piglets” that Xenophon proceeds to make (7.8.5).

to Zeus Meilichios since he went abroad. Eukleidēs therefore advises him to offer sacrifices as he is accustomed to do: “you will be the better for it” (KAÌ ἘΠΗΕ SUNOÍSEIN ἘΠὶ Τὸ ΒÉΛΤΙΟΝ: 7.8.4). Xenophon heeds the advice. The next day he goes to Ophrunios and makes an offering and burns piglets whole. Xenophon does all this in accordance with the law of his father. The victims are auspicious. On that very day two men arrive with money for the army. (They were apparently sent by the Lacedaemonian Thibrōn.) Hosted by Xenophon, the two men give him back his horse as well, which he had sold in Lampsakos for a large sum of money. For, they suspected that he had sold the animal out of need because they heard that he was well pleased with it. They thus graciously give him back the horse without accepting the price of it.

The army marches through the Troad and eventually reaches Pergamon in Mysia. There Xenophon is hosted by a Greek woman named Hellas, the wife of Gongylos the Eretrian.⁸⁹ She indicates to him that there is a Persian man in the plain named Asidatēs.⁹⁰ If Xenophon should go at night with three hundred men, he could capture Asidatēs with his household and all his belongings. To act as his guides, Hellas sends along her (unnamed) nephew as well as “Daphnagoras, whom she values most highly” (7.8.9). Xenophon offers sacrifices with these two by his side, and with the soothsayer Basias. The latter declares that the victims are most propitious to Xenophon: “the man will be easy to capture” (7.8.10). But Daphnagoras keeps silent. Apparently, he does not share in the optimism of Basias. Or is he less than friendly to Xenophon?⁹¹

The divination of the soothsayer Basias proves to be erroneous. Or perhaps it would be better to say, with Xenophon, that its fulfillment is delayed (cf. 7.8.22). At any rate, it will take two attempts to capture Asidatēs. The first attempt nearly ends in disaster. Xenophon takes along the captains who were his closest friends and the troops that had been most

⁸⁹ On this Gongylos, a well-known Medizer, see Thucydides 1.128, *Hellenika* 3.1.6; see also Ambler (2008) p. 273. The last chapter of the *Anabasis* contains references to several Medizers like Gongylos and Demaratos (7.8.17). They—or rather their relatives or descendants—are all helpful to Xenophon. Is he trying to repay a debt of gratitude by showing that they assisted Greeks against Persians, helping them cleanse their family honor?

⁹⁰ “Asidatēs” is most likely a case of renaming (ASIDĒROS-ATĒ). The man is represented here as being defenseless—“without iron” (cf. the improvised weapon used at 7.8.14, and consider the light this sheds on *Hellenika* 3.3.7). Despite his defenselessness (which amounts to “madness”), the first attack against Asidatēs fails. Perhaps the failure reflects the fact that the attack takes place in unmartial Mysia (7.8.8).

⁹¹ There is no obvious reason why Daphnagoras is included in this episode. He plays no role whatsoever. Or is he a stand-in for Apollo? (Daphnagoras = “The-Speaker-With-Laurels”: DAPHNĒ-AGOREUŌ. The crown of laurels was a common attribute of Apollo.) It is also suggestive that a woman named “Hellas” is said to value “Daphnagoras” “most highly” (7.8.9). This would appear to mean that Hellas (the political entity) values the

faithful through it all, so that he might benefit them (7.8.11). As many as six hundred men try to force their way into the raid as well. But the captains drive them away. They do not want to share what they expect will be easy money. The attack on Asidatēs encounters an obstinate resistance. The man has taken refuge in a strong tower and is supported by imperial Persian garrisons from the area. His archers are especially troublesome. Xenophon is soon forced to retreat. He and his men are hard-pressed. Nearly half of them are wounded, including the gallant Agasias. With much difficulty, they reach safety. But Xenophon refuses to settle for failure. He organizes a second attack. This time, however, he employs the entire army and resorts to deception. He again offers sacrifices—though he does not say whether the victims are auspicious (7.8.20).⁹² The second attack is successful: Asidatēs is captured with his entire household.⁹³ Afterward the army returns to Pergamon, where Xenophon salutes the god.⁹⁴ For the Laconians, the captains, the generals, and the soldiers join in arranging for Xenophon to get his pick of horses, of yoked teams, and other property. Henceforth, he is capable of benefiting another (7.8.23). King Midas has gotten rich. Not long afterward Thibrōn takes over the host and merges it with his other Hellenic troops, waging war against the satraps Tissaphernēs and Pharnabazos.⁹⁵



The final chapter of the *Anabasis* contains several references to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes—a play that, as we have observed repeatedly in this study, is the key to the proper interpretation of a series of important episodes. Here, Xenophon comes to sight as an impoverished lover of a horse that costs about as much as the extravagant Koppatias of Pheidippidēs.⁹⁶ Xenophon also neglects to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios, apparently out of

Delphic god most highly. Is that why Xenophon sacrifices to Apollo in this chapter—to repeat, the only time he does this in the *Anabasis* (7.8.30)? The career of Xenophon began with the expulsion of Apollōnidēs (3.1.26–32). As he is on the verge of returning to Hellas, he attempts a *rapprochement* with Apollo. But the deity will have none of it.

⁹² Is this an admission against interest? In that case, a favorable omen is followed by failure (7.8.10) and an unfavorable omen is followed by success (7.8.20–22).

⁹³ Xenophon links this success to the earlier sacrifice, the one interpreted favorably by Basias (7.8.22). But his account suggests a different interpretation. See the previous note.

⁹⁴ Apparently, Zeus Meilichios is meant. Compare the use of ASPADZOMAI (“to salute”) at 7.1.8 and at 7.1.40. The pattern is apparently broken, however, by 7.2.23.

⁹⁵ To pick up the thread of the story of “those who ascended with Cyrus” the reader must turn to book three of the *Hellenika*.

⁹⁶ Stronk (1995) observes that the enormous sum Xenophon got for his horse (= 50 gold darics) “seems a fancy price, almost absurd” (p. 288). Flower (2012) speaks of “the fantastic

indifference. But Zeus Meilichios is the very deity honored in Athens in the festival of the Diasia which forms the backdrop of Socrates's attack on Zeus and of his corruption of the son in the *Clouds*.⁹⁷ (Unless I am mistaken, there is only one reference to Zeus Meilichios in Xenophon's corpus.) Xenophon is here "Pheidippidēs." But where is the father "Strepsiadēs"? He has been displaced—just as he was in the *Clouds*—by Socrates. For, in order to remedy his neglect of Zeus Meilichios, Xenophon sacrifices piglets as burnt holocausts. He offers this sacrifice "in accordance with the law of his father" (TŌ PATRŌŌ NOMŌ: 7.8.5, MSS. CBAE). What does this mean? To sacrifice "piglets" (CHOĪROS) was a customary way of speaking of a small sacrifice.⁹⁸ That these piglets were "burnt whole" did not turn them into fatted hogs. The sacrifice was done "in accordance with the law of the father" because Socrates was accustomed to make small sacrifices from his small possessions, and even these small sacrifices he made infrequently.⁹⁹ The final chapter of the *Anabasis* is a parody of the parody of the *Clouds*.¹⁰⁰ It confirms in humorous but striking fashion that Xenophon thinks of himself as a Socratic. The anabasis of Xenophon literally begins and ends with his "father" (3.1.4–14, 7.8.5).

The main contention of this study is thus confirmed by the ending of the *Anabasis*: the rule of Xenophon must be read in light of his Socratism. But this conclusion will render the final scene of the work, if anything, more problematic than before. But for now, I wish to make only one additional remark. I believe that it is on purpose that Xenophon ends the *Anabasis* with a disappointing scene. He ends in this way to encourage his readers to consider the alternative embodied by Socrates. This suggestion is less paradoxical than it may sound at first. The primary addressees of the *Anabasis*—high-minded and talented youths with some political ambition—will be spurred to consider the teaching of the philosopher not only by the pull of this ambition—they will have noticed that the noble successes of Xenophon in the *Anabasis* are somehow linked

sum of 50 gold darics (about 1,300 Athenian drachmas, at a time when a drachma per day was a standard wage)" (p. 213). Masqueray (Vol. 2, p. 190) explicitly draws a parallel between Xenophon's expensive horse and Pheidippidēs's, but he fails to realize the aptness of his remark.

⁹⁷ See lines 408, 864. On the Diasia and Zeus Meilichios, see also Thucydides 1.126.

⁹⁸ Cf. e.g. Plato, *Republic* 378a5; see also *Odyssey* 14.80–82.

⁹⁹ *Memorabilia* 1.3.3. Note the lack of parallelism in that passage: Socrates made sacrifices that were not only small but also few.—We might be tempted to excuse the smallness of Xenophon's sacrifice by invoking the fact that he was exceedingly poor when he made it. Yet this temptation must be resisted. Xenophon had already sold his horse for 50 gold darics when he made the sacrifice (cf. 7.8.6 with 7.8.5). The smallness of the offering was a choice.

¹⁰⁰ To my knowledge, only Dakyns (1901) has somehow sensed that chapter 7.8 is such a parody. But he merely sensed it, banishing the thought immediately (pp. iv–v, note 6).

to Socrates (3.1)—but also by what I have called their seriousness. They will be bothered by the final scene. This is as it should be. The final scene is intended to enlist the seriousness of such addressees in the service of their own education. They will turn to Socrates not only as a teacher of politics, but also as someone who has some explaining to do regarding the place of the noble in the exercise of rule. They will turn to Socrates in the hope of somehow easing the understandable disappointment they will experience. They will thereby take a crucial step toward the philosophic life. And in this connection, observe that all of Xenophon's main non-Socratic works—the *Education of Cyrus*, the *Hellenika*, the *Anabasis*, and the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*—end with disappointments. The *Anabasis* merely follows a broader pattern. I interpret this pattern as follows: politics *as such*—that is, the life devoted to politics—is ultimately a disappointment according to Xenophon. By contrast, even the most “tragic” of the Socratic writings—the *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors*—ends with the laughter of Socrates (§28).

It is now time to take our leave of Xenophon. As he prepares to return home there is evidence that he has conceived of writing the *Anabasis* already.¹⁰¹ His references to Socrates in the final chapter make clear that he expects philosophy to be central to his life henceforth.¹⁰² Yet he will be exiled in the not-too-distant future (7.7.57). In this way, too, the *Anabasis* ends with a disappointment. But there is no reason for us to be dispirited. We have enjoyed and profited immensely from reading, thinking, and writing about Xenophon. It is impossible to believe that he himself penned his masterpiece without sharing in the joys and the profit—to say nothing of the quiet laughter.

¹⁰¹ Consider the reference to Kleagoras at 7.8.1. The text of this passage varies in the MSS. But if we follow the best MSS., and above all MS. C, we read that Kleagoras was the author of a book titled “TA ENOIKIA EN OIKIŌ.” This is a strange title that means “The-Household-Things-Inside-the-House.” This book—apparently an emphatic praise of private life—was written by a man who might have been expected (in view of his name) to eulogize political life (KLEAGORAS = “The-Glorious-Public-Speaker” [KLEOS-AGOREUŌ]). Is “Kleagoras,” author of TA ENOIKIA EN OIKIŌ, the alter ego of Xenophon, author of the *Anabasis*? This would be consistent with the character of the *Anabasis*. We must also keep in mind here that the word “house” (OIKIA or OĪKOS) has been repeatedly used as a metaphor for the Socratic school in the *Anabasis* (3.1.11, as well as the “MOSSUNOIKOI” [chapter 5.4]: pp. 121–22 and pp. 201–04.) At the end of the *Anabasis* Xenophon is preparing to return to private life, where he will write a book in praise of the private life of Socratic philosophy.

¹⁰² Note that two of the characters in the last chapter—Eukleidēs and Biōn—are namesakes of famous philosophers or scientists.

CONCLUSION

THE ARGUMENT OF THE *ANABASIS OF CYRUS*

In this study I analyzed three models of rule with the aim of uncovering Xenophon's answer to a question of perennial political importance: Can morality and advantage, the noble and the good, be conjoined or reconciled in and through the exercise of rule? The three models in question—the Godlike King, the Pious King, and the Socratic King—are each attractive in their own way. Nevertheless, our analysis has shown that each is a partial failure with a view to the task at hand. By far the most successful ruler in the *Anabasis* is Xenophon. The Socratic King saves both the majority of the Ten Thousand and himself, and does so in noble fashion. His achievement is remarkable. The model of rule he embodies is undoubtedly superior to the available alternatives. Yet the final scene of the work adumbrates the limits of this success as well. A zone of agreement between ancient and modern political realism—between Xenophon and Machiavelli—has been uncovered. This is the first conclusion of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.

Our study has also uncovered a major difference between Xenophon and Machiavelli regarding their respective manner of writing. Whereas Machiavelli shouts from the rooftops that a prince must learn to be able not to be good, and use this (or not use it) according to necessity, Xenophon refuses to do more than intimate the same conclusion or teaching. Of course, the outspoken rhetoric of Machiavelli would need to be treated in a separate and detailed study. We must limit ourselves here to the case of Xenophon. We can claim to have shown that *his* manner of writing, which brings the good things to the fore and leaves the bad in the penumbra, is intelligible in view of two main goals.

The first of these goals is politico-moral. Xenophon is sympathetic to, and a defender of, what I have called a politics of virtue (chapter three). Such a politics is superior to its main alternatives—especially Asiatic

despotism—insofar as it yields a greater measure of excellence, happiness, and freedom. The very success of the retreat of the Ten Thousand adumbrates this superiority. More generally, Xenophon is a friend of virtue. In the *Anabasis*, he depicts sympathetically several gallant soldiers and political figures—Proxenos of Boeotia, Agasias of Stumphalia, Eurulochos of Lusía, Kallimachos of Parrasia, and several others—to honor and encourage what they embody. The heroes of the *Anabasis* are the good men; the “baddies,” such as Menōn, are censured. Yet if Xenophon is a friend of virtue, he knows that virtue is not enough. His manner of writing reflects this insight. That he is a critic of paganism has, I think, been shown with sufficient clarity. But it is undeniable that he conveys this critique unobtrusively. The grounds of his innermost views on the issue of piety and the gods—which I only began to discuss in chapter two—as well as the theoretical significance of this issue, would need to be brought out by a study of the four Socratic writings, above all of the *Oikonomikos*, the account of an epochal conversation between the philosopher Socrates and the gentleman Ischomachos. Here others have blazed a most noble trail.

The second main goal being served by Xenophon’s manner of writing is educational. The *Anabasis* can be said to be a chronicle and a war memoir. But it is above all an introduction to philosophy. By bringing the good things to the fore and leaving the bad in the penumbra, Xenophon appeals to high-minded and talented addressees. He appeals to the likes of “Proxenos.” More precisely, he nourishes the hopes of these addressees by highlighting the virtues and qualities of the model rulers he presents. Thus Xenophon successively highlights the magnanimity and justice of Cyrus, the strength and piety of Klearchos, the prudence, nobility, and generosity of Xenophon. But he then proceeds to disappoint his addressees. I have explained how this manner of writing, which fosters an initial movement of enthusiasm for the rulers in question, is meant to prompt careful re-readings of the *Anabasis* (chapter one). Ultimately, this manner of writing aims to encourage a consideration of the alternative embodied by Socrates: that is, a study of the four Socratic writings (chapter seven). Even in his own lifetime, Xenophon was famous as the leader of the Ten Thousand. He could therefore reasonably expect that many or most of his readers would turn to his writings in the first place to see how he had managed to help save the Greek army. His fame created a literary opportunity that he exploited to the full: he wrote the *Anabasis* as the gateway to his account of Socrates.

The last observation to be made about Xenophon’s manner of writing is that the two goals just outlined are in a state of tension.¹ The needs

¹ The manner of writing of Xenophon also reflects a wish to avoid persecution. He did not want to provide ammunition to critics, both of philosophy and of himself.

or requirements of a politics of virtue and the needs or requirements of a Socratic education are not coterminous. The paradigmatic case of Socrates illustrates that philosophy competes with the city over the love of the most promising among the young.² Xenophon's choice to present himself as a successful ruler—and *not* as the philosopher that he also was—must be viewed in light of this perennial tension. Xenophon turns his political successes into a bridge between philosophy and the city. He makes Hellenism, which prizes above all martial valor, piety, and manliness, more respectful of the “dancing” of Socrates. The *Anabasis* is a splendid contribution to the task of fostering toleration of philosophic rationalism in oftentimes hostile polities.



Xenophon believed that the political life at its peak can be a source of excitement, noble challenges, and worthwhile rewards. In the *Anabasis*, he himself performs many deeds and makes many speeches, not only with consummate skill but also with zest. In this he differs from Socrates, who sees in the political life only burdens and a not-too-serious distraction from philosophy. Yet the *Anabasis* is ultimately a *critique* of the political life. Elements of this critique have been analyzed over the course of this study: rulers must sometimes take harsh measures, under necessity, for the sake of the common good; rulers are liable to be envied; their lives can be threatened; they can meet with base ingratitude from the ruled; and so forth. But the core of the critique in question pertains to the question of the noble and the good. The men of political ambition—I have called them the lovers of the noble, after Xenophon's usage³—are shown in the *Anabasis* to claim to *know* what it means to be good. But they prove to be confused about virtue. The political life is shown through a series of examples, including Klearchos (chapter two), Kēphisodōros and Amphikratēs (chapter four), Agasias (chapter six) and Episthenēs (chapter seven), among others, to be pursued by men who lack clarity about the character of, and the relation between, the noble and the good. The lovers of the noble aim at self-transcendence. But they do not and cannot achieve it: they have not reflected adequately on what transcendence can be. Stated more generally, the political philosophy of Xenophon is not primarily “Political Theory” or “Leadership Theory”—though Xenophon teaches us a great deal about regimes and leadership. But Xenophon's political philosophy is at its core psychology in the original sense of the

² *Symposium* 8.41.

³ To be more precise, Xenophon speaks in the *Memorabilia* of “those who long for noble things” (TOUS OREGOMENOUS TŌN KALŌN: 3.1.1).

word. He is a teacher of self-knowledge. And I add that the hope that has driven our study throughout—the hope of discovering a model of rule that conjoins or reconciles the noble with the good *perfectly*—is itself rooted in the perspective of the lovers of the noble. But this perspective points beyond itself toward a trans-political plane. This is the second main conclusion of the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.

Paradoxical as it may sound, it is precisely the *Anabasis*—a work in which Xenophon seems to abandon philosophy for politics—that shows that (and why) he in fact judges politics to be inferior to philosophy. The Socratic education had perfected his capacity to rule even as it reduced his willingness to rule. Of course, no one can deny that Xenophon *did* abandon philosophy for a time. He left Socrates to befriend Cyrus. But this choice was *not* rooted in ambition: he was pursuing security and money.⁴ Nor can we deny that Xenophon lived the political life to the fullest as long as circumstances made it his lot. For a moment, he was tempted by the prospect of founding a city on the shores of the Black Sea, or of becoming the sole ruler of the Ten Thousand. He was attracted to honor, more obviously than Socrates ever was. Yet the kind of honor Xenophon sought above all was from his *friends*—that is, from competent judges of his abilities and accomplishments—not from the short-sighted or the misguided.⁵ Even in his difference with Socrates, Xenophon's education had left him a superior ruler and a more self-sufficient human being, less enslaved to the fickle approval of the unwise and better able to maintain his serenity and wit under the strain of undeserved unpopularity. And as we saw, the Socratic education helped him bear the loss of his prospects serenely when they proved to be dangerous or divisive.

Xenophon retires from politics after the expedition of the *Anabasis*, though the exact moment when he does so is unknown. He eventually settles in Skilloūs, where he pursues a life centered on philosophic

⁴ Neither the word “ambition” (PHILOTIMIA) nor the cognate adjective PHILOTIMOS (“ambitious” or “honor-loving”) occurs in the *Anabasis*. This is noteworthy. Those words are common in Xenophon. They are used to describe the motivations of several prominent political men including Cyrus the Elder (*Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1, 1.4.1), Agesilaos (*Agesilaos* 10.4), Alcibiades and Kritias (*Memorabilia* 1.2.14), and Hiero (*Hiero* 7.3–10). Interestingly, the cognate verb PHILOTIMEOMAI (“to be ambitious” or “to love honor”) does occur in the *Anabasis*—once—in reference to two rulers whose ambition cause them to *abandon* Cyrus and the political life: in the context of the *Anabasis*, ambition somehow points away from, or beyond, politics (1.4.7). (Consider also how PHILOTIMIA is used by Socrates at *Oikonomikos* 1.22 and how PHILOTIMEOMAI is used by Cyrus at *Oikonomikos* 4.24. The latter passage shows that the near absence of PHILOTIMIA in the *Anabasis* does *not* reflect a lack of ambition on Cyrus's part. As for the former passage, it bears on the Socratic King's view of ambition.)

⁵ 6.1.20.

reflection and writing. It is philosophy—not politics—that attracts the best energies of his prime. His moment in the limelight is perhaps best compared to the political career of Tigranēs, his alter ego in the *Education of Cyrus*. The young Tigranēs is taken away from his “hunting” at home by political forces beyond his control; though eager to follow Cyrus the Elder, he never displays great ambition during the campaign; and he fades away as soon as it is over. Tigranēs’s manliness is even questioned by Cyrus.⁶ It is not by befriending a latter-day Cyrus but by befriending and being educated by Socrates that Xenophon was prepared, or prepared himself, for a life at once elevated and profitable, admirable and pleasant—a life that accords with the deepest need of human nature, the need for knowledge. The noble and the good *can* be reconciled. But this possibility exists on a trans-political plane. When properly understood, the noble *is* the good. Virtue is knowledge.⁷ This is the third main conclusion adumbrated by the *logos* of the *Anabasis*.



We began our study of the *Anabasis of Cyrus* with a puzzle: Why does Xenophon entitle the entire work after “the ascent of Cyrus” even though Cyrus dies at the end of book one? The solution to the puzzle was pointed to by a philosopher when he observed that Cyrus the Younger does not complete his ascent in the *Anabasis of Cyrus*, just as Cyrus the Elder fails to complete his education in the *Education of Cyrus*. Each failure points in its own way to the success embodied by Socrates. And in this connection, recall that the theme of eros is absent from the *Anabasis*. The word itself is used a single time—by the Persian satrap Tissaphernēs—in a passage where he hints that he longs to become King (ERŌS, 2.5.22).⁸ Eros

⁶ At the end of his conquests, Cyrus the Elder rewards Tigranēs’s wife—but *not* Tigranēs—for “campaigning in a manly fashion” (8.4.24)! The soldiers think of Xenophon along the same lines at the end of the *Anabasis*: 7.1.21. Yet whereas Tigranēs is eager to leave Armenia *after* the killing of the sophist he so admired, Xenophon anticipates that event in the case of Socrates (*Education of Cyrus* 3.1.38–40, §42–43). This parallel suggests that the growing impossibility to converse with Socrates played a role in Xenophon’s decision to leave Athens. I do not know why Xenophon calls himself “Tigranēs,” but *Hellenika* 4.8.21 is probably important to solving this puzzle.

⁷ *Memorabilia* 3.8, *Symposium* c. 5; *Memorabilia* 3.9.4–7.

⁸ In this respect the *Anabasis* differs strikingly from the *Education of Cyrus*. In addition to the use of ERŌS at 2.5.22, cognates of the word appear in the *Anabasis* only three times (3.1.29, 4.6.3; also 7.4.7). ERŌS and its cognates occur with much greater frequency in the *Education of Cyrus*, especially in two related scenes: 5.1.1–18 (more than a dozen times) and 6.1.31–44 (four times). The absence of eros in the *Anabasis* is mirrored by the absence of “soul.” The word PSUCHĒ is used only five times (3.1.23 [2X], 3.1.42, 3.2.20, 7.7.43).

is linked to the longing for Godlike Kingship.⁹ Eros is absent from the *Anabasis* because it is suppressed. And it is suppressed to reflect the fact that Xenophon turned away from Socrates, for a moment, to befriend Cyrus. On the other hand, the *Anabasis* as a whole is named after Cyrus because Cyrus shows most conspicuously what “ascending” means, and because the *Anabasis* as a whole is a propaedeutic to philosophy.

The Socratic writings make clear that Xenophon is not indifferent to eros.¹⁰ But his other works do so as well. According to Diogenes Laertius, Xenophon made Thucydides famous by publishing his history.¹¹ The author of the *Peloponnesian War* did not aim to produce a declamation for present-day hearers (he writes) but an eternal possession (KTĒMA ES AIEI: 1.22). The formula is deservedly famous. That Xenophon expresses a similar wish for his works is less well known, and for a good reason. Xenophon states that he has sought to make his readers not sophistical but wise and good, for he wishes that his writings not seem useful, but be so, that they may stand “unrefuted forever” (ANEXELEGTA EIS AEI). As he pens this phrase, we glimpse a corner of his soul. Thucydides’s immortal KTĒMA ES AIEI is inscribed on the entrance gates of his magnificent history. Xenophon’s phrase is buried somewhere near the end of his opuscle *On Hunting with Dogs*.¹²

It is perhaps no coincidence that three of these five occurrences are concentrated in the chapter where Socrates makes his cameo (3.1). PSUCHĒ occurs over fifty times in the *Education of Cyrus*.

⁹ Tissaphernēs indicates that he “wears the tiara on his heart” (2.5.23). The “heart” (KARDIA) is explicitly linked to erotic longings at *Symposium* 4.28. (KARDIA occurs only these two times in Xenophon’s corpus, I believe.) As for the tiara, it is of course a symbol of kingship. Only the King can wear the tiara “upright” on his head (*Education of Cyrus* 8.3.13, *Anabasis* 2.5.23). But the tiara could apparently be worn by heirs to the throne as well, if perhaps not “upright” (cf. *Education of Cyrus* 3.1.13). Tissaphernēs is thus suggesting that he is in his heart “heir” to the Persian throne.

¹⁰ *Memorabilia* 1.3.8–15. This is another noteworthy difference between Xenophon and Socrates. See also the *Symposium* as a whole.

¹¹ (1995) 2.57.

¹² *Kunēgetikos* 13.7.

APPENDIX 1

WHY IS XENOPHON “THEMISTOGENĒS OF SYRACUSE”?

In the first two books of the *Hellenika*, Xenophon describes the end of the Peloponnesian War, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens which followed the city’s defeat, and the civil war that eventually engulfed it. At the beginning of book three, he turns to the postwar period, beginning with the campaign of Cyrus against King Artaxerxes:

How Cyrus gathered an army and with it marched up country against his brother, and how the battle took place, and how he died, and how after this the Hellenes came safely back to the sea, has been written by Themistogenēs of Syracuse. (3.1.2)

The reference to “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” in this passage has puzzled generations of scholars.¹ Nothing is known about Themistogenēs or his putative book. No mention of him occurs anywhere outside the pages of Xenophon.² Indeed, as early as the first century AD, Plutarch surmises that “Themistogenēs” is a pseudonym for “Xenophon.”³ Today,

¹ For a sample of the explanations of “Themistogenēs” that have been adduced in more recent times, see Dillery (1998) pp. 6–8; Flower (2012) pp. 53–55; Hoeg (1950); MacLaren (1934); Masqueray (1930) pp. 3–5; Prentice (1947); Rood (2005) p. xix; Strauss (1983) p. 106. To my knowledge, the mystery has never been solved. Yet to Leo Strauss belongs the substantial merit of having indicated that “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” and the anonymous Syracusan of the *Symposium* are somehow the same person—Xenophon (1972, p. 178).

² There is however a brief reference to Themistogenēs in the Suidas, apparently derived from the *Hellenika* passage. See MacLaren (1934) p. 241.

³ Plutarch (1936) 345e. MacLaren (1934) states: “To say the least, if there ever were a real Themistogenes and an *Anabasis* written by him, he had become such an obscure figure by the end of the first century after Christ that a well educated, widely read man like Plutarch

this identification is widely accepted and is, I believe, correct. Indeed the notion that Xenophon could have authored a masterpiece like the *Anabasis* only to refer his readers (in the *Hellenika*) to an alternative and obscure account is altogether implausible. Nor can we take refuge in the notion that the *Anabasis* was perhaps not yet written or published when the *Hellenika* was given to the public, thus preventing Xenophon from referring to it in the *Hellenika*. The *Hellenika* is a late work, ending with an account of the battle of Mantinea (362 BC). Since Xenophon was in his twenties or early thirties when he joined Cyrus (401 BC), he would have had to be in his sixties or early seventies when the *Hellenika* was completed and published (i.e., sometime after 362 BC). It is unlikely that he waited forty years or more to write and publish his *Anabasis*, as the notion in question forces us to assume.⁴ The freshness and vividness of the work militates against such a late composition. The *Anabasis* was almost certainly written and published before—and, in any case, *not* after—the *Hellenika*.

We must therefore accept that “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” is a pseudonym for “Xenophon of Athens.” But this conclusion only leads to a more difficult problem: Why does Xenophon use a pseudonym at all? Why not say in the *Hellenika* that the *Anabasis* has been written by “Xenophon of Athens”? Nothing could have been simpler. In Antiquity, Plutarch surmised that Xenophon used a pseudonym to give greater credibility to the account of his deeds by making it appear as if he had written about someone else. But this explanation is clearly unsatisfactory. Anyone can see that the *Anabasis* was written by Xenophon. The work contains details about his thoughts and dreams, his hopes and fears, his private deliberations, his domestic life after the expedition, and so on. No one could have written the book except for Xenophon. The pseudonym “Themistogenēs” does *not* give greater credibility to the account of his deeds, and neither does the fact that he writes about himself in the third person, a practice which does not exclude his occasional use of the first person in any case (1.2.5, 1.9.22, 1.9.28, 2.3.1; also 2.6.6). Besides, the pseudonym occurs *only* in the *Hellenika*. Yet the putative aim ascribed to it would have been more effectively served had the pseudonym been used in the *Anabasis*. As one scholar nicely puts it, “There is something odd in

did not know of his existence. It seems unthinkable that a companion piece to Xenophon’s famous account of the exploits of the Ten Thousand could have suffered such an eclipse at so early a date” (p. 242).

⁴ To avoid this difficulty, some scholars hypothesize that the *Hellenika* was published in two distinct phases, the first phase involving the first two books and the beginning of the third, and the second phase the rest of the work. This hypothesis is based on literary differences between these two sections of text. But it is otherwise unsupported.

the argument that Xenophon employed a pseudonym to give the account of his achievements greater plausibility but then did not actually include that pseudonym in the text of the *Anabasis* itself.”⁵ The explanation of Themistogenēs lies elsewhere.

Let me try to think through this age-old puzzle, beginning with the obvious. By the time Xenophon published the *Anabasis* he was an exile.⁶ Hence, he would presumably have had to write in book three of the *Hellenika* that the *Anabasis* had been written by “Xenophon, the Athenian exile” had he sought to present himself accurately to the public. Was he perhaps reluctant to place the *Anabasis* under the cloud of his exile? Did he wish to avoid prejudicing his readers?

This is part of the explanation of the use of the pseudonym, I believe. Xenophon wished to deemphasize his exile. Yet we cannot rest satisfied with this explanation insofar as it remains open to a powerful objection. For Thucydides, too, was an exile from Athens when he wrote the *Peloponnesian War* (5.26.5). Yet he describes himself in the first line of the work, and again later on, as “Thucydides the Athenian” (1.1.1, 5.26.1). What prevented Xenophon from doing the same?

Let us consider the context of the reference to Themistogenēs in the *Hellenika*. We have seen that the first two books of the work describe the end of the Peloponnesian War, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, and the civil war in Athens. Xenophon makes it perfectly clear that the Athenians suffered grievously during this period. For several months they were blockaded by land and sea by the Lacedaemonians before capitulating. Scores of people actually died of starvation during the siege.⁷ Afterward, the Long Walls were razed and the Lacedaemonians helped such shady characters as Kritias and Charmides set up the regime of the Thirty. Many innocent Athenians were murdered by these tyrannical rulers.⁸ The ensuing civil war brought on yet more suffering. Now, Sparta’s victory in the Peloponnesian War was made possible by the financial backing of Cyrus.⁹ The Lacedaemonians themselves will acknowledge this after the war.¹⁰ Hence, had Xenophon indicated in the *Hellenika*—on the heels of his description of the Athenian suffering (in books one and two)—that he had befriended and marched with Cyrus against Artaxerxes, he would have

⁵ Flower (2012) p. 54.

⁶ *Anabasis* 5.3.7, 7.7.57.

⁷ *Hellenika* 2.2.11; also §14, §21.

⁸ *Hellenika* 2.3.15–23, 2.4.21. According to one report, the Thirty “killed, for the sake of private gain, just about more Athenians in eight months than all the Peloponnesians did in ten years of war”: *Hellenika* 2.4.21.

⁹ *Hellenika* 1.5.1–10, 2.1.11–12, 2.1.13–15, 2.3.7–8; see also 1.4.1–7.

¹⁰ *Hellenika* 3.1.1.

cast a very long shadow over his patriotism. He would have reminded the Athenians that he had befriended and helped their mortal enemy. He must have been reluctant to vex them (further) in this way. Hence, he de-emphasized his authorship of the *Anabasis* at the beginning of book three of the *Hellenika*, expecting that thoughtful readers would understand, upon reflection, that *he* had to be “Themistogenēs of Syracuse.”

The foregoing explanation is only a preliminary elucidation of Xenophon’s use of a pseudonym. I will return to the issue since I have not yet resolved it. But first, I have to explain why Xenophon settles on this *particular* pseudonym. For he could have chosen *any* pseudonym he fancied. He coined a different one for the *Anabasis*—“Theopompos of Athens,” as we saw (2.1.12–13). Why does Xenophon wish to come to sight as “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” in the *Hellenika*?¹¹

“Themistogenēs” means “the offspring of law” or “he who is born of right” (THEMIS-GIGNOMAI). The name calls attention to Xenophon’s rootedness in justice—or, more precisely, in divine law (THEMIS)—as well as to his origin or parentage. The meaning of the name, however, is obscure. The word “THEMIS” is rare in Xenophon. It occurs only three times, I believe, and not once in either the *Hellenika* or the *Anabasis*.¹² “Syracuse,” on the other hand, is mentioned frequently in the *Hellenika* and elsewhere too. Perhaps it is therefore best to begin where the evidence is most abundant: Why does Xenophon wish to come to sight as a “Syracusan”?

Syracuse occupies something of a middle position between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. Like Athens, Syracuse is a democracy and a naval and commercial power.¹³ Yet Syracuse is a strong ally of Sparta. In our first glimpse of the Syracusans in the *Hellenika*, they are literally burning their ships to avoid their capture by the Athenians (1.1.18). Thereafter the Syracusans distinguish themselves by their zeal for the Spartan cause (1.1.26, 1.2.10). Is Xenophon a “Syracusan” because he is an “Athenian” with “Spartan” sympathies? The explanation is plausible. The *Hellenika* is often said to show a strong “Spartan bias.” Yet however

¹¹ According to Tuplin (2003a), the name Themistogenēs is “otherwise known only in Hellenistic-Roman Thessaly” (130). According to Erbse (2010), “the name formation is unique” (p. 494). All the more reason to conclude that the choice is purposeful.

¹² The three occurrences are at *Oikonomikos* 11.8, 11.11; also *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.6. The cognates THEMITOS and ATHEMITOS (or ATHEMISTOS) are rare as well: unless I am mistaken, they occur a total of six times: *Memorabilia* 1.1.9, *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.6, 8.8.5, *Oikonomikos* 11.5, 11.6; also 11.8. The closely related noun THESMOS (“divine law”) occurs at *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.6.

¹³ That “Athens” and “Syracuse” can be interchangeable in Xenophon is shown explicitly by the character of Lukios: cf. 1.10.14 with 3.3.20. See Strauss (1983) p. 106.

it may be of this claim, the explanation is not particularly persuasive. For why would Xenophon emphasize that he is a “Syracusan” precisely as he mentions his authorship of a book—the *Anabasis*—that is severely critical of Sparta, as I have shown in this study (chapter 7)?

The parallel histories¹⁴ of Athens and Syracuse suggest a second possible reason why Xenophon wishes to come to sight as a “Syracusan:” he is adumbrating a similarity between himself and the Syracusan general Hermokratēs, one of the quiet heroes of the *Hellenika* (1.1.27–31). Several textual pointers invite this comparison. Not only are the two men sentenced to exile by their respective cities, but both also march up-country to meet the King, and (perhaps most remarkably) both are accompanied on their march upland by their “brother Proxenos”!¹⁵ The two men are also exceptional rulers. Most important for present purposes, the rule of Hermokratēs is characterized by what we can call superior law-abidingness. After his banishment from Syracuse, and while he is still in the field with his troops, awaiting the arrival of the new generals elected by the city, Hermokratēs urges his soldiers, who are disgruntled by his banishment, *not* to start a civil war against their country. (Xenophon will do something analogous to save Byzantium when he convinces his soldiers to accept a wrong suffered at the hands of the Lacedaemonians: *Anabasis* 7.1.7–32.) Hermokratēs urges the soldiers to show restraint despite the unjust and illegal act of the demos, which he deplores (1.1.27–28). Is Xenophon a “Syracusan” because, much like Hermokratēs, he is an out-standing ruler who displays superior law-abidingness?

This explanation is at once attractive and plausible. Xenophon certainly admires Hermokratēs. And the explanation has the further advantage of indicating why the pseudonym “Themistogenēs” emphasizes “law.” But the explanation is open to two weighty objections. First, it fails

¹⁴ In the late stages of the war, the Athenian democracy shows a total disregard for the law. Most notorious in this regard is the trial and execution of the ten generals who had won the battle of the Arginousai only to be sentenced *en bloc* and executed in contravention of the law (*Hellenika* 1.6–7). This illegal action will lead in short order to the destruction of the Athenian fleet (under inexperienced command), and therewith to the Athenian defeat and the establishment of tyranny (cf. 2.3.16). In like fashion, the Syracusan demos sentences its generals to exile—the generals include Hermokratēs—in contravention of the law (1.2.27). These leaders had deserved better of their city (1.1.18, §26). This illegal action soon leads to the establishment of tyranny at Syracuse (2.2.24, 2.3.5).

¹⁵ *Hellenika* 1.3.13. Immediately after this passage, we find several distinct echoes of the *Anabasis*, including a reference to Klearchos, then harmost of Byzantium, who in the *Anabasis* takes over after the death of Cyrus (*Hellenika* 1.3.14–22 cf. *Anabasis* book two and *passim*), as well as a reference to Koiratadas, a ruler in Byzantium, who in the *Anabasis* briefly acts as general of the Ten Thousand (*Hellenika* 1.3.14–22 cf. *Anabasis* 7.1.33–41). Koiratadas becomes general in the wake of Xenophon saving Byzantium.

to elucidate why the pseudonym invokes the divine law (THEMIS) as opposed to the human law (NOMOS). Why doesn't Xenophon call himself "Nomiōn of Syracuse," for example, if he wishes to draw attention to his superior NOMOS-abidingness?¹⁶ Second, the explanation does not elucidate why the pseudonym emphasizes Xenophon's *parentage*. Why is he the *offspring* of THEMIS?

I have said that the word THEMIS is rare in Xenophon. But the *Education of Cyrus* illuminates one crucial meaning of the word: to abide by THEMIS is to abide by one's sworn oaths.¹⁷ This is significant in the context of the *Hellenika*. For, the name "Themistogenēs" occurs right after a noteworthy oath. At the close of the Athenian civil war—depicted in the final pages of book two of the *Hellenika*—both the oligarchs and the democrats swear an oath "not to remember [past] evils" (MĒ MNĒSIKAKĒSEIN: 2.4.43). The two sides are reconciled with each other. They let bygones be bygones. Xenophon, who was then living in Athens, must have sworn this oath like every other Athenian citizen. Is he "Themistogenēs" because he abided by this oath? But in what sense did Xenophon "not remember [past] evils"? One mischievous interpretation suggests itself: Xenophon was true to this oath because his "non-remembering" of past evils led him to befriend the mortal enemy of the city. He acted with oath-induced amnesia when he travelled to Asia.

To be sure, this interpretation of "Themistogenēs" would turn the pseudonym into something of a pleasantry. And levity is probably out of place when dealing with the evils of war, to say nothing of sworn oaths. Let us therefore go back to the *Hellenika* in our effort to discover the meaning of "Themistogenēs." For we have yet to discover it.

I discussed above the law-abiding Hermokratēs, comparing him to Xenophon. But we encounter in book one of the *Hellenika* a man who is even more remarkable from the standpoint of law-abidingness. Toward the end of the Peloponnesian War, Socrates gets entangled in the bitter

¹⁶ Cf. for example, *Iliad* 2.871.

¹⁷ 8.8.1–5. Even in the *Hellenika*, Xenophon intimates that judging the ten Athenian generals *en masse* was an act of impiety in addition to being illegal: it was a transgression of THEMIS (1.7.19, 1.7.25).—I should add, however, that Xenophon's use of THEMIS is, for the most part, unorthodox. To abide by one's sworn oath is arguably the most important meaning of THEMIS. But Xenophon uses the word, for the most part, to emphasize the importance of *knowledge* in human life. THEMIS and its cognates occur, as I have said above that I believe, a total of ten times in the Xenophonic corpus (see note 12). These words are almost always put in the mouth of Socrates (or of the Socratic Cambyse), on the one hand (eight times), or of the gentleman Ischomachos, on the other (twice). The singular importance of the THEMIS-cognate used at *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.5 is suggested by the fact that it is, I believe, Xenophon's only use of such a word in his own name. Xenophon never uses THEMIS.

controversy over how to try the ten Athenian generals who had won the battle of the Arginousai only to fail to rescue the shipwrecked sailors, who subsequently drowned (1.7.15). Socrates and his fellow prytanes were threatened by an angry mob that wanted to try all the generals with a single vote in contravention of the law. Eventually, the prytanes gave in to the mob—all but one: “The prytanes, struck by fear, agreed [to put the illegal motion to a vote]—all except Socrates, the son of Sophronikos, *who said that he would not do anything except in accordance with the law*” (1.7.15, my emphasis). Socrates comes to sight in the *Hellenika*—and this is his only cameo in the work—as the embodiment of law. He is law incarnate. This is a remarkable fact that must be combined with another finding of our study of the *Anabasis*. Recall that when we considered the only cameo of Socrates in the *Anabasis*, we observed that Xenophon thinks of Socrates as his “father” (3.1.4–8). Let us now put these two facts or findings together. Once we do so, we reach the conclusion that Xenophon is “Themistogenēs” because he is “the offspring of Socrates,” and because Socrates is himself law incarnate. *That* is the meaning of “Themistogenēs,” I believe.

But this conclusion is open to two objections. First, am I not forgetting that Socrates says in the *Hellenika* that he will not do anything “except in accordance with the *NOMOS*”—HOŪTOS D’ OUK EPĤĒ ALL’ Ē KATA NOMON PANTA POIĒSEIN (1.7.15, my emphasis)? That is, Socrates does not pronounce the word *THEMIS*. How, then, can I claim that he is the incarnation of *THEMIS*? The objection, however, is less powerful than it initially seems. To realize this, turn to the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon offers a second and somewhat different version of the episode of the trial of the ten generals (1.1.17–19). In *that* version, the refusal of Socrates to do anything contrary to the *NOMOS* is adduced to prove Socrates’s *piety*. And it can be adduced to prove his *piety* because Socrates had *sworn an oath* (Xenophon emphasizes) to “give counsel in accordance with the *NOMOI*” (*Memorabilia* 1.1.18). Socrates was unwilling to break this oath. He apparently would have chosen to die rather than to break it. It is Socrates’s outstanding oath-abidingness on that occasion that makes him an incarnation of *THEMIS*.

But (the second objection runs) Xenophon never links Socrates with *THEMIS* in the *Hellenika*, nor does he mention Socrates’s oath there. Why not? If the link between Socrates and *THEMIS* is as important as I claim it is, why establish the link only in the *Memorabilia*, and not in the *Hellenika*? (And even in the *Memorabilia*, the link is inexplicit: *Memorabilia* 1.1.17–19 must be read together with *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.1–5 to appreciate that Socrates is indeed an incarnation of *THEMIS*.) To this objection, I answer that Xenophon cannot link Socrates with

THEMIS explicitly in the *Hellenika* without linking Socrates explicitly with “Themistogenēs.” But the implications of such a linking would have been grave for “Themistogenēs.”

Well-nigh every reader of the *Hellenika* understands that “Themistogenēs” is a pseudonym for “Xenophon.” The issue is not who “Themistogenēs” is but why Xenophon calls himself by that name. Hence, to link Socrates explicitly with “Themistogenēs” in the *Hellenika* would be, in effect, to link Socrates explicitly with Xenophon. But Xenophon cannot afford to make his connection to Socrates explicit in that work, least of all at the beginning of book three. He needs to be coy because of the disreputable company he has been keeping. Recall that among the most notorious members of the Thirty Tyrants were Charmides and, above all, Kritias, two associates of Socrates and of the Socratic circle.¹⁸ Xenophon has to downplay his own ties to Socrates and the Socratic circle in the wake of describing the crimes of Kritias in particular—which he does in book two of the *Hellenika*—lest he share in the public opprobrium justly directed especially at Kritias. Xenophon simply cannot afford to present himself as a Socratic in the *Hellenika*. And in this regard, review my discussion of the speech that the democratic war leader Thrasuboulos delivers at the end of the civil war (*Hellenika* 2.4.40–42; see pp. 115–16). Thrasuboulos, the undisputed leader of Athens at the end of the war and a man of reputed boldness, is so hostile to the Socratics that he calls them publicly “biting dogs” who need to be “muzzled.”¹⁹

I conclude that Xenophon had several reasons to come to sight under a pseudonym in the *Hellenika*. The first two reasons were that (1) he was an exile and (2) did not want to remind the Athenians of his vexing friendship with Cyrus. But the most important reason was this: in the context of the *Hellenika*, he thought it best merely to whisper that he was “the offspring of Socrates.” The pseudonym “Themistogenēs” reflects a wish on his part both to emphasize his closeness to Socrates, while concealing it.



Since “Themistogenēs” adumbrates Xenophon’s Socratism, the meaning of the reference to Syracuse in the pseudonym “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” is not likely to be exhausted by the (intended) parallel between

¹⁸ Consider the central use of ΣΥΜΦΟΙΤῆΤΑΙ (“schoolfellows”) at *Hellenika* 2.4.20 in light of the mention of Kritias and Charmides in the immediate vicinity (2.4.19). The alleged educational influence of Socrates on Kritias—“the most thievish, violent and murderous of all in the oligarchy”—was invoked against Socrates by the accuser and contributed to his execution (*Memorabilia* 1.2.12).

¹⁹ On Thrasuboulos, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1400b20–21; cf. *Hellenika* 4.8.31 and context.

Xenophon and the Syracusan Hermokratēs, or by the suggestion that Xenophon is an Athenian with Spartan sympathies.²⁰ Could it be that “Syracuse,” too, somehow connects Xenophon to Socrates?

To explore this possibility, let us consider Xenophon’s *Symposium*. Specifically, we must consider the character of the nameless Syracusan who takes center stage there. Doing this will enable us to complete our explanation of why Xenophon is “Themistogenēs of Syracuse.”

The *Symposium* poses an obvious difficulty of interpretation. Xenophon states at the outset that he *was* present at the banquet he depicts. Yet he does not mention himself in the work even a single time (1.1).²¹ Not only does the character Xenophon neither offer a boast (c. 3) nor defend one (c. 4)—all the other participants do—but he is not even listed among the Socratic attendees (1.2–3). It is as if Xenophon appoints himself to the post of official fly on the wall. He reports on the banquet without sharing in any of the proceedings. This authorial silence—along with the emphatic claim that Xenophon *was* present—would appear to mean that we must somehow look for him under a different guise. Could it be that Xenophon *is* present in the *Symposium* as another character? When we put this hypothesis to the test, however, we discover that our choice of possible stand-ins is fairly limited. Most of the attendees at the banquet were well-known historical characters. Xenophon could not plausibly have assumed their identity. In fact, only one attendee is both anonymous and given a central role—the nameless Syracusan. Could *he* be a stand-in for Xenophon?

Before I proceed any further, let me make one point clear. Xenophon and the Syracusan are *not* one and the same person. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the Syracusan is not present at the start of the symposium (cf. 2.1) whereas Xenophon is (e.g., 1.8–10). Moreover, the two men differ in important respects: the Syracusan is crude; Xenophon is graceful; the Syracusan envies Socrates and is hostile to him; Xenophon does not tire of praising Socrates. Thus, we need to be wary of simply equating Xenophon with the Syracusan, who is a caricature of our author, not his *alter ego*. Still, every good caricature reflects the original being lampooned. The Syracusan likes money (2.1, 4.55); he enjoys sleeping with his beautiful boy “all night, every night” (4.52–55 cf. *Memorabilia* 1.3.8–15);

²⁰ A possible alternative explanation of “Syracusan” is that Xenophon is thinking of the Sicilian origins of comedy (cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449b4–9). In his works, the word “Syracusan” is often synonymous with “playful fiction.” Consider the reference to Epicharmos, a Sicilian comic poet, at *Memorabilia* 2.1.20. There are at least two examples of playfully fictitious Syracusans in the *Anabasis* (in addition to “Themistogenēs” in the *Hellenika*), at 1.2.9 and 1.10.14 (see Appendix 3 for 1.2.9, and p. 78, note 3 for 1.10.14).

²¹ Unless some of the anonymous remarks are to be ascribed to him: for example, 3.12, §13.

he even becomes the pupil of Socrates at the end of the evening (7.2–5), while Socrates expresses a desire to learn from him “SCHĒMATA” (“dance routines”—a word that has, however, a broad range of meanings: 2.15–20). An exhaustive analysis of the Syracusan would illuminate the relationship as well as the differences between Xenophon and Socrates. This is a theme I leave for further research since my purpose here is limited. I contend that the key to understanding why Xenophon is a “Syracusan” in the *Hellenika*—in reference to his authorship of the *Anabasis*—is the fact that, like the anonymous Syracusan of the *Symposium*, the author of the *Anabasis* is both a displayer of “dancing” shows and a teacher of “dancing.” I must explain what I mean.

In the sixth chapter of this study, I discussed a scene of dancing among the soldiers.²² I argued that that scene conveys the principle of Xenophon’s self-presentation in the *Anabasis*. As we saw, Xenophon thinks of himself as a displayer of dancing shows: he depicts in the *Anabasis* his own “dancing,” which is the dancing of a virtuous warrior, but ultimately, of a philosopher dressed in martial garb. The *Anabasis* brings philosophy to the fore in a way that is designed to earn a measure of toleration for it in the cities of Hellas. Like the Syracusan, Xenophon is ready to please a Hellenic public with arresting political or military wonders that ultimately appeal to what he calls a lack of moderation.²³ He apparently even supports himself with these shows.²⁴ Moreover, we have seen that at a deeper level the *Anabasis* is an introduction to philosophy. Xenophon aims to introduce the best among the young to the “dancer” *par excellence*, Socrates. He does this through his treatment of the question of the noble and the good. It has been the main goal of this study to show how. The *Anabasis* is a pro-paedeutic to philosophy in the guise of a chronicle and a soldier’s memoir. For, the teaching of “dancing” is ultimately a metaphor for the teaching of virtue.²⁵ And, as we discover in the *Symposium*, “dancing” comes in two basic forms—“martial” dancing and Socratic dancing.²⁶ The double character of dancing mirrors the double character of KALOKAGATHIA.

²² 6.1.2–13; see pp. 222–29.

²³ The Syracusan who puts on the dancing shows prides himself “on those who lack moderation, by Zeus!” (EPI NĒ DIA TOÏS APHROSIN”: *Symposium* 4.55, my emphasis). His last show depicts the god Dionysos and his beloved Ariadne (c. 9). For a fuller statement on what “lacking moderation” means, see *Memorabilia* 3.9.4–7.

²⁴ *Symposium* 2.1, 4.52–55. Note how the Syracusan endeavors (unsuccessfully, in this case) to turn “reading and writing” into pleasing wonders (*Symposium* 7.3). The Syracusan is struggling to find a way to present the works of the mind attractively to a Hellenic public.

²⁵ *Symposium* 2.9–10, 2.11–14.

²⁶ Compare the “martial” dance discussed at 2.11–14 with the Socratic dance discussed at 2.15–20. The first dance is performed by a female, the second by a male. So much for the inferior manliness of the philosopher.

I conclude that “Themistogenēs of Syracuse, author of the *Anabasis*” means “Xenophon the Socratic, author of a propaedeutic to philosophy designed to earn a measure of toleration for philosophy.” Insofar as there remain differences between Socrates and the Syracusan at the end of the day, “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” may also mean “Xenophon the Socratic, a man who resists certain aspects of the Socratic path.” For among other differences—and I cannot treat this issue adequately here—Xenophon-Themistogenēs is much more willing than Socrates to move the Hellenic public with his artistry or his word. Whereas Socrates prides himself on his “pimping”—but is unwilling to practice this art—the Syracusan displays “dancing shows” that move human beings powerfully by arousing their erotic longings.²⁷ The final chapter of the *Symposium* is revealing in this regard.

Yet this difference between Xenophon and Socrates, though significant, should not cause us to overlook their fundamental agreement. Xenophon-Themistogenēs is, as such, a devotee of THEMIS. Socrates, too, casts himself as a devotee of THEMIS in the episode of the trial of the ten generals. Dedication to THEMIS is the public face of Socratism. At least, it is the public face of Socratism that Xenophon chose to imitate in the *Anabasis*.²⁸

I conclude that the pseudonym “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” confirms a central contention of this study: the author of the *Anabasis* is a Socratic who depicts the dancing of a philosopher in martial garb.

²⁷ *Symposium* 3.10, 4.56–61. “Pimping” is of course a metaphor. What does it mean? Note the following sequence of events in the *Hellenika*: (1) The Athenian generals win a major naval battle near the Arginousai (1.6.27–38); (2) The Athenian demos cashiers the victorious generals who are put on trial in a manner contrary to the law (1.7.1–14); (3) Alone of the prytanes, Socrates refuses to put the issue of the guilt of the generals to a vote; he is reported to say that he will not do anything except in accordance with the law (1.7.15); (4) The Athenian Euruptolemos makes a speech in the ensuing assembly to defend the generals and urge action in accordance with the law; no one else makes a speech; Euruptolemos is a relative and a friend of some of the generals (1.7.16–33); (5) The speech of Euruptolemos fails to save the generals (1.7.34); (6) The generals are executed (1.7.34); (7) The new generals of the Athenians are inexperienced; they allow the Athenian fleet to be captured and destroyed (2.1.22–32); many Athenians die of starvation during the siege (2.2.11, §21); Athens is ruled by the Thirty Tyrants and goes through a civil war, suffering massively through it all (2.3–4).

²⁸ Dedication to THEMIS is one of the *two* public faces of Socratism. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon imitates the reverent Socrates of the *Hellenika* (1.7.15) rather than the boastful Socrates of the *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors*. To explain this choice would require a detailed interpretation of the latter work. The absence of Xenophon from the *Symposium*—where the members of the Socratic circle are shown to “pride themselves” on various things, including virtue or knowledge—also reflects that choice. Xenophon belongs to the Socratic circle. Yet he “ceases” to belong to it when its members are depicted in their propensity to pride themselves or to have “a high opinion of themselves” (MEGA PHRONEŌ). To appreciate the overtones of MEGA PHRONEŌ, consider *Hellenika* 7.1.27.

APPENDIX 2

ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE DIVISION OF THE *ANABASIS* INTO SEVEN BOOKS AND FIFTY-ONE CHAPTERS

Many scholars believe that the division of the *Anabasis* into seven books and fifty-one chapters was not made by Xenophon but by a later hand. There are dissenters from this view, notably Høeg, who adduces weighty evidence in favor of authenticity, but they constitute a minority.¹

In this study, I have endeavored to show that Xenophon points to his philosophic *logos* by placing certain books and chapters of the *Anabasis* “at the center,” thus adumbrating their special significance. The readers will judge the soundness of this contention. Of course, insofar as I have brought out the significance in question, my contention implies that the division into books and chapters is authentic. More generally, my contention to have uncovered the plan of the *Anabasis* implies that the division into seven books, in particular, is authentic. I believe that I have shown that the plan in question, outlined in the introduction, enables us to interpret every episode of the *Anabasis* as well as the *logos* of the whole. I wish to call attention here to a feature of the *Anabasis* that supports the authenticity of the chapter division in particular.

It is a well-known fact that some schools of ancient thought were partial to numerology, endowing numbers with symbolic significance. The Pythagoreans, in particular, were said to have assigned symbolic meanings to several numbers. Not much is known about that numerical system today—it is said to have been transmitted orally—and it would be reckless to place too much weight on what we think we know

¹ Høeg (1950), esp. pp. 163–64. However, Høeg’s argument that “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” is *not* a pseudonym for Xenophon is unconvincing.

of it. But it is reasonable to make use of the sober report of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*. According to that report, the number seventeen (among others) was important to the Pythagoreans. They viewed it as the number of the heavenly spheres, that is, the number of philosophy.² The numbers nine and eight, the sum of which is seventeen, were also held to be symbolic in this regard. These facts—if they are facts—lend support to the authenticity of the chapter division of the *Anabasis*.

We have seen that Pythagoras is on the mind of Xenophon at the beginning of the *Anabasis*. When he hears the name “Samios”—the name of a Lacedaemonian admiral—he is liable to think of Pythagoras, the most famous Samian philosopher. Hence “Samios” becomes “Pythagoras” (1.4.2).³ Interestingly, the number seventeen is linked to philosophy in a remarkably constant pattern in the *Anabasis*. The philosopher Socrates makes his appearance—his only appearance *eo nomine* in the work—in the seventeenth chapter (3.1). The seventeenth chapter of Part III—the part on the rule of the Socratic King—is the chapter of the “Mossunoikoi” (5.4). But the Mossunoikoi are stand-ins for the Socratics. The number seventeen—along with the numbers nine and eight—all occur together in the twenty-sixth chapter of the *Anabasis* (4.5).⁴ That chapter—the central chapter of the *Anabasis* as a whole—features a cameo of Socrates in the form of a “hunter.” Yet again, philosophy and seventeen occur together.⁵

² Cf. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* 1093a1–end, esp. 1093a26–1093b6; 985b22–986a13.

³ See chapter one, p. 58.

⁴ To be more precise, “ninth” and “seventeen” occur in the twenty-sixth chapter (at 4.5.24); “eighth” occurs in the first line of the twenty-seventh chapter (4.6) but in reference to the twenty-sixth chapter. All these numbers are oddly precise in their respective contexts: the daughter of the village-chief was “in the ninth day of marriage”; the Hellenes captured “seventeen” colts in an Armenian village; the Hellenes departed from the villages “on the eighth day.”

⁵ The number seventeen occurs explicitly only twice in the *Anabasis*, at 4.5.25 and at 2.2.11. I explain the occurrence at 4.5.25 in the text. But the occurrence at 2.2.11 seems inconsequential. It could be thought to refute my thesis that Xenophon uses “seventeen” meaningfully. But let us look more closely at the passage. At 2.2.11, the Persian Ariañs reminds Klearchos that for the last seventeen days of the march toward Babylon, Cyrus and his troops could get no supplies from the land. They were traveling through a desert, as we had been told earlier. Indeed, Xenophon says repeatedly that the land in question was “a desert” or “desolate” (ERĒMOS: 1.5.1, 1.5.5; also §10). This description is pregnant with significance. Recall that the word ERĒMOS can also be translated as “solitary” or “being alone” (cf. p. 97, note 41; see how ERĒMOS is used at 1.5.4, as well as at 1.3.6, the first occurrence of the word in the *Anabasis*). That is to say, the number seventeen—the number of the *heavenly spheres*—is linked to “being alone” at 2.2.11. This linking occurs right on the heels of the single most elaborate scene of oath-swearing in the entire *Anabasis* (2.2.8–10) and at the outset of the rule of the Pious King. (That the use of “seventeen” at 2.2.11 is meaningful is also shown by the fact that Cyrus and his troops actually march for *twenty* days, not seventeen, without getting any supplies from

This pattern of joint appearances reflects, I believe, the artfulness of the *Anabasis*. It suggests that the division into fifty-one chapters goes back to Xenophon.⁶ If the pattern does not settle the issue by itself, it places the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of those who deny authenticity. That every single complete MSS. of the *Anabasis* is divided into the same seven books and fifty-one chapters yields a presumption that these divisions are authentic. It is certainly not enough to assert (without any evidence) that the divisions came later, and are not by Xenophon's hand.

To avoid any misunderstanding, let me add that if Pythagoras is on the mind of Xenophon at the start of the *Anabasis*, there is no reason to think that he believed in numerology. He was no Pythagorean mystic.

the land: 13 days [1.5.5] + 3 days [1.7.1] + 1 day [1.7.14] + 3 days [1.7.19–20]. For the last seven days of the march Cyrus and his troops are admittedly no longer traveling through a desert, but the King has scorched the earth [1.6.1].)

⁶ It is noteworthy that 51 chapters = 3×17 chapters. The number “three” was apparently the noblest number, the number of perfection: cf. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1092b26–1093a1.

APPENDIX 3

HOW MANY IS TEN THOUSAND?

How many Greek mercenaries were in the pay of Cyrus? It is difficult to answer this question with precision because of seeming discrepancies among the indications provided by Xenophon as well as of divergences in the MSS. In and of itself, the question is of secondary importance. Yet resolving it properly sheds light on Xenophon's manner of writing.

The difficulties connected with this question can be overcome, I believe, if we keep in mind three simple rules: (1) the readings of the best MS. C should be followed in the few places where the MSS. diverge; (2) Cyrus has an interest in "rounding up" his numbers when he announces publicly how many Greek troops he has (he wants to instill confidence and limit the number of desertions); and (3) Xenophon has a sense of humor.

The size of the Greek contingents of Cyrus as well as the names of the Greek generals in charge are mentioned in book one. They are as follows:

| <i>General</i> | <i>Number of Hoplites</i> | <i>Number of Light-Armed Troops</i> |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| Xenias (1.2.3) | 4000 | -- |
| Proxenos (1.2.3) | 1500 | 500 |
| Sophainetos (1.2.3) | 1000 | -- |
| Sōcrates (1.2.3) | 500 | -- |
| Pasiōn (1.2.3) | 300 | 300 |
| Menōn (1.2.6) | 1000 | 500 |
| Klearchos (1.2.9) | 1000 | 1000 (= 800 + 200) |
| Sōsias (or Sōsis: 1.2.9) | 300 | -- |
| Sophainetos (1.2.9) | 1000 | -- |
| TOTAL (at Kelainai: 1.2.9) | 10 600 | 2300 |

Thus if we make a tally of the troops said to join Cyrus in book one, we get a total of 12,900 soldiers (i.e., 10,600 hoplites and 2,300 light-armed troops). This number is almost identical to the official number announced by Cyrus at the city of Kelainai (1.2.9), where he holds a review of his Greek troops and counts them. (Cyrus announces a total of “around” 13,000 troops.¹) Moreover, this figure of 12,900 is identical to the figure given right before the Battle for Babylon, when another review takes place and the Greek troops are again counted (1.7.10). (The breakdown of troops at Babylon is slightly different however: 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 light-armed troops, compared to 10,600 hoplites and 2,300 light-armed troops at Kelainai. But the difference is perhaps negligible.)

So far, so good. Now our problems begin in earnest. To reach the total of 12,900 troops announced at Kelainai, we must count “twice” the contingent of one thousand hoplites brought by the general Sophainetos. This is surely the strangest feature of Xenophon’s text: the general Sophainetos reaches Cyrus at 1.2.3 and then he arrives “again” at 1.2.9, each time bringing (apparently the same!) one thousand hoplites (see the table above). But this is of course absurd. Hence editors of the *Anabasis* emend the MSS. and replace the name “Sophainetos,” the second time it occurs (1.2.9), with the name Hagias (or Agias), a general whose arrival goes unmentioned but who plays some role later on in our story (2.5.31). This solution settles our perplexity, but only for a moment. For it does nothing to solve another equally vexing problem: between the first review and counting of the Greek troops at Kelainai (1.2.9) and the second one near Babylon (1.7.10), Cyrus adds a net total of one thousand hoplites.² Yet this addition is *not* reflected in the final tally before the Battle for Babylon, which remains constant at 12,900, as we have seen. How can that be?

One scholar has argued that the puzzling constancy of the number 12,900 is to be explained by the fact that many soldiers deserted during the march between Kelainai and Babylon: “Suspicion was rife [among the Greek troops] that the expedition was against the king. And dissatisfied soldiers had abundant opportunities at the busy ports of Issus

¹ To be most precise, the total announced at Kelainai is 11,000 hoplites and “around” 2,000 light-armed troops (1.2.9).

² The Lacedaemonian general Cheirisophos joins Cyrus late and brings him seven hundred hoplites (1.4.3). Another group of four hundred hoplites who had been in the pay of the King become turncoats and go over to Cyrus (1.4.3). We thus have an addition of eleven hundred hoplites. But Menōn loses one hundred hoplites in the mountains of Cilicia (1.2.25). Hence a net addition of one thousand hoplites between Kelainai and Babylon.

and Myriandrus to slip away by sea.”³ This explanation is plausible. Desertions were common in ancient mercenary armies. But upon reflection, it fails to persuade. In the first place, deserting from *this* army was a risky proposition, not least because Cyrus was thought to punish deserters most severely (cf. 1.4.7). Above all, Xenophon does not say a word about large-scale desertions of troops. In the wake of the death of Klearchos and of the Greek generals, he mentions the desertion of a group of about twenty people (3.3.5). A very small group indeed—yet he *does* mention it. How, then, could he have failed to say anything about the desertion of a combined total of one thousand hoplites—nearly 10 percent of Cyrus’s hoplite army? That seems most improbable.⁴

Short of emending the MSS. on our own authority, then, is there no way to make sense of Xenophon’s numbers? I propose the following solution. The tally of troops remains constant at 12,900, between Kelainai and Babylon, for the simple reason that the initial tally (at 1.2.9) is inflated.⁵ Cyrus is trying to instill confidence in his army and to limit the number of desertions. Xenophon playfully mentions Sophainetos “twice” to suggest that in order to arrive at the inflated tally of 11,000 hoplites one would need to count Sophainetos “twice.”⁶ (Note that *only* the first counting of the Greek troops is ascribed to Cyrus, not the second one: cf. 1.2.9 with 1.7.10.) Moreover, observe the presence in Cyrus’s army at Kelainai of a general named “Sōsias”—“the Savior” or “the Safe” (1.2.9).⁷ This general is mentioned there and never again in the rest of the *Anabasis*. He is a fictional character. A “Savior” is needed—in addition to the “extra” thousand hoplites of Sophainetos—to arrive at the inflated

³ Bonner (1931) pp. 86–87.

⁴ The formula HOI POLLOI at 3.1.10 could imply that some desertions occurred during Cyrus’s march toward Babylon. Xenophon mentions the desertion of upward of forty Thracian horsemen and about three hundred Thracian foot at 2.2.7. But these desertions occur much later in the story, not during Cyrus’s march but after his death.

⁵ Cyrus the Elder also alters his numbers for political advantage in the *Education of Cyrus*: cf. 2.1.2 with 1.5.5. I owe this observation to Nadon (2001) pp. 61–62.

⁶ I suspect that the double mention of Sophainetos is meant to intimate something else besides Cyrus’s mendacity: this mediocre general—who may have written an *Anabasis* of his own—was something of a boaster. Could it be that Sophainetos pretended in his book to have brought *two* thousand hoplites to Cyrus? The issue cannot be settled since Sophainetos’s book, if it ever existed, has been lost. But it is undeniable that Xenophon depicts this general negatively (see pp. 35–36, note 88; p. 104, note 68; p. 248, note 94). And such a quiet and playful critique of Sophainetos would be in character for Xenophon.

⁷ In some MSS., “Sōsias” is called “Sōsis.” But this (and other) slight variation(s) in the spelling of his name do(es) not affect my main point: in all cases the man is “the Savior.”

tally of Cyrus. Finally, note that Sōsias and the “second” Sophainetos are mentioned at the very end of the tally of troops at 1.2.9. This makes sense: the sole purpose of these fictional troops is to pad the numbers, so to speak, concealing somewhat that Cyrus’s ensuing announcement is mendacious—and, of course, to make us laugh (1.2.9).⁸

⁸ Regarding the variation in the breakdown of the troops—more troops are counted as light-armed troops later at Babylon (1.7.10) than earlier at Kelainai (1.2.9): the reason for this anomaly is unclear, but it may be that Cyrus counted as hoplites in the first review what were in fact merely light-armed troops. Demotions could also account for the variation.

WORKS CITED

I Editions of the Greek Text of the Anabasis

- Brownson, Carleton L. 1998. *Xenophon. Anabasis. With an English Translation.* Revised by John Dillery. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Couvreux, Paul. 1929. *Anabase: Texte Grec Revu et Publié avec une Introduction et des Notes.* Hachette: Paris.
- Dindorf, L. 1855. 2nd ed. *Xenophontis. Expeditio Cyri, Ex Recensione Et Cum Annotationibus.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gemoll, G. 1909. 2nd ed. *Xenophontis. Expeditio Cyri.* Editio Maior. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Hude, C. 1972. *Xenophontis. Expeditio Cyri: Anabasis.* Revised by J. Peters. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Hug, Arnold. 1886. *Xenophontis. Expeditio Cyri.* Editio Maior. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Marchant, E. C. 1904. *Xenophontis Opera Omnia. Expeditio Cyri.* Tomus III. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Masqueray, Paul. 1930. *Xénophon: Anabase.* Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres" (in two volumes).

II Literature

- Ainsworth, W. F. 1875. *The Anabasis; or, Expedition of Cyrus, and the Memorabilia of Socrates. Literally translated from the Greek of Xenophon by J. S. Watson. With a geographical commentary by W.F. Ainsworth.* London: George Bell and Sons.
- Ambler, Wayne. 2008. *Xenophon: The Anabasis of Cyrus.* Translated and Annotated. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Amigues, Suzanne. 1995. "Végétation et cultures du Proche-Orient dans l'*Anabase*." In *Dans Les Pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et Pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec.* Edited by Pierre Briant. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 61–78.
- Anderson, John K. 1970. *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Apollodorus. 1996. *The Library.* Translated by James George Frazer. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in two volumes).
- Arrian, 1976. *Anabasis of Alexander.* Translated by P. A. Brunt. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in two volumes).
- Bacon, Sir Francis. 1952. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning Divine and Human.* Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

- . 1985. *The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall*. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by Michael Kiernan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bartlett, Robert C. Ed. 1996a. *The Shorter Socratic Writings*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 1996b. "Editor's Introduction." In *The Shorter Socratic Writings*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1–8.
- . 1996c. "On the Symposium." In *The Shorter Socratic Writings*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 173–196.
- Baslez, Marie-Françoise. 1995. "Fleuves et voies d'eau dans l'*Anabase*." In *Dans Les Pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et Pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*. Edited by Pierre Briant. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 79–88.
- Bizos, Marcel. 1972. *Xénophon: Cyropédie*. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres" (in three volumes).
- Bolotin, David. 1987. "Thucydides." In *History of Political Philosophy*. Edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 7–32.
- Bonner, R. J. 1931. "Desertions from the Ten Thousand." *Classical Philology* 15: 85–88.
- Bradley, Patrick J. 2010. "Irony and the Narrator in Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In *Xenophon*. Edited by Vivienne J. Gray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 520–552.
- Braun, Thomas. 2004. "Xenophon's Dangerous Liaisons." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 97–130.
- Briant, Pierre. 1995. Ed. *Dans Les Pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et Pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail.
- Bruell, Christopher. 1984. "Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates." *The Political Science Reviewer* 15 (Fall): 263–318.
- . 1987. "Xenophon." In *History of Political Philosophy*. Edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 90–117.
- . 1994. "Xenophon and His Socrates." In *Xenophon: Memorabilia*. Translated and Annotated by Amy L. Bonnette. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 1999. *On the Socratic Education: An Introduction to the Shorter Platonic Dialogues*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- . 2007. *Happiness in the Perspective of Philosophy*. Public Lecture delivered at the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung. Munich (unpublished).
- . forthcoming. *Aristotle As Teacher: His Introduction to a Philosophic Science*. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press.
- Brulé, Pierre. 1995. "Un nouveau monde ou le même monde?" In *Dans Les Pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et Pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*. Edited by Pierre Briant. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 3–20.
- Buzzetti, Eric. 2001. "The Rhetoric of Xenophon and the Treatment of Justice in the *Memorabilia*." *Interpretation* 29 no. 1 (Fall): 3–33.
- . 2008. "Introduction: The Political Life and the Socratic Education" In *Xenophon: The Anabasis of Cyrus*. Translated and Annotated by Wayne Ambler. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1–35.

- Cawkwell, George. 1972. "Introduction." In *The Persian Expedition*. Translated by Rex Warner, with an Introduction and Notes by George Cawkwell. London: Penguin Books.
- . 1979. "Introduction." In *A History of My Times (Hellenika)*. Translated by Rex Warner, with an Introduction and Notes by George Cawkwell. London: Penguin Books.
- . 2004. "When, How and Why Did Xenophon Write the *Anabasis*?" In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 47–67.
- Chambry, Pierre. 1967. *Xénophon: L'Anabase, Le Banquet, L'Économique, De La Chasse, La République des Lacédémoniens, La République des Athéniens*. Traduction, notices et notes. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion.
- Cicero. 1923. *On Old Age, On Friendship, On Divination*. Translated by William Armistead Falconer. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dakyns, H. G. 1901. *The March of the Ten Thousand, Being a Translation of the Anabasis Preceded by a Life of Xenophon*. New York: Macmillan.
- De Coulanges, Fustel. 1900. *La cité antique*. Hachette: Paris.
- Derenne, Eudore. 1976 (reprint of the 1930 edition). *Les Procès d'Impiété Intentés aux Philosophes à Athènes au Vme et IVme Siècles Avant J.-C.* New York: Arno Press.
- Dillery, John. 1995. *Xenophon and the History of His Times*. London and New York: Routledge.
- . 1998. "Introduction." In *Xenophon: Anabasis*. With an English Translation by Carleton L. Brownson. Revised by John Dillery. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dürnbach, F. 1893. "L'apologie de Xénophon dans l'*Anabase*." *Revue des études grecques* 6: 343–386.
- Erbse, Harmut. 2010. "Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In *Xenophon*. Edited by Vivienne J. Gray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 476–501.
- Flower, Michael. 2012. *Xenophon's Anabasis, or The Expedition of Cyrus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gautier, Léopold. 1911. *La Langue de Xénophon*. Geneva: Albert Kundig.
- Gibbon, Edward. 1909. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Edited with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by J. B. Bury. London: Methuen & Co. (in seven volumes).
- Grant, Alexander. 1871. *Xenophon*. Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott.
- Gray, Vivienne. 2011a. *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . Ed. 2011b. *Xenophon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Grote, George. 1899–1900. *Greece*. New York: Peter Fenelon Collier (in twelve volumes).
- Higgins, William E. 1977. *Xenophon the Athenian*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hirsch, Steven W. 1985. *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire*. Hanover: University Press of New England.

- Høeg, C. 1950. "Xenophontos Kurou Anabasis. Œuvre anonyme ou pseudonyme ou orthonyme?" *Classica et Mediaevalia* 11: 151–179.
- Hornblower, Simon. 2004. "'This Was Decided' (edoxe tauta): The Army as polis in Xenophon's *Anabasis*—and Elsewhere." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 243–263.
- Howland, Jacob. 2000. "Xenophon's Philosophic Odyssey: On the *Anabasis* and Plato's *Republic*." *American Political Science Review* 94 no. 4 (December): 875–889.
- Hude, C. 1985. *Xenophontis. Commentarii*. Stuttgart: Teubner.
- Hutchinson, Godfrey. 2000. *Xenophon and the Art of Command*. London: Greenhill Books.
- Kaldellis, Anthony. 2004. *Procopius of Caesarea: Tyranny, History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kuhrt, Amélie. 1995. "The Assyrian Heartland in the Achaemenid Period." In *Dans Les Pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et Pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*. Edited by Pierre Briant. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 239–254.
- Laertius, Diogenes. 1995. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Translated by R. D. Hicks. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in two volumes).
- Lane Fox, Robin. Ed. 2004a. *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 2004b. "Introduction." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1–46.
- . 2004c. "Sex, Gender and the Other in Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 184–214.
- Larcher, M. 1778. *L'Expédition de Cyrus dans l'Asie Supérieure et la Retraite des Dix Mille*. Paris: Frères Debure (in two volumes).
- Lee, John W. I. 2007. *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lendle, Otto. 1995. *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis (Bücher 1–7)*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Lucian. 1921. *Works*. Translated by A. M. Harmon. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in eight volumes).
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1998. *The Prince*. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1996. *Discourses on [the First Decade of Titus] Livy*. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- MacLaren, Malcolm Jr. 1934. "Xenophon and Themistogenes." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 64: 240–247.
- Mandelstam, Nadezhda. 1999. *Hope against Hope*. Translated from the Russian by Max Hayward, with an Introduction by Clarence Brown and "Nadezhda Mandelstam (1899–1980): An Obituary" by Joseph Brodsky. New York: Modern Library.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1998. *On Liberty and Other Essays*. Edited with an Introduction by John Gray. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Montesquieu, Baron de (Charles-Louis de Secondat). 1951. *De L'Esprit des Loïs. Œuvres Complètes*. Texte Présenté et Annoté par Roger Caillois. Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (in two volumes).
- Nadon, Christopher. 2001. *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley University Press.
- Nepos, Cornelius. 1961. *Oeuvres*. Translated by Anne-Marie Guillemin. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres."
- Nussbaum, G. B. 1967. *The Ten Thousand: A Study in Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Paap, A. H. R. E. 1970. *The Xenophon Papyri*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Parker, Robert. 2004. "One Man's Piety: The Religious Dimensions of the *Anabasis*." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 131–153.
- Plutarch. 1926. "Life of Artaxerxes." In *Lives: Aratus, Artaxerxes, Galba, Otho*. Vol 11. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1936. "De Gloria Atheniensium." In *Moralia*. Vol. 4. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polybius. 2000. *The Histories*. Translated by W. R. Paton. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in six volumes).
- Prentice, William K. 1947. "Themistogenes of Syracuse an Error of Copyist." *The American Journal of Philology* 68 no. 1: 73–77.
- Proietti, Gerald. 1987. *Xenophon's Sparta*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Reynolds, L. D. and N. G. Wilson. 1991. *Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Rood, Tim. 2004. "Panhellenism and Self-Presentation: Xenophon's Speeches." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven: Yale University Press, 305–329.
- . 2005. "Introduction." In *The Expedition of Cyrus*. Translated by Robin Waterfield, with an Introduction and Notes by Tim Rood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roy, James. 2004. "The Ambitions of a Mercenary." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 264–288.
- Ruderman, Richard. 1992. "The Rule of a Philosopher-King: Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In *Politikos II*. Edited by Leslie Rubin. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
- Sandridge, Norman B. 2012. *Loving Humanity, Learning and Being Honored: The Foundations of Leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus*. Cambridge: Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University.
- Siculus, Diodorus. 2000. *The Library of History*. Translated by C. H. Oldfather et al. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in twelve volumes).
- Spelman, Edward. 1855. *The Anabasis*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Strabo. 2000. *Geography*. Translated by Horace Leonard Jones. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in eight volumes).

- Strassler, Robert. Ed. 2009. *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika*. Translated by John Marincola with an Introduction by David Thomas. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Strauss, Leo. 1939. "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon." *Social Research* 6 no. 4 (November): 502–536.
- . 1983. "Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, with an Introduction by Thomas L. Pangle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 105–136.
- . 1998a. *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus*. Preface by Allan Bloom, Foreword by Christopher Bruell. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press.
- . 1998b. *Xenophon's Socrates*. Editor's Note by Allan Bloom, Foreword by Christopher Bruell. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press.
- . 2000. *On Tyranny. Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence*. Edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stronk, Jan. 1995. *The Ten Thousand in Thrace*. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben.
- Stylianou, P. J. 2004. "One *Anabasis* or Two?" In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 68–96.
- Tatum, James. 1989. *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Thomas, David. 2009. "Introduction." In *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika*. Edited by Robert Strassler and Translated by John Marincola. New York: Pantheon Books, ix–lxvi.
- Thompson, Sir Edward Maunde. 1912. *An Introduction to Greek and Latin Palaeography*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tuplin, Christopher. 1987. "Xenophon's Exile Again." In *Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble*. Edited by M. Whitby and P. Hardie. Bristol: Bristol Classical, 59–68.
- . 1993. *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon*. *Hellenika* 2.3.11–7.5.27 Stuttgart: F. Steiner.
- . 2003a. "Heroes in Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In *Modelli eroici dall'antichità alla cultura europea*. Edited by A. Barzano et al. Vol. 4. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneide, 115–156.
- . 2003b. "Xenophon in Media." In *Continuity of Empire: Assyria, Media, Persia*. Edited by G. B. Lanfranchi, M. Roaf, and R. Rollinger. Vol. 5. Padua: S.a.r.g.o.n.
- . 2004. "The Persian Empire." In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*. Edited by Robin Lane Fox. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 154–183.
- Waterfield, Robin. 2006. *Xenophon's Retreat: Greece, Persia and the End of the Golden Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wylie, G. 1992. "Cunaxa and Xenophon." *L'Antiquité classique* 61: 119–134.

INDEX

Achaean, 235–6
Agasias of Stumphalia, 127, 131n57,
150, 153, 175–6, 186n19, 187,
233–4, 249–56, 262, 292,
296–7
AGATHOS ANĒR, 150n3, 151n5,
153, 156, 274
Agesilaos, 5n5, 56n44, 63n73,
90–1, 116n19, 140n76,
193n33, 197n47, 200n57,
290n86, 298n4
Agesilaos (Xenophon), 5n5, 56n44,
63n73, 91n28, 197n47,
200n57, 290n86, 298n4
Alcibiades, 56n46, 115, 217n104,
219n107, 228, 269n29,
278n51, 298n4
Alexander the Great, 91, 140
Ambler, Wayne, 28, 71n101,
90n27, 96n40, 97n42,
104n69, 111n1, 123n39,
134n62, 136n67, 152n6,
154n10, 159n21, 162n27,
173n48, 176n57, 179n65,
180n71, 189, 194n36,
205n77, 220n12, 231n31,
239n62, 242n72, 248n93,
251n101, 267–8, 272n37,
274n41, 276n45, 279–82,
288n79, 291n89
Amphikratēs, 157–9, 297
Anabasis
authenticity of the divisions of,
313–15

Book One
ascent of Cyrus and descent of
Xenophon, 50–8
Battle for Babylon, 59–66
Cyrus and his friends, 44–50
Godlike King, 66–79
overview, 39
rooting for the noble and good
king, 39–43
Book Two
good without noble, 107–8
hope and friendship with the
divine, 95–104
noble without good, 104–6
overview, 77–8
strength and weaknesses of
Klearchos, 85–95
virtue and weapons, 78–85
Book Three
overview, 111–13
success, failure, and divine
providence, 141–7
virtue, piety, and freedom, 129–41
Xenophon as Socratic, 113–18
Xenophon, Zeus the King, and
Apollo, 119–28
Book Four
Chalubēs, 171–4
end of necessity, 171–80
example from piety, 159–65
Kolchoi, 177–80
longing for immortality, 153–8
necessity and noble, 150–71
overview, 149–50

Anabasis—Continued

- philosophic life, 166–70
- Taochoi, 174–7
- Book Five
 - Hellenic laws, founding a city, and the good, 204–17
 - justice and the good, 217–20
 - justice, private interest, and common good, 182–90
 - law and nature, 190–204
 - overview, 181–2
- Book Six
 - atoning for ingratitude toward gods, 239–48
 - gratitude and the good, 248–57
 - gratitude, dancing, and philosophy, 222–9
 - gratitude of the army and gratitude of Xenophon, 229–34
 - ingratitude towards gods and men, 234–9
 - overview, 221–2
- Book Seven
 - generosity of the philosopher, 273–7
 - overview, 259–60
 - PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS and the good, 260–73
 - Xenophon as PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS, 277–89
 - Xenophon the Socratic, 289–94
 - recent scholarship on, 29–36
- ANAGKĒ/ANAGKAĪON, 147, 149, 153, 161, 171, 173, 207–8, 219n107
- ANAPHRONEŌ, 179n67
- Anaxibios, 18n35, 183, 230, 232n34, 250, 260–5
- ANDRAGATHIA, 186
- APALLASSŌ, 261n5
- APODEIKNUMI GNŌMĒN, 204n70
- APODIDRASKŌ, 47, 239
- Apollo, 55–7, 78n3, 85n17, 112–13, 116, 119, 128, 135, 136n66, 144, 192, 194–5, 200n56–7, 290, 291n91

- Apollōnidēs, 125–30, 135, 144, 292n91
- Apology of Socrates to the Jurors* (Xenophon), 7, 56, 117n21, 118n35, 193n33, 227, 238n60, 294, 311n38
- APOPHEUGŌ, 47
- APOROS, 29n73
- APORRĒTOS, 53–4
- Arabia, 1, 49, 55n40
- Araxes of Armenia, 171n47
- Arcadia, 10–11, 80, 103, 151, 153, 156–7, 224–5, 235–46, 270, 279
- Archagoras, 157, 158n18
- ARCHĒGOI, 126n44
- Arēxiōn, 241
- Arginousai, 80n6, 305n14, 307, 311n27
- Argonauts, 234–5
- Ariaños, 78–9, 81, 86–8, 92–4, 103, 131–2
- Aristarchos, 18n36, 264–8, 272, 280
- Aristōnumos of Methudria, 153, 175
- Aristophanes, 9, 23n49, 118, 121, 134, 147, 150n3, 197n50, 201, 217, 233, 292
- Aristotle, 53n35, 58n53, 106n72, 118n25, 132, 159n20, 170, 178n64, 212–13, 217n102, 234n46, 308–9, 314–15
- Armenia, 22, 29, 51, 118n23, 140n77, 149, 159, 161, 163, 166–71, 218–19, 299, 314n5
- Arrian, 91n29
- Artaozos, 93, 103n65
- Artapates, 22, 52, 71n100
- ARTAPOU, 22
- Artaxerxes, 12, 39–42, 52–3, 55n40, 58n58, 66–8, 87, 90–1, 95n37, 97n42, 123–5, 128, 143, 146, 301, 303
- Artemis, 135, 136n66, 192–3, 195, 197n46
- Aruēnis, 145
- Arustas, 270n30
- Asidatēs, 291
- ASPADZOMAI, 292n94

- ATASTHALIA, 159n21
 Atē, 24n52, 179n67
 ATHEMITOS, 304n12
 Athens
 Cheirisophos and, 173
 Delphi, 192, 199–200
 Gnēsippos, 270–1
 gods and, 128, 135–6, 200n57, 293
 Lukios, 144n87
 Nikias, 102n61
 Peloponnesian War and, 42, 115–16, 228, 303–5
 Persians and, 135
 Polukratēs, 22, 185
 Socrates and, 8, 57, 59n58, 113, 217, 227–8
 Sparta and, 80, 185n14, 228, 232, 264, 303–5
 stealing and, 173
 Ten Thousand and, 131
 “Theopompos,” 80, 85
 Thirty Tyrants, 301, 303
 Xenophon and, 1, 6, 33, 112–18, 122, 137, 192–4, 230, 233, 239, 262, 299n6
 AUTOKRATÖR ARCHÖN, 229n27
 AXIOŌ, 100, 205–6, 208, 269

 Bacon, Francis, 58–9, 91n28, 140, 273
 Bartlett, Robert C., 10n18, 56n45, 169n38
 Basias the Arcadian, 151, 289n83, 291–2
 Battle for Babylon, 3, 39, 42, 46, 58–66, 68–9, 71, 77–8, 90–1, 129, 137, 318
 Battle of Issus, 91
 Battle of Korōneia, 264n13
 Battle of Mantinea, 302
 Battle of Marathon, 135
 Battle of the Arginousai, 80n6, 305n14, 307, 311n27
 Bible, 72n106, 95, 146n95
 Biōn, 289n83, 294n102
 Bolotin, David, 102n61
 Brasidas, 182n3
 Brownson, Carleton, 28, 80n2, 199n55
 Bruell, Christopher, 6n7, 10n18, 32, 68–9, 155n14, 171, 196n45
 Brulé, P., 44n13, 197n47
 Byzantium, 18, 35–6, 160n21, 236, 242, 250, 255, 261–5, 267, 305n15
 Cawkwell, G. L., 4n2, 13n28, 34–6
 Cervantes, Miguel de, 190
 Chalubes, 149, 171–4
 Cheirisophos, 6n8, 79, 86, 103n66, 129, 131–4, 136, 140–2, 150–1, 162–4, 166–7, 171–4, 183–5, 191, 194n77, 229, 231–2, 234–7, 241, 244, 255, 275, 318n2
 Chrysopolis, 257, 259
 Cicero, 120
Clouds (Aristophanes), 9n15, 23n49, 117–18, 121–2, 147, 150n3, 201, 203n64, 203n65, 217, 219, 229n25, 292–3
 Cobet, C. G., 28, 224n13
Constitution of the Lacedaemonians (Xenophon), 80n5, 131n56, 176n52, 190n28, 294
 courage
 fighting nobly against Chalubes, 171–4
 fighting nobly against Kolchoi, 177–80
 fighting nobly against Taochoi, 174–7
 longing for immortality, 153–8
 necessity and, 150–70
 piety and, 159–65
 pointing toward philosophic life, 166–71
 Couvreur, Paul, 6n6, 124n41, 199n55
 Cretans, 27–8, 189–90
 Cyrus
 ascent of, 50–8
 Battle for Babylon and, 59–66
 friends and, 44–50
 Godlike King, 66–73
 noble and the good, 39–43

- dancing, 5, 170n45, 197–8, 222–9,
297, 310–11
- Dante, 222
- Daphnagoras, 289n93, 291
- Delphi, 56, 112, 114n10, 127–8, 144,
192, 195–6, 199–202, 230,
292n91
- democracy, 8–9, 115–16, 181, 304–6
- DĒMOCRATĒS, 160n21
- demos*, 115–16, 305, 311n27
- Derkulidas, 118n23, 193n33
- Dexippos the Laconian, 184–5, 249–56
- DIABALLŌ/DIABALLEIN, 43, 211
- Dillery, John, 10n18, 28n72, 57n51,
80n6, 181n1, 190n25, 194n37,
197n46, 199n55, 290n85,
301n1
- Dindorf, L., 20–1, 25n58, 27n65,
43n11, 49n24, 80n6, 102–3,
154n9, 160n21, 199n55,
210n86, 214n97, 238n57,
247n89, 252n102, 263n9
- Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 177
- Drakontion, 179, 254
- Drilai, 24, 185–6, 188–90
- Ēchēs Mount, 25–6, 177
- Education of Cyrus* (Xenophon)
Aglaitadas and, 25n60
AKLEISTOS and, 23n49
Armenia and, 168
ARTAMOS and, 22n45
Artaoz and, 103n65
ARUŌ and, 270n30
ASTRAPĒ and, 120n32
BASILEUS and, 7n10
Battle for Babylon and, 64–5
Cyrus the Elder, 68–73, 319n5
DECHOMAI and, 64–5
disappointment and, 294
eros and, 154
gods and, 11n20, 59–60, 121–2,
124n41, 143n84, 146n93,
179n67, 217n102, 230n28,
236n50, 282n63
Hellenika and, 41n5
hunting and, 169–70, 195n41
ILĒ and, 190n28
justice and, 42n9, 51n29, 222n3,
256n111
KENTRIDZŌ and, 164n29
kingship and, 68–73, 120n32
Klearchos and, 99–100
Ktēsias and, 14n29
law and, 204n70, 273n40
LOUSASTHAI and, 49n24
Mēdeia, and, 146n93
Mossunoikoi and, 198n51
MUSATTOMAI and, 54n35
NEMŌ and, 256n111
omina and, 121n33
panhellenism and, 34
PARASTASIS and, 115n11
password and, 62–4
PHILOTIMOS and, 298n4
piety and, 13n24, 140
Samos and, 61
scholarship on, 31–2
Scythian archers and, 27
Socrates and, 63n72, 118n23,
300n8
TEMENOS and, 160
THEMIS and, 304n12, 306–7
THĒSAUROS and, 199n56
Tigranēs and, 299
virtue and, 137
- EKKOMIDZŌ, 255n108
- ENKRATEIA, 68
- Enualios, 65, 187
- Episthenēs, 274–7, 297
- ERĒMIA, 97n41
- eros*, 68n88, 154–5, 203n68, 275,
299–300
- Eros, 24, 67n85
- Eukleidēs, 290–1, 294n102
- Eurulochos of Lusia, 150, 157–8, 175,
263n9, 280n56, 285n73, 296
- Flower, Michael, 10n18, 33–5, 41n4,
62n66, 69n91, 113n6, 160n21,
185n14, 193n33, 260n3,
292n96, 301n1

- Ganos, 278n51
 Gautier, Léopold, 10n18, 22n45, 25n60
 Gemoll, G., 20–1, 25n58, 27–8, 80n6, 87n21, 160n21, 199n55, 238n57, 242n74
 Gnēsippos, 270–2
 Golden Fleece, 234
 Gorgias of Leontini, 105–6, 108
 gratitude
 of army and Xenophon, 229–34
 atonement for ingratitude toward gods, 239–48
 dancing, philosophy, and, 222–9
 good and, 248–57
 ingratitude toward gods and men, 234–9
 Gray, Vivienne J., 8n13, 31–3, 35, 260n4
 Grote, George, 6n7, 24n55, 61n62, 100n52, 127n46, 263–4, 288n80
 Gryllos, 118
 Hecatōnumos, 205–10, 253n105
Hellenika (Xenophon)
 Agesilaos and, 91n28, 193n33
 Alcibiades and, 269n29
 Anaxibios and, 264n16
 APORRĒTOS and, 53n35
 ARCHĒGOI and, 126n44
 Chersonese and, 268
 Cyrus and, 41–3, 112n2, 264n13, 292n95
 disappointment and, 294
 “eat men raw” and, 178n64
 ERĒMIA and, 97n41
 Hēraklēs Leader and, 245
 HIKETEUŌ and, 275n42
 Jason of Thessaly and, 91n28, 200n57
 Kardouchoi and, 29n73
 Klearchos and, 84n13
 MEGA PHRONEŌ and, 311n28
 Mossunoikoi and, 197n47
 Mysians and, 139n73
 Peloponnesian War and, 115–16, 233n40
 renaming and, 58, 291n90, 299n6
 Socrates and, 239n60, 306–8
 Sparta and, 112n2, 115–18
 SUNTHĒMA and, 64
 TEMENOS and, 160n21
 “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” and, 116, 227, 301–11
 Theopompos and, 80n6
 THĒSAUROS and, 199–200
 Hērakleia, 234–6, 244–6
 Hērakleides, 269, 271, 277–8, 284, 287–8
 Hēraklēs, 179–80, 232n35, 234, 236–7, 245–6, 248, 255–6
 Hermogenēs, 44, 50–1, 99n48, 227n23
 Herodotus, 23–4, 27n66, 44n13, 48n23, 55n42, 58n57, 61n62, 120–1, 128n49, 128n50, 145, 182n3, 210n86, 212–13
Hiero (Xenophon), 115n11, 200n57, 261n5, 287n77, 298n4
 Hierōnumos, 129, 246n87
 HIEROS, 195
 Higgins, W. E., 10n18, 31
Hipparchikos (Xenophon), 143n84
 Hippias, 221n2
 HOI ARCHONTES, 251n99
 HOI HĒGOUMENOI, 247
 HOI HELLĒNES, 196n43
 HOI HUPOLOCHOI, 187n19
 HOI POLLOI, 319n4
 HOI STRATĒGOI, 251n99
 HOI STRATEUSAMENOI, 198
 Homer, 24n56, 26, 78n2, 190n28, 203n62
 HŌS KRATISTA, 173
 Hude, C., 17n34, 20, 25n58, 27n65, 28, 43n11, 80n6, 87n21, 154n9, 160n21, 199n55, 210n86, 238n57, 247n89, 263n9
 Hug, Arnold, 20n43, 27–8
 hunting, 55, 68, 168–70, 194–6, 215, 299–300
 HUPOSTRATEGOI, 126n44

- immortality, 150, 153–8, 170–1
 Ischomachos, 7, 67n85, 72n105, 99,
 196n45, 296, 306n17
- Jason of Thessaly, 98n28, 140n76,
 200n57
- justice
 good and, 217–20
 Hellenic laws, founding a city, and
 the good, 204–17
 laws, nature, and, 190–204
 private interest, common good,
 and, 182–90
- Kaldellis, Anthony, 120n29
 Kallimachos of Parrasia, 150, 153,
 175, 296
- KALOKAGATHIA, 310
 KATABASIS, 185n17
 KATAGELAŌ, 67n85
 Katarrēktēs, 55n42
 KATOIKEŌ, 212n89
 KATOIKIDZŌ, 212n89
 Kentritēs river, 24, 29n75, 160–1,
 163–4, 171
 Kēphisodōros, 157–9, 297
 King Agesilaos of Sparta, 90–1,
 116n19, 140n76
 King Darius, 11–12, 39, 41, 69
 King Midas, 57, 63, 128, 259,
 290n87, 292
 Kleander, 236, 242, 248–57, 262, 264
 Kleanōr the Orchomenian, 80–1, 85,
 103–4, 132–4, 136, 172,
 243–4, 263
- Klearchos
 Battle for Babylon, 61–2
 capture, 119, 244n80
 Cyrus and, 11–13, 40, 44–6, 48,
 51, 70
 death, 101–2, 319
 Hellenika and, 305n15
 hope and friendship with the
 divine, 95–104
 Kleanōr and, 132
 march on Babylon and, 314n5
 Menōn and, 48–50, 107–8
 number of hoplites, 317
 obituary, 104–5, 241n70
 Proxenos and, 49–50, 104–6, 112–14
 renaming and, 23–4
 rule, 3–5, 7, 77–108
 strengths and weaknesses, 85–94
 Ten Thousand and, 49, 78–9, 85,
 90–2, 94–5, 98, 140
 “Theopompos” and, 78–85
 Thracians and, 223n6, 236n49
 Tissaphernēs and, 95–104, 113
 virtue and weapons, 78–85
 Xenophon and, 119, 137, 140, 296–7
- Klearetos (or Klearatos), 23, 25n59
 Kleōnumos, 151
Knights (Aristophanes), 134
 Koiratadas, 305n15
 Kolchoi, 149, 171, 177–80, 219–20
 Kritias, 115, 217n104, 228, 298n4,
 303, 308
 Krüger, C. G., 27
 Ktēsias, 14n29, 34, 41
Kunēgetikos (Xenophon), 117n20,
 136n66, 169n37, 194n37,
 195–6. See also *On Hunting
 with Dogs*
- Laertius, Diogenes, 28, 118, 300
 Lane Fox, Robin, 35–6, 44n13, 169n36
 Larissa, 27n67, 145–6
 Lee, John W. I., 30–1, 35, 181n1
 Leonidas, 85
Life of Artaxerxes (Plutarch), 14n29,
 41, 62
 Lucian, 120
 LUKAONAS (or “LUKARNAS”),
 22, 25
 Lukios of Syracuse, 78n3, 144, 304n14
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, 2–4, 15, 78,
 108, 194n37, 222n4, 295
 MAINOMAI, 99, 179n67
 Marchant, E. C., 25n58, 27–8, 80n6,
 87n21, 115n11, 160n21,
 199n55, 238n57

- Marsyas, 55–8, 116, 128, 226n21
 Masqueray, Paul, 6n6, 19n38–9,
 20n42–3, 25–8, 44n13,
 49n24, 80n6, 87n21,
 135n65, 160n21, 171n47,
 194n67, 199n54–5, 214n97,
 238n57, 241n70, 293n96,
 301n1
 Medes, 135, 139, 145–6
 MEGA PHRONEŌ, 116, 239n60,
 311n28
 MEGALĒGORĒSANTAS, 238
 MEGISTON AGATHON, 102
Memorabilia (Xenophon)
 Diodōros and, 51
 eros and, 300
 gods and, 53n33
 good and, 158n19, 193–4, 204n69
 good nature and, 106n74
 gratitude and, 221–2, 224, 228
 helmets and, 68n87
 hunting and, 169–70
 justice and, 219–20
 KALOS and, 176n58
 KATAGELAŌ and, 67n85
 kingly art and, 2n1, 9n16
 law and, 17
 life of strangers and, 196n43
 LOŪN and, 49n24
 LUKOŪSTHAI and, 22n47
 noble and, 158n19, 176n58, 193–4,
 204n69, 287n77, 297–8
 NOMIDZEIN and, 48n22
 PARAITEOMAI and, 256n110
 PARASION and, 43n11
 Peloponnesian War and, 115n12
 PERIPATEIN and, 58n56
 philosophy and, 117n20
 self-knowledge and, 101n59
 SKĒPTOS and, 120n32
 Socrates and, 58n56, 63n71, 99n48,
 106n74, 115–18, 130n55,
 217n104, 226n19, 293
 Socratic education and, 7, 165
 SOPHIA and, 56n44
 THEMIS and, 304n12, 307–8
 “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” and,
 307–10
 THĒSAUROS and, 199n56
 TUCHĒ and, 15n31
 virtue and, 130n55, 135, 245n85,
 299
 Menōn of Thessaly, 13–14, 16, 19,
 46n19, 48–50, 67n85, 70, 79,
 83n11, 86, 93, 100, 104, 107–8,
 223n8, 241n70, 296, 317–18
 Mesopotamia, 17, 23, 26, 82, 87, 142,
 144
 Mespila, 27n67, 145–7
Metaphysics (Aristotle), 169n39,
 213n95, 217n102, 314
 money, 12, 42, 44, 63, 72, 105, 114,
 129, 192–5, 200, 204n70, 210,
 214, 235, 259, 261, 267, 270,
 278, 286–8, 290–2, 298, 309
 morality
 acquisitiveness and, 182n4
 advantage in rule and, 2–7
 Delphi and, 201
 “international morality of the day,”
 289–90
 Klearchos and, 24, 100–3
 knowledge and, 14n30, 95–103,
 253, 297
 law and, 190–220
 Menōn and, 19, 107
 noble and, 164–5
 piety and, 8–9, 95–103, 129–41
 politics and, 14, 295
 Mossunoikoi, 24n56, 121n35, 191,
 197–204, 212, 314
 MUSATTOMAI, 54n35
 Mysians, 52, 54, 97, 139, 189–90,
 224–6, 29
 Nadon, Christopher, 10n18, 31–2,
 69n93, 319n5
 NEANISKOS, 81n7, 85n15, 93–4,
 116
 Neōn, 214–15, 217n102, 236, 241n70,
 244–6, 263, 265, 267
 Nepos, Cornelius, 278n51

- Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle), 53n35,
106n72, 118n25, 159n20, 170,
178n64, 282n63
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 36
- numerology, 313–15
- obituaries, 12, 33, 64n78, 66, 68–71,
104–5, 107–8, 241n70
- OIKIA (or OĪKOS), 121, 294n101
- Oikonomikos* (Xenophon), 7, 11n20,
49n25, 56n44, 58n56, 63,
67n85, 69n91, 70n95, 72n105,
86n20, 117n20, 180n69, 195–6,
296, 298n4, 304n12
- On Horsemanship* (Xenophon), 68n87,
164n29, 199n56, 224n11
- On Hunting with Dogs* (Xenophon),
169, 196, 300. See also
Kunēgetikos
- On Revenues* (Xenophon), 160n21
- Orontēs, 42, 51–4, 71
- PAĪDAS, 290n86
- PAIDEIA, 173
- PARAITEOMAI, 256n110
- PARASTASIS, 115n11
- PARRASION (or PARASION), 43n11
- Parysatis, 11–12, 39–40, 124n41
- Peloponnesian War, 42, 80n6, 115, 122,
228, 233, 262, 301, 303–6
- Peloponnesian War* (Thucydides), 300,
303
- Pericles, 219n107
- PERIPATEIN, 58n56
- Persian Wars, 128, 135–8
- Peters, J., 20, 25n58, 27n65, 28,
43n11, 80n6, 87n21, 154n9,
160n21, 199n55, 210n86,
238n57, 247n89, 263n9
- Phalīnos, 79–86
- Pharnabazos, 245n83, 260, 263–5,
292
- Phasis river, 24, 171–2, 214–15
- Phaidippidēs, 219, 292–3
- PHILOKERDĒS, 273
- PHILOPATRIA, 261n4, 264
- PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS
generosity of the philosopher, 273–7
good and, 260–73
Xenophon as, 277–89
- PHILOTIMIA, 298n4
- PHRONEŌ, 86
- PHRONĒSIS, 68
- Phruniskos, 263, 265n18
- PHUTEUŌ, 201–3
- piety
courage and, 159–65
Klearchos and, 77–108
success, failure, and divine
providence, 141–7
virtue, freedom, and, 129–41
- Plato, 2, 9–10, 24n53, 53–4, 56, 58n57,
63n72, 67n85, 88n25, 106n72,
108, 118n25, 150n3, 155n13,
169n37, 225n17, 293n98
- Plutarch, 14, 34, 41, 62, 301–2
- Politics* (Aristotle), 58n53, 212n89,
234n46
- Polukratēs, 22, 185, 265n18, 280n56
- Poseidon, 128n52
- PRATTEIN, 212
- Proietti, Gerald, 10n18, 42n8, 112n2
- Proxenos of Boeotia, 6, 17–19, 30,
45n15, 50, 57–9, 63, 70, 80,
83, 85–6, 92–3, 104–8, 112,
114, 119, 122–3, 125–6,
129–31, 134, 192, 241n70,
296, 305, 317
- renaming, 21–8, 49n24, 55, 58, 102–3,
115–16, 128, 141n79, 164, 172,
190, 214n97, 246n86, 263,
270, 272n38, 278n50,
289n83, 291n90
- repetition, 15–16, 29, 129, 246n88
- Republic* (Plato), 9–10, 56, 67n85,
88n25, 293n98, 300n12
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 155n14
- Ruderman, Richard, 133n58
- Samios, 58, 116, 314
- Satyre, 57n50

- Seuthēs, 18, 263, 265–89
 Siculus, Diodorus, 14, 34, 42n7, 56n43, 58n54, 85n18, 259n1
 Silene, 55–8, 194n37
 Sinopeans, 179, 192, 204–10, 213, 234
 Skilloūs, 5, 191–4, 196, 198, 201, 298
 Socrates
 Anabasis of Cyrus and, 2, 6, 34–6, 113, 117–18, 121–2, 147, 309–11, 314
 audiences and, 130–1, 135
 Clouds and, 117–18, 121–2, 147, 150n3, 201, 203n64, 203n65, 217, 219, 292–3
 “dancing” and, 225, 297
 gods and, 8, 56, 293–4
 good and, 158n19, 221n2
 good nature and, 106n74
 Hellenika and, 239n60, 306–9
 hunting and, 168–9
 Ischomachos and, 296
 KATAGELAŌ and, 67n85
 law and, 17, 306–8
 MEGALĒGORĒSANTAS and, 238–9
 in *Memorabilia*, 50–1, 68, 221n2, 224n12
 money and, 63
 Mossunoikoi and, 204
 names and, 24n56
 noble and, 2
 politics and, 2, 6–7
 self-knowledge and, 101
 sophistry and, 168
 Symposium and, 56, 225, 308–11
 trial and execution, 6, 8, 56, 193n33, 217, 227–8
 Xenophon and, 1, 6–7, 30–1, 56–9, 86, 99, 108n77, 112–17, 223–8, 277, 290n87, 296–300
 Sophainetos, 35–6, 45, 104, 247–8, 317–20
 SOPHIA, 56, 68, 226n21
 SŌPHROSUNĒ, 68, 220n11
 Sparta
 Athens and, 80, 185n14, 232, 264, 303–5
 Battle of Thermopylae and, 85
 Cheirisophos, 6
 Cyrus and, 42, 112
 dancing and, 224–5
 Drakontion, 179, 254
 exile of Klearchos, 44–5
 harmosts, 206n75
 King Agesilaos, 90–1, 116n19, 140n76
 gods and, 80n5, 86
 paternal influence and, 118n25
 patriotism, 264
 Peloponnesian War and, 42, 115–16, 228, 303–5
 Persia and, 85, 91–2, 289n85
 Pythagoras, 58, 314
 sacrifices before battle, 80n5
 Seuthēs and, 283
 stealing and, 173n52
 Ten Thousand and, 222n5
 Theopompos and, 80n6
 virtue and, 137
 Xenophon and, 30, 185n14, 193n33, 229–30, 309
 see also Klearchos
 Stephanus of Byzantium, 35–6, 160n21
 STRATEIA, 114n9, 198
 Strauss, Leo, 8, 10n18, 12–13, 16n33, 31, 33, 44n12, 58n55, 115n11, 147n76, 168–9, 202n60, 212n91, 215n100, 217n102, 231n33, 287n77, 301n1, 304n13
 Strepsiadēs, 219, 293
 Stylianou, P. J., 35–6
 SUMPHOITĒTAI, 308n18
 SUSTRATEUOMAI, 92n31
Symposium (Xenophon)
 “dancing” in, 170n45, 201, 225–6, 308–11
 freedom in, 199n53
 heart and, 300n9
 Hermogenēs and, 99n48
 “hunting” in, 169

- Symposium* (Xenophon)—*Continued*
 KENTRIDZŌ in, 164n29
 kingship and, 54n37
 MEGA PHRONEŌ in, 116n16,
 239n60
 noble and, 154–5, 158n19, 194n37,
 204n69
 philosophy and city in, 297n2
 Socrates and, 56
 “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” and,
 301n1, 308–11
 virtue in, 44, 299n7
 Syracuse, 160n21, 243, 304–6, 308–9
- Taochoi, 18, 171, 174–7, 206
 Tatum, James, 31
 TAXIARCHOI, 126n44
 TELOS, 186, 189–90, 208, 223–9,
 247n90, 250
- Ten Thousand
 Alexander the Great and, 91
 analyses of, 30–1, 33, 35–6
 Apollōnidēs and, 126–8
 Armenia and, 166–8, 170–1
 arrival at Black Sea, 177–9
 Artaxerxes and, 90–1, 123–5, 146
 Athens and, 6
 attempts to lead, 3
 Chrysopolis and, 259–60
 as community, 181–2
eros and, 155
 explained, 1–2
 gratitude and, 248–57
 as Hellenes, 196n43
 Hellenism and, 222, 228
 Hērakleia and, 234–5, 245–6
 home and, 117–18, 139–41
 justice and, 181–4, 188, 217–22
 Kardouchia and, 147, 154
 Kleander and, 248–57
 Klearchos and, 49, 78–9, 85, 90–2,
 94–5, 98, 140
 Kolchoi and, 177–9
 law and, 190–8, 204–17
 legacy, 91
 Menōn and, 49
 Mossunoikoi and, 197–8
 Mount Ēchēs and, 177–8
 numbers, 317–20
 Persian Wars and, 137–41
 PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS and, 260,
 264
 piety and, 111, 122–8, 131–2, 134–5,
 137–41, 240–4
 Proxenos and, 134–5
 renaming and, 21–3, 26
 retreat from Mesopotamia, 26, 30–1
 Sparta and, 222n5, 230, 232
 Taochoi and, 174
 TELOS, 186, 189–90, 208, 223–9,
 247n90
 Tissaphernēs and, 91–2, 98, 100
 Xenophon and, 6, 15, 17–18, 88,
 111, 122, 230, 240–3, 295–6,
 298, 302, 305
 Zeus and, 119–20, 123–4, 132, 134,
 146, 216n102, 246
- Thēchēs Mount. *See* Mount Ēchēs
 THEMIS, 304, 306–8, 311
 Themistocles, 128
 “Themistogenēs of Syracuse”
 (Xenophon)
Hellenika and, 116, 227, 301–11
 law and, 305–7
 meaning of name, 301–11
 as pseudonym for Xenophon,
 301–11, 313n1
 Socrates and, 305–8
Symposium and, 301n1, 308–11
 “Theopompos” (Xenophon), 78–86,
 93, 102, 116, 124–5, 304
 Thermopylae, 85
 THĒSAUROS, 195, 199
 Thibrōn, 193n33, 278, 280, 283, 291–2
 Thirty Tyrants, 115–16, 301, 303,
 308, 311n27
 Thōrax the Boeotian, 211–14
 Thrasuboulos, 115–16, 308
 “Thrulochos,” 263n9
 Thucydides, 60–1, 95n38, 102n59,
 160n21, 182n3, 223n7,
 291n89, 293n97, 300, 303

- Tigranēs, 51n29, 115n11, 118n23, 299
 Timasiōn, 142n81, 204n70, 211–15,
 260n2, 263, 269–71
 Tissaphernēs, 24, 26–7, 39–43, 55n39,
 79, 82, 90–103, 106–8, 113,
 129, 132, 138, 161–2, 262,
 264, 278–9, 289n85, 292,
 299–300
 Tolmidēs, 186n19, 187
 Tuplin, Christopher, 31, 44n13,
 53n36, 139n74, 145n91,
 193n33, 289n84, 304n11
 TURANNOS, 115n11
 Wall of Media, 92
 Waterfield, Robin, 4n2, 30–1, 35,
 44n13, 177n60
 Wylie, G., 13n25, 62n65, 64n76, 69n90
- XENIKOS, 196n43
 Xennias of Parrasia, 10–11, 43n11,
 45–7
 Xenophon
 Athens and, 1, 6, 33, 112–18, 122,
 137, 192–4, 230, 233, 239,
 262, 299n6
 esotericism
 “being at the center,” 16–19
 LEGETAI, repetitions, and
 omissions, 13–16
 overview, 7–10
 Xenophon’s depiction of Cyrus’s
 stance toward the gods, 10–13
 gods and, 119–47
 gratitude, 229–34
 Klearchos and, 119, 137, 140, 296–7
 manner of writing
 emending the manuscripts, 26–9
 overview, 19–21
 primacy of Manuscript C, 21–6
 as PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS, 277–89
 recent scholarship on *Anabasis*, 29–36
 as Socratic, 113–18, 289–94, 301–11
 Sparta and, 30, 185n14, 193n33,
 229–30, 309
 success, failure, and divine
 providence, 141–7
 Ten Thousand and, 6, 15, 17–18,
 88, 111, 122, 230, 240–3,
 295–6, 298, 302, 305
 “Themistogenēs of Syracuse” and,
 301–11
 virtue, piety, and freedom, 129–41
 Zeus and, 132–4, 143–7, 193,
 219–20, 280, 282n63
see also “Themistogenēs of
 Syracuse;” “Theopompos”
 Xerxes, 55, 57, 85, 128, 135, 138
- ZAPATAN, 24–5
 ZATĒN, 24–5, 102, 144n85
 Zeus
 ATĒ and, 24n53
 Klearchos and, 80, 95–103
 PARASION and, 43n11
 Poseidon and, 128n52
 Socrates and, 122n36
Symposium and, 310n23
 Ten Thousand and, 119–20, 123–4,
 132, 134, 146, 216n102, 246
 Xenophon and, 129–47, 193, 219–20,
 280, 282n63
 Zeus Lukaion, 10–12, 88
 Zeus Melichios, 290–3
 Zeus of Hosts, 132
 Zeus Savior, 62–4, 77, 133–4, 159,
 179, 236, 246
 Zeus the King, 3–4, 54–5, 77–8,
 114n10, 119–22, 124, 128,
 132, 162, 230–2, 234